Evolving judgments of terror risks: foresight, hindsight, and emotion

The authors examined the evolution of cognitive and emotional responses to terror risks for a nationally representative sample of Americans between late 2001 and late 2002. Respondents' risk judgments changed in ways consistent with their reported personal experiences. However, they did not recognize these changes, producing hindsight bias in memories for their judgments. An intensive debiasing procedure failed to restore a foresightful perspective. A fear-inducing manipulation increased risk estimates, whereas an anger-inducing manipulation reduced them-both in predictions (as previously observed) and in memories and judgments of past risks. Thus, priming emotions shaped not only perceptions of an abstract future but also perceptions of a concrete past. These results suggest how psychological research can help to ensure an informed public.     

Not the same old hindsight bias: Outcome information distorts a broad range of retrospective judgments

The hindsight bias (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975) illustrates that outcome information can make people believe that they would have (or did) predict an outcome that they would not (or did not) actually predict. In two experiments, participants (N = 226) made a prediction immediately before receiving outcome information. Therefore, participants could not distort or misremember their predictions to make them align with the outcome information. In both experiments, participants distorted their reports of how certain they recalled having been in their prediction, how good of a basis they had for making the prediction, how long they took to make the prediction, and so forth. Experiment 2 showed that these effects were diminished when participants engaged in private thought about the upcoming questions prior to receiving outcome information, suggesting that the effect is not due to impression management concerns.     

Happiness as a belief system: individual differences and priming in emotion judgments

Three studies involving 104 undergraduates sought to examine how an individual's level of life satisfaction organizes their knowledge concerning the self's emotions. Participants judged the self's positive and negative emotions within a computerized task. Key results sought to determine whether judging two positive emotions in a consecutive sequence speeds the second judgment--a pattern of priming that would suggest a tighter, more interconnected structure in semantic memory related to one's positive emotions. As expected, individual differences in life satisfaction predicted the magnitude of this priming effect (Studies 1 & 2), which appeared to be unique to judgments of the self's emotions (Study 3). The results indicate that happy, relative to less happy, individuals organize information concerning their positive emotions in a qualitatively different and tighter semantic manner.     

Children's interpretive understanding,moral judgments,and emotion attributions: Relations to social behaviour

The study investigated interpretive understanding, moral judgments, and emotion attributions in relation to social behaviour in a sample of 59 5‐year‐old, 123 7‐year‐old, and 130 9‐year‐old children. Interpretive understanding was assessed by two tasks measuring children's understanding of ambiguous situations. Moral judgments and emotion attributions were measured using two moral rule transgressions. Social behaviour was assessed using teachers' ratings of aggressive and prosocial behaviour. Aggressive behaviour was positively related to interpretive understanding and negatively related to moral reasoning. Prosocial behaviour was positively associated with attribution of fear. Moral judgments and emotion attributions were related, depending on age. Interpretive understanding was unrelated to moral judgments and emotion attributions. The findings are discussed in regard to the role of interpretive understanding and moral and affective knowledge in understanding children's social behaviour.     

Effects of mood and emotion on juror processing and judgments

This study explored the influence of mood and emotion on mock-jurors' processing of testimonial inconsistencies, perceptions of witness credibility and offender culpability, and verdicts. Jurors' mood and testimonial consistency were manipulated using a simulated trial with a 2 (mood: sad/neutral) x 2 (testimonial consistency: consistent/inconsistent) between-groups design. Sad mood resulted in more accurate reporting of testimonial inconsistencies, a finding consistent with previous research indicating more substantive processing in association with sad mood. Direct relationships between veridicality and number of inconsistencies detected and mock-juror judgments were also observed. Although anger was not experimentally manipulated, the data suggest that trial circumstances which arouse anger in jurors may impair processing and also bias their judgments of witnesses and defendants. Possible directions for research on mood and emotion in the courtroom context are suggested.     

Acute exercise suppresses judgments of facial emotion intensity

The ability to recognize others’ facial expressions is critical to the social communication of affective states. The present work examined how transient states of high physiological arousal during aerobic exercise influence recognizing and rating morphed facial expressions. Participants exercised at either a low or high work rate. While exercising and then during cool-down and rest periods, participants performed a version of the morphed faces task that involved animated faces changing into or away from five target affective states (happy, surprise, sadness, anger, and disgust); they were asked to stop the animation when the face first corresponded to a target state, and rate its emotional intensity. Results demonstrated no differences in animation stop data, but overall lower ratings of perceived emotion intensity during high versus low work rate exercise; these effects dissipated through cool-down and rest periods. Results highlight important interactions between physiological states and processing emotional information.     

The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits

This paper re‐examines the commonly observed inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit. We propose that this relationship occurs because people rely on affect when judging the risk and benefit of specific hazards. Evidence supporting this proposal is obtained in two experimental studies. Study 1 investigated the inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgments under a time‐pressure condition designed to limit the use of analytic thought and enhance the reliance on affect. As expected, the inverse relationship was strengthened when time pressure was introduced. Study 2 tested and confirmed the hypothesis that providing information designed to alter the favorability of one's overall affective evaluation of an item (say nuclear power) would systematically change the risk and benefit judgments for that item. Both studies suggest that people seem prone to using an ‘affect heuristic’ which improves judgmental efficiency by deriving both risk and benefit evaluations from a common source—affective reactions to the stimulus item. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dual processes of emotion and reason in judgments about moral dilemmas

We report the results of two experiments that show that participants rely on both emotion and reason in moral judgments. Experiment 1 showed that when participants were primed to communicate feelings, they provided emotive justifications not only for personal dilemmas, e.g., pushing a man from a bridge that will result in his death but save the lives of five others, but also for impersonal dilemmas, e.g., hitting a switch on a runaway train that will result in the death of one man but save the lives of five others; when they were primed to communicate thoughts, they provided non-emotive justifications for both personal and impersonal dilemmas. Experiment 2 showed that participants read about a protagonist's emotions more quickly when the protagonist was faced with a personal dilemma than an impersonal one, but they read about the protagonist's decision to act or not act equally quickly for personal and impersonal dilemmas.     

Observing emotion in infants: facial expression,body behavior,and rater judgments of responses to an expectancy-violating event

Eleven-month-old European-American, Japanese, and Chinese infants (ns = 23, 21, and 15, respectively) were videotaped during baseline and stimulus episodes of a covert toy-switch procedure. Infants looked longer at the object during the expectancy-violating event (stimulus episode) but did not produce more surprise-related facial expressions. American and Japanese infants produced more bodily stilling during stimulus than baseline, and American infants also produced more facial sobering. Naive raters viewing both episodes could correctly identify the expectancy-violating event. Rater judgments of surprise were significantly related to infants' bodily stilling and facial sobering. Judgments of interest were related to cessation of fussing. Thus, observer judgments of infant emotions can be systematically related to behaviors other than prototypic emotional facial expressions.     

Universals and cultural differences in the judgments of facial expressions of emotion

We present here new evidence of cross-cultural agreement in the judgement of facial expression. Subjects in 10 cultures performed a more complex judgment task than has been used in previous cross-cultural studies. Instead of limiting the subjects to selecting only one emotion term for each expression, this task allowed them to indicate that multiple emotions were evident and the intensity of each emotion. Agreement was very high across cultures about which emotion was the most intense. The 10 cultures also agreed about the second most intense emotion signaled by an expression and about the relative intensity among expressions of the same emotion. However, cultural differences were found in judgments of the absolute level of emotional intensity.     

Retroactive pessimism: a different kind of hindsight bias

In an attempt to regulate disappointments people may sometimes change their perceptions of the events leading to an undesirable outcome so that in retrospect this outcome seems almost inevitable. This retroactive pessimism effect was demonstrated in three studies. In the first, sports fans rated the likelihood of success for their team and its opponent before and after an important soccer match. Evidence for significant pre‐ and post‐game probability shifts was found for the fans of the defeated team but not for the supporters of the winning opponent. In the second and the third experiments participants responded to a scenario depicting a loss of stipend that was either large or small in value. Participants were expected to show more evidence of retroactive pessimism with greater disappointment. Indeed, estimates of the probability of a more favorable counterfactual outcome were sensitive to the magnitude of the loss with lower estimates of the probability that things could have turned out better in the large stipend condition. The effect was attenuated, however, when the loss was not personal but rather that of a friend (Experiment 2), or when the disappointment was mitigated (Experiment 3). Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The distinctiveness of emotion concepts: a comparison between emotion, abstract, and concrete words

Are the concepts represented by emotion words different from abstract words in memory? We examined the distinct characteristics of emotion concepts in 3 separate experiments. The first demonstrated that emotion words are better recalled than both concrete and abstract words in a free recall task. In the second experiment, ratings of abstract, concrete, and emotion words were compared on concreteness, imageability, and context availability scales. Results revealed a difference between all 3 word types on each of the 3 scales. The third experiment investigated priming in a lexical decision task for homogeneous (abstract-abstract and emotion-emotion) and heterogeneous (abstract-emotion and emotion-abstract) associated word pairs. Priming occurred only for the homogeneous and heterogeneous abstract-emotion word pair conditions. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed in terms of the circumplex, hierarchical, and semantic activation models. The results are most consistent with the predictions of the semantic activation model.