抽象概念表征的具身认知观

抽象概念是否通过感知经验来表征以及如何被感知经验表征是具身认知面临的一大问题.在抽象概念表征是否具有感知经验基础的问题上,具身认知理论认为抽象概念通过情境模拟或隐喻与感知经验发生联系.在抽象概念如何与感知经验表征发生联系的问题上,概念模拟理论强调情景或运动模拟在抽象概念表征中的直接作用;概念隐喻理论则侧重具体经验或具体经验与抽象概念之间的共同结构关系在抽象概念表征中的间接作用.未来研究应改变概念表征的稳定的心理实体观,从语言和抽象表征的关系、正常儿童和特殊群体的抽象概念表征差异入手,整合不同的具身认知观点.     

Linking somatic and symbolic representation in semantic memory: the dynamic multilevel reactivation framework

Biological plausibility is an essential constraint for any viable model of semantic memory. Yet, we have only the most rudimentary understanding of how the human brain conducts abstract symbolic transformations that underlie word and object meaning. Neuroscience has evolved a sophisticated arsenal of techniques for elucidating the architecture of conceptual representation. Nevertheless, theoretical convergence remains elusive. Here we describe several contrastive approaches to the organization of semantic knowledge, and in turn we offer our own perspective on two recurring questions in semantic memory research: (1) to what extent are conceptual representations mediated by sensorimotor knowledge (i.e., to what degree is semantic memory embodied)? (2) How might an embodied semantic system represent abstract concepts such as modularity, symbol, or proposition? To address these questions, we review the merits of sensorimotor (i.e., embodied) and amodal (i.e., disembodied) semantic theories and address the neurobiological constraints underlying each. We conclude that the shortcomings of both perspectives in their extreme forms necessitate a hybrid middle ground. We accordingly propose the Dynamic Multilevel Reactivation Framework—an integrative model predicated upon flexible interplay between sensorimotor and amodal symbolic representations mediated by multiple cortical hubs. We discuss applications of the dynamic multilevel reactivation framework to abstract and concrete concept representation and describe how a multidimensional conceptual topography based on emotion, sensation, and magnitude can successfully frame a semantic space containing meanings for both abstract and concrete words. The consideration of ‘abstract conceptual features’ does not diminish the role of logical and/or executive processing in activating, manipulating and using information stored in conceptual representations. Rather, it proposes that the materials upon which these processes operate necessarily combine pure sensorimotor information and higher-order cognitive dimensions involved in symbolic representation.     

感知运动信息在概念表征中的作用

研究概念的表征问题对理解概念的本质非常重要,传统认知和具身认知视角下的概念表征理论争议的焦点在于感觉运动信息在表征中的作用。传统认知视角下的离身认知认为感知觉运动信息会转化成抽象的符号,概念表征不包含感知觉运动信息。概念表征的具身观点认为感知觉运动信息是概念表征的基础。对感知运动信息在概念表征中起作用这一命题已经达成共识。未来研究应该关注感知运动信息起作用的机制,以及抽象概念表征等问题,进一步完善发展概念表征理论。     

Embodied experience and linguistic meaning

What role does people's embodied experiences have in their use and understanding of meaning? Most theories in cognitive science view meaning in terms of propositional structures that may be combined to form higher-order complexes in representing the meanings of conversations and texts. A newer approach seeks to capture meaning in terms of high-dimensional semantic space. Both views reflect the idea that meaning is best understood as abstract and disembodied symbols. My aim in this article is to make the case for an embodied view of linguistic meaning. This view provides a challenge to traditional approaches to linguistic meaning (although may not necessarily be entirely incompatible with them). I discuss several new lines of research from both linguistics and psychology that explore the importance of embodied perception and action in people's understanding of words, phrases, and texts. These data provide strong evidence in favor of the idea that significant aspects of thought and language arises from, and is grounded in, embodiment.     

On doing two things at once: Temporal constraints on actions in language comprehension

In two experiments, we investigated how text comprehension is influenced by the interaction between the properties of actions and the temporal relations specified by adverbs. Participants read short narratives describing a protagonist who performed two actions that involved similar sensorimotor systems (e.g., chopping wood and painting a fence) or different ones (e.g., whistling a melody and painting a fence). The actions were described as simultaneous or successive by means of the temporal adverbs while and after, respectively. Comprehension, both in Spanish and in English, was markedly impaired (longer reading times and lower subjective coherence) for sentences including the adverb while and actions involving the same sensorimotor system. However, when one of the same sensorimotor system actions was described as a mental plan (e.g., chopping wood and thinking of painting a fence), comprehension was equally easy with the adverbs while and after. These results are compatible with a revised version of the indexical hypothesis that specifies how comprehension is guided by syntax and embodied constraints within multiple noninteracting mental spaces.     

具身概念表征的研究及理论述评

具身认知强调认知在本质上是具身的, 身体在认知的实现中发挥着关键作用。传统的符号加工理论认为, 概念表征独立于主体的知觉运动系统并以抽象符号的形式储存于语言记忆中。概念表征的具身理论则认为, 概念表征与知觉运动系统具有共同的神经基础, 概念在本质上是主体经验客体时知觉与运动体验的神经记录, 而概念加工的基本形式则是身体经验的模拟与还原。关于该理论的实证研究主要集中于概念加工引发的知觉动作变化、身体动作对概念加工的影响、抽象概念加工的具身特征等领域。今后的研究应关注符号加工理论与具身理论的整合等。     

Using Dynamic Field Theory to extend the embodiment stance toward higher cognition

The embodiment stance emphasizes that cognitive processes unfold continuously in time, are constantly linked to the sensory and motor surfaces, and adapt through learning and development. Dynamic Field Theory (DFT) is a neurally based set of concepts that has turned out to be useful for understanding how cognition emerges in an embodied and situated system. We explore how the embodiment stance may be extended beyond those forms of cognition that are closest to sensorimotor processes. The core elements of DFT are dynamic neural fields (DNFs), patterns of activation defined over different kinds of spaces. These may include retinal space and visual feature spaces, spaces spanned by movement parameters such as movement direction and amplitude, or abstract spaces like the ordinal axis along which sequences unfold. Instances of representation that stand for perceptual objects, motor plans, or action intentions are peaks of activation in the DNFs. We show how such peaks may arise from input and are stabilized by intra-field interaction. Given a neural mechanism for instantiation, the neuronal couplings between DNFs implement cognitive operations. We illustrate how these mechanisms can be used to enable architectures of dynamic neural fields to perform cognitive functions such as acquiring and updating scene representations, using grounded spatial language, and generating sequences of actions. Implementing these DFT models in autonomous robots demonstrates how these cognitive functions can be enacted in embodied, situated systems.     

Reenactment: an embodied cognition approach to meaning and linguistic content

A central finding in experimental research identified with embodied cognition (EC) is that understanding actions involves their embodied simulation, i.e., executing some processes involved in performing these actions. Extending these findings, I argue that reenactment??the overt embodied simulation of actions and practices, including especially communicative actions and practices, within utterances??makes it possible to forge an integrated EC-based account of linguistic meaning. In particular, I argue: (a) that remote entities can be referred to by reenacting actions performed with them; (b) that the use of grammatical constructions can be conceived of as the reenactment of linguistic action routines; (c) that complex enunciational structures (reported speech, irony, etc.) involve a separate level of reenactment, on which characters are presented as interacting with one another within the utterance; (d) that the segmentation of long utterances into shorter units involves the reenactment of brief audience interventions between units; and (e) that the overall meaning of an utterance can be stated in reenactment terms. The notion of reenactment provides a conceptual framework for accounting for aspects of language that are usually thought to be outside the reach of EC in an EC framework, thus supporting a view of meaning and linguistic content as thoroughly grounded in action and interaction.     

Semantic embodiment,disembodiment or misembodiment? In search of meaning in modules and neuron circuits

“Embodied” proposals claim that the meaning of at least some words, concepts and constructions is grounded in knowledge about actions and objects. An alternative “disembodied” position locates semantics in a symbolic system functionally detached from sensorimotor modules. This latter view is not tenable theoretically and has been empirically falsified by neuroscience research. A minimally-embodied approach now claims that action–perception systems may “color”, but not represent, meaning; however, such minimal embodiment (misembodiment?) still fails to explain why action and perception systems exert causal effects on the processing of symbols from specific semantic classes. Action perception theory (APT) offers neurobiological mechanisms for “embodied” referential, affective and action semantics along with “disembodied” mechanisms of semantic abstraction, generalization and symbol combination, which draw upon multimodal brain systems. In this sense, APT suggests integrative-neuromechanistic explanations of why both sensorimotor and multimodal areas of the human brain differentially contribute to specific facets of meaning and concepts.     

Dissociable neural systems support retrieval of how and why action knowledge

In everyday discourse, people typically represent actions in one of two ways: how they are performed or why they are performed. In the present study, we determined the neural systems that support these natural modes of representing actions. Participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while identifying how and why people perform various familiar actions. Identifying how actions are performed produced activity in premotor areas that support the execution of actions and in higher-order visual areas that support the perception of action-related objects; this finding supports an embodied view of action knowledge. However, identifying why actions are performed preferentially engaged areas of the brain associated with representing and reasoning about mental states; these areas were right temporoparietal junction, precuneus, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and posterior superior temporal sulcus. Our results suggest that why action knowledge is not sufficiently constituted by information in motor and visual systems, but requires a system for representing states of mind, which do not have reliable motor correlates or visual appearance.     

Grounding language in action

We report a new phenomenon associated with language comprehension: the action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE). Participants judged whether sentences were sensible by making a response that required moving toward or away from their bodies. When a sentence implied action in one direction (e.g., "Close the drawer" implies action away from the body), the participants had difficulty making a sensibility judgment requiring a response in the opposite direction. The ACE was demonstrated for three sentences types: imperative sentences, sentences describing the transfer of concrete objects, and sentences describing the transfer of abstract entities, such as "Liz told you the story." These dataare inconsistent with theories of language comprehension in which meaning is represented as a set of relations among nodes. Instead, the data support an embodied theory of meaning that relates the meaning of sentences to human action.     

The experience of new sensorimotor contingencies by sensory augmentation

Embedded in the paradigm of embodied cognition, the theory of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs) proposes that motor actions and associated sensory stimulations are tied together by lawful relations termed SMCs. We aimed to investigate whether SMCs can be learned by means of sensory augmentation. Therefore we focused on related perceptual changes. Subjects trained for 7 weeks with the feelSpace belt mapping information of the magnetic north to vibrotactile stimulation around the waist. They experienced substantial changes in their space perception. The belt facilitated navigation and stimulated the usage of new navigation strategies. The belt’s vibrating signal changed to a kind of spatial information over time while the belt’s appeal and perceived usability increased. The belt also induced certain emotional states. Overall, the results show that learning new SMCs with this relatively small and usable device leads to profound perceptual and emotional changes, which are fully compatible with embodied theories of cognition.     

Action-dependent perceptual invariants: from ecological to sensorimotor approaches

Ecological and sensorimotor theories of perception build on the notion of action-dependent invariants as the basic structures underlying perceptual capacities. In this paper we contrast the assumptions these theories make on the nature of perceptual information modulated by action. By focusing on the question, how movement specifies perceptual information, we show that ecological and sensorimotor theories endorse substantially different views about the role of action in perception. In particular we argue that ecological invariants are characterized with reference to transformations produced in the sensory array by movement: such invariants are transformation-specific but do not imply motor-specificity. In contrast, sensorimotor theories assume that perceptual invariants are intrinsically tied to specific movements. We show that this difference leads to different empirical predictions and we submit that the distinction between motor equivalence and motor-specificity needs further clarification in order to provide a more constrained account of action/perception relations.     

Testing the theory of embodied cognition with subliminal words

In the current study, we tested the embodied cognition theory (ECT). The ECT postulates mandatory sensorimotor processing of words when accessing their meaning. We test that prediction by investigating whether invisible (i.e., subliminal) spatial words activate responses based on their long-term and short-term meaning. Masking of the words is used to prevent word visibility and intentional elaboration of the words’ semantic content. In this way, masking specifically isolates mandatory sensorimotor processing of words as predicted by the ECT. Do spatial subliminal words activate responses nonetheless? In Experiment 1, we demonstrate a spatial congruence effect of the invisible words if they precede visible target words. In Experiment 2, we show that masked words activate responses based on their long-term meaning. In Experiment 3, we demonstrate that masked words are also processed according to their short-term response meaning. We conclude that the ECT is supported by our findings and discuss implications of our results for embodied theories of semantic word processing and masked priming experiments.     

Moving along the mental time line influences the processing of future related words

Abstract concepts like numbers or time are thought to be represented in the more concrete domain of space and the sensorimotor system. For example, thinking of past or future events has a physical manifestation in backward or forward body sway, respectively. In the present study, we investigated the reverse effect: can passive whole-body motion influence the processing of temporal information? Participants were asked to categorize verbal stimuli to the concepts future or past while they were displaced forward and backward (Experiment 1), or upward and downward (Experiment 2). The results showed that future related verbal stimuli were categorized faster during forward as compared to backward motion. This finding supports the view that temporal events are represented along a mental time line and that the sensorimotor system is linked to that representation. We showed that body motion is not just an epiphenomenon of temporal thoughts. Passive whole-body motion can influence higher-order temporal cognition.     

Mirror Neurons,Embodied Simulation,and the Neural Basis of Social Identification

The shared intersubjective space in which we live since birth enables and bootstraps the constitution of the sense of identity we normally entertain with others. Social identification incorporates the domains of action, sensations, affect, and emotions and is underpinned by the activation of shared neural circuits. A common underlying functional mechanism—embodied simulation—mediates our capacity to share the meaning of actions, intentions, feelings, and emotions with others, thus grounding our identification with and connectedness to others. Social identification, empathy, and “we-ness” are the basic ground of our development and being. Embodied simulation provides a model of potential interest not only for our understanding of how interpersonal relations work or might be pathologically disturbed but also for psychoanalysis. The hypothesis is that embodied simulation is at work within the psychoanalytic setting between patient and analyst. The notions of projective identification and the interpersonal dynamic related to transference and countertransference can be viewed as instantiations of the implicit and prelinguistic mechanisms of the embodied simulation-driven mirroring mechanisms here reviewed.     

Using relations within conceptual systems to translate across conceptual systems

According to an "external grounding" theory of meaning, a concept's meaning depends on its connection to the external world. By a "conceptual web" account, a concept's meaning depends on its relations to other concepts within the same system. We explore one aspect of meaning, the identification of matching concepts across systems (e.g. people, theories, or cultures). We present a computational algorithm called ABSURDIST (Aligning Between Systems Using Relations Derived Inside Systems for Translation) that uses only within-system similarity relations to find between-system translations. While illustrating the sufficiency of a conceptual web account for translating between systems, simulations of ABSURDIST also indicate powerful synergistic interactions between intrinsic, within-system information and extrinsic information.     

Simulating sensorimotor metaphors: Novel metaphors influence sensory judgments

Embodied cognition theory proposes that individuals’ abstract concepts can be associated with sensorimotor processes. The authors examined the effects of teaching participants novel embodied metaphors, not based in prior physical experience, and found evidence suggesting that they lead to embodied simulation, suggesting refinements to current models of embodied cognition. Creating novel embodiments of abstract concepts in the laboratory may be a useful method for examining mechanisms of embodied cognition.     

Attention to body-parts varies with visual preference and verb–effector associations

Theories of embodied conceptual meaning suggest fundamental relations between others’ actions, language, and our own actions and visual attention processes. Prior studies have found that when people view an image of a neutral body in a scene they first look toward, in order, the head, torso, hands, and legs. Other studies show associations between action verbs and the body-effectors used in performing the action (e.g., “jump” with feet/legs; “talk” with face/head). In the present experiment, the visual attention of participants was recorded with a remote eye-tracking system while they viewed an image of an actor pantomiming an action and heard a concrete action verb. Participants manually responded whether or not the action image was a good example of the verb they heard. The eye-tracking results confirmed that participants looked at the head most, followed by the hands, and the feet least of all; however, visual attention to each of the body-parts also varied as a function of the effector associated with the spoken verb on image/verb congruent trials, particularly for verbs associated with the legs. Overall, these results suggest that language influences some perceptual processes; however, hearing auditory verbs did not alter the previously reported fundamental hierarchical sequence of directed attention, and fixations on specific body-effectors may not be essential for verb comprehension as peripheral visual cues may be sufficient to perform the task.     

Experiential blindness revisited: In defence of a case of embodied cognition

The sensorimotor theory (Noë, 2004, Noë, in press) discusses a special instance of lack of perceptual experience despite no sensory impairment. The phenomenon dubbed “experiential blindness” is cited as evidence for a constitutive relation between sensorimotor skills and perceptual experience. Recently it has been objected (Adams and Aizawa, 2008, Aizawa, 2007) that the cases described by Noë as experiential blindness are cases of pure sensory deficit. This paper argues that while the objections bring out limitations of Noë’s sensorimotor theory they do not do enough to challenge a robust perception–action interdependence claim. There are genuine cases of experiential blindness and these are better explained by the hypothesis of the interdependence of perception and action rather than by a passive vision approach. The cases provide support for a strong thesis of embodied cognition where ongoing sensorimotor dynamics non-trivially constrain perceptual content.