Causal learning about tolerance and sensitization

We introduce two abstract, causal schemata used during causal learning. (1) Tolerance is when an effect diminishes over time, as an entity is repeatedly exposed to the cause (e.g., a person becoming tolerant to caffeine). (2) Sensitization is when an effect intensifies over time, as an entity is repeatedly exposed to the cause (e.g., an antidepressant becoming more effective through repeated use). In Experiment 1, participants observed either of these cause—effect data patterns unfolding over time and exhibiting the tolerance or sensitization schemata. Participants inferred stronger causal efficacy and made more confident and more extreme predictions about novel cases than in a condition with the same data appearing in a random order over time. In Experiment 2, the same tolerance/sensitization scenarios occurred either within one entity or across many entities. In the manyentity conditions, when the schemata were violated, participants made much weaker inferences. Implications for causal learning are discussed.     

Studies of inference from lack of knowledge

Two experiments were performed to investigate the conditions affecting lack-of-knowledge inferences. The lack-of-knowledge inference is a metainference, an inference based on knowledge about one’s own knowledge, in which the absence of information concerning a possible assertion is taken as evidence that the assertion is false. In Experiment 1, it was shown that lack of knowledge about an assertion decreases subjects’ ratings of the likelihood that the assertion is true. The more important the assertion and the more expert the person who lacks knowledge, the more certain is the lack-of-knowledge inference, as measured by a decrease in the rated likelihood of the assertion. In Experiment 2, a hypothesis about the nature of self-judgments of expertise was tested. This intrinsic observation hypothesis states that expertise relevant to an assertion is determined by the number of similar assertions from the same domain that the person can retrieve. The hypothesis was ruled out by the results of Experiment 2. Other possibilities for the manner in which self-judgments of this kind are made are discussed.     

Person theories: their temporal stability and relation to intertrait inferences

This article tests whether individual differences in inferring one trait from another (intertrait inferences) can be linked to lay beliefs about the malleability of personality (person theories). It finds that holding the belief that personality is malleable (incremental theory) rather than fixed (entity theory) at the time of inferences is associated with less extreme inferences involving semantically related (but not unrelated) traits. Although person theories have been assumed to be stable over time, existing short-term test-retest coefficients do not capture their instability over a longer period. These results can illuminate interrater discrepancies in assessments of personality pathology and job performance, enrich understanding of such phenomena as stereotyping and impression formation, refine the interpretation of past research involving person theories, and inform research planning.     

The role of preschoolers' social understanding in evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions

Preschoolers use information from interventions, namely intentional actions, to make causal inferences. We asked whether children consider some interventions to be more informative than others based on two components of an actor’s knowledge state: whether an actor possesses causal knowledge, and whether an actor is allowed to use their knowledge in a given situation. Three- and four-year-olds saw a novel toy that activated in the presence of certain objects. Two actors, one knowledgeable about the toy and one ignorant, each tried to activate the toy with an object. In Experiment 1, either the actors chose objects or the child chose for them. In Experiment 2, the actors chose objects blindfolded. Objects were always placed on the toy simultaneously, and thus were equally associated with the effect. Preschoolers’ causal inferences favored the knowledgeable actor’s object only when he was allowed to choose it (Experiment 1). Thus, children consider both personal and situational constraints on knowledge when evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions.     

Inferences from disclosures about the truth and falsity of expert testimony

Participants acting as mock jurors made inferences about whether a person was a suspect in a murder based on an expert's testimony about the presence of objects at the crime scene and the disclosure that the testimony was true or false. Experiment 1 showed that participants made more correct inferences, and made inferences more quickly, when the truth or falsity of the expert's testimony was disclosed immediately after the testimony rather than when the disclosure was delayed. Experiment 2 showed no advantage for prior disclosure over immediate disclosure. Experiment 3 showed that the pattern of inferences when there was no disclosure mirrored the pattern when it was disclosed that the expert's testimony was true rather than false. Participants made more correct inferences from true conjunctions than disjunctions, and from false disjunctions than conjunctions. We discuss the implications for theories of the mental representations and cognitive processes that underlie human reasoning.     

Inferences about the authentic self: when do actions say more than mental states?

Three studies involving 478 undergraduates examined the perceived importance of observable actions versus mental states in revealing the "true self"-the authentic and fundamental nature of a target person. Results suggest that when people have only limited information about a target, they believe that an action is more diagnostic of the individual's true self than the accompanying mental state. When participants have knowledge concerning chronic dispositional tendencies of the target, however, they judge that a chronic mental state is more diagnostic of the true self than a chronic action tendency. Considered together, the findings suggest that people conceptualize the true self as a relatively private entity but nevertheless believe that an action of a little-known person may be particularly informative about that individual. Perceived diagnosticity of the true self was partially mediated by inferences concerning the relative stability of actions versus states but not by inferences of volition.     

The psychology of knights and knaves

Knight-knave brain teasers are about a realm in which some people, knights, tell only truths, whereas all others, knaves, tell only lies. For example, suppose person A says, "I am a knight and B is a knight," and person B says, "A is a knave." Is A a knight or a knave? Is B a knight or a knave? In a pilot study, we asked subjects to think aloud while solving problems like these. Their statements suggested that they were making assumptions about the knight/knave status of the characters and drawing deductive inferences from these assumptions to test their consistency. This encouraged us to model the process by means of a simulation based on an earlier natural-deduction theory of reasoning. The model contains a set of deduction rules in the form of productions and a working memory that holds a proof of the correct answer. The greater the number of steps (assumptions and inferences) in the proof, the greater the predicted difficulty of the puzzle. The experiments reported here confirmed this prediction by showing that subjects were more likely to make mistakes (Experiment 1) and take longer to solve (Experiment 2) puzzles associated with a larger number of proof steps.     

Infants learn about objects from statistics and people

In laboratory experiments, infants are sensitive to patterns of visual features that co-occur (e.g., Fiser & Aslin, 2002). Once infants learn the statistical regularities, however, what do they do with that knowledge? Moreover, which patterns do infants learn in the cluttered world outside of the laboratory? Across 4 experiments, we show that 9-month-olds use this sensitivity to make inferences about object properties. In Experiment 1, 9-month-old infants expected co-occurring visual features to remain fused (i.e., infants looked longer when co-occurring features split apart than when they stayed together). Forming such expectations can help identify integral object parts for object individuation, recognition, and categorization. In Experiment 2, we increased the task difficulty by presenting the test stimuli simultaneously with a different spatial layout from the familiarization trials to provide a more ecologically valid condition. Infants did not make similar inferences in this more distracting test condition. However, Experiment 3 showed that a social cue did allow inferences in this more difficult test condition, and Experiment 4 showed that social cues helped infants choose patterns among distractor patterns during learning as well as during test. These findings suggest that infants can use feature co-occurrence to learn about objects and that social cues shape such foundational learning in distraction-filled environments.     

Adjusting Social Inferences in Familiar and Unfamiliar Domains: The Generality of Response to Situational Pragmatics

Two experiments investigated the influence of situational pragmatics on the selective use of specific instances and generalized knowledge structures to make social inferences. In Experiment 1, social inferences were made in an unfamiliar domain similar in structure to a typical situation of social greetings and address, but devoid of useful cues to social schemas. Participants were told that either one or another of the features of the situation was more pragmatically important for deriving inferences about appropriate social behaviour; consistent with predictions from a computational model of analogical mapping (ACME), they made reliable inferences based on analogies to specific instances, with the situational importance of relations guiding the selection of the optimal analogue. In Experiment 2, social inferences were examined in the more familiar domain of predicting social behavior between low and high status persons and between members of an ingroup and an outgroup in Japan. The availability of specific examples was varied, as was the perceived importance of status and group membership. The situation was isomorphic to that in the first experiment, except for the availability of generalized knowledge structures to guide inferences. Participants made relatively veridical inferences that were sensitive to variations in the pragmatic importance of dimensions. Provision of specific analogues had little impact on inferences, suggesting that participants were relying instead on more general and cross-culturally applicable knowledge about adjusting social relations according to situational pragmatics.     

Probabilistically Valid Inference of Covariation From a Single x,y Observation When Univariate Characteristics Are Known

Participants were asked to draw inferences about correlation from single x,y observations. In Experiment 1 statistically sophisticated participants were given the univariate characteristics of distributions of x and y and asked to infer whether a single x, y observation came from a correlated or an uncorrelated population. In Experiment 2, students with a variety of statistical backgrounds assigned posterior probabilities to five possible populations based on single x, y observations, again given knowledge of the univariate statistics. In Experiment 3, statistically naïve participants were given a problem analogous to that given in Experiment 1, framed verbally. Experiment 4 replicated Experiment 3 but added an "impossible to determine" response option. Models that rely on computing sample correlations make no predictions about these investigations. From a Bayesian perspective, participants' inferences in all four experiments tended to make probabilistically valid inferences as long as the single datum was directional. The results are discussed in light of the Brunswikian notion of vicarious functioning.     

What emotional reactions can tell us about the nature of others: An appraisal perspective on person perception

The present research aimed to assess how people use knowledge about the emotional reactions of others to make inferences about their character. Specifically, we postulate that people can reconstruct or “reverse engineer” the appraisals underlying an emotional reaction and use this appraisal information to draw person perception inferences. As predicted, a person who reacted with anger to blame was perceived as more aggressive, and self-confident, but also as less warm and gentle than a person who reacted with sadness (Study 1). A person who reacted with a smile (Study 1) or remained neutral (Study 2) was perceived as self-confident but also as unemotional. These perceptions were mediated by perceived appraisals.     

Causal learning across domains

Five studies investigated (a) children's ability to use the dependent and independent probabilities of events to make causal inferences and (b) the interaction between such inferences and domain-specific knowledge. In Experiment 1, preschoolers used patterns of dependence and independence to make accurate causal inferences in the domains of biology and psychology. Experiment 2 replicated the results in the domain of biology with a more complex pattern of conditional dependencies. In Experiment 3, children used evidence about patterns of dependence and independence to craft novel interventions across domains. In Experiments 4 and 5, children's sensitivity to patterns of dependence was pitted against their domain-specific knowledge. Children used conditional probabilities to make accurate causal inferences even when asked to violate domain boundaries.     

Person perception from changing emotional expressions: primacy,recency, or averaging effect?

ABSTRACT

Dynamic changes in emotional expressions are a valuable source of information in social interactions. As the expressive behaviour of a person changes, the inferences drawn from the behaviour may also change. Here, we test the possibility that dynamic changes in emotional expressions affect person perception in terms of stable trait attributions. Across three experiments, we examined perceivers’ inferences about others’ personality traits from changing emotional expressions. Expressions changed from one emotion (“start emotion”) to another emotion (“end emotion”), allowing us to disentangle potential primacy, recency, and averaging effects. Drawing on three influential models of person perception, we examined perceptions of dominance and affiliation (Experiment 1a), competence and warmth (Experiment 1b), and dominance and trustworthiness (Experiment 2). A strong recency effect was consistently found across all trait judgments, that is, the end emotion of dynamic expressions had a strong impact on trait ratings. Evidence for a primacy effect was also observed (i.e. the information of start emotions was integrated), but less pronounced, and only for trait ratings relating to affiliation, warmth, and trustworthiness. Taken together, these findings suggest that, when making trait judgements about others, observers weigh the most recently displayed emotion in dynamic expressions more heavily than the preceding emotion.     

Violations of implicit theories and the sense of prediction and control: implications for motivated person perception

Beginning with the assumption that implicit theories of personality are crucial tools for understanding social behavior, the authors tested the hypothesis that perceivers would process person information that violated their predominant theory in a biased manner. Using an attentional probe paradigm (Experiment 1) and a recognition memory paradigm (Experiment 2), the authors presented entity theorists (who believe that human attributes are fixed) and incremental theorists (who believe that human attributes are malleable) with stereotype-relevant information about a target person that supported or violated their respective theory. Both groups of participants showed evidence of motivated, selective processing only with respect to theory-violating information. In Experiment 3, the authors found that after exposure to theory-violating information, participants felt greater anxiety and worked harder to reestablish their sense of prediction and control mastery. The authors discuss the epistemic functions of implicit theories of personality and the impact of violated assumptions.     

Five-year-old children's difficulty with false belief when the sought entity is a person

A total of 153 children (excluding those who erred on control questions), mainly 5 and 7 years of age, participated in two experiments that involved tests of false belief. In the task, the sought entity was first at Location 1 and then, unknown to the searching protagonist, it moved to Location 2. In Experiment 1, performance was well below ceiling in 5-year-olds when the sought entity was a person, and this contrasted with a task in which the sought entity was a physical object. Performance was especially inaccurate when the sought person moved of his or her own volition rather than when the sought person was requested to move by a third party. Interestingly, 5-year-olds were more likely to nominate Location 1 when asked where the searching protagonist would look first than when asked what he or she would do next. In Experiment 2, however, 5-year-olds also tended to nominate Location 1 following a question that included the word "first" even in a test of true belief--a patently incorrect response. Altogether, the results suggest that 5-year-old children have considerable difficulty with a test of false belief when the sought entity is a person acting under his or her own volition. This suggests that 5-year-olds' handle on states of belief is surprisingly fragile in this kind of task.     

Children's category‐based inferences affect classification

Children learn many new categories and make inferences about these categories. Much work has examined how children make inferences on the basis of category knowledge. However, inferences may also affect what is learned about a category. Four experiments examine whether category‐based inferences during category learning influence category knowledge and thereby affect later classifications for 5‐ to 7‐year‐olds. The children learned to classify pictures of new types of creatures on the basis of a salient feature (colour) and then answered a question that required them to make an inference on the basis of other features. At test, children classified pictures that included only some features (without colour). Experiment 1 showed that the features relevant to the inference during learning led to better classification than did features irrelevant to the inference. Experiment 2 replicated this finding even when the relevant features were physically close to the irrelevant features. Experiments 3 and 4 found this effect even when the classification was learned prior to the inference task and even when no mention was made of the categories during inference learning. Taken together, these results show that making inferences during category learning can influence category knowledge and suggest a need to integrate the work on category learning and category‐based inferences.     

Smart and easy: Co-occurring activation of spontaneous trait inferences and spontaneous situational inferences

Social perceivers have been shown to draw spontaneous trait inferences (STI’s) about the behavior of an actor as well as spontaneous situational inferences (SSI’s) about the situation the actor is in. In two studies, we examined inferences about behaviors that allow for both an STI and an SSI. In Experiment 1, using a probe recognition paradigm, we found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s. In Experiment 2, using a relearning paradigm, we again found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s, regardless of temporarily activated processing goals. Results are discussed in light of three-stage models of the process of social inference.     

Self-Doubt Effects Depend on Beliefs about Ability: Experimental Evidence

Past research has shown negative effects of chronic self-doubt on psychological and performance outcomes. Recent correlational evidence suggests that incremental beliefs about ability ameliorate certain self-doubt effects. The current research examines whether these correlational findings are robust when subjected to experimental testing. In Experiment 1, we manipulated beliefs about ability (incremental vs. entity) and demonstrated that changing beliefs about ability altered responses to self-doubt. For individuals primed with entity beliefs, higher self-doubt was associated with greater nervousness and poorer anagram performance; for individuals primed with incremental beliefs, self-doubt had no significant effects. Experiment 2 was a 2 (manipulated belief: incremental vs. entity) × 2 (self-doubt: doubt induction vs. control) factorial design. The result showed that self-doubt induction lowered self-esteem relative to control when people were primed with entity beliefs but did not affect self-esteem when incremental beliefs were primed. However, Experiment 1 results on affect and performance were not replicated in Experiment 2. Thus, although we provide some causal evidence that inducing individuals to adopt an ability-is-malleable mindset reduces the negative effects of self-doubt, further experimental work is required to study the moderating role of mindsets for self-doubt effects.