Compulsive perseveration: empirical criticism on the mood-as-input model

It has been proposed that the "Mood as Input" model provides an explanation of the perseverative nature of Obsessive Compulsive (OC) behaviour (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91). The model implies that task perseveration occurs when individuals (a) experience a bad mood and (b) ask themselves "did I do as much as I can?" In two earlier experiments with healthy participants (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91) it was found that when the allegedly critical conditions were met (negative mood and "did I as much as I can?" stop rule) perseveration occurred on a complex text-correction task. This finding was held to support a "mood as input" explanation of compulsive perseveration. It is important to note, however, that perseveration in clinical samples occurs for very simple "tasks" (e.g. closing a door or washing ones hands) and perseveration does not increase efficacy of performance. In the present study we compared the effects of the original task to effects of text correction tasks that were simpler and more OCD-like. The original effects were replicated: the combination of negative mood and the "did I do as much as I can" stop rule provoked perseveration. Meanwhile, "perseveration" was highly functional: the more "perseveration" the more text-errors were detected. Secondly, to the degree that tasks became simpler and more OCD-like, less checking occurred and the effects of the "did I do as much as I can?" stop rule on detection of errors became smaller. The findings raise questions about the validity of the paradigm as a model of OC perseveration.     

A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: the relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully

The present paper reports the results of two experiments designed to test predictions from the mood-as-input account of perseverative checking. Using an analogue checking task, both experiments showed that perseveration, as indicted by a range of measures relevant to compulsive checking, was affected by the configuration of the stop rule for the task and mood at the outset of checking. Perseveration was most significant in the condition that most closely resembled the characteristics of obsessive-compulsive checkers (negative mood combined with a stop rule that specifies that the task should be done as thoroughly as possible--namely, an 'as many as can' stop rule). The studies also indicated that confidence at having completed the checking task successfully was (1) significantly related to the use of 'as many as can' stop rules at the outset of checking, (2) mood ratings at the end of checking, and (3) checking perseveration generally. These findings provide support for a mood-as-input explanation of perseverative psychopathologies such as compulsive checking, and begin to cast some light on how anxiety-reduction and 'confidence' models of compulsive checking, might be explained within broader mechanisms of perseveration.     

Mood-as-input and depressive rumination

This article describes a test of mood-as-input theory predictions as applied to a rumination task in a nonclinical population. An experimenter-controlled interview was used to allow participants to reflect on a personal period of depression while in an experimentally-induced mood state (either negative or positive) or while deploying a specific stop rule for the task (either an “as many as can” or “feel like continuing” stop rule). As predicted by mood-as-input theory, persistence at the rumination task was greatest in the group experiencing negative mood while deploying an “as many as can” stop rule, and this suggests a mechanism that may contribute to perseverative depressive rumination. It is argued that the variables that contributed to perseveration in this study are already known to be characteristic of ruminative thinkers (e.g. negative mood and positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination that will command the deployment of “as many as can” stop rules for rumination). It is also argued that mood-as-input processes may provide a common mechanism for perseverative rumination and perseverative worry, and this common mechanism may account for many of the similarities between these two functionally-distinct activities.     

Mood as input and catastrophic worrying

The authors describe 3 experiments investigating a "mood-as-input" approach to understanding catastrophic worrying. Experiment 1 found that induced negative mood increased the number of steps emitted in both a catastrophizing interview procedure and a positive iteration task. Experiment 2 found that the number of items that worriers emitted in an iterative item generation task was dependent on the stop rules specified by the procedure. Experiment 3 found that manipulating the stop rules for catastrophizing had differential effects on worriers and nonworriers, depending on the nature of the stop rules specified. These results suggest that mood provides information about continuing or terminating the catastrophizing process that is interpreted in the context of the stop rules for the task. It is argued that the mood-as-input hypothesis accounts for the facts of exacerbated catastrophizing in worriers better than explanations couched in terms of either mood congruency effects or worriers possessing a generalized perseverative iterative style.     

What ends a worry bout? An analysis of changes in mood and stop rule use across the catastrophising interview task

This paper reports the results of two experiments designed to test predictions from the mood-as-input hypothesis about the factors that contribute to the ending of a worry bout. Experiment 1 looked at changes in self-reported mood across a catastrophising interview task. Experiment 2 investigated whether there were any changes in stop rule deployment between the beginning and end of a catastrophising interview task. Experiment 1 demonstrated that worriers tended to show increases in negative mood and decreases in positive mood over the course of catastrophising. In Experiment 2, participants exhibited a significant shift away from endorsing the use of 'as many as can' stop rules and a significant increasing tendency to endorse the use of 'feel like continuing' stop rules over the course of catastrophising. These results suggest that worriers exhibit increases in negative mood across the worry bout, but shift from the use of 'as many as can' to 'feel like continuing' stop rules. Mood-as-input hypothesis predicts that if high worriers ask the question "do I feel like continuing?" in the context of increasing negative mood, this will imply that the activity is no longer enjoyable or profitable and should be terminated. The results are discussed in the context of mood-as-input accounts of pathological worrying and the therapeutic implications of these findings are reviewed.     

Inflated responsibility and the use of stop rules for catastrophic worrying

The present paper reports the results of two experiments designed to test some predictions from a mood-as-input explanation of catastrophic worrying (). In particular, these experiments attempted to identify whether worriers possess characteristics that would contribute to the use of relatively strict 'as many as can' closure rules for catastrophising. Experiment 1 demonstrated that high worriers begin a catastrophising task with higher self-reported levels of responsibility towards fully considering all issues involved, than low worriers. Experiment 2 suggested that inflated responsibility has a causal effect on perseveration at the catastrophising task (rather than being a simple non-causal by-product of excessive worrying), and that inflated responsibility exacerbates catastrophising only in conjunction with negative mood. This suggests a relatively complex relationship between responsibility and mood, where there are mood conditions in which high responsibility does not generate greater persistence than low responsibility. These findings are consistent with predictions from a mood-as-input account of catastrophic worrying, and provide evidence for a putative mechanism that mediates the influence of variables such as inflated responsibility on perseveration.     

Inflated responsibility and perseverative checking: the effect of negative mood

This article reports the results of 2 experiments designed to test predictions from the mood-as-input hypothesis on the role of inflated responsibility in perseverative checking. Through the use of an analog checking task in both experiments, the authors showed that perseveration, as indicated by a range of measures relevant to compulsive checking, was affected by a combination of the level of inflated responsibility and the valency of mood at the outset of checking. In particular, inflated responsibility significantly facilitated checking perseveration only in the context of a negative mood and was not a sufficient condition for checking perseveration to occur. These effects of the various configurations of inflated responsibility and mood valency are predicted by the mood-as-input hypothesis.     

Service without a smile: comparing the consequences of neutral and positive display rules

We used an experimental design to examine the intrapersonal and interpersonal processes through which neutral display rules, compared to positive display rules, influence objective task performance of poll workers and ratings provided by survey respondents of the poll workers. Student participants (N = 140) were trained to adhere to 1 of the 2 display rule conditions while delivering opinion surveys to potential patrons of an organization during a 40-min period. Results showed that, compared to positive display rules, neutral display rules resulted in less task persistence and greater avoidance behavior. These effects were mediated through a greater use of expression suppression. In addition, neutral display rules resulted in less positive respondent mood, which accounted for lower ratings of service quality and of overall favorability attitudes toward the sponsoring organization. The importance and ubiquity of neutral display rules are discussed, given the potential for positive and negative consequences at work.     

Accessibility as input: The use of construct accessibility as information to guide behavior

Priming typically increases behavioral enactments of primed constructs. The current work explored a novel mechanism for the behavioral effects of priming, termed the “accessibility as input” account. In two experiments, participants were nonconsciously primed and then completed anagrams until they judged themselves to have reached a particular state. Two different states, or stop rules, were specified, and were matched to the primed constructs such that the combination either implied that the state had been met (e.g., “slow” prime and “tired” stop rule) or had not been met (e.g., “fast” prime and “tired” stop rule). The priming and stop rule manipulations interacted to determine persistence on the anagram task. The results demonstrate that the heightened accessibility resulting from priming can be used as information about one’s current state in relation to situational requirements and, hence, can produce varying, contextually-dependent behavior.     

SenseCam, imagery and bias in memory for wellbeing

Identifying and modifying the negative interpretation bias that characterises depression is central to successful treatment. While accumulating evidence indicates that mental imagery is particularly effective in the modification of emotional bias, this research typically incorporates static and unrelated ambiguous stimuli. SenseCam technology, and the resulting video-like footage, offers an opportunity to produce training stimuli that are dynamic and self-relevant. Here participants experienced several ambiguous tasks and subsequently viewed SenseCam footage of the same tasks, paired with negative or positive captions. Participants were trained to use mental imagery to inter-relate SenseCam footage and captions. Participants reported increased levels of happy mood, reduced levels of sad mood, and increased task enjoyment following SenseCam review with positive versus negative captions. This shift in emotional bias was also evident at 24-hour follow-up, as participants recollected greater task enjoyment for those tasks previously paired with positive captions. Mental imagery appears to play an important role in this process. These preliminary results indicate that in healthy volunteers, SenseCam can be used within a bias modification paradigm to shift mood and memory for wellbeing associated with performing everyday activities. Further refinements are necessary before similar methods can be applied to individuals suffering from subclinical and clinical depression.     

特质应对与展现规则对情绪劳动的影响

采用2×3组间设计, 检测特质应对(积极与消极)与展现规则(积极、消极、无规则)对情绪劳动的影响。结果表明, 积极应对引起更多深层动作; 积极规则下出现较少表层扮演(与消极应对比)。积极和消极规则都引起较多深层和表层动作。积极应对在积极规则下表层扮演较少(与消极规则比); 消极应对在积极规则下表层扮演较多(与消极规则比)。研究提示, 特质情绪性可能是调节展现规则与情绪劳动关系的重要原因。     

Regulatory fit as input for stop rules

Three experiments show that the motivational effects of regulatory fit (consistency between regulatory state and strategic means) are context dependent. With no explicit decision rule about when to stop (Experiment 1) or an explicit enjoyment stop rule (Experiments 2 and 3), participants exerted more effort on tasks when experiencing regulatory fit than when experiencing regulatory nonfit. With an explicit sufficiency stop rule (Experiments 2 and 3), participants exerted less effort when experiencing regulatory fit than when experiencing regulatory nonfit. The interactive effect of regulatory fit and stop rules can be explained by misattribution of rightness feelings from regulatory fit; the effect was eliminated by drawing participants' attention to an earlier event as a source of rightness feelings (Experiments 1 and 3).     

积极情绪对任务转换的影响

通过两个行为实验考察了积极情绪图片所诱发的情绪状态对任务转换的影响及其机制。研究任务是数字分类任务,分为保持和转换两个阶段。首先要求被试对靶刺激形成一定的习惯化反应,然后改变任务要求。实验1以53名大学生为被试,分别在积极情绪、消极情绪和中性条件下完成任务,发现在与中性条件相比时,积极情绪促进任务转换,消极情绪延缓任务转换。实验2以37名大学生为被试,增加了一种转换条件,考察积极情绪促进任务转换的心理原因,结果表明积极情绪因偏好新异刺激而促进任务转换     

“Not Thinking” Helps Reasoning

Despite previous research suggesting that participants’ negative and positive emotions can impair and facilitate reasoning performance, a recent study proposes that the emotional content of the mood induction materials may not be crucial in eliciting these phenomena—deontic selection task performance is as poor when these materials are neutral as when they are negative (Perham and Oaksford 2006). We extend this finding to syllogistic reasoning performance. Participants in the mood induction conditions (negative and neutral) verbally described their experiences in relation to twenty negative or neutral words whereas participants in the control condition received no such mood induction. Subsequent syllogistic reasoning performance was significantly poorer for both mood induction conditions yet only those in the negative mood induction condition showed a significant increase in anxiety. Results imply that the key mechanism involved in the impairment derives from the production of irrelevant thoughts and that these need not be linked to a positive or negative mood, thus “not thinking” may actually help the reasoning process.     

Change in affective state assessed by impaired color-naming of threat-related words

This study investigated the effects of mood induction on Stroop color-naming times for threat-related words. The subjects’ task was to color-name sets of threat-related words and affectively neutral matched control words both before and after mood-induction. Subjects were shown a short film about the medical effects of nuclear war (negative affect manipulation), a humorous cartoon, or no film. A significant and highly reliable color-naming decrement of the threat-related words was observed only after the negative affect manipulation. This indicates that the attentional bias towards the processing of threat-related material observed in clinically anxious or high Trait-Anxious subjects can be induced in initially nonanxious subjects. An incidental recall task included in the procedure provided no evidence of mood state dependent recall.     

Rule-violations sensitise towards negative and authority-related stimuli

Rule violations have usually been studied from a third-person perspective, identifying situational factors that render violations more or less likely. A first-person perspective of the agent that actively violates the rules, on the other hand, is only just beginning to emerge. Here we show that committing a rule violation sensitises towards subsequent negative stimuli as well as subsequent authority-related stimuli. In a Prime-Probe design, we used an instructed rule-violation task as the Prime and a word categorisation task as the Probe. Also, we employed a control condition that used a rule inversion task as the Prime (instead of rule violations). Probe targets were categorised faster after a violation relative to after a rule-based response if they related to either, negative valence or authority. Inversions, however, primed only negative stimuli and did not accelerate the categorisation of authority-related stimuli. A heightened sensitivity towards authority-related targets thus seems to be specific to rule violations. A control experiment showed that these effects cannot be explained in terms of semantic priming. Therefore, we propose that rule violations necessarily activate authority-related representations that make rule violations qualitatively different from simple rule inversions.     

Change in affective state assessed by impaired color-naming of threat-related words

This study investigated the effects of mood induction on Stroop color-naming times for threat-related words. The subjects’ task was to color-name sets of threat-related words and affectively neutral matched control words both before and after mood-induction. Subjects were shown a short film about the medical effects of nuclear war (negative affect manipulation), a humorous cartoon, or no film. A significant and highly reliable color-naming decrement of the threat-related words was observed only after the negative affect manipulation. This indicates that the attentional bias towards the processing of threat-related material observed in clinically anxious or high Trait-Anxious subjects can be induced in initially nonanxious subjects. An incidental recall task included in the procedure provided no evidence of mood state dependent recall.     

Reacting to Perceived High- and Low-Risk Win–Lose Opportunities in a Risky Decision-Making Task: Is It Framing or Affect or Both?

Affect research has suggested that in high-risk situations, a positive mood often results in an enhanced sensitivity to losses, leading to strong risk-averse behavior relative to neutral or negative mood, but when a situation is seen as being low risk, a reversal occurs and positive affect will often result in more risk-seeking behavior. It was hypothesized that the simple framing of a gambling task to emphasize either potential gains or potential losses could act as an affect inducer and would produce similar results. In Experiment 1 the effects of an induced positive or negative affective state on risk-taking behavior in a gambling task were examined. Results replicated the risk-averse/risk-seeking reversal phenomenon described above. In Experiment 2 the affect conditions were replaced with a simple Winning vs. Losing framing manipulation where an instructional emphasis was placed either on accumulating points or avoiding the loss of points. Results demonstrated that a reversal pattern in risk taking like that found in Experiment 1 for affect could also be obtained via this simple framing manipulation. An affective-cognitive model of pre-choice framing and a theoretical link between the effects of framing and the effects of mood manipulation based on mood management theory are presented and discussed.     

On learning complex procedural knowledge

Lewicki, Czyzewska, and Hoffman (1987) demonstrated learning without awareness in a visual search task. Rules determined target location on every seventh trial on the basis of target locations in the preceding six trials. Learning was demonstrated by negative transfer effects when the rules were changed. When questioned afterwards, the subjects could not describe the rules and denied awareness of them. This experiment was designed to replicate that of Lewicki et al. and to test several hypotheses about this apparent learning without awareness. Transfer conditions were included to determine whether rule learning was primarily perceptual or motor. The present assessment of awareness was based on an objective definition of awareness, rather than a subjective definition as in Lewicki et al.'s study. Their effect was replicated, and the transfer conditions revealed that learning relied on perceptual aspects of the task. The objective measure of awareness provided further evidence that subjects were unaware of the rules.     

Common attitudes about the effect of positive and negative mood on task related motivation]

Several theories on emotion and mood have stressed the close relationship between emotion and motivation. However, assumptions on mood contingent motivations have mainly been studied in the field of social behavior, and there are only few studies concerned with mood contingent task motivations, an area in which nit is possible to distinguish between two motivational sets, the deliberative and the implemented mind set. Assuming that positive mood is associated with a stronger task-oriented deliberative mind set, and that negative mood is associated with a stronger self-oriented deliberative mind set, and that implemented mind set should be intrinsically task-oriented during positive mood and instrumentally task-oriented during negative mood. The present paper is concerned with these assumptions from a subjective perspective: The respondents were asked about their lay perceptions of mood influences (positive, elated versus negative, sad mood) on task related motivations. In study I the respondents (N = 40) were asked about their deliberative mind sets during positive versus negative mood and about their general perceptions of mood influences on performance. In study II the respondents (N = 58) were requested to imagine situations which elicit positive, negative or neutral mood, and then to answer questions on deliberative and implemented mind sets during these states; they also hat to answer a general question about mood influences on task performance. Both quantitative and qualitative measures are used in these studies. The findings support the above general notions, and they additionally show that in the respondents' opinions negative mood effects are more variable than positive mood effects; further, that there are quite a few individual differences in assumed mood effects on task-related motivation.