Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity: The Contemporary Significance of Early Husserl's Conception of Truth

This essay explores Edmund Husserl's significance for contemporary truth theory. Focusing on his Logical Investigations (1900/1901), it argues that early Husserl's conception of truth unsettles a common polarity between epistemic and nonepistemic approaches. Unlike contemporary epistemic conceptions of truth, he gives full weight to “truth makers” that have their own being: objective identity, perceptible objects, and states of affairs. Yet, unlike contemporary nonepistemic conceptions, he also insists on the intentional givenness of such truth makers and on the complexity of the experiences within which propositional truth claims arise. To develop this argument, the essay explains how early Husserl's conception of truth builds on his phenomenology of intentional experience and knowledge. By emphasizing an objective identity between what is signitively meant and intuitively given, Husserl's approach provides a way to resituate propositional truth within a broader and more dynamic conception of truth.     

Hume on space, geometry, and diagrammatic reasoning

Hume??s discussion of space, time, and mathematics at T 1.2 appeared to many earlier commentators as one of the weakest parts of his philosophy. From the point of view of pure mathematics, for example, Hume??s assumptions about the infinite may appear as crude misunderstandings of the continuum and infinite divisibility. I shall argue, on the contrary, that Hume??s views on this topic are deeply connected with his radically empiricist reliance on phenomenologically given sensory images. He insightfully shows that, working within this epistemological model, we cannot attain complete certainty about the continuum but only at most about discrete quantity. Geometry, in contrast to arithmetic, cannot be a fully exact science. A number of more recent commentators have offered sympathetic interpretations of Hume??s discussion aiming to correct the older tendency to dismiss this part of the Treatise as weak and confused. Most of these commentators interpret Hume as anticipating the contemporary idea of a finite or discrete geometry. They view Hume??s conception that space is composed of simple indivisible minima as a forerunner of the conception that space is a discretely (rather than continuously) ordered set. This approach, in my view, is helpful as far as it goes, but there are several important features of Hume??s discussion that are not sufficiently appreciated. I go beyond these recent commentators by emphasizing three of Hume??s most original contributions. First, Hume??s epistemological model invokes the ??confounding?? of indivisible minima to explain the appearance of spatial continuity. Second, Hume??s sharp contrast between the perfect exactitude of arithmetic and the irremediable inexactitude of geometry reverses the more familiar conception of the early modern tradition in pure mathematics, according to which geometry (the science of continuous quantity) has its own standard of equality that is independent from and more exact than any corresponding standard supplied by algebra and arithmetic (the sciences of discrete quantity). Third, Hume has a developed explanation of how geometry (traditional Euclidean geometry) is nonetheless possible as an axiomatic demonstrative science possessing considerably more exactitude and certainty that the ??loose judgements?? of the vulgar.     

Distributive Justice and Enviromental Sustainability

Andrew Dobson has outlined three conceptions of environmental sustainability: the 'critical natural capital' conception; the 'irreversibility' conception; and the 'natural value' conception. He has also attempted to map out the various 'dimensions of social justice'– his purpose in so doing being to analyze the 'encounter' of each conception of environmental sustainability with the points on his map. Not surprisingly, Dobson concludes that as one moves from the 'critical natural capital' conception through the 'irreversibility' conception to the 'natural value' conception of 'sustainability', the 'points of contact' with his map of 'the dimensions of social justice' are found to 'become fewer and further apart'. In this article I argue that Dobson is fundamentally confused in his reason for thinking why this is so. I also argue that a core argument he deploys concerning future generations cannot do the work he requires of it.     

Quine's Nihilism

Quine is an important philosopher. The point of departure of his philosophical enterprise is sound: his down to earth naturalism, his scientism and behaviourism. However, he tends to get carried away by it, when he goes to extremes – and ends up in nihilism. It is certainly true that we can never quite rule out the possibility that we have misunderstood another person. And what he or she means is a consequence mainly of two things. It is a consequence of his actual intention with the utterance and also, to some extent, of the way the world actually is. This is not to say, however, that there is no fact of the matter. While there is underdetermination by actual evidence of interpretation there is no such thing as indeterminacy of translation (or interpretation). While there may well exist conflicting empirically adequate theories, there is no room for ontological relativity. Some of these theories may be the right one and the others wrong, even if this is something we cannot even in principle decide on empirical grounds.     

The Limits of Learning: Habermas' Social Theory and Religion

Habermas' view that contemporary philosophy and social theory can learn from religious traditions calls for closer consideration. He is correct to hold that religious traditions constitute a reservoir of potentially important meanings that can be critically appropriated without emptying them of their motivating and inspirational power. However, contrary to what he implies, his theory allows for learning from religion only to a very limited degree. This is due to two core elements of his conceptual framework, both of which are key features of his account of postmetaphysical thinking. The first is the requirement of ethical agnosticism; this requires philosophy and social theory to refrain from offering guidance on questions of the good life. The second is his language‐immanent conception of truth in the domain of practical reason; this follows from his rejection of any source of validity beyond human communication in this domain. I make the case for a more robust account of learning from religious traditions and metaphysical worldviews, arguing that for this purpose Habermas must modify his requirement of ethical agnosticism and relinquish his language‐immanent conception of truth.     

McDowell and Idealism

John McDowell espouses a certain conception of the thinking subject: as an embodied, living, finite being, with a capacity for experience that can take in the world, and stand in relations of warrant to subjects' beliefs. McDowell presents this conception of the subject as requiring a related conception of the world: as not located outside the conceptual sphere. In this latter conception, idealism and common‐sense realism are supposed to coincide. But I suggest that McDowell's conception of the subject scuppers this intended coincidence. The upshot is a dilemma: McDowell can retain his conception of the subject, but lose the coincidence; or he can keep the coincidence, but abandon his conception of the subject.     

Reduction and abduction in chemistry‐a response to Scerri

Eric Scerri has proposed an account of how reduction might be understood in chemistry. He claims to build on a general aspect of Popper's views which survives his otherwise heavy criticism, namely adherence to actual scientific practice. This is contrasted with Nagel's conception, which Scerri takes to be the philosopher's standard notion. I argue that his proposal, interesting though it is, is not so foreign to ideas in the tradition within which Nagel wrote as Scerri would have us believe. Moreover, actual scientific practice can be commandeered in support of a holistic conception which Popper contrasted with what he saw as the admirable strivings towards reduction in science.     

Unity,Plurality, and Hylomorphic Composition in Aristotle's Metaphysics

How should we understand the relationship, for Aristotle, between matter, form, and hylomorphic composite? Are matter and form distinct from each other, so that each hylomorphic unity harbours a plurality within it, or would such a plurality undermine the unity of the composite? A recent strand of argument in both Aristotelian and contemporary literature on hylomorphism has concluded that no genuine unity can be composed of a plurality. I will argue that the objection motivating this conclusion falls away as improperly formulated in light of Aristotle's metaontology—in particular, his thesis that unity (and therefore also plurality) is indeterminate. The genuine objection threatening hylomorphic unity is one that Aristotle himself formulates as a central concern in his Metaphysics: no substance can be composed of substances. He answers this genuine objection in his appeal to the actuality/potentiality distinction, and in Metaphysics VIII.6 he reminds us why no more basic problem of hylomorphic unity arises. Against the backdrop of Aristotle's metaontology, hylomorphic unity cannot be undermined by the plurality, just as such, of matter and form.     

Autonomy and Common Good: Interpreting Rousseau’s General Will

Rousseau’s project in his Social Contract was to construct a conception of human subjectivity and political institutions that would transcend what he saw to be the limits of liberal political theory of his time. I take this as a starting point to put forward an interpretation of his theory of the general will as a kind of social cognition that is able to preserve individual autonomy and freedom alongside concerns with the collective welfare of the community. But whereas many have seen Rousseau’s ideas as a prelude to communitarianism or authoritarianism, we should instead see his project as articulating an alternative model of moral-cognitivist reasoning. In order to provide a framework for this interpretation, I propose reading his conception of the general will through the theory of collective intentionality and social ontology. I end with a consideration of how this interpretation of the general will can provide a more satisfying understanding of political and practical rationality contemporary debates over republicanism and liberalism.     

The Coextensiveness Thesis and Kant's Modal Agnosticism in the ‘Postulates’

In the Critique of Pure Reason, following his elucidation of the ‘postulates’ of possibility, actuality, and necessity, Kant makes a series of puzzling remarks. He seems to deny the somewhat metaphysically intuitive contention that the extension of possibility is greater than that of actuality, which, in turn, is greater than that of necessity (A230/B283). Further, he states that the actual adds nothing to the possible (B284). This leads to the view, fairly common in the literature, that Kant holds that all modal categories, in their empirical applications, are coextensive. I diverge from the common view. First, Kant is not committed to the coextensiveness thesis, understood as above. Instead, he espouses a weaker, epistemological version of the coextensiveness thesis, namely that what we can assert to be really possible is coextensive with what we cognize to be actual. Second, Kant's remarks are not intended to introduce a positive ontological thesis about the extensions of modal categories. Rather, he means to criticize a certain conception of modalities that was prevalent among his rationalist predecessors, i.e., the conception of modalities as various determinations that enter the intensions of concepts of things.     

Internalism and the snapshot conception of phenomenal experience: A reply to Fisher

Justin Fisher (2007) has presented a novel argument designed to prove that all forms of mental internalism are false. I aim to show that the argument fails with regard to internalism about phenomenal experiences. The argument tacitly assumes a certain view about the ontology of phenomenal experience, which (inspired by Alva Noë) I call the “snapshot conception of phenomenal experience.” After clarifying what the snapshot conception involves, I present Fisher with a dilemma. If he rejects the snapshot conception, then his argument against phenomenal internalism collapses. But if he embraces the snapshot conception, then internalists may argue that in light of the snapshot conception, their view is not so implausible—and that if Fisher still disagrees, he owes us an argument that shows why phenomenal internalism is false even given the snapshot conception. I conclude the paper by showing that Fisher cannot escape my criticism by adjusting his argument so that it no longer depends on the snapshot conception.     

Is There Such a Thing as Relative Analyticity?

Fine bases his influential conception of essence on a particular account of definitions. And he complements it with a specific account of analyticity. I will argue that Fine's conception of relative analyticity confuses the idea of a sentence's being true in virtue of a term's definition with the idea of a sentence's being true in virtue of a term's meaning. His idea that correct definitions specify essential properties of meanings is mistaken. The correctness of definitions can only be assessed by reference to the actual usage of the terms involved. The resulting conception of definitions leads to a deflationary interpretation of claims about essences.     

From Conceptual Analysis to Serious Metaphysics

Abstract

Habermas’s recent work in epistemology has been marked by a decisive rejection of his earlier epistemic conception of truth in which he understood truth as ‘what may be accepted as rational under ideal conditions’. Arguing that no ‘idealization of justificatory conditions’ can do justice to both human fallibility and the unconditional nature of truth, he has attempted to develop a realistic conception of truth that severs any conceptual link between truth and justification while respecting the epistemic relevance of justification for ascertaining the truth. But realizing this second goal has proved elusive for Habermas because he veers too close to a form of metaphysical realism in his epistemology. By contrast, Hilary Putnam’s recent turn to what he calls ‘natural realism’ is more successful in articulating a form of realism that, in taking its leave of an epistemic conception of truth, still manages to keep its distance from metaphysical realism.     

Some results on extensions and modifications of the Theil — Sen regression estimator

Many robust regression estimators have been proposed that have a high, finite‐sample breakdown point, roughly meaning that a large porportion of points must be altered to drive the value of an estimator to infinity. But despite this, many of them can be inordinately influenced by two properly placed outliers. With one predictor, an estimator that appears to correct this problem to a fair degree, and simultaneously maintain good efficiency when standard assumptions are met, consists of checking for outliers using a projection‐type method, removing any that are found, and applying the Theil — Sen estimator to the data that remain. When dealing with multiple predictors, there are two generalizations of the Theil — Sen estimator that might be used, but nothing is known about how their small‐sample properties compare. Also, there are no results on testing the hypothesis of zero slopes, and there is no information about the effect on efficiency when outliers are removed. In terms of hypothesis testing, using the more obvious percentile bootstrap method in conjunction with a slight modification of Mahalanobis distance was found to avoid Type I error probabilities above the nominal level, but in some situations the actual Type I error probabilities can be substantially smaller than intended when the sample size is small. An alternative method is found to be more satisfactory.     

睽而知其类,异而知其通——《周易》睽卦卦爻辞新释

睽卦卦义为睽而通,其卦辞与各爻爻辞亦皆围绕此义而展开。睽是睽乖之义,睽乖之所以能通,是因为本卦还有逊退之象义。卦辞之所以仅"小事吉",是因为逊退只能用于非原则性冲突,或者仅作为一种策略运用。初九爻:"丧马"是睽,"勿逐自复"是通;"见恶人"是睽,"无咎"是通。九二爻:臣仆遇主人,本应退避,但"遇主于巷",避无所避,是睽;因属情势所逼,自身无过,故"无咎",是通。六三爻:受刑者艰难赶车,是睽;因赶车很卖力,喻能洗心革面,终能获吉,是通。九四爻:睽孤无助,是睽;遇元夫得助,是通。六五爻:同宗之间有乖违之事,是悔,是睽;乖违之事消解,故同宗之人一起登上宗祠吃肉庆祝,是通。上九爻:求婚或娶亲队伍似寇盗,是睽;"往遇雨则吉",是通。     

Wittgenstein on Set Theory and the Enormously Big

Wittgenstein's conception of infinity can be seen as continuing the tradition of the potential infinite that begins with Aristotle. Transfinite cardinals in set theory might seem to render the potential infinite defunct with the actual infinite now given mathematical legitimacy. But Wittgenstein's remarks on set theory argue that the philosophical notion of the actual infinite remains philosophical and is not given a mathematical status as a result of set theory. The philosophical notion of the actual infinite is not to be found in the mathematics of set theory, only in a certain associated philosophy – what Wittgenstein calls a certain kind of “prose”.     

Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis

This paper presents and defends an argument that the continuum hypothesis is false, based on considerations about objective chance and an old theorem due to Banach and Kuratowski. More specifically, I argue that the probabilistic inductive methods standardly used in science presuppose that every proposition about the outcome of a chancy process has a certain chance between 0 and 1. I also argue in favour of the standard view that chances are countably additive. Since it is possible to randomly pick out a point on a continuum, for instance using a roulette wheel or by flipping a countable infinity of fair coins, it follows, given the axioms of ZFC, that there are many different cardinalities between countable infinity and the cardinality of the continuum.