The Necessity of Thinking Historically – Heidegger After Nietzsche

ABSTRACT

This paper is concerned with the turning that occurs within the work of Martin Heidegger. In particular it seeks to reveal it as a turning that takes place within the notion of history as it is elaborated by Heidegger in the difference between Nietzsche and Hölderlin, that is, in the difference between philosophy and poetizing. It locates the necessity for such a turning in Heidegger's dissatisfaction with his own thinking up to the early 1930s (as suggested in his Black Notebooks). In particular the paper focuses on Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche over the question of nihilism in the hope of drawing out the different approaches of each thinker in trying to think this problem historically, and how this confrontation helps move Heidegger's thought towards a more poietical way of thinking. The paper concludes that Heidegger, in seeking to distinguish his thought from that of Nietzsche's, not only owes a debt to Nietzsche but that Heidegger's non-public texts of the late 1930s and early 1940s are also formally indebted to him.     

I. Frege's ‘Kernsätze zur Logik’

The short fragment of Frege's Nachlass which bears the above title, given to it by the editors, is in fact a sequence of connected comments by him on the Introduction to Lotze's Logik, or, more exactly, a response by him to that Introduction. It is thus very probably the earliest piece of writing from Frege's pen on the philosophy of logic surviving to us, and, when it is read in this light, the motivation for its author's puzzling selection of remarks and the turns of phrase he employs become intelligible. We see here an early attempt by Frege to attain clarity about a topic that was to preoccupy him throughout his entire philosophical career, the nature of thoughts.     

Reply to Reviews of Awakening the Dreamer: Clinical Journeys by Philip M. Bromberg

I reply here to reviews by three inspiring thinkers, Ethel Person, Susan Sands, and Allan Schore who, though uniquely different from one another in their conceptual frames of reference, share a sensibility as clinicians and creative scholars that has led them to engage and appreciate my work in depth while enriching it with their individual perspectives. Ethel Person's review is meaningful to me for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that we think very much alike about “how we are” with patients despite the diversity in our families of origin. Her thinking, which extends the boundaries established by any one school of thought, transcends doctrine, especially that of “technique.” I am equally grateful to Susan Sands, whose review stimulated a dialogue between us about the similarities and differences in our views of the analyst's personal role in enactments with severe trauma survivors and whether there is reason to distinguish between life-threatening and developmental trauma. My reply to Allan Schore's review satisfies a long-standing wish to engage with him in dialogue about what he refers to in his review as “a remarkable overlap between Bromberg's work in clinical psychoanalysis and my work in developmental neuropsychoanalysis, a deep resonance between his treatment model and my regulation theory” (this issue, p. 755). In my reply I comment from my own vantage point on how our shared commitment to an interpersonal and intersubjective perspective—my interpersonal/relational treatment model and his “Interpersonal Neurobiology” led us to arrive at overlapping views on developmental trauma, attachment, the dyadic regulation of states of consciousness, and dissociation.     

Claude Debussy's opera Pelléas et Mélisande: Secrecy,mystery and ambiguity in Debussy's life and art

Debussy attempted to conceal the stresses of his early life: his father leaving to fight in the Franco-Prussian War, his younger siblings being sent to live with an aunt, and Debussy remaining alone with his mother. His early-discovered musical talent provided him with a sense of continuity throughout his life. However, he felt his training at the Paris Conservatoire to be restrictive and rebelled against it in the musical style he developed. Debussy’s opera Pelléas et Mélisande gave him an opportunity to creatively depict these thwarted passions and his aversion to restriction.     

Borges and the Art of Mourning

In my reply to Susi Federici-Nebbiosi, I emphasize and elaborate on the points of agreement between us, as well as the points where our thinking differs. My primary point of difference regards the suggestion that my accepting Yossi for short-term treatment was acquiescence to his request. This is only partially true. From his point of view, I offered him a treatment substantially longer than the one he wanted, thus I was agreeing and not agreeing to his request simultaneously.

The main idea that I put forth in my paper is that we always construct our setting together with our patients and that this is, in itself, a therapeutic factor. I share Federici-Nebbiosi's observation that the setting has undergone a great deal more change in practice than is reflected in the literature, and that there is unease discussing the issue of setting. I offer some thoughts on this and express the hope that the present exchange of ideas will lead to further discussion.     

Kanian Freedom and the Problem of Luck

This article provides a brief explanation of Robert Kane's indeterministic, event‐causal libertarian theory of freedom and responsibility. It is noted that a number of authors have criticized libertarian theories, such as Kane's, by presenting the problem of luck. After noting how Kane has tried to answer this problem in his recent writings, the author goes on to explain Ishtiyaque Haji's recent version of the luck argument. The author considers three possible Kanian replies to Haji's luck argument and argues that the third reply can adequately answer the luck objection. It is also noted that the third reply requires making some significant alterations to Kane's theory that would also help him resolve certain problems with his views about responsibility for character.     

Francis Xavier: Figure of Exile and Holiness

Abstract

Francis Xavier was one of the great Christian figures of the 16th century. The aim of this article is to delineate some of the important, and sometimes underemphasised, influences on his life in order to help shed light on the motivation which inspired his activities. It sets him first within a brief account of his family background, university education and life-changing friendship with Ignatius Loyola, which is described as generating ‘the undying archetype of the twin, with Loyola at the centre of the universe and Xavier at its periphery, complementing each other as perfectly as the point and the circle’. Against the background of ‘ever-present’ Islam, it then addresses Xavier's experiences with the corrupt and rather secularised Portuguese colonial environment in India and East Asia, and the royal ecclesiastical patronage exercised under the Padroado system, which led him to the role of a ‘counter-figure’ an exile or castaway, lançado or degregado. Japanese culture and religion and Xavier's fascination with China are two further areas explored. Permeating this account is the question of the nature of Xavier's spiritual life and personal holiness, within which his adventurous voyages may ultimately be seen as an immense pilgrimage and as the sign of a sanctity that was augmented rather than diminished by the obscurity of his death.     

I. Mathematical modeling of election predictions: Final reply to professor Aubert

Professor Aubert's ‘three‐stage rocket’ (Inquiry, Vol. 26 [1983], No. 1) has reached periodic orbit. His comments on my earlier reply to his critique of my election predictions paper simply repeat arguments I have already refuted. In this note, I limit myself largely to pointing out Professor Aubert's misconceptions of what my position actually is. I find no reasons for revising the views stated in my original election predictions paper, nor any reasons for thinking that paper violated norms of scientific method that prevail in the natural sciences.     

The Role of Bayesian Concepts in Test Development and Test Interpretation

Column Editor's Note. Among Robert L. Thorndike's many contributions is his use of Bayesian thinking in test construction and his dissemination of information about Bayesian concepts. Thorndike's ability to render complex technical material comprehensible to nonspecialists prompted your editor to invite him to develop a series of three articles. In the first, readers are introduced to central tenets of Bayesian reasoning and are led to appreciate that it is not an esoteric approach reserved for specialists; rather, it is closely related to common sense. In the second article, to appear in next month's issue, Thorndike sketches some Bayesian approaches to test development. In the final installment, which will appear in November, Thondike illustrates how Bayesian thinking can and should be used to interpret test scores. When we interpret a score, we usually have prior test or nontest information about the examinee. “We should neither ignore nor overvalue this prior information but should skillfully use it to govern our interpretation of the new data. It is hoped that this trilogy will not only provide some interpretive skill but will also enhance commonsense thinking in a wide variety of professional and personal applications.—Gerald S. Hanna     

Problems with paccekabuddhas—decoding early Buddhism

Steven Collins's review (Religion 2:3 (July 1992), pp. 271–8) of my publication Ascetic Figures before and in Early Buddhism: the Emergence of Gautama as the Buddha, Berlin, New York, Mouton de Gruyter 1990) warrants an extended response for a variety of reasons. In a circumstance where a four‐thousand word review has not one positive thing to say about a book, then the principle of natural justice particularly cries out for the author's right of reply. If Collins's review should have the effect of putting off prospective readers of my book then my reply is designed to recuperate their interest. Notwithstanding, it does not take an adept in the art of hermeneutic suspicion to realize the review actually tells us much more about the reviewer than the book. I cannot think that frenzied expressions like ‘academic hooligan’, ‘hearer‐bashing’, ‘fantasy’, ‘biting the hand that feeds you, with a vengeance’ could so easily have poured forth from the pen of normally so gracious a reviewer, had this particular book not hit an emotive nerve—if nothing else!—and sent Collins into an unparalleled fit of moral panic. Indeed, I shall be so bold as to suggest that Collins's reaction to the book has less to do with questions of its scholarly credibility (though his academic posturing would have us believe otherwise): ‘the thesis is presented as historical scholarship, and so it must be judged on academic grounds’ (p. 274) than with Collins's own narrow, pedantic conception, or preconception, of Buddhist Studies. This means my rejoinder to Collins's review inevitably draws me into a discussion of broader methodological questions of general interest to the wider academic community as well as particular issues pertaining to Buddhist scholarship.     

Foucault's neoliberal ideology

Foucault's analysis of neoliberalism in The Birth of Biopolitics has had a considerable influence on the way that it is currently regarded. Nevertheless, his analysis is beset by numerous metatheoretical and methodological problems, which cause him to badly frame the phenomenon empirically. One expression of these problems is Foucault's willingness to accept at face value the way that neoliberalism's leading theorists portray it. Yet, over the past 40 years, what neoliberal theorists have said about neoliberalism has sharply deviated from its actual practices, which suggests that neoliberalism is an ideology, but because Foucault rejects the concept of ideology, his framework cannot entertain this possibility. Those who critique neoliberalism on the basis of his analysis, even when in opposition to Foucault's own inclinations, generally start from his uncritical assumptions and therefore often undercut the very purposes for which they put him to use. One such example is Wendy Brown, whose own influential Undoing the Demos demonstrates this inclination.     

RECONSIDERING BARTH'S REJECTION OF PRZYWARA'S ANALOGIA ENTIS

Many interpreters argue that Barth's rejection of Erich Przywara's analogia entis is based upon a misinterpretation and that Barth actually incorporated a form of the analogia entis into his mature theology. Through an examination of records from Przywara's visit to Barth's seminar on Thomas Aquinas at the University of Münster in 1929 along with key texts from that period, I argue that Barth did not reject the analogia entis because he misinterpreted it. Rather, he did so on the basis of an accurate account of its meaning and content provided to him personally by Przywara. I also argue that, while Barth's response to the analogia entis did change over the course of his career, he never retracted, either explicitly or implicitly, his rejection of it—nor should he have done so.     

Sense data and logical relations: Karin Costelloe-Stephen and Russell’s critique of Bergson

ABSTRACT

Though scholarship has explored Karin Costelloe-Stephen’s contributions to the history of psychoanalysis, as well as her relations to the Bloomsbury Group, her philosophical work has been almost completely ignored. This paper will examine her debate with Bertrand Russell over his criticism of Bergson. Costelloe-Stephen had employed the terminology of early analytic philosophy in presenting a number of arguments in defence of Bergson’s views. Costelloe-Stephen would object, among other things, to Russell’s use of an experiment which, as she points out, was first conducted by Carl Stumpf. Russell appeals to Stumpf's experiment in his attempt to prove that sense data are terms in logical relations, a thesis presupposed by the project of logical analysis outlined in Our Knowledge of the External World. A reformulated version of Costelloe-Stephen's argument put forth by this paper shows that Russell's argument fails to provide adequate proof for his thesis. Further modifications of the argument can also address a reconstruction (based on contemporary reports) of Russell's reply to Costelloe-Stephen. In his reply, Russell would use, already in 1914, the term ‘analytic philosophy’ in contrasting his and Moore’s approach to a continental one, exemplified by Bergson and Costelloe-Stephen.     

MOURNING,DREAMING, AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX

The author argues that the structure of mourning and the structure of the Oedipus complex are triadic, the latter being obvious and easy to conceptualize, while the former is quite subtle. When it is the father who is mourned, the son must repeatedly invoke the dead object so that libidinal cathexis can be reinvested in living objects. Such was the situation in which Freud found himself in 1896 when his father died—the triadic nature of the Oedipus complex ironically not yet discovered by him. In the author's belief, Freud's mourning and his attendant rich dream life occurring between 1896 and 1897 gave him access to the unconscious raw material that would eventually help him conceptualize the triadic structure at the instinctual core of the Oedipus complex.     

JUSTICE,INCENTIVES AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

In Rescuing Justice and Equality, G. A. Cohen reiterates his critique of John Rawls's difference principle as a justification for inequality‐generating incentives, and also argues that Rawls's ambition to provide a constructivist defence of the first principles of justice is doomed. Cohen's arguments also suggest a natural response to my earlier attempt to defend the basic structure objection to Cohen's critique, which I term the alien factors reply. This paper criticises the reply, and Cohen's more general argument against Rawls's constructivism. 1     

You Must Have Thought This Book Was About You1: Reply to Daniel Dennett

Daniel Dennett's review 2 of my book, Human Nature and the Limits of Science, 3 was apparently conceived as part of a multiple review, anticipating an author's response, so I am grateful for the opportunity to satisfy this expectation. Indeed, Dennett uses this excuse to justify devoting his own contribution to responding to those parts of the book directed explicitly at his own work, leaving other imagined reviewers to take care of other issues. Since he has things to say about most of the topics in the book he evidently interpreted this remit widely, in fact taking the book as “presented as an antidote of sorts to [his] own world view” (p. 482). Let me begin, therefore, by reassuring Dennett that, while I certainly had some critical things to say about some of his views, the book most certainly was not intended as an ad hominem attack. The nine pages (out of 187) on which his work is cited fairly accurately reflects the extent to which his views figured in my thinking. Curiously, his ire seems most strongly aroused by my assault on his views on free will in which, apparently, I agree with nearly everything he says and, worse still, fail to cite him at all.     

I. Frege as a Realist

H. Sluga (Inquiry, Vol. 18 [1975], No. 4) has criticized me for representing Frege as a realist. He holds that, for Frege, abstract objects were not real: this rests on a mistranslation and a neglect of Frege's contextual principle. The latter has two aspects: as a thesis about sense, and as one about reference. It is only under the latter aspect that there is any tension between it and realism: Frege's later silence about the principle is due, not to his realism, but to his assimilating sentences to proper names. Contrary to what Sluga thinks, the conception of the Bedeutung of a name as its bearer is an indispensable ingredient of Frege's notion of Bedeutung, as also is the fact that it is in the stronger of two possible senses that Frege held that Sinn determines Bedeutung. The contextual principle is not to be understood as meaning that thoughts are not, in general, complex; Frege's idea that the sense of a sentence is compounded out of the senses of its component words is an essential component of his theory of sense. Frege's realism was not the most important ingredient in his philosophy: but the attempt to interpret him otherwise than as a realist leads only to misunderstanding and confusion.     

SHIFTING BETWEEN ALTERNATIVE MODES OF COGNITION: CAN FREE ASSOCIATION,IN AND OF ITSELF,PROVE THERAPEUTIC?

From early on in his career, at the time of his treatment of Frau Emmy von N., Freud (Breuer and Freud 1895) recognized the value of listening to the patient's material without attempting to steer it along a particular course. His focus on the method of freie Einfalle (free association), to be presented to the patient as the fundamental rule of analytic treatment, led to his recommendation that the analyst listen with evenly suspended attention (Freud 1912 ). But is free association therapeutic in and of itself? The author proposes an affirmative reply to this question based on the contribution of free association to the patient's nascent ability to shift between active and passive modes of cognition.     

An Assessment of Robert Jenson's Hermeneutics on Divine Im/Passibility and the Emotions of God

The term apatheia, ‘impassibility’, has had varied meanings in Christian history. While some theologians have dismissed this attribute due to its Greek origins – as Paul Gavrilyuk states, a classic case of committing the genetic fallacy – Robert Jenson has prudently noted that for some of the church Fathers impassibility did not mean God was affectionless as the Greeks proposed; rather, it meant eternal faithfulness. This essay examines whether Jenson's appropriation of the early church's understanding of apatheia is true to the Fathers' original intentions. I first identify Jenson's assumptions regarding his interpretation of Scripture that causes him to conclude that God is im/passible. I then assess the validity of Jenson's claim that his own view is the same as the early church Fathers.     

From Latimer's Fellow-martyr to the ‘English Calvin': Nicholas Ridley's Reputation and the Circulation of A brief declaracion of the Lordes Supper, 1555-1570

Abstract

Nicholas Ridley, the Edwardian Bishop of London, was executed in 1555 during Mary Tudor's reign. An active publicist, he composed in prison a didactic treatise that promoted the Reformed view of the Eucharist and was published in Emden (1555) and in Strasbourg (1556). In 1556, A brief declaracion found its way to Geneva where a community of English exiles had it translated into Latin (Conrad Badius then issued a version in French). Not only did the translation acquire a polemical edge, but certain allusions, scattered in the preface and in the margins of the text, turned Ridley's treatise into a ‘Calvinist’ manifesto at a time when Calvin was ardently defending his views against the Lutheran polemicist, Westphal. Meanwhile, Jean Crespin made use of Badius's version in his martyrologies and reprinted Ridley's treatise in his 1570 edition. Whereas in England, Ridley's works began to be perceived as controversial after Mary's death, Crespin and Beza (Icones, 1580) kept his treatise alive and heralded him as the ‘English Calvin’ in French Reformed circles.