Spinoza on the Conditions that Nominally Define the Human Condition

ABSTRACT

In ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ Harry Frankfurt argues that a successful analysis of the concept ‘human’ must reveal something that distinguishes humans from non-humans, as well as indicate something informative about ‘those attributes [of ourselves] which are the subject of our most humane concern.’ In this paper, I present an analysis of Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ as it is employed within his Ethics. I show that Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ satisfies Frankfurt’s desiderata because I show that Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ is, at core, a version of Frankfurt’s own. I argue that Spinoza’s account of human bondage and human freedom indicate that Spinoza sees humans as beings that possess higher-order volitions, and that comments Spinoza makes throughout his corpus shows that he views beings that lack higher order desires to be, in an important sense, non-human. The analysis here sheds light upon the community of entities that Spinoza’s Ethics is written for, as well as upon issues concerning the nature of Spinoza’s Free Man.     

Cares,Identification, and Agency Reductionism

Reductionists about agency maintain that an agent's causing something is reducible to states and events involving the agent causing something. Some worry that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self‐determination. One reductionist answer to this worry, which I call ‘identification reductionism,’ contends that self‐governing agents are identified with certain attitudes, and so these attitudes causing a decision count as the agent's self‐determining the decision. I argue that a prominent species of identification reductionism developed by Harry Frankfurt, Agnieszka Jaworska, Jeffrey Seidman, and David Shoemaker – according to which an agent is identified with his (deepest) cares – is inadequate.     

Bratman on identity over time and identification at a time

According to reductionists about agency, an agent’s bringing something about is reducible to states and events (such as desires and beliefs) involving the agent bringing something about. Many have worried that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self-determination. One common reductionist answer to this worry (which I call “identification reductionism”) contends that self-determining agents are identified with certain states and events, and so these states and events causing a decision counts as the agent’s self-determining the decision. In this paper, I discuss Michael Bratman’s well-known identification reductionist theory and his general strategy of grounding an agent’s identification at a time in the agent’s identity over time. I develop two constraints that an adequate identification reductionist theory must satisfy, argue that Bratman’s theory cannot satisfy both, and show that his general strategy for grounding an agent’s identification at a time in the agent’s identity over time is without merit.     

Mottainai: a Japanese sense of anima mundi

The Japanese expression ‘Mottainai!’ can be translated as ‘What a waste!’ or ‘Don't be wasteful!’ However, mottainai means much more than that. It expresses a sense of concern or regret for whatever is wasted because its intrinsic value is not properly utilized. Buddhism and Japan's indigenous religion, Shinto, are integral to the Japanese psyche, accordingly the other‐than‐human world is also experienced and lived in daily life. In the Japanese worldview everything in nature is endowed with spirit, every individual existence is dependent on others and all are connected in an ever‐changing world. Mottainai offers a glimpse of the anima mundi inherent in this worldview. This contrasts with our anthropocentric Zeitgeist, which manifests outwardly as environmental crisis and inwardly as fixation upon social interactions, especially through communication technologies, to the exclusion of all else. Jung's statement, ‘The decisive question for man is: Is he related to something infinite or not? That is the telling question of his life’, has never been more pertinent. Encounters beyond the human world could be understood as touching this ‘something infinite’, and the apparent benefits of such experiences in the analytical process are illustrated with clinical vignettes from the author's practice.     

THE NEUTRALITY OF RIGHTNESS AND THE INDEXICALITY OF GOODNESS: BEYOND OBJECTIVITY AND BACK AGAIN

My purpose in the present paper is two‐fold: to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the difference between rightness and virtue; and to systematically account for the role of objective rightness in an individual person's decision making. I argue that a decision to do something virtuous differs from a decision to do what's right not simply, as is often supposed, in being motivated differently but, rather, in being taken from a different point of view. My argument to that effect is the following. The ‘objectively right’ course of action must be right, ‘neutrally’ speaking, that is right for each of the participants in a given situation: if it is right for you to do A, then it cannot, at the same time, be right for me to prevent you from doing A. But the latter is precisely how things work with virtuous action: for instance, it may be virtuous of you to assume responsibility for my blunder, but it isn't virtuous of me to let you do so. I maintain, on this basis, that, while objectivity does have normative force in moral decision‐making, the objective viewpoint is not, typically, the viewpoint from which decisions to act virtuously are taken. I then offer an account of objectivity's constraining power.     

Consciousness as an Inhibited Manifestation and Quantum Physics

The term soul is used in the traditional literature as a synonym for one’s true Self and is associated with the subjective essence of one’s living. Since, we don’t have any means to quantify it, the science has ruled out this idea from its investigations. But, in a recent study, Ceylan et al. (2017) has reintroduced the word soul to scientific literature and examined the possibility of the study of the soul through scientific modalities. The primary focus of their study is to find and understand the scientific analog of the soul as quoted and discussed in the traditional literature. In the present paper, we examine the idea of a soul that uses a novel approach; integrating neuroscience and quantum physics, as proposed in Ceylan et al. (2017). For this purpose, we make use of findings from neuroscientific studies on meditation to understand the concepts of soul and consciousness in terms of inhibition mechanisms. In this context, this paper serves as an attempt to call for more studies to discuss and expand the hypothesis about the soul as uninhibited mental activity.     

How Berkeley's Gardener Knows His Cherry Tree

The defense of common sense in Berkeley's Three Dialogues is, first and foremost, a defense of the gardener's claim to know his cherry tree, a claim threatened by both Cartesian and Lockean philosophy. This defense depends on the esse is percipi thesis (EIP). EIP is not something the gardener believes; rather, it is a philosophical analysis of the rules he unreflectively follows in his use of the word ‘exists’. Uncovering these connections between Berkeley's epistemology and philosophy of language will clarify Berkeley's strategy for bringing his reader back to common sense and practical engagement in the ordinary affairs of life.     

REVIVING GERMAN-JEWISH COMEDY: DANI LEVY'S FAMILY FARCE GO FOR ZUCKER!

Dani Levy's film Go for Zucker! (2004) won a myriad of prizes in 2005 and was touted as the first Jewish comedy to be produced in Germany since the rise of National Socialism. Critics and scholars who have analysed Levy's popular film tend to focus on its presentation of Jewish characters as something other than victims of the Shoah and on its comic engagement with persistent social and cultural divisions between East and West Germans in post-reunification Germany. What these otherwise valid approaches ignore, however, is an additional historical and cultural layer of interpretation, one that more aptly fulfils Levy's goal of paying homage to pre-Shoah forms of self-deprecating German-Jewish humour. Such examples of the Jewish comedic tradition reach even further back in time than the early twentieth-century films of Ernst Lubitsch and the Hollywood films of Billy Wilder to include turn-of-the-century Jargon theatre and the metropolitan revue show, forms of popular entertainment that thrived in Imperial Berlin and delighted mixed audiences of Jews and Gentiles. By reviving a comic past, in which Jewishness could be staged in a variety of ways without derision, Levy's film provides hope that contemporary Germany might once again become a place where Jewish and non-Jewish Germans can laugh together.     

Performing the imago Dei: human enhancement,artificial intelligence and optative image-bearing

If the imago Dei is not a taxonomic definition but rather something that is performed in context, what are the implications for questions of human enhancement and the development of artificial intelligence (AI)? The author considers Alistair McFadyen’s performative vision of the imago Dei, one that actively seeks humanity in concrete situations, in the context of human enhancement and AI, asking the questions, ‘Does becoming cyborg through human enhancement make us less bearers of the divine image?’ And, ‘Can AI ever be considered to be in the image of God?’ Briefly tracing the shift in perspectives on the imago Dei, before considering what a performance of the image might look like, the author proposes three performances that have significant implications for questions about what it means to be human. To be an image-bearer is not dependent upon human DNA or species membership, but on an optative performance of the imago Dei.     

Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Heterodox dictum de omni et de nullo

Aristotle's explanation of what is said ‘of every’ and ‘of none’ has been interpreted either as involving individuals (of which something is said ‘of every’, or of which something is said ‘of none’), or as regarding exclusively universal terms. I claim that Alexander of Aphrodisias endorsed this latter interpretation of the dictum de omni et de nullo. This interpretation affects our understanding of Alexander's syllogistic: as a matter of fact, Alexander maintained that the dictum de omni et de nullo is one of the core principles of syllogistic.     

NATURE MAKES AN ASCENT FROM THE LOWER TO THE HIGHER: GREGORY OF NYSSA ON HUMAN DISTINCTIVENESS

This essay explores the way in which early Christian writers held an eschatological understanding of what it is to be human, something that is to be attained, through the transformation of death and resurrection, and something that requires our assent. In this context, the article offers a new reading of the late fourth-century work entitled On the Human Image of God (otherwise known in English as On the Making of Man) by Gregory of Nyssa. It argues that Gregory structured his text in parallel to the three parts of Timaeus’ speech in Plato's dialogue. The resulting picture sees creation as a dynamic ascent from the lower forms of life to the higher, a growth which is recapitulated in the life-span of each human being, and also the growth of the human race into the totality of human beings that together constitute the human being in the image of God, the body of Christ.     

Toward a Spinozistic modification of skinner's theory of man

B. F. Skinner argues in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York 1971) that only his theory of man is compatible with a ‘scientific’ approach to human behavior. I argue that Skinner's entirely open‐ended view of man is inadequate for his own purposes in that it leaves no room for the claim that certain value judgments are universally valid, something I argue Skinner is committed to despite an explicit avowal in one place of cultural relativism. I then go on to show that a modification of Skinner's theory of man which builds on Spinoza's notion of conatus would provide one with a theory‐based rationale for universally valid judgments without involving one in a ‘non‐scientific’ approach to human behavior. Specifically, I argue that such a Spinozistic modification would provide one with a theory‐based guarantee that man will not evolve in such a way that a truly scientific observer would deem a totalitarian state good.     

Wittgenstein,Quasi-fideism,and Scepticism

In the discussion of certainties, or ‘hinges’, in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty some of the examples that Wittgenstein uses are religious ones. He remarks on how a child might be raised so that they ‘swallow down’ belief in God (§107) and in discussing the role of persuasion in disagreements he asks us to think of the case of missionaries converting natives (§612). In the past decade Duncan Pritchard has made a case for an account of the rationality of religious belief inspired by On Certainty which he calls ‘quasi-fideism’. Pritchard argues that religious beliefs are just like ordinary non-religious beliefs in presupposing fundamental arational commitments. However, Modesto Gómez-Alonso has recently argued that there are significant differences between the kinds of ‘hinges’ discussed in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and religious beliefs such that we should expect an account of rationality in religion to be quite different to the account of rational practices and their foundations that we find in Wittgenstein’s work. Fundamental religious commitments are, as Wittgenstein said, in the foreground of the religious believer’s life whereas hinge commitments are said to be in the background. People are passionately committed to their religious beliefs but it is not at all clear that people are passionately committed to hinges such as that ‘I have two hands’. I argue here that although there are differences between religious beliefs and many of the hinge-commitments discussed in On Certainty religious beliefs are nonetheless hinge-like. Gómez-Alonso’s criticisms of Pritchard mischaracterise his views and something like Pritchard’s quasi-fideism is the correct account of the rationality of religious belief.

     

Depictions of Gender Across Eight Decades of Disney Animated Film: The Role of Film Producer,Director, and Writer Gender

Depictions of gender in media are often scrutinized for stereotypical patterns. Disney films are of particular interest, as they are often watched by children and may play a role in children’s gender socialization. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to assess gender depictions of characters in animated Disney films (released between 1937 and 2019; 61 films with 323 characters total), and second, to explore depictions of gender in Disney animated films coupled with an analysis of the gender of those involved in the production of these films (producers, directors, and writers). We found a significant difference in the number of male and female characters (roughly 60% male, 40% female), which did not significantly differ by decade. Female characters were more consistently depicted as attractive compared to male characters, although character’s intelligence, ability, popularity, activity level, family role, story role, and romantic engagement did not differ by gender. Male characters were more often represented as parents or children in films written by women, and female characters were more often represented as the antagonist in films written by men. Male characters were over-represented as overly active in films produced by women, and female characters were over-represented as grandparents in films produced by women. These findings revealed few stereotypical gendered depictions of characters in Disney films over nine decades and that the inclusion of women in the production process resulted in more nuanced depictions of both male and female characters.

     

Attention,People of Earth! Aristotelian Ethics and the Problem of Exclusion

Abstract

Growth in human happiness seems to do in part with insights gained through attentive emotional engagement with fictional characters and their identities. For this reason it is important to pay attention to the critique that founding ethics on what we cannot but affirm of ourselves, our identity (rationality and sociability, in Nussbaum’s reading of Aristotle), amounts to a moral elitism, excluding those who fail to meet these marks of human identity. This objection throws light on the importance of the shift towards thematizing ‘subjectivity’ in modern and contemporary philosophy. Ethics takes place at the level of the deliberating subject, intending the good. The foundational element is grasped through moral commitment and not at all ‘neutrally’, in a disengaged attitude alien to human aspirations – something disturbingly overlooked in much normative ethics today. The criteria picked out as essential to our humanity are clarifications of this commitment, and involve an attitude of inclusivity. In our own non-classical philosophical framework this needs spelling out, in a manner not made clear in Nussbaum’s ‘self-validating’ arguments, in terms of the exigencies of self-enactment and personal identity. This also answers critics who would disallow the conflation of identity and judgments of value.     

Attitudes to suffering: Parfit and Nietzsche

Abstract

In On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that Nietzsche does not disagree with central normative beliefs that ‘we’ hold. Such disagreement would threaten Parfit’s claim that normative beliefs are known by intuition. However, Nietzsche defends a conception of well-being that challenges Parfit’s normative claim that suffering is bad in itself for the sufferer. Nietzsche recognizes the phenomenon of ‘growth through suffering’ as essential to well-being. Hence, removal of all suffering would lead to diminished well-being. Parfit claims that if Nietzsche understood normative concepts in Parfit’s objectivist sense, he would not disagree with the claim that suffering is bad in itself – that intrinsic facts about suffering count in favour of our not wanting it. I argue that Nietzsche would disagree. Suffering for Nietzsche is not merely instrumentally necessary for psychological growth, nor is it easy to construe it as something bad in itself that contributes value as part of a good whole. Suffering that can be given meaning through growth is something we have reason to want. Suffering that remains brute and uninterpreted is something we have reason not to want. But for Nietzsche, suffering as such has no invariant value across all contexts.     

Intentional Objects,Pretence, and the Quasi-Relational Nature of Mental Phenomena: A New Look at Brentano on Intentionality

Abstract

Brentano famously changed his mind about intentionality between the 1874 and 1911 editions of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (PES). The 1911 edition repudiates the 1874 view that to think about something is to stand in a relation to something that is within in the mind, and holds instead that intentionality is only like a relation (it is ‘quasi-relational’). Despite this, Brentano still insists that mental activity involves ‘the reference to something as an object’, much as he did in the 1874 edition of PES. The question is what Brentano might have meant by this, given that he rejects a relational account of intentionality. The present paper suggests an answer. It draws on recent work on pretence theory to provide a model of Brentano’s notion of the quasi-relational nature of mental phenomena, as well as of the notion of mental reference to an object, and argues that the model helps to explain why Brentano might have been able discern a clear continuity between the views of the 1874 and 1911 editions of PES, despite the differences.     

Discourse,agency and the question of evil

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of evil from an ethical and discourse-analytical perspective, taking Joan Copjec’s commentary on Kant’s notion of ‘radical evil’ and its relation to human freedom as its point of departure. Specifically, Copjec’s argument, that for Kant (and, one may add, for Lacan) the subject is always “in excess of itself”, provides an important foil for, or corrective to what may seem to be the upshot of Foucault’s notion of discourse (its heuristic value notwithstanding). The latter entails that, insofar as the subject is ineluctably discursively constructed, its actions could be understood as being ‘determined’ by the discursive structure of (its) subjectivity. That is, the subject as agent may seem to lack volitional freedom in the sense that it is merely an instrument of a certain discourse by which it is ’spoken‘. However, Kant’s idea of ’radical evil‘, it is further argued, presupposes that the subject is free, in other words, that it always exceeds itself. In Foucault’ s terms, this would mean that the subject of discourse is able to adopt a counter-discursive position - something Foucault sometimes seems to make room for. What Kant calls ‘radical evil’ may be understood as something that occurs in the world through human agency, in the face of the possibility of an alternative course of action; that is, it is chosen - even if we only know this in retrospect through the phenomenon of guilt. i, in contrast, it is understood as being ‘diabolical’ in the sense of being unavoidably and irresistibly part and parcel of human ‘nature’, no one could condemn it in moral terms. This line of thinking is fleshed out, or given concrete significance by means of a discourse-analysis of documents pertaining to the so-called ‘ripper-rapist’ (criminal) case in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, in the mid-1990s.     

Not starting psychotherapy is more often initiated by the therapist than the patient

The phenomenon of not starting psychotherapy is seldom investigated. The present study of psychotherapy in the Swedish mental health services differentiates between patients applying for and being offered psychotherapy but choosing not to start (n = 69), patients recommended to receive no treatment, another type of treatment or treatment at another clinic (n = 133), and therapy starters (n = 1294). After the initial assessment, nearly twice as many patients did not start based on the therapist’s decision than on the patient’s. Cases of not starting psychotherapy decided by the therapist were more frequent among patients whose occupational status was less stable, presented a danger to others, had lower levels of initial therapeutic alliance, and by therapists with lower levels of psychotherapy training and those at less structured and more unstable clinics. Patients choosing not to start therapy had lower levels of mental ill-health than both starters and therapist-initiated nonstarters. The most frequently presented reason for a patient-initiated decision to not start therapy was “patient wished another treatment or therapist,” whereas the most common therapist-initiated reason was “recommended or referred to another treatment or clinic”.     

Women with Beards and Men in Frocks: Gender Nonconformity in Modern American Film

The present study examines the portrayal of gender nonconformity in 36 American films released from 2001 to 2011. Mainstream and independent films with at least one character portrayed in a gender transgressive way were chosen for analysis. The films were coded at two levels: (1) the entire film, and (2) the individual characters. The entire films were coded for mainstream versus independent production, genre, and screen time of gender nonconforming characters. The characters were coded for the type of gender transgression, the characters’ demographics, and their purposes in the plot. The most common purpose of the non-conforming characters was humor, especially in mainstream films. Exploring identity was a much less common purpose and these films were far more likely to be independent films. The non-conforming characters were far more likely to identify as a static identity, man or woman, rather than anything else. Gender identity was almost always presented as something simple, static and binary.