Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil,or Part of the Problem?

Theodicy, the enterprise of searching for greater goods that might plausibly justify God’s permission of evil, is often criticized on the grounds that the project has systematically failed to unearth any such goods. But theodicists also face a deeper challenge, one that places under question the very attempt to look for any morally sufficient reasons God might have for creating a world littered with evil. This ‘anti-theodical’ view argues that theists (and non-theists) ought to reject, primarily for moral reasons, the project of ‘justifying the ways of God to men’. Unfortunately, this view has not received the serious attention it deserves, particularly in analytic philosophy of religion. Taking my cues from such anti-theodicists as Kenneth Surin, D.Z. Phillips and Dostoyevsky’s Ivan Karamazov, I defend several reasons for holding that the way of thinking about God and evil enshrined in theodical discourse can only add to the world’s evils, not remove or illuminate them.

Is There a Problem of Special Angelic Action?

One of the most widely discussed topics in the recent science & theology literature has been divine activity. It is odd that in this literature there has been no discussion of whether and how to accommodate special angelic action (hereafter SAA). Just as the Bible records many instances of apparent SDA, it records many instances of apparent SAA. This neglect may be due to an assumption that there is no distinct problem relating to SAA; the existing suggested solutions to the problem(s) surrounding SDA may be transferable to the angelic context. My aim is to disprove that idea.     

Is the Problem of Divine Hiddenness a Problem for the Reformed Epistemologist?

The problem of divine hiddenness, currently a much‐discussed topic in analytic philosophy of religion, can be (roughly) summarized in the question, ‘Why is God not more obvious or apparent?’ Sometimes the problem is used to undermine theistic belief. Here we seek to add a unique contribution to the growing debate on this theme from the perspective of Reformed epistemology, particularly Alvin Plantinga's construal; moreover, we do so in a way that is theologically relevant. We conclude, with assistance from Scripture and from Plantinga, that the problem of divine hiddenness is not a problem for the Reformed epistemologist.     

Moral Evil and Leibniz’s Form/Matter Defense of Divine Omnipotence

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Leibniz’s form/matter defense of omnipotence is paradoxical, but not irretrievably so. Leibniz maintains that God necessarily must concur only in the possibility for evil’s existence in the world (the form of evil), but there are individual instances of moral evil that are not necessary (the matter of evil) with which God need not concur. For Leibniz, that there is moral evil in the world is contingent on God’s will (a dimension of divine omnipotence), with the result that even though it is necessary that God exerts his will, there are particular products of his will that are contingent and unnecessary—including human moral evil. If there are instances of evil which are contingent on God’s will and yet unnecessary, then the problematic conclusion for Leibniz’s view must be that human evil depends upon divine concurrence, not just for its possibility in the world (which is necessary) but for its instance (which is contingent). If the form/matter defense of omnipotence contains a true paradox, then God concurs in the form as well as the matter of evil. To assuage this difficulty for Leibniz, I will argue that he could either give up an Augustinian notion of evil, or rely upon a distinction between *potenta absoluta* and *potenta ordinate*, which was popular among important thinkers in the medieval period.     

Dirty Hands and Moral Conflict – Lessons from the Philosophy of Evil

Philosophia - According to one understanding of the problem of dirty hands, every case of dirty hands is an instance of moral conflict, but not every instance of moral conflict is a case of dirty...     

Aquinas’s Miracles and the Luciferous Defence: The Problem of the Evil/Miracle Ratio

Miracles and the problem of evil are two prominent areas of research within philosophy of religion. On occasion these areas converge, with God’s goodness being brought into question by the claim that either there is a lack of miracles, or there are immoral miracles. In this paper I shall highlight a second manner in which miracles and the problem of evil relate. Namely, I shall give reason as to why what is considered to be miraculous may be dependent upon a particular response to the problem of natural evil. To establish this claim, I shall focus upon Aquinas’s definition of a miracle and a particular free-will defence, the Luciferous defence.

Problem Drinking: A Problem for the Theory of Reasoned Action?1

The present study examined the sufficiency of the theory of reasoned action (TRA) to predict intention and behavior with respect to problem drinking, as well as the ability of the theory of planned behavior (TPB) to predict intention and behavior over and above the TRA. The role of perceived control in the TPB was also examined. A 12-year longitudinal study on alcohol and drug use attitudes and behavior provided the context for this investigation. Two criterion variables were examined: intention to get drunk and frequency of getting drunk. It was hypothesized that heavier drinkers would perceive less control over their drinking. Coincidentally, the TRA, which assumes the behavior being predicted is volitional, would become less predictive as drinking became heavier. Furthermore, the TPB, which extends the TRA to include perceived (volitional) control over the behavior would be more predictive of intention and behavior than the TRA. All three hypotheses were supported. In addition, perceived control proved to be differentially predictive for nonproblem and problem drinkers. Specifically, perceived control contributed to the prediction of intention to get drunk for nonproblem drinkers, but to the prediction of behavior (frequency of getting drunk) for problem drinkers. Implications of these results for theory development and application are discussed.     

The Action of God in the World—A Synthesis of Process Thought in Science and Theology

A foundational belief of monotheistic religions is that God acts in the world. In this paper, the case is made that divine action has its origins in the molecular world. Within a metaphysical framework of process thought, a hypothesis is constructed in which God's action in the world, God's ‘initial aim’ for all actualities, is divine motivation of chemical becoming.     

Breathing New Life Into the World‐Soul? Revisiting an Old Doctrine Through the Lens of Current Debates on Special Divine Action

Nicholas Saunders’ 2002 book Divine Action and Modern Science remains among the most significant and widely‐cited recent contributions to the literature on special divine action (SDA). One of the tasks he takes up in that work is to critique a wide assortment of models of SDA, including that of Grace Jantzen. Her account employs the panentheistic notion that the physical universe is related to God in a manner closely analogous to the way in which a human body is related to the human mind—that is, the cosmos is God’s body. And just as we humans can exercise basic actions on and with our bodies without violating the laws of nature, God can exercise basic action on parts of the cosmos without such violations, thereby providing a workable non‐interventionist model of SDA. Saunders critiques this model on both philosophical and theological grounds, and moves on to consider another: the idea that God never acts directly on the cosmos, but instead interacts with the world by influencing human minds, which influence needn’t involve the violation of laws. This model too comes in for heavy criticism. In this essay I suggest a way of retaining important aspects of both of these accounts while sidestepping the criticisms levelled by Saunders. This can be done by reviving an idea sympathetically entertained by such notables as Plato, several early Church fathers (including Augustine), and Isaac Newton: that of a World‐Soul distinct from God.     

The Problem of a Subjective Authenticity and the Articulation of Belonging among the Irish in England—A Psychosocial Approach

This article presents the question of identity and authenticity as a problematic one, capable of investigation through a psychosocial lens. “Authenticity,” as explored by Erickson (1995) and Weigert (2009), may be understood as a commitment to self-values, meaning and motivation. Feeling “true to oneself” thus becomes an intensely personal affective project, which remains theoretically the preserve of the individual subject, and thus incapable of challenge by others. However, as identity is inherently social, there is a need to interrogate the affective nature of belonging to a collective identity. In particular, I consider how this personalised sense of authenticity may come into conflict with the need to have one’s personal identity recognised as authentic within the wider set of meaning-makings around the collectivity. I argue that this problem of authenticity and belonging may arise in the interplay between the personal and the collective in three ways: reflection, recognition and ownership. Any articulation of belonging to a collective identity whilst maintaining a personally “felt” authenticity must negotiate these three aspects. In this article, I develop these ideas through my own recent research on discourses of authenticity among the Irish in England. Drawing on Wetherell’s (2012) recent articulation of the affective-discursive, I explore how one second-generation Irish woman articulates her experiences of “belonging” and personal “authenticity” in interview talk. I argue that the resolution of dilemmas around the affective and collective nature of authenticity can be usefully investigated by attending to the co-construction of the interview between participant and interviewer. The positioning of the interviewer and the power dynamics of the interview thus become key modes of enquiry in the psychosocial analysis of authenticity.