Is perceptual salience needed in explanations of the isolation effect?

The isolation effect is a well-known phenomenon that has a well-accepted explanation: An item that is isolated on a list becomes perceptually salient, which leads to extra rehearsal that enhances memory for the isolate. To evaluate this hypothesis, the authors isolated an item near the beginning of a list. Immediately after each item was presented for study, participants judged the likelihood of recalling the item. Although the isolation effect occurred, participants did not judge the isolate as being more memorable than the preceding item, suggesting that the isolate was not salient. In a second experiment, participants rehearsed items aloud. Isolation at the beginning of the list did not produce extra rehearsal. By contrast, isolation in the middle of the list produced extra rehearsal; however, even when the isolate did not receive extra rehearsal, an isolation effect was evident. Thus, salience and extra rehearsal are not necessary for producing an isolation effect.     

Is a false belief statement a lie or a truthful statement? Judgments and explanations of children aged 3 to 8

Attribution of a false belief is usually taken to indicate that children distinguish between a real world state of affairs and its representation by a subject. But how do they conceive of the properties of such a mental entity? Do they understand that false belief necessarily goes hand in hand with good faith? Our study explores to what extent children conflate false beliefs with lies. Sixty children aged 3 to 8 were presented with an FB situation and then asked whether the character having an FB was lying or not. Results show that up to 6 years, although correctly attributing the FB, children systematically judge the FB statement to be a lie, since it does not correspond to the real world state of affairs. Older children succeed in the lie judgment, invoking the false believer's not knowing the world state. Discussion bears on the relation between false belief and more general epistemic states.     

Is belief reasoning automatic?

Understanding the operating characteristics of theory of mind is essential for understanding how beliefs, desires, and other mental states are inferred, and for understanding the role such inferences could play in other cognitive processes. We present the first investigation of the automaticity of belief reasoning. In an incidental false-belief task, adult subjects responded more slowly to unexpected questions concerning another person's belief about an object's location than to questions concerning the object's real location. Results in other conditions showed that responses to belief questions were not necessarily slower than responses to reality questions, as subjects showed no difference in response times to belief and reality questions when they were instructed to track the person's beliefs about the object's location. The results suggest that adults do not ascribe beliefs to agents automatically.     

Is analytical psychology a religion? Rationalist and romantic approaches to religion and modernity

The relationship between analytical psychology and religion is part of the larger issue of the relationship between modernity and religion. There are three main views on the issue. The fundamentalist position sets religion against modernity and opts for religion over modernity. What I call the 'rationalist' position likewise sets religion against modernity but opts for modernity over religion. By contrast to both views, what I call the 'romantic' position reconciles religion with modernity. Rationalists maintain that religion can exist only in so far as it serves as an explanation of the physical world, which the rise of science now precludes. Romantics maintain that religion, while serving as an explanation of the physical world till dislodge by science, is at heart anything but an explanation. The toppling of the religions explanation by the scientific one, far from dooming religion, prods religion into making explicit what it has in fact been all along. By this categorization, Jung is overwhelmingly a romantic. For him, the function of religion has always been more psychological than explanatory, and the rise of science does not preclude the continuing existence of religious myths as a psychological rather than an explanatory phenomenon. For those for whom science does spell the demise of religion, secular myths can replace religious ones, and those secular myths are more secular versions of religions myths than secular alternatives to religions myths. Yet even if for Jung religion can still exist today because religion is in fact psychology, it does not follow that psychology is therefore a religion.     

Eliminativism and the ambiguity of ‘belief’

It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms theoretical and belief are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of theoretical that is of use to the eliminativist, and in this sense some kinds of belief (dispositional states, infra-conscious states and the Freudian unconscious) are indeed theoretical and hence possible candidates for elimination, while others (consciously occurring thoughts like judgements and perceptualGestalten) are not theoretical and hence not candidates for elimination.     

Is knowledge justified true belief?

Is knowledge justified true belief? Most philosophers believe that the answer is clearly ‘no’, as demonstrated by Gettier cases. But Gettier cases don’t obviously refute the traditional view that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). There are ways of resisting Gettier cases, at least one of which is partly successful. Nevertheless, when properly understood, Gettier cases point to a flaw in JTB, though it takes some work to appreciate just what it is. The nature of the flaw helps us better understand the nature of knowledge and epistemic justification. I propose a crucial improvement to the traditional view, relying on an intuitive and independently plausible metaphysical distinction pertaining to the manifestation of intellectual powers, which supplements the traditional components of justification, truth and belief.     

Easy to remember?: genocide and the philosophy of religion

Philosophers of religion have written a great deal about “the problem of evil.” Their reflections, however, have not concentrated, at least not extensively or sufficiently, on the particularities of evil that manifest themselves in genocide. Concentrating on some of those particularities, this essay reflects on genocide, which has sometimes been called the crime of crimes, to raise questions such as: how should genocide affect the philosophy of religion and what might philosophers of religion contribute to help check that crime against humanity?     

Is supernatural belief unreliably formed?

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - I criticize 5 arguments for the conclusion that religious belief is unreliably formed and hence epistemically tainted. The arguments draw on...     

Spirituality,the opiate of scholars of religion?

This review discusses Craig Martin’s approach to religious individualism and more widely the ways in which social scientists can make sense of individuals’ identities, beliefs and practice, as these seem more volatile and eclectic than ever. In particular, it is interested in the ‘critical’ study of religion developed in Capitalizing Religion. This review underscores the convergence between this book and other recent works regarding epistemological weaknesses affecting the contemporary study of religion (and in particular the ‘paradigm of spirituality’). It discusses Martin’s original contributions – in particular, a critical analysis of the ideological origins and biases underlying the categorisation of freely chosen spirituality vs. coercive religion. Finally, this review tries to further Capitalizing Religion’s argument by drawing on my own empirical work on the popularisation of meditation, yoga and kabbalah, sharing Martin’s critical approach and interest for the ways in which social structure and cultural norms affect individuals’ religious life.     

New Age Witchcraft? Popular spell books and the re-enchantment of everyday life

Witchcraft is entering mainstream culture through movies, magazines, websites, novels, and spell books. This paper examines a small number of popular spell books to investigate the effects of popularisation on the beliefs and practices of Witchcraft. I interrogate the debate about Witchcraft's relationship to the New Age to identify characteristics that might be present in a popularised Witchcraft. The characteristics include: the self-ethic, a this-worldly orientation, holism, evolutionary development and ephemeral participation. I argue that popularised Witchcraft has some New Age characteristics, but that other interesting trends include the re-enchantment of everyday life and the sacralisation of the sensuous through love spells, body confidence spells, and material prosperity spells. Spell books provide a technology of the self for young women. I argue that the paraphernalia of New Age Witchcraft are a site in which central contemporary identity issues are contested.     

Does cognitive science show belief in god to be irrational? The epistemic consequences of the cognitive science of religion

The last 15 years or so has seen the development of a fascinating new area of cognitive science: the cognitive science of religion (CSR). Scientists in this field aim to explain religious beliefs and various other religious human activities by appeal to basic cognitive structures that all humans possess. The CSR scientific theories raise an interesting philosophical question: do they somehow show that religious belief, more specifically belief in a god of some kind, is irrational? In this paper I investigate this question and argue that CSR does not show that belief in god is irrational.     

Is `God exists' a `hinge proposition' of religious belief?

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Is interpolation cognitively encapsulated? Measuring the effects of belief on Kanizsa shape discrimination and illusory contour formation

Contour interpolation is a perceptual process that fills-in missing edges on the basis of how surrounding edges (inducers) are spatiotemporally related. Cognitive encapsulation refers to the degree to which perceptual mechanisms act in isolation from beliefs, expectations, and utilities (Pylyshyn, 1999). Is interpolation encapsulated from belief? We addressed this question by having subjects discriminate briefly-presented, partially-visible fat and thin shapes, the edges of which either induced or did not induce illusory contours (relatable and non-relatable conditions, respectively). Half the trials in each condition incorporated task-irrelevant distractor lines, known to disrupt the filling-in of contours. Half of the observers were told that the visible parts of the shape belonged to a single thing (group strategy); the other half were told that the visible parts were disconnected (ungroup strategy). It was found that distractor lines strongly impaired performance in the relatable condition, but minimally in the non-relatable condition; that strategy did not alter the effects of the distractor lines for either the relatable or non-relatable stimuli; and that cognitively grouping relatable fragments improved performance whereas cognitively grouping non-relatable fragments did not. These results suggest that (1) filling-in effects during illusory contour formation cannot be easily removed via strategy; (2) filling-in effects cannot be easily manufactured from stimuli that fail to elicit interpolation; and (3) actively grouping fragments can readily improve discrimination performance, but only when those fragments form interpolated contours. Taken together, these findings indicate that discriminating filled-in shapes depends on strategy but the filling-in process itself may be encapsulated from belief.     

Is school bullying really on the rise?

Whether bullying in schools is increasing, as is widely believed, was investigated drawing upon empirical studies undertaken in a wide range of countries in which findings had been published describing its prevalence at different points in time between 1990 and 2009. Results do not support the view that reported bullying in general has increased during this period; in fact, a significant decrease in bullying has been reported in many countries. However, there are some indications that cyber bullying, as opposed to traditional bullying, has increased, at least during some of this period. The reported decreases in the prevalence of school bullying are consistent with reports of significant but small reductions in peer victimisation following the implementation of anti-bullying programs in schools world-wide.     

Defenders of faith? Victims of secularisation? Polish politicians and religion in the European Parliament

Recent years have shown a growing academic interest in the role and function of religion in the EU. This resulted from ongoing discussions on the symbolic deficit of the European project and politicised debate on the Christian roots of European identity, as well as from the enlargement of 2004, which brought into the EU new member-states with different traditions of church–state relations and distinctive forms of religious governance. Our study contributes to this scholarship by focusing on the role of religion in the context of the European Parliament (EP) as exercised by Polish members. The first part provides some background information on the relationship between religion and politics in the Polish domestic context. This is followed by presentation of the research findings from a survey conducted among Polish members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and from a qualitative content analysis of the arguments used by them in plenary sessions. In conclusion, we argue that religion is an important resource in the hands of right-wing politicians for justifying various claims in the EP. Furthermore, we also maintain that the national context and the national understanding of the functions of religion influence the way it is presented and used at the European level.     

Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?

Philosophical Studies - For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary...