Do 9-month-olds perceive causation-at-a-distance?

Humans understand mechanical events to involve physical bodies interacting by contact, but intentional events involve agents that can also interact at a distance. We investigated infant sensitivity to causality in a simple event in which one agent appears to react to another without contact. Infants 9 months old were habituated to one of two events involving a computer-animated red square moving nonrigidly--like a caterpillar--towards a green square. In the 'reaction event', the green object moved in turn before the red one stopped, while in the 'pause event' the green object moved after the red one stopped. After habituation, each infant saw the habituation movie played in reverse. This test involved identical spatiotemporal changes for reaction and pause event, but the reversed reaction additionally involved a change in the causal roles. Infants dishabituated to reversal of the reaction but not the pause event, a result which suggests sensitivity to causation-at-a-distance. This ability could support development of social cognition and theory of mind.     

Emerging perception of causality in action-and-reaction sequences from 4 to 6 months of age: Is it domain-specific?

Two experiments (N=136) studied how 4- to 6-month-olds perceive a simple schematic event, seen as goal-directed action and reaction from 3 years of age. In our causal reaction event, a red square moved toward a blue square, stopping prior to contact. Blue began to move away before red stopped, so that both briefly moved simultaneously at a distance. Primarily, our study sought to determine from what age infants see the causal structure of this reaction event. In addition, we looked at whether this causal percept depends on an animate style of motion and whether it correlates with tasks assessing goal perception and goal-directed action. Infants saw either causal reactions or noncausal delayed control events in which blue started some time after red stopped. These events involved squares that moved either rigidly or nonrigidly in an apparently animate manner. After habituation to one of the four events, infants were tested on reversal of the habituation event. Spatiotemporal features reversed for all events, but causal roles changed only in reversed reactions. The 6-month-olds dishabituated significantly more to reversal of causal reaction events than to noncausal delay events, whereas younger infants reacted similarly to reversal of both. Thus, perceptual causality for reaction events emerges by 6 months of age, a younger age than previously reported but, crucially, the same age at which perceptual causality for launch events has emerged in prior research. On our second question, animate/inanimate motion had no effect at any age, nor did significant correlations emerge with our additional tasks assessing goal perception or goal-directed object retrieval. Available evidence, here and elsewhere, is as compatible with a view that infants initially see A affecting B, without differentiation into physical or psychological causality, as with the standard assumption of distinct physical/psychological causal perception.     

Infants' sensitivity to effects of gravity on visible object motion.

A preference method probed infants' perception of object motion on an inclined plane. Infants viewed videotaped events in which a ball rolled downward (or upward) while speeding up (or slowing down). Then infants were tested with events in which the ball moved in the opposite direction with appropriate or inappropriate acceleration. Infants aged 7 months, but not 5 months, looked longer at the test event with inappropriate acceleration, suggesting emerging sensitivity to gravity. A further study tested whether infants appreciate that a stationary object released on an incline moves downward rather than upward; findings again were positive at 7 months and negative at 5 months. A final study provided evidence, nevertheless, that 5-month-old infants discriminate downward from upward motion and relate downward motion in videotaped events to downward motion in live events. Sensitivity to certain effects of gravity appears to develop in infancy.     

Infant sensitivity to trajectory forms

The authors investigated whether infants are sensitive to visual event trajectory forms, and whether they are sensitive to the underlying dynamics of trajectory forms. The authors habituated 8-month-old infants to a videotaped event run either forward or reversed in time and then switched them to the same event run in the opposite direction. Infants dishabituated when switched to the event with the novel direction in time, indicating sensitivity to the form of the trajectory. Infants exhibited equivalent habituation rates and looking times for forward and reversed events, thus failing to provide evidence that infants are sensitive to the underlying dynamics. In a partial replication of this first experiment, the same pattern of results was found. Both experiments revealed infant sensitivity to the trajectory forms, but not the underlying dynamics of events. The authors discuss implications for methods used in infant event perception studies.     

The role of visual perspective in information processing

Social events can be described from the perspective of either a person in the situation in which the event occurs (e.g., “John came into…”) or that of an outside observer (“John went into…”). We find that when individuals are disposed to form visual images, they have difficulty comprehending both verbal statements and pictures when the perspective from which the event is described differs from the perspective from which they have encountered similar events in daily life. Furthermore, the disposition to form visual images increases the intensity of emotional reactions to an event when the event is described from the perspective of someone in the situation in which it occurs. These effects are not evident, however, among individuals who typically process information semantically without forming visual images.     

Naturals and strivers: Preferences and beliefs about sources of achievement

To understand how talent and achievement are perceived, three experiments compared the assessments of “naturals” and “strivers." Professional musicians learned about two pianists, equal in achievement but who varied in the source of achievement: the “natural” with early evidence of high innate ability, versus the “striver” with early evidence of high motivation and perseverance (Experiment 1). Although musicians reported the strong belief that strivers will achieve over naturals, their preferences and beliefs showed the reverse pattern: they judged the natural performer to be more talented, more likely to succeed, and more hirable than the striver. In Experiment 2, this “naturalness bias” was observed again in experts but not in non-experts, and replicated in a between-subjects design in Experiment 3. Together, these experiments show a bias favoring naturals over strivers even when the achievement is equal, and a dissociation between stated beliefs about achievement and actual choices in expert decision-makers.     

Cognitive effects of language on human navigation

Language has been linked to spatial representation and behavior in humans, but the nature of this effect is debated. Here, we test whether simple verbal expressions improve 4-year-old children’s performance in a disoriented search task in a small rectangular room with a single red landmark wall. Disoriented children’s landmark-guided search for a hidden object was dramatically enhanced when the experimenter used certain verbal expressions to designate the landmark during the hiding event. Both a spatial expression (“I’m hiding the sticker at the red/white wall”) and a non-spatial but task-relevant expression (“The red/white wall can help you get the sticker”) enhanced children’s search, relative to uncued controls. By contrast, a verbal expression that drew attention to the landmark in a task-irrelevant manner (“Look at this pretty red/white wall”) produced no such enhancement. These findings provide further evidence that language changes spatial behavior in children and illuminate one mechanism through which language exerts its effect: by helping children understand the relevance of landmarks for encoding locations.     

Temporal order perception of auditory stimuli is selectively modified by tonal and non-tonal language environments

The close relationship between temporal perception and speech processing is well established. The present study focused on the specific question whether the speech environment could influence temporal order perception in subjects whose language backgrounds are distinctively different, i.e., Chinese (tonal language) vs. Polish (non-tonal language). Temporal order thresholds were measured for both monaurally presented clicks and binaurally presented tone pairs. Whereas the click experiment showed similar order thresholds for the two language groups, the experiment with tone pairs resulted in different observations: while Chinese demonstrated better performance in discriminating the temporal order of two “close frequency” tone pairs (600 Hz and 1200 Hz), Polish subjects showed a reversed pattern, i.e., better performance for “distant frequency” tone pairs (400 Hz and 3000 Hz). These results indicate on the one hand a common temporal mechanism for perceiving the order of two monaurally presented stimuli, and on the other hand neuronal plasticity for perceiving the order of frequency-related auditory stimuli. We conclude that the auditory brain is modified with respect to temporal processing by long-term exposure to a tonal or a non-tonal language. As a consequence of such an exposure different cognitive modes of operation (analytic vs. holistic) are selected: the analytic mode is adopted for “distant frequency” tone pairs in Chinese and for “close frequency” tone pairs in Polish subjects, whereas the holistic mode is selected for “close frequency” tone pairs in Chinese and for “distant frequency” tone pairs in Polish subjects, reflecting a double dissociation of function.     

Objects, events and "to be" verbs in Spanish--an ERP study of the syntax-semantics interface

In Spanish, objects and events at subject position constrain the selection of different forms of the auxiliary verb “to be”: locative predicates about objects require “estar en”, while those relating to events require “ser en”, both translatable as “to be in”. Subjective ratings showed that while the “object + ser + en” is considered as incorrect, the “event + estar + en” combination is also perceived as unacceptable but to a lesser degree. In an ERP study, we evaluated the impact of a purely semantic distinction (object versus events) on the subsequent processing of these auxiliary verbs followed by locatives in Spanish. For the “ser en” predicate, the P600 component was larger when the subject was an object than when it was an event. This P600 effect is consistent with an online repair of the defining predicate when it does not fit with the adequate semantic properties of the subject. On the other hand, for the “estar en” predicate, event subjects when compared to object subjects showed more positive ongoing amplitudes between 280 and 380 ms after the presentation of the “en” preposition, followed by a longer positive wave starting around 400 ms and lasting until 700 ms after the presentation of the following determiner, with central and frontal scalp distributions respectively. Thus, the different subject-predicate combinations, depending on the semantic features of the subjects, triggered syntactic reparatory processes at a structural level. These findings are consistent with an incremental interpretation of sentence meaning based on the interaction between syntactic and semantic information.     

Goal attribution to schematic animals: do 6‐month‐olds perceive biological motion as animate?

Infants are sensitive to biological motion, but do they recognize it as animate? As a first step towards answering this question, two experiments investigated whether 6‐month‐olds selectively attribute goals to shapes moving like animals. We habituated infants to a square moving towards one of two targets. When target locations were switched, infants reacted more to movement towards a new goal than a new location – but only if the square moved non‐rigidly and rhythmically, in a schematic version of bio‐mechanical movement older observers describe as animal‐like ( Michotte, 1963 ). Goal attribution was specific to schematic animal motion: It did not occur if the square moved rigidly with the same rhythm as the animate stimulus, or if the square had the same amount of non‐rigid deformation, but in an inanimate configuration. The data would seem to show that perception of schematic animal motion is linked to a system for psychological reasoning from infancy. This in turn suggests that 6‐month‐olds may already interpret biological motion as animate.     

Using movement and intentions to understand human activity

During perception, people segment continuous activity into discrete events. They do so in part by monitoring changes in features of an ongoing activity. Characterizing these features is important for theories of event perception and may be helpful for designing information systems. The three experiments reported here asked whether the body movements of an actor predict when viewers will perceive event boundaries. Body movements were recorded using a magnetic motion tracking system and compared with viewers’ segmentation of his activity into events. Changes in movement features were strongly associated with segmentation. This was more true for fine-grained than for coarse-grained boundaries, and was strengthened when the stimulus displays were reduced from live-action movies to simplified animations. These results suggest that movement variables play an important role in the process of segmenting activity into meaningful events, and that the influence of movement on segmentation depends on the availability of other information sources.     

Are historic years understood as numbers or events? An fMRI study of numbers with semantic associations

While numbers generally cue processing of quantity or order, they can also contain semantic information, as in the case of historic years (e.g., “1492” calls forth associations of Columbus sailing the ocean blue). Whether these dates are processed as quantities or events may depend on the context in which they occur. We examined such “ambiguous number” processing in two different contexts using a paired-comparison task, recording both behavioral responses and brain activity. Participants were either asked to think of all items as numbers and to choose the larger number, or were told to treat the comparators as events and to choose the later event. Behaviorally, all events showed a normal distance effect, establishing that they may be understood and compared in an ordinal sequence. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) demonstrated significant differences between years when treated as numbers versus as events. Dates in both contexts shared activity in parietal lobe regions previously implicated in number processing. Dates as numbers showed no extra-numeric activity, while dates thought of as events evoked activity in temporal semantic processing and frontal semantic retrieval areas. These differences suggest that extra-numeric information may be easily accessed and incorporated during processing when supported by even a weak context. This work supports previous studies showing a dissociation between quantity and meaning, and illustrates the brain areas involved in these different aspects.     

On the temporal dynamics of language-mediated vision and vision-mediated language

Recent converging evidence suggests that language and vision interact immediately in non-trivial ways, although the exact nature of this interaction is still unclear. Not only does linguistic information influence visual perception in real-time, but visual information also influences language comprehension in real-time. For example, in visual search tasks, incremental spoken delivery of the target features (e.g., “Is there a red vertical?”) can increase the efficiency of conjunction search because only one feature is heard at a time. Moreover, in spoken word recognition tasks, the visual presence of an object whose name is similar to the word being spoken (e.g., a candle present when instructed to “pick up the candy”) can alter the process of comprehension. Dense sampling methods, such as eye-tracking and reach-tracking, richly illustrate the nature of this interaction, providing a semi-continuous measure of the temporal dynamics of individual behavioral responses. We review a variety of studies that demonstrate how these methods are particularly promising in further elucidating the dynamic competition that takes place between underlying linguistic and visual representations in multimodal contexts, and we conclude with a discussion of the consequences that these findings have for theories of embodied cognition.     

Categorical perception of emotional facial expressions in preschoolers

Adults perceive emotional facial expressions categorically. In this study, we explored categorical perception in 3.5-year-olds by creating a morphed continuum of emotional faces and tested preschoolers’ discrimination and identification of them. In the discrimination task, participants indicated whether two examples from the continuum “felt the same” or “felt different.” In the identification task, images were presented individually and participants were asked to label the emotion displayed on the face (e.g., “Does she look happy or sad?”). Results suggest that 3.5-year-olds have the same category boundary as adults. They were more likely to report that the image pairs felt “different” at the image pair that crossed the category boundary. These results suggest that 3.5-year-olds perceive happy and sad emotional facial expressions categorically as adults do. Categorizing emotional expressions is advantageous for children if it allows them to use social information faster and more efficiently.     

A preference for genuine smiles following social exclusion

Research indicates that rejected individuals are better than others at discriminating between genuine (Duchenne) and deceptive (non-Duchenne) smiles (i.e., true versus false signals of affiliative opportunity). We hypothesized that rejected individuals would show a greater preference to work with individuals displaying Duchenne versus non-Duchenne smiles. To test this, participants wrote essays about experiences of inclusion, exclusion, or mundane events. They then saw a series of 20 videos of smiling individuals (10 with Duchenne and 10 with non-Duchenne smiles). Participants then indicated how much they would like to work with each target. Analyses revealed that compared to included and control participants, excluded individuals showed a greater preference to work with individuals displaying “real” as opposed to “fake” smiles. This effect was partially mediated by threats to “relational needs” (Williams, 2007) and fully mediated by threats to self-esteem. These results suggest that exclusion yields adaptive responses that could facilitate reconnection with others.     

The importance of differentiation in young children’s acquisition of expertise

In a short-term longitudinal study, stories told about novel creatures conveyed information varying in its capability for differentiating. Depending on the context, a bodily feature could be functionally undifferentiated (FUF), meaning that its subtypes (e.g., eyes of two forms) shared a generic function (“seeing”), or functionally differentiated (FDF), meaning that each subtype’s function was unique to it (e.g., only a “hooded eye” could “see in a sandstorm”). 5- to 6-year-olds who heard 8 stories, but not those who heard only 4, cited FDFs more than FUFs in a pair-justification test of judged similarity; and their delayed recall of specific story events was greater when FDFs rather than FUFs were involved. In the absence of direct instruction, young children show sensitivity to the degree of differentiation afforded by feature-function relations.     

Colored aftereffects produced with moving edges

Colored aftereffects that lasted as long as 6 weeks were produced with moving patterns of parallel black and white stripes or with black and white spirals. During adaptation, the patterns moved periodically in opposite directions, each direction paired with one illuminant, red or green. When the moving patterns were later viewed in white light, S saw the red and green colors, but they were related in the opposite way to the direction of motion. The red and green aftereffects were also produced by other pairs of illuminants, red and white, white and green, reddish-yellow and white, and white and greenish-yellow. The aftereffects did not occur unless, during adaptation, the stripes moved in both directions, each direction paired with a different color. The aftereffect was elicited by stripe motion over the retina—it was seen when the eye swept over a pattern of stationary stripes. The aftereffect desaturated when the retinal orientation of the stripes was changed from the adaptation orientation. Saturation was increased by longer exposure and slower speed during adaptation and by faster speed and a more rapid rate of altemation during the test. The luminance of the adaptation light seemed to have little effect. The aftereffect did not transfer from one eye to the other, and it did not change retinal locus, as was shown when clear images of a colored square that lasted several days were produced with a spiral. S ftxated the spiral’s center. The spiral rotated altemately in opposite directions. A red square with a green surround was projected on the center of the spiral when it rotated in one direction; a green square with a red surround was used when it rotated in the other direction. Following 50 min of adaptation, colored images of the squares were seen when the center of the spiral was ftxated and the direction of     

Regular Minimality and Thurstonian-type modeling

A Thurstonian-type model for pairwise comparisons is any model in which the response (e.g., “they are the same” or “they are different”) to two stimuli being compared depends, deterministically or probabilistically, on the realizations of two randomly varying representations (perceptual images) of these stimuli. The two perceptual images in such a model may be stochastically interdependent but each has to be selectively dependent on its stimulus. It has been previously shown that all possible discrimination probability functions for same–different comparisons can be generated by Thurstonian-type models of the simplest variety, with independent percepts and deterministic decision rules. It has also been shown, however, that a broad class of Thurstonian-type models, called “well-behaved” (and including, e.g., models with multivariate normal perceptual representations whose parameters are smooth functions of stimuli) cannot simultaneously account for two empirically plausible properties of same–different comparisons, Regular Minimality (which essentially says that “being least discriminable from” is a symmetric relation) and nonconstancy of the minima of discrimination probabilities (the fact that different pairs of least discriminable stimuli are discriminated with different probabilities). These results have been obtained for stimulus spaces represented by regions of Euclidean spaces. In this paper, the impossibility for well-behaved Thurstonian-type models to simultaneously account for Regular Minimality and nonconstancy of minima is established for a much broader notion of well-behavedness applied to a much broader class of stimulus spaces (any Hausdorff arc-connected ones). The universality of Thurstonian-type models with independent perceptual images and deterministic decision rules is shown (by a simpler proof than before) to hold for arbitrary stimulus spaces.     

Social comparison and confidence: When thinking you’re better than average predicts overconfidence (and when it does not)

A common social comparison bias—the better-than-average-effect—is frequently described as psychologically equivalent to the individual-level judgment bias known as overconfidence. However, research has found “Hard–easy” effects for each bias that yield a seemingly paradoxical reversal: Hard tasks tend to produce overconfidence but worse-than-average perceptions, whereas easy tasks tend to produce underconfidence and better-than-average effects. We argue that the two biases are in fact positively related because they share a common psychological basis in subjective feelings of competence, but that the “hard–easy” reversal is both empirically possible and logically necessary under specifiable conditions. Two studies are presented to support these arguments. We find little support for personality differences in these biases, and conclude that domain-specific feelings of competence account best for their relationship to each other.