Patterns of maternal and infant imitation during play

In contrast to recent experimental studies that have sought to establish the infant's ability to imitate, the goal of the current study was to establish the actual performance of imitation by infants and their mothers during episodes of face-to-face play. Three-min play episodes of 20 mothers and their 13- to 16-week-old infants were videotaped. Instances of mouth openings, lip movements, tongue protrusions, smiling, and vocalizations by both partners were coded. Sequential analyses revealed stochastic patterns of imitation by both interactants. Mothers contingently imitated initiations by their infants and were more likely to make like initiations during action in the same category by their infants. Infants did not show onset-to-onset imitation but did show an increased likelihood to initiate actions when their mothers were engaged in a like action. That imitation by the mother is a pervasive characteristic of such interactions is consistent with earlier suggestions of its role in the acquisition of social and emotional skills. The results suggest that infants also display patterns of matching in early social interactions.     

Fourteen-month-olds’ imitation is influenced more strongly by a model’s competence than by a model’s certainty

Research has shown that infants are more likely to learn from certain and competent models than from uncertain and incompetent models. However, it is unknown which of these cues to a model’s reliability infants consider more important. In Experiment 1, we investigated whether 14-month-old infants (n = 35) imitate and adopt tool choices selectively from an uncertain but competent compared to a certain but incompetent model. Infants watched videos in which an adult expressed either uncertainty but acted competently or expressed certainty but acted incompetently with familiar objects. In tool-choice tasks, the adult then chose one of two objects to operate an apparatus, and in imitation tasks, the adult then demonstrated a novel action. Infants did not adopt the model’s choice in the tool-choice tasks but they imitated the uncertain but competent model more often than the certain but incompetent model in the imitation tasks. In Experiment 2, 14-month-olds (n = 33) watched videos in which an adult expressed only either certainty or uncertainty in order to test whether infants at this age are sensitive to a model’s certainty. Infants imitated and adopted the tool choice from a certain model more than from an uncertain model. These results suggest that 14-month-olds acknowledge both a model’s competence and certainty when learning novel actions. However, they rely more on a model’s competence than on his certainty when both cues are in conflict. The ability to detect reliable models when learning how to handle cultural artifacts helps infants to become well-integrated members of their culture.     

The Role of a Model's Age for Young Children's Imitation: A Research Review

The influence of a model's age on young children's behaviour has been a subject of considerable debate among developmental theorists. Despite the recent surge of interest, controversy remains about the nature of peer influence in early life. This article reviews studies that investigated the influence of a model's age on young children's behaviour in the first 5 years of life, and presents an account of seemingly mixed results. We propose that children imitate familiar behaviour for social reasons, such as in order to identify with the model or to communicate likeness. Since age is an important indicator of the degree of being alike, we propose that children are more likely to imitate familiar behaviour from peers. In contrast, we propose that children primarily imitate novel behaviour for learning reasons. Since adults are perceived as being more competent than children, children are more likely to learn from adults. We further suggest that increased peer experience leads children to evaluate peers as valuable resources for learning novel behaviour in domains in which peers are knowledgeable. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relationship between attention and deferred imitation in 12-month-old infants

Imitation is a frequent behavior in the first years of life, and serves both a social function (e.g., to interact with others) and a cognitive function (e.g., to learn a new skill). Infants differ in their temperament, and temperament might be related to the dominance of one function of imitation. In this study, we investigated whether temperament and deferred imitation are related in 12-month-old infants. Temperament was measured via the Infant Behavior Questionnaire Revised (IBQ-R) and parts of the Laboratory Temperament Assessment Battery (Lab-TAB). Deferred imitation was measured via the Frankfurt Imitation Test for 12-month-olds (FIT-12). Regression analyses revealed that the duration of orienting (IBQ-R) and the latency of the first look away in the Task Orientation task (Lab-TAB) predicted the infants’ imitation score. These results suggest that attention-related processes may play a major role when infants start to imitate.     

Infants prefer to imitate a reliable person

Research has shown that preschoolers prefer to learn from individuals who are a reliable source of information. The current study examined whether the past reliability of a person's emotional signals influences infants’ willingness to imitate that person. An emotional referencing task was first administered to infants in order to demonstrate the experimenter's credibility or lack thereof. Next, infants in both conditions watched as the same experimenter turned on a touch light using her forehead. Infants were then given the opportunity to reproduce this novel action. As expected, infants in the unreliable condition developed the expectation that the person's emotional cues were misleading. Thus, these infants were subsequently more likely to use their hands than their foreheads when attempting to turn on the light. In contrast, infants in the reliable group were more likely to imitate the experimenter's action using their foreheads. These results suggest that the reliability of the model influences infants’ imitation.     

Relations between 18-month-olds’ gaze pattern and target action performance: A deferred imitation study with eye tracking

Deferred imitation studies are used to assess infants’ declarative memory performance. These studies have found that deferred imitation performance improves with age, which is usually attributed to advancing memory capabilities. Imitation studies, however, are also used to assess infants’ action understanding. In this second research program it has been observed that infants around the age of one year imitate selectively, i.e., they imitate certain kinds of target actions and omit others. In contrast to this, two-year-olds usually imitate the model's exact actions. 18-month-olds imitate more exactly than one-year-olds, but more selectively than two-year-olds, a fact which makes this age group especially interesting, since the processes underlying selective vs. exact imitation are largely debated. The question, for example, if selective attention to certain kinds of target actions accounts for preferential imitation of these actions in young infants is still open. Additionally, relations between memory capabilities and selective imitation processes, as well as their role in shaping 18-month-olds’ neither completely selective, nor completely exact imitation have not been thoroughly investigated yet. The present study, therefore, assessed 18-month-olds’ gaze toward two types of actions (functional vs. arbitrary target actions) and the model's face during target action demonstration, as well as infants’ deferred imitation performance. Although infants’ fixation times to functional target actions were not longer than to arbitrary target actions, they imitated the functional target actions more frequently than the arbitrary ones. This suggests that selective imitation does not rely on selective gaze toward functional target actions during the demonstration phase. In addition, a post hoc analysis of interindividual differences suggested that infants’ attention to the model's social-communicative cues might play an important role in exact imitation, meaning the imitation of both functional and arbitrary target actions.     

Over‐imitation in children with autism and Down syndrome

Typically developing children have been shown to imitate the specific means used by an adult to achieve an object‐directed outcome, even if a more efficient method is available. It has been argued that this behaviour can be attributed to social and communicative motivations. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), relative to children with Down syndrome (DS), show a reduced tendency to copy the exact means used by an adult to produce a novel outcome. To achieve this a sample of 34 children (22 with ASD and 12 with DS) were given a test of object‐directed imitation. Contrary to expectation, children in both groups imitated the specific method of the model to the same high extent. This finding is in line with suggestions that object‐directed imitation is relatively spared in children with autism but is surprising given arguments linking such imitation to socially based motivations. Nevertheless, children's ability to successfully copy the model was associated with their communicative ability, providing some support for the link between imitation and communication.     

The social context of imitation in infancy

Infants increasingly generalize deferred imitation across environmental contexts between 6 and 18 months of age. In three experiments with 126 6-, 9-, 12-, 15-, and 18-month-olds, we examined the role of the social context in deferred imitation. One experimenter demonstrated target actions on a hand puppet, and a second experimenter tested imitation 24h later. When the second experimenter was novel, infants did not exhibit deferred imitation at any age; when infants were preexposed to the second experimenter, all of them did. Imitating immediately after the demonstration also facilitated deferred imitation in a novel social context at all ages but 6 months. Infants' pervasive failure to exhibit deferred imitation in a novel social context may reflect evolutionary selection pressures that favored conservative behavior in social animals.     

Social looking,social referencing and humor perception in 6- and-12-month-old infants

Social referencing refers to infants’ use of caregivers as emotional referents in ambiguous situations (Walden, 1993). Studies of social referencing typically require ambulation, thereby over-looking younger, non-ambulatory infants (i.e., ≤8-months) and resulting in a widespread assumption that young infants do not employ this strategy. Using a novel approach that does not require mobility, we found that when parents provided unsolicited affective cues during an ambiguous-absurd (i.e., humorous) event, 6-month-olds employ one component of social referencing, social looking Additionally, 6-month-olds who did not laugh at the event were significantly more likely to look toward parents than their counterparts who found the event funny. Sequential analyses revealed that, following a reference to a smiling parent, 6-month olds were more likely to smile at the parent, but by 12 months were more likely to smile at the event suggesting that older infants are influenced by parental affect in humorous situations. The developmental implications of these findings are discussed, as well as the usefulness of studying humor for understanding important developmental phenomena.     

An integrative model of rational imitation in infancy

It has been proposed that infants selectively imitate based on a rational evaluation of an observed action (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002). This rational-imitation account has been rejected based on findings which suggested that infant imitation depends on: (a) the similarity between the infant's and the model's body posture; and (b) the presence of action effects (Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, 2011). Despite this controversy, we show that both accounts have received empirical support from different fields of research. We propose that both accounts operate on different levels, and we present an integrative model, which combines the two seemingly competing accounts. Motor resonance is perceived as a mechanism that enables infants to imitate, and a rational evaluation of the model's action is conceived as a mechanism that guides infants’ imitative behavior.     

Individual differences in neonatal “imitation” fail to predict early social cognitive behaviour

The influential hypothesis that humans imitate from birth – and that this capacity is foundational to social cognition – is currently being challenged from several angles. Most prominently, the largest and most comprehensive longitudinal study of neonatal imitation to date failed to find evidence that neonates copied any of nine actions at any of four time points (Oostenbroek et al., [2016] Current Biology, 26, 1334–1338). The authors of an alternative and statistically liberal post‐hoc analysis of these same data (Meltzoff et al., [2017] Developmental Science, 21, e12609), however, concluded that the infants actually did imitate one of the nine actions: tongue protrusion. In line with the original intentions of this longitudinal study, we here report on whether individual differences in neonatal “imitation” predict later‐developing social cognitive behaviours. We measured a variety of social cognitive behaviours in a subset of the original sample of infants (N = 71) during the first 18 months: object‐directed imitation, joint attention, synchronous imitation and mirror self‐recognition. Results show that, even using the liberal operationalization, individual scores for neonatal “imitation” of tongue protrusion failed to predict any of the later‐developing social cognitive behaviours. The average Spearman correlation was close to zero, mean r_s = 0.027, 95% CI [?0.020, 0.075], with all Bonferroni adjusted p values > .999. These results run counter to Meltzoff et al.'s rebuttal, and to the existence of a “like me” mechanism in neonates that is foundational to human social cognition.     

Delayed imitation of complex behavioural sequences by 14- to 16-month olds

The present study was conducted to determine if children under the age of 18 months can exhibit delayed imitation of three-event sequences when they have no opportunity to practice. Twenty-three 14- to 16-month-old children underwent two different imitation conditions. In the practice condition the children could imitate the sequence immediately after modelling; then they were tested 1 or 7 days later. In the no practice condition the children had the chance to imitate only on the test day. Children were able to imitate the sequences under both conditions irrespective of the delay period. They produced significantly more target actions, and more target actions in the correct order, in the test phase and cued recall phase, compared with the baseline. There were no differences between the two conditions with a 1-day delay period, but after a 7-day delay, the number of target actions produced during the practice condition was significantly higher than those in the no practice condition. The results are discussed in terms of nonverbal mimetic representations. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fourteen‐Month‐Olds' Imitation of Differently Aged Models

Studies comparing adult and peer imitation are rare and have to date provided mixed results. The aim of the present study was to investigate 14‐month‐olds' imitation of different actions (novel versus familiar) performed by televised models of different age groups (peers, older children or adults). In two experiments, we investigated infants' imitative performance when observing a novel action (Experiment 1) and familiar actions (Experiment 2). The results showed that the likelihood of imitating a novel action increased as the age of the model increased. The opposite was true for familiar actions where infants imitated the peer more frequently than either the older child or the adult model. These findings are discussed in relation to infants' ability to take into account a model's characteristics such as age when imitating actions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Actions speak louder than words: Differences in memory flexibility between monolingual and bilingual 18‐month‐olds

Bilingual infants from 6‐ to 24‐months of age are more likely to generalize, flexibly reproducing actions on novel objects significantly more often than age‐matched monolingual infants are. In the current study, we examine whether the addition of novel verbal labels enhances memory generalization in a perceptually complex imitation task. We hypothesized that labels would provide an additional retrieval cue and aid memory generalization for bilingual infants. Specifically, we hypothesized that bilinguals might be more likely than monolinguals to map multiple perceptual features onto a novel label and therefore show enhanced generalization. Eighty‐seven 18‐month‐old monolingual and bilingual infants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions or a baseline control condition. In the experimental conditions, either no label or a novel label was added during demonstration and again at the beginning of the test session. After a 24‐hr delay, infants were tested with the same stimulus set to test cued recall and with a perceptually different but functionally equivalent stimulus set to test memory generalization. Bilinguals performed significantly above baseline on both cued recall and memory generalization in both experimental conditions, whereas monolinguals performed significantly above baseline only on cued recall in both experimental conditions. These findings show a difference between monolinguals and bilinguals in memory generalization and suggest that generalization differences between groups may arise from visual perceptual processing rather than linguistic processing. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://youtu.be/yXB4pM3fF2k     

Cognitive imitation in 2-year-old children (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Homo sapiens</Emphasis>): a comparison with rhesus monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>)

Here we compare the performance of 2-year-old human children with that of adult rhesus macaques on a cognitive imitation task. The task was to respond, in a particular order, to arbitrary sets of photographs that were presented simultaneously on a touch sensitive video monitor. Because the spatial position of list items was varied from trial to trial, subjects could not learn this task as a series of specific motor responses. On some lists, subjects with no knowledge of the ordinal position of the items were given the opportunity to learn the order of those items by observing an expert model. Children, like monkeys, learned new lists more rapidly in a social condition where they had the opportunity to observe an experienced model perform the list in question, than under a baseline condition in which they had to learn new lists entirely by trial and error. No differences were observed between the accuracy of each species' responses to individual items or in the frequencies with which they made different types of errors. These results provide clear evidence that monkeys and humans share the ability to imitate novel cognitive rules (cognitive imitation).     

Infants' understanding of actions performed by mechanical devices

Recent research suggests that 9-month-old infants tested in a modified version of the A-not-B search task covertly imitate actions performed by the experimenter. The current study examines whether infants also simulate actions performed by mechanical devices, and whether this varies with whether or not they have been familiarized with the devices and their function. In Experiment 1, infants observed hiding and retrieving actions performed by a pair of mechanical claws on the A-trials, and then searched for the hidden toy on the B-trial. In Experiment 2, infants were first familiarized with the experimenter and the claws but not their function. In Experiment 3, infants were familiarized with the function of the claws. The results revealed that search errors were at chance levels in Experiments 1 and 2, but a significant proportion of the infants showed the A-not-B error in Experiment 3. These results suggest that 9-month-old infants are less likely to simulate observed actions performed by mechanical devices than by human agents, unless they are familiarized with the function of the devices so that their actions are perceived as goal-directed.     

Prior experiences and perceived efficacy influence 3-year-olds' imitation

Children are selective and flexible imitators. They combine their own prior experiences and the perceived causal efficacy of the model to determine whether and what to imitate. In Experiment 1, children were randomly assigned to have either a difficult or an easy experience achieving a goal. They then saw an adult use novel means to achieve the goal. Children with a difficult prior experience were more likely to imitate the adult's precise means. Experiment 2 showed further selectivity--children preferentially imitated causally efficacious versus nonefficacious acts. In Experiment 3, even after an easy prior experience led children to think their own means would be effective, they still encoded the novel means performed by the model. When a subsequent manipulation rendered the children's means ineffective, children recalled and imitated the model's means. The research shows that children integrate information from their own prior interventions and their observations of others to guide their imitation.     

Infants’ and adults’ looking behavior does not indicate perceptual distraction for constrained modelled actions − An eye-tracking study

When observing a novel action, infants pay attention to the model’s constraints when deciding whether to imitate this action or not. Gergely et al. (2002) found that more 14-month-olds copied a model’s use of her head to operate a lamp when she used her head while her hands were free than when she had to use this means because it was the only means available to her (i.e., her hands were occupied). The perceptional distraction account (Beisert et al., 2012) claims that differences between conditions in terms of the amount of attention infants paid to the modeled action caused the differences in infants’ performance between conditions. In order to investigate this assumption we presented 14-month-olds (N = 34) with an eye-tracking paradigm and analyzed their looking behavior when observing the head-touch demonstration in the two original conditions. Subsequently, they had the chance to operate the apparatus themselves, and we measured their imitative responses. In order to explore the perceptional processes taking place in this paradigm in adulthood, we also presented adults (N = 31) with the same task. Apart from the fact that we did not replicate the findings in imitation with our participants, the eye-tracking results do not support the perceptional distraction account: infants did not statistically differ − not even tendentially − in their amount of looking at the modeled action in both conditions. Adults also did not statistically differ in their looking at the relevant action components. However, both groups predominantly observed the relevant head action. Consequently, infants and adults do not seem to attend differently to constrained and unconstrained modelled actions.     

Imitation in infancy: the development of mimicry

Parents of 162 infants ages 6 to 20 months modeled subsets of four of the same set of eight behaviors, each for a maximum of 3 min, and encouraged their infants to imitate. Proportions of infants producing each behavior (a) when it was modeled and (b) during modeling of a different behavior were compared to estimate the age at which infants mimicked each kind of behavior. No reproduction of these motor acts--that is, no mimicry--was observed at 6 months. Mimicry appeared to develop slowly through most of the 2nd year, emerging at different ages for different behaviors. The findings suggest that newborns' behavioral matching may not be continuous with mimicry later in infancy. Imitation is probably not one behavioral competency with one underlying mechanism. It is more likely a category of different ways of combining and using different types of knowledge, some of which develop across the first 2 years of life.     

The reliability of a model influences 14-month-olds’ imitation

Human infants have an enormous amount to learn from others to become full-fledged members of their culture. Thus, it is important that they learn from reliable, rather than unreliable, models. In two experiments, we investigated whether 14-month-olds (a) imitate instrumental actions and (b) adopt the individual preferences of a model differently depending on the model’s previous reliability. Infants were shown a series of videos in which a model acted on familiar objects either competently or incompetently. They then watched as the same model demonstrated a novel action on an object (imitation task) and preferentially chose one of two novel objects (preference task). Infants’ imitation of the novel action was influenced by the model’s previous reliability; they copied the action more often when the model had been reliable. However, their preference for one of the novel objects was not influenced by the model’s previous reliability. We conclude that already by 14 months of age, infants discriminate between reliable and unreliable models when learning novel actions.