克雷佩林连续加算法的初步研究

本研究遵循克雷佩林连续加算法的基本原则,参照内田-克雷佩林心理测验的基本形式和操作方法．并加以改进．编制了一套作业法测验,并建立了数量化评定指标——相对作业量。通过对近2500名学生被试进行初步研究,该测验具有较好的信度和效度,以相对作业量为标准可以较客观地判定作业曲线的凹陷和凸起等形态特征。这对于连续加法计算作业在中国的推广应用以及教育、科研、心理咨询、职业指导等工作具有重要的意义。     

内田─克雷佩林心理测验在我国的试用研究

对１５２２名大、中学生进行内田—克雷佩林心理测验的结果表明：该测验是一种跨文化的心理测量工具,具有较好的信度和效度。还对内田—克雷凤林心理的测验的特点做了剖析,并为进一步的研究提出了建议。     

SK-克雷佩林心理测验--一种客观性人格测验的研究和编制

本研究遵循克雷佩林连续加算法的基本原则,充分吸收内田一克雷佩林心理测验的长处,参照其客观化的作业方式和操作方法,并加以改进,研究并编制出一套既科学又客观的连续加法运算作业测验,以编制者的名义命名为SK-克雷佩林心理测验。并根据作业曲线的变化特征提出了“作业商数”这一客观化指标,可以对受测者作业曲线的总体分布以及与标准作业曲线的符合或偏差程度有大致的了解,并由此推断个体心理机能各方面基本倾向是比较协调还是略有偏差等。     

精神病人社区影响因素分析及对策思考

精神病人作为一个"弱势群体",需要全社会给予积极的关注与支持.近年来,开展了以社区为基础的康复护理,但要使得精神病人得到更好的照顾,还需要政府、社会工作者,医务人员与家庭的共同努力与协作,形成自上而下的互相监督的系统模式,本文仅就我国精神病人社区康复工作存在的问题提出参考性的建议.     

保安处分视角下精神病人强制医疗范式探析

精神病人刑事强制医疗的刑法实体法依据只有总则第十八条,实践中关于精神病人的刑事强制医疗程序并无统一标准而适用各异.保安处分是西方大陆法系国家广泛接受和适用的一种方法,从保安处分理论之本意出发,应该完善我国精神病人刑事强制医疗,重塑保安处分视角中的精神病人强制医疗.     

针对精神病人心理特点灵活运用心理治疗方法

对于患有精神病的人，应针对其心理特点，对症下药，可以灵活运用以下几种方法： 一、心理分析疗法 心理分析疗法亦叫精神分析疗法，就是把病人所不知道的症状产生的真正原因和意义，通过挖掘病人无意识的心理过程，     

美国哲学整体论思潮的自然主义与反自然主义分形

美国哲学整体论思潮发端于蒯因自然主义整体论,迄今在宏观上已形成自然主义与反自然主义两大分形;分形的依据是对黑格尔集大成的西方近代先验哲学的态度,反对者为自然主义,赞成者则为反自然主义.在微观上,自然主义分形囊括蒯因自然主义整体论、哈克温和自然主义整体论和前期库恩科学历史主义整体论等;反自然主义分形包括后期库恩理性重构主...     

转型时代教育学的学科形象

20世纪90年代以后,中国高等院校进入了持续的扩招时代。高校扩招对于满足我国的人才需求,提高人口素质,起到了重要的作用。但是高校扩招在管理、师资、财政投入等方面,也形成了新的问题。为此,本刊组织了“扩招时代的高等教育:问题与对策”笔谈,从不同角度分析高校面临的问题及其对策。史根林、何小忠的文章讨论了时代变化对教育学科形象的重塑,李芸的文章讨论扩招和开放时代学生管理的新问题,卞清和高澎等人的文章讨论了研究生教育问题,吴晓曼则对大陆与香港研究型大学的投入问题进行了比较研究。     

精神病态与反社会型人格障碍间的关系

精神病态传统上一般被定义为一种人格(尤其是情感缺乏)的障碍,其次在小范围内才是行为障碍。尽管经常被相互混用,但是在诊断思路上,精神病态与反社会型人格障碍还是有区别的。二者不能简单等同起来,需明辨二者的关系。     

Theism, Dualism, and the Scientific Image of Humanity

Recently, some philosophers of religion have suggested that a reduction of the classical image of humanity may jeopardize classical theism. To obstruct reductionism, some theologians have argued for dualism on the basis of the argument of consciousness. In this essay, I argue that even consciousness must be considered a brain-based phenomenon. This does not commit one to reductionism, however. Nonreductive physicalism appears to offer a promising alternative to either dualism or reductionism, without necessarily compromising more traditional views of humanity. I do suggest that a modification of the classical image of God may be inevitable.     

Deleuze and Naturalism

Abstract

Against the tendency to regard Deleuze as a materialist and a naturalistic thinker, I argue that his core philosophical writings involve commitments that are incompatible with contemporary scientific naturalism. He defends different versions of a distinction between philosophy and natural science that is inconsistent with methodological naturalism and with the scientific image of the world as a single causally interconnected system. He defends the existence of a virtual realm of entities that is irreconcilable with ontological naturalism. The difficulty of reconciling Deleuze’s philosophy with ontological naturalism is especially apparent in his recurrent conception of pure events that are irreducible to their incarnation in bodies and states of affairs. In the last section of this essay, I canvass some of the ways in which Deleuze’s thought might be reconciled with a more liberal, pluralist and ethical naturalism that he identified in an early essay on Lucretius.     

Naturalism, Science and the Supernatural

There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural entities. Naturalism is characterized, following Leiter and Rea, as a position which involves a primary commitment to scientific methodology and it is argued that any naturalistic ontological commitments must be compatible with this primary commitment. It is further argued that properly applied scientific method has warranted the acceptance of the existence of supernatural entities in the past and that it is plausible to think that it will do so again in the future. So naturalists should allow for the possibility of supernatural entities.

Pragmatism, Relativism, and the Critique of Philosophy

The relativist strain in Rorty's work should be distinguished from the Davidsonian strain. The latter may be exploited in support of Rorty's critique of philosophy but it is at odds with his use of "solidarity" and "ethnocentrism"as explanatory concepts. Once this is recognized, there remains in Rorty's work a consistent challenge to the search for general philosophical theories of truth, objectivity, and rationality (of which relativism itself is an example). On this reading, however, Rorty's pragmatism is not a theory that offers answers to questions about the authority of beliefs and practices but rather a critical tool used to open detailed, concrete, and critical investigation into particular questions about the establishment and viability of the beliefs and practices we have.     

Liberal naturalism,objectivity and the autonomy of the mental

ABSTRACT

The paper distinguishes between two different ways of cashing out the general insight that often goes by the name of ‘liberal naturalism’. The objective is to show how these two different argumentative strategies undergird two fundamentally different approaches to the project of elucidating the specificity of mental phenomena. On one approach, the central concern of such a project is the ontological status of subjective conscious phenomena; on the other, the central concern is the irreducibility of parochial capacities in the adoption of intentional stances. I begin by tracing out some of the origins of this important divergence and then focus on the motivations of the latter approach. I show that there is a tension between its motivations and the way that it has been used to rehabilitate idealist themes from the post-Kantian tradition.     

An idealist critique of naturalism

ABSTRACT

According to many naturalists, our ordinary conception of the world is in tension with the scientific image: the conception of the world provided by the natural sciences. But in this paper, I present a critique of naturalism with precedents in the post-Kantian idealist tradition. I argue that, when we consider our actual linguistic behavior, there is no evidence that the truth of our ordinary judgments hinges on what the scientific image turns out to be like. I then argue that the best explanation of this result is that the norms and presuppositions operating in ordinary discourse are different from the norms and presuppositions operating in scientific discourse. So naturalistic attempts to undermine the manifest image are illegitimate attempts to critique a practice ‘from the outside’.     

Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy

We argue that Maclaurin and Dyke's recent critique of non-naturalistic metaphysics suffers from difficulties analogous to those that caused trouble for earlier positivist critiques of metaphysics. Maclaurin and Dyke say that a theory is naturalistic iff it has observable consequences. Depending on the details of this criterion, either no theory counts as naturalistic or every theory does.     

How to Make Naturalism Safe for Supernaturalism: An Evaluation of Willem Drees's Supernaturalistic Naturalism

Naturalism is often considered to be antithetical to theology and genuine religion. However, in a series of recent books and articles, Willem Drees has proposed a scientifically informed naturalistic account of religion, which, he contends, is not only compatible with supernaturalistic religion and theology but provides a better account of both than either purely naturalistic or purely supernaturalistic accounts. While rejecting both epistemological and methodological naturalism, Drees maintains that ontological naturalism offers the best philosophical account of the natural world and that, in addition, it provides the opening for a supernaturalistic understanding of religion and theology, one that best fits the condition of epistemic and moral distance from the transcendent characteristic of religious wonderers and wanderers. In this paper I examine Drees's claim and argue that it is seriously flawed. I show that Drees's naturalism is, in fact, both methodologically and epistemologically naturalistic. I also show that his attempts to limit naturalism to the sphere of the natural world by means of the phenomena of limit questions and underdetermination fail. Arguing for a more optimistic, but also, I contend, more empirically accurate account of human epistemic and moral capacities, I propose a full-fledged scientifically based naturalistic account of theology.