Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure

New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure, have even acquired the status of basic assumptions for many other kinds of philosophers. It is therefore of singular interest to investigate some of the most important arguments from total failure. This is what I propose to do in this paper. My aim is not be to demonstrate that these arguments are inconsistent or that total failure and naked tryings are metaphysically impossible. Rather, my aim is be to build a case against the possibility of naked, independently existing tryings, by questioning how well we understand the scenarios invoked in their favour. Thus, rather than attempting to present a definitive metaphysical refutation of New Volitionalism, I attempt to diminish or demolish its underlying motivation.

It's Not a Story

This writing presents a firsthand account of living with the certain knowledge that you can't rely on your brain the way you used to. Epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, brain tumor—what do these words really mean day by day, moment by moment? The author blends poetry and prose in her account of forging a new relationship with her own brain. Activities that were once routine are now difficult and even dangerous. No longer is her brain a silent partner as she navigates the debilitating, embarrassing, and occasionally humiliating symptoms of her disease. Can I really get through this shower? How much help do we need today, Brain? Mindfulness practice helps the author become more aware of her moment-by-moment experience. Her therapist prods her to dig into her own story, but the author resists. She resists and yet she shares her story that may not be a story.     

The Brain Is Not a Tool

Some psychologists claim that the brain is a tool. This claim can be construed either literally or figuratively. We argue that, in the former case, it is false, whereas in the latter case it has no place in scientific psychology. We also try to show why this discussion is relevant and suggest how a metaphor should behave to be of use in science.     

Why Spinoza was Not a Panentheist

Philosophia - In spite of some panentheistic traits in his philosophy, Spinoza was clearly a pantheist. Spinoza’s God is not personal and not transcendent but immanent, as God is identical to...     

Not Intentional,Not Unintentional

Philosophia - In contemporary philosophy of action, the existence of intentional and unintentional action is relatively uncontroversial. What is controversial is whether there exists a third kind...     

Authorship Not Taught and Not Caught in Undergraduate Research Experiences at a Research University

Science and Engineering Ethics - This grounded study investigated the negotiation of authorship by faculty members, graduate student mentors, and their undergraduate protégés in...     

It's Not Just a Headache,Dear

No abstract available for this article.     

Subthreshold semantic priming: Not a context effect

Bernstein, Bissonnette, Vyas, and Barclay (1989) showed that masked primes can be recognized more often when followed by a related target than when followed by an unrelated target. They suggested that this effect may allow subjects in subthreshold semantic priming experiments to recognize the masked primes on the related semantic priming trials, even when the subjects cannot recognize masked primes presented alone. The present experiment found that when masked primes are presented at recognition rates comparable to those used in published studies of subthreshold masked priming, the forced choice recognition of masked primes followed by related targets was similar to that of masked primes presented alone (25% vs. 22%). In addition, the recognition of masked primes on the forced choice trials was highly predictive of masked prime recognition on the semantic priming trials.     

Transmission Failure Failure

I set out the standard view about alleged examples of failure of transmission of warrant, respond to two cases for the view, and argue that the view is false. The first argument for the view neglects the distinction between believing a proposition on the basis of a justification and merely having a justification to believe a proposition. The second argument for the view neglects the position that one 9s justification for believing a conclusion can be one 9s premise for the conclusion, rather than simply one 9s justification for the premise. Finally, the view is false since it is inconsistent with the closure of knowledge as closure is properly understood.     

CE is Not a Conservative Extension of E

The logic CE (for Classical E) results from adding Boolean negation to Anderson and Belnap"s logic E. This paper shows that CE is not a conservative extension of E.