Two modes of transfer in artificial grammar learning

Participants can transfer grammatical knowledge acquired implicitly in 1 vocabulary to new sequences instantiated in both the same and a novel vocabulary. Two principal theories have been advanced to account for these effects. One suggests that sequential dependencies form the basis for cross-domain transfer (e.g., Z. Dienes, G. T. M. Altmann, & S. J. Gao, 1999). Another argues that a form of episodic memory known as abstract analogy is sufficient (e.g., L. R. Brooks & J. R. Vokey, 1991). Three experiments reveal the contributions of the 2. In Experiment 1 sequential dependencies form the only basis for transfer. Experiment 2 demonstrates that this process is impaired by a change in the distributional properties of the language. Experiment 3 demonstrates that abstract analogy of repetition structure is relatively immune to such a change. These findings inform theories of artificial grammar learning and the transfer of grammatical knowledge.     

Analogic and abstraction strategies in synthetic grammar learning: A functionalist interpretation

Subjects learned artificial grammars under two conditions of acquisition: paired-associate learning and observation of exemplars. The former procedure was strongly associated with the establishment of a fairly concrete memorial space consisting of specific items and parts of items and the use of an analogic strategy for making decisions about novel stimuli. The observation procedure was strongly associated with the induction of an abstract representation of the rules of the grammar and the use of a correspondence strategy for decision making. Moreover, this latter procedure led to more robust knowledge and better overall performance. Analyses of both objective response patterns and subjective introspections yielded coordinated data in support of this distinction. The relationships between acquisition condition and cognitive strategy are discussed from a functionalist point of view.     

Inference and update

We look at two fundamental logical processes, often intertwined in planning and problem solving: inference and update. Inference is an internal process with which we uncover what is implicit in the information we already have. Update, on the other hand, is produced by external communication, usually in the form of announcements and in general in the form of observations, giving us information that might not have been available (even implicitly) before. Both processes have received attention from the logic community, usually separately. In this work, we develop a logical language that allows us to describe them together. We present syntax, semantics and a complete axiom system; we discuss similarities and differences with other approaches and mention how the work can be extended.     

Computer Understanding of Conventional Metaphoric Language

Metaphor is a conventional and ordinary part of language. An approach to metaphor, based on the explicit representation of knowledge about metaphors, has been developed. This approach asserts that the interpretation of conventional metaphoric language should proceed through the direct application of specific knowledge about the metaphors in the language. MIDAS (Metaphor Interpretation, Denotation, and Acquisition System) is a computer program that has been developed based upon this approach. MIDAS can be used to represent knowledge about conventional metaphors, interpret metaphoric language by applying this knowledge, and dynamically learn new metaphors as they are encountered during normal processing.     

On the Epistemology of Language

Epistemology of language, a branch of both epistemology and the philosophy of language, asks what knowledge of language consists in. In this paper, I argue that such an inquiry is a pointless enterprise due to its being based upon the incorrect assumption that linguistic competence requires knowledge of language. However, I do not think the phenomenon of knowledge of language is trivial. I propose a virtue‐theoretic account of linguistic competence, and then explain the phenomenon from a virtue‐semantic point of view.     

Can infants use video to update mental representations of absent objects?

Before their second birthday, infants can update their knowledge based on what someone tells them, but can they do so based on what a video shows them? The current study explored whether infants can update their representation of an absent object’s properties after seeing a video of something happening to it, following seminal work showing that they can update their representation after being told about something happening to it (Ganea et al., 2007). It thus adapted an existing paradigm for testing infants’ understanding of references to absent objects (using language) to investigate a different symbolic medium (video). Twenty-two-month-olds first played with a toy and later saw on video that the toy underwent a change in state while they were out of the room. Infants in the current study did not subsequently identify the toy based on this new information, whereas those in previous research did. Infants this age thus appear less likely to update their representation of an absent object’s properties using video than using language. This result is consistent with the possibility that infants may understand the representational function of symbolic objects later in development than they understand the representational function of language. It also aligns with evidence of the video deficit in which infants learn less effectively from video than from firsthand experience.     

Hypothesizing about signaling networks

The current knowledge about signaling networks is largely incomplete. Thus biologists constantly need to revise or extend existing knowledge. The revision and/or extension is first formulated as theoretical hypotheses, then verified experimentally. Many computer-aided systems have been developed to assist biologists in undertaking this challenge. The majority of the systems help in finding “patterns” in data and leave the reasoning to biologists. A few systems have tried to automate the reasoning process of hypothesis formation. These systems generate hypotheses from a knowledge base and given observations. A main drawback of these knowledge-based systems is the knowledge representation formalism they use. These formalisms are mostly monotonic and are now known to be not quite suitable for knowledge representation, especially in dealing with the inherently incomplete knowledge about signaling networks. We propose an action language based framework for hypothesis formation for signaling networks. We show that the hypothesis formation problem can be translated into an abduction problem. This translation facilitates the complexity analysis and an efficient implementation of our system. We illustrate the applicability of our system with an example of hypothesis formation in the signaling network of the p53 protein.     

语义表征具身理论:情绪在概念表征中的作用

概念如何被表征是认知科学的热点问题,其中抽象概念如何表征是当前具身认知最具争议性的话题之一。与前期概念隐喻理论(强调意象图式)和知觉符号理论(强调情境内省信息)的观点不同,语义表征具身理论强调情绪经验信息在抽象概念表征和加工中的作用。具体而言,具体概念的表征主要来自感觉运动信息,而抽象概念的表征主要来自情绪经验信息和语言信息。研究证明,抽象概念的高情绪经验信息能够促进词汇的加工,且这一促进作用受词汇情绪效价的调节。未来研究应进一步考虑影响情绪经验信息发挥作用的因素,比如语言信息的丰富性、情绪唤醒或个体的情绪状态等。     

Playing with reality

The authors explore the interpersonal aspects of the early development of an experience of external reality and the roots of this experience in primary intersubjectivity. They suggest some implications that this has for psychoanalytic work with the patient's experience of external reality. They argue that the external world is not an independently existing 'given', for the infant to discover, as is sometimes implicitly assumed. Infants acquire knowledge about the world not just through their own explorations of it but by using other minds as teachers. The experience of external reality is invariably shaped through subjectivities. The authors argue that at first the infant assumes that his knowledge is knowledge held by all, that what he knows is known by others and that what is known by others is accessible to him. Only slowly does the uniqueness of his own perspective differentiate so that a sense of mental self can develop. In clinical work we frequently observe the undoing of this process of differentiation, and understanding the underlying mechanisms can be helpful in managing the transference and countertransference consequences when the process has been derailed.     

On the factivity of implicit intersubjective knowledge

The concept of knowledge can be modelled in epistemic modal logic and, if modelled by using a standard modal operator, it is subject to the problem of logical omniscience. The classical solution to this problem is to distinguish between implicit and explicit knowledge and to construe the knowledge operator as capturing the concept of implicit knowledge. In addition, since a proposition is said to be implicitly known just in case it is derivable from the set of propositions that are explicitly known by using a certain set of logical rules, the concept of implicit knowledge is definable on the basis of the concept of explicit knowledge. In any case, both implicit and explicit knowledge are typically characterized as factive, i.e. such that it is always the case that what is known is also true. The aim of the present paper is twofold: first, we will develop a dynamic system of explicit intersubjective knowledge that allows us to introduce the operator of implicit knowledge by definition; secondly, we will show that it is not possible to hold together the following two theses: (1) the concept of implicit knowledge is definable along the lines indicated above and (2) the concept of implicit knowledge is factive.     

The Social N400 effect: how the presence of other listeners affects language comprehension

During conversation, it is necessary to keep track of what others can and cannot understand. Previous research has focused largely on understanding the time course along which knowledge about interlocutors influences language comprehension/production rather than the cognitive process by which interlocutors take each other’s perspective. In addition, most work has looked at the effects of knowledge about a speaker on a listener’s comprehension, and not on the possible effects of other listeners on a participant’s comprehension process. In the current study, we introduce a novel joint comprehension paradigm that addresses the cognitive processes underlying perspective taking during language comprehension. Specifically, we show that participants who understand a language stimulus, but are simultaneously aware that someone sitting next to them does not understand the same stimulus, show an electrophysiological marker of semantic integration difficulty (i.e., an N400-effect). Crucially, in a second group of participants, we demonstrate that presenting exactly the same sentences to the participant alone (i.e. without a co-listener) results in no N400-effect. Our results suggest that (1) information about co-listeners as well as the speaker affect language comprehension, and (2) the cognitive process by which we understand what others comprehend mirrors our own language comprehension processes.     

Artificial intelligence,language, and the study of knowledge

This paper studies the relationship of Artificial Intelligence to the study of language and the representation of the underlying knowledge which supports the comprehension process. It develops the view that intelligence is based on the ability to use large amounts of diverse kinds of knowledge in procedural ways, rather than on the possession of a few general and uniform principles. The paper also provides a unifying thread to a variety of recent approaches to natural language comprehension. We conclude with a brief discussion of how Artificial Intelligence may have a radical impact on education if the principles which it utilizes to explore the representation and use of knowledge are made available to the student to use in his own learning experiences.     

主语表征预报思维指向状态的马尔科夫链模型

个体的语言表征是一种随机现象, 在连续句子构成的语言表征中, 句子主语表征现象具有马氏性。采用马尔科夫链模型建构句子主语表征的状态转移概率矩阵, 发现主语表征的名词(n)/代词(r)是一个正则链。主语表征变化规律反映思维指向的变化规律, 个体根据对环境的适应需要, 通过第一个句子的主语表征反映出客观思维或主观思维指向的随机性, 通过N个句子则反映出个体既关注外界又关注自我的思维指向稳定性的特征。外显的语言表征是观察内隐的心理变化的客观线索, 运用数学模型的方法, 通过语言表征的规律可以对心理活动的可能变化做出预报。     

汉语声调水平映射规则的内隐学习及其长度迁移效应

内隐学习领域关注的重要问题是被试能够习得何种结构及其相应的学习机制。远距离规则的研究为澄清这一问题提供了新的视角。现有研究已证实被试能够内隐地习得并迁移固定长度的远距离规则。按照内隐学习抽象性的观点,如果被试习得的是远距离的抽象规则本身,那么迁移也同时会发生在不同长度的材料上。因此,研究以独特的汉语声调水平映射规则为材料,通过对表面特征与底层规则之间的分离操作,探讨声调水平映射规则的内隐习得和长度迁移,结果表明被试不仅能够习得这一规则,还能够将该规则灵活迁移到不同长度的材料上,进一步为内隐学习的抽象性特点和无限性的学习机制提供强有力的新证据。     

Heuristics in learning classifiers: The acquisition of the classifier system and its implications for the nature of lexical acquisition

Classifiers are like nouns in that they classify entities in the world into lexical categories. However, the lexical nature of the classifier system is very different from that of nouns. We discuss how Japanese and Chinese children learn the meanings of classifiers. We focus on two specific questions: How classifier acquisition is different from noun acquisition; and what the prerequisites are for spontaneously extracting the meanings of classifiers. It is shown that children are very conservative in assigning meaning to classifiers. The pace of learning largely depends on semantic complexity, across languages and within each language. Furthermore, we suspect that learning the meanings of classifiers requires a certain cognitive ability – an ability to synthesize pieces of partial knowledge and form them into a cohesive whole. It may be only when children have developed such an ability that they are able to extract the complex semantic rules of classifiers on their own. We conclude that children take very different routes in learning nouns and classifiers: Unlike noun acquisition, classifier acquisition is guided by a slow, bottom-up process.     

Does functional neuroimaging solve the questions of neurolinguistics?

Neurolinguistic research has been engaged in evaluating models of language using measures from brain structure and function, and/or in investigating brain structure and function with respect to language representation using proposed models of language. While the aphasiological strategy, which classifies aphasias based on performance modality and a few linguistic variables, has been the most stable, cognitive neurolinguistics has had less success in reliably associating more elaborately proposed levels and units of language models with brain structure. Functional imaging emerged at this stage of neurolinguistic research. In this review article, it is proposed that the often-inconsistent superfluity of outcomes arising from functional imaging studies of language awaits adjustment at both "ends" of the process: model and data. Assumptions that our current language models consistently and reliably represent implicit knowledge within human cerebral processing are in line for major revision; and the promise of functional brain imaging to reveal any such knowledge structures must incorporate stable correlates of the imaging signal as dependent variable.     

AN ESSAY ON DREAMING,PSYCHICAL WORKING OUT AND WORKING THROUGH2

In this paper the author attempts to expand the idea put forward by Freud who considered dreams as a special form of unconscious thinking. It is the author's contention that the psychical working‐out function performed by dreams is a form of unconscious thinking, which transforms affects into memories and mental structures. He also attempts to clarify the way in which meaning is built and transformed in mental life. In that respect the unconscious internal world is seen as a form of unconscious thinking, a private theatre where meaning is generated and transformed. He focuses on what happens to feelings in dreams in connection with the meanings as a result of and an expression of the several stages of working through. The dream world is described as the setting where the mind gives expressive pictorial representation to the emotions involved in a conflict: a first step towards thinkability. The dreamwork also constitutes a process through which meaning is apprehended, built on and transformed at an expressive non‐discursive level, based on representation through figurative/pictorial images. The author draws on Meltzer's formulation to conjecture that the working‐through function of dreams, mainly in response to interpretations, is performed by a process of progression in formal qualities of the representations made available by dreaming in the form he has called affective pictograms. It is through progression in formal qualities of the representation that the thinking capabilities of the affective life develop and become part of the process of what is called metaphorically the metabolisation of emotional life. This process takes place through migration of meaning across various levels of mental process. In this perspective the analyst'sinterpretations of dreams effect what linguists call transmutation of the symbolic basis, a process that is necessary to help the mind to improve its capacity to think. Something expressed on the evocative plane and condensed into a pictographic image is then transformed into verbal language that expresses meaning. These conceptions are illustrated by a detailed clinical case.     

Joint independent random utility models where one of the choice structures satisfies the strict utility model

It is known that one cannot construct an independent joint random utility model for which both the preference and aversion probabilities satisfy the strict utility model. Given this result, it is natural to ask what kind of relations are possible in such contexts. Here, for instance, we demonstrate that if a structure of preference and aversion probabilities are generated by a common independent random utility model, and if the preference probabilities satisfy the strict utility model, then the preference and aversion probabilities are related by what is known as the strong acceptance condition. We also prove an appropriate converse of this result. Finally, an example is given of a process (other than the random utility model) that is compatible with the assumption that a structure of preference and aversion probabilities satisfies a common strict utility model.