Naïve realism and capturing the “wisdom of dyads”

Two studies provided evidence for the role of naïve realism in the failure of individuals to give adequate weight to peer input, and explored two strategies for reducing the impact of this inferential bias. Study 1 demonstrated that dyad members see their own estimates as more “objective” than those of their partners and that this difference in perceived objectivity predicts the degree of underweighting. Compelling participants to assess their own versus their partners' objectivity prior to revising estimates decreased underweighting, an effect that was mediated by differences in perceived objectivity. Study 2 showed that the increase in accuracy that results from requiring dyad members to offer joint estimates via discussion is largely retained in subsequent individual estimates. Both studies showed that underweighting is greater when dyad members disagree on the issue about which they are making consensus estimates—a finding that further supports a “naïve realism” interpretation of the phenomenon.     

The cost of collaboration: why joint decision making exacerbates rejection of outside information

Prior investigators have asserted that certain group characteristics cause group members to disregard outside information and that this behavior leads to diminished performance. We demonstrate that the very process of making a judgment collaboratively rather than individually also contributes to such myopic underweighting of external viewpoints. Dyad members exposed to numerical judgments made by peers gave significantly less weight to those judgments than did individuals working alone. This difference in willingness to use peer input was mediated by the greater confidence that the dyad members reported in the accuracy of their own estimates. Furthermore, dyads were no better at judging the relative accuracy of their own estimates and the advisor's estimates than individuals were. Our analyses demonstrate that, relative to individuals, dyads suffered an accuracy cost. Specifically, if dyad members had given as much weight to peer input as individuals working alone did, then their revised estimates would have been significantly more accurate.     

On attributing negative motives to others who disagree with our opinions

The research explores the tendency for people to attribute negative motives to others who hold an attitude position that is discrepant from their own. In Studies 1 and 2, American and Canadian respondents indicated their perceptions of U.S. President Bush's motives for initiating war in Iraq. Consistent with the proposed bias, respondents who disagreed with the war attributed more selfish motivations than did those who supported the war. Study 3 revealed a similar bias when respondents rated the motives of the general citizenry concerning their attitudes about the war, and Study 4 provided evidence of the bias on different attitudinal issues (e.g., abortion and gay marriage). Study 4 also indicated that biased attributions of motive were primarily confined to respondents who were highly involved in the attitude issue. Discussion centers on na?ve realism, social identity concerns, and attitude justification as relevant underlying theoretical factors.     

When goal sharing produces support that is not caring

Four studies used experimental and correlational methods to investigate the effect of a "partner-achievement goal," or a personal goal for a relationship partner's successful achievement. This goal led support providers to offer unhelpful support about how to play a computer game (Study 1). It also predicted poor achievement for dieting support recipients (Study 2). The effects of partner-achievement goals were moderated by recipient expectations of success and mediated by recipient effort. Recipients with low expectations of their own success requested that their provider partners with partner-achievement goals refrain from offering them support (Study 3); they also invested less time studying Latin grammar and learned fewer Latin words over one week (Study 4). Together, these findings highlight the unique behavioral consequences of partner-achievement goals for both members of a relationship.     

The effects of perceived social support on quality of life in patients awaiting coronary artery bypass grafting and their partners: testing dyadic dynamics using the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model

Patients awaiting coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) need support from their partners or family caregivers to manage their self care successfully and to maximise quality of life. Partners need social support to help overcome the stressful tasks of an unexpected caregiving role. It is not known whether the individual's perceived social support contributes to their own, as well as their partner's quality of life. The aims of this study were to assess differences in social support and quality of life in patients and partners awaiting CABG, and to examine whether patients' and partners' perceived social support predicted their own, as well as their partner's quality of life before CABG. This cross-sectional study recruited 84 dyads (patients 84% males, aged 64.5 years and partners 94% females, aged 61.05 years). Perceived social support was assessed using the Medical Outcomes Study Social Support survey, with sub-scales for informational/emotional support, affectionate support, tangible support and positive social interaction. Quality of life was assessed using the Short-Form 12 Health Survey. Dyadic data were analysed using the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model, with distinguishable dyad regression. Results revealed the patients' informational/emotional support exhibited an actor effect on their own mental health (? = 0.19, p = 0.001); indicating those with low informational/emotional support had poorer mental health. There was a partner effect of the patients' informational/emotional support on their partner's mental health (? = 0.14, p = 0.024), indicating the patients' informational/emotional support was associated with the partner's mental health. None of the other types of social support exhibited an actor effect or a partner effect on the patient's or the partner's mental or physical health. More research into the relationship between social support and mental health is needed to help inform the design of interventions that target the dyad.     

Are we aware of the external factors that influence our food intake?

OBJECTIVES: This research examines the extent to which people accurately report some of the external influences on their food intake. DESIGN: In two studies, specific factors (the presence and behavior of others) were manipulated in order to influence the amount of food that individuals consumed. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: The main outcomes of interest were participants' spontaneously generated explanations for their food intake (Study 1; n = 122), and their ratings of the importance of several potential determinants of food intake (Study 2; n = 75). RESULTS: In Study 1, there was high concordance between the amounts eaten by members of a dyad, but very few participants indicated that they were influenced by their partner's behavior; they instead identified hunger and taste as the primary determinants of intake. Study 2 showed that participants' intake was strongly influenced by the behavior of others, but people rated taste and hunger as much more important influences on their intake. CONCLUSIONS: If external environmental factors influence people's food intake without their awareness or acknowledgment, then maintaining a healthy diet can be a challenge, with long-term consequences for health and well-being.     

You don't know me, but I know you: the illusion of asymmetric insight

People, it is hypothesized, show an asymmetry in assessing their own interpersonal and intrapersonal knowledge relative to that of their peers. Six studies suggested that people perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers' knowledge of them. Several of the studies explored sources of this perceived asymmetry, especially the conviction that while observable behaviors (e.g., interpersonal revelations or idiosyncratic word completions) are more revealing of others than self, private thoughts and feelings are more revealing of self than others. Study 2 also found that college roommates believe they know themselves better than their peers know themselves. Study 6 showed that group members display a similar bias-they believe their groups know and understand relevant out-groups better than vice versa. The relevance of such illusions of asymmetric insight for interpersonal interaction and our understanding of "naive realism" is discussed.     

For my eyes only: gaze control, enmeshment, and relationship quality

Perceived closeness that preserves the distinctness of each partner enhances intimate relationship quality, whereas pseudocloseness or enmeshment--reflecting an inability to distinguish one's own thoughts and emotions from a partner's--may have more negative outcomes (R. J. Green & P. D. Werner, 1996). Two studies investigated whether a dispositional inability to differentiate self from other is manifested at the attentional level as reduced capacity to inhibit following the gaze of another (A. Frischen, A. P. Bayliss, & S. P. Tipper, 2007). Among healthy elderly spouses in Study 1, superior gaze control predicted superior sociocognitive functioning, and those with poorer gaze control abilities were perceived by the partner as constricting the perceiving partner's autonomy, which in turn predicted lower relationship satisfaction among the latter. Moreover, these links were mediated by enmeshment, as indicated by the percentage of "we"-focused versus "I"- or partner-focused thoughts and emotions in the partners' independent accounts of the same relationship events. Extending these findings in a sample of Parkinson's disease patients and their spouses, Study 2 revealed a biphasic effect of self-other differentiation on relationship dynamics: In the early stages of the disease, increased couple focus promoted superior relationship quality, whereas lack of self-other differentiation predicted poorer relationship quality later. Thus, dispositional variations in fundamental social-perceptual processes predict both close relationship dynamics and long-term relationship quality.     

Perspective taking as egocentric anchoring and adjustment

The authors propose that people adopt others' perspectives by serially adjusting from their own. As predicted, estimates of others' perceptions were consistent with one's own but differed in a manner consistent with serial adjustment (Study 1). Participants were slower to indicate that another's perception would be different from--rather than similar to--their own (Study 2). Egocentric biases increased under time pressure (Study 2) and decreased with accuracy incentives (Study 3). Egocentric biases also increased when participants were more inclined to accept plausible values encountered early in the adjustment process than when inclined to reject them (Study 4). Finally, adjustments tend to be insufficient, in part, because people stop adjusting once a plausible estimate is reached (Study 5).     

The naïve intuitive statistician: a naïve sampling model of intuitive confidence intervals

The perspective of the na?ve intuitive statistician is outlined and applied to explain overconfidence when people produce intuitive confidence intervals and why this format leads to more overconfidence than other formally equivalent formats. The na?ve sampling model implies that people accurately describe the sample information they have but are na?ve in the sense that they uncritically take sample properties as estimates of population properties. A review demonstrates that the na?ve sampling model accounts for the robust and important findings in previous research as well as provides novel predictions that are confirmed, including a way to minimize the overconfidence with interval production. The authors discuss the na?ve sampling model as a representative of models inspired by the na?ve intuitive statistician.     

Is Intuition Necessary for Defending Platonism?

G?del asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of G?del’s conceptual realism’s basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, G?del asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too na?ve to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. G?del and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, G?del thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of G?del’s conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from na?ve, despite what some philosophers have claimed.     

The name of the game: predictive power of reputations versus situational labels in determining prisoner's dilemma game moves

Two experiments, one conducted with American college students and one with Israeli pilots and their instructors, explored the predictive power of reputation-based assessments versus the stated "name of the game" (Wall Street Game vs. Community Game) in determining players' responses in an N-move Prisoner's Dilemma. The results of these studies showed that the relevant labeling manipulations exerted far greater impact on the players' choice to cooperate versus defect--both in the first round and overall--than anticipated by the individuals who had predicted their behavior. Reputation-based prediction, by contrast, failed to discriminate cooperators from defectors. A supplementary questionnaire study showed the generality of the relevant short-coming in na?ve psychology. The implications of these findings, and the potential contribution of the present methodology to the classic pedagogical strategy of the demonstration experiment, are discussed.     

Auditory hindsight bias

People who know the outcome of an event tend to overestimate their own prior knowledge or others' na?ve knowledge of it. This hindsight bias pervades cognition, lending the world an unwarranted air of inevitability. In four experiments, we showed how knowing the identities of words causes people to overestimate others' na?ve ability to identify moderately to highly degraded spoken versions of those words. We also showed that this auditory hindsight bias occurs despite people's efforts to avoid it. We discuss our findings in the context of communication, in which speakers overestimate the clarity of their message and listeners overestimate their understanding of the message.     

Attachment and the management of empathic accuracy in relationship-threatening situations

The current studies tested how attachment orientations are related to empathic accuracy (i.e., the accuracy with which one infers a partner's private thoughts and feelings) during attachment-relevant discussions. In Study 1, married couples were videotaped discussing a severe or a less severe relationship issue that involved intimacy or jealousy. In Study 2, dating couples were videotaped trying to resolve a relationship conflict. Consistent with the revised empathic accuracy model, highly avoidant individuals were less empathically accurate in both studies. Relative to less anxious persons, highly anxious individuals were more empathically accurate when discussing intimacy issues that posed a potential threat to their relationship (in Study 1) and when they were rated as more distressed when discussing a relationship conflict (in Study 2). The findings are discussed in terms of how highly anxious and highly avoidant people differentially manage empathic accuracy to regulate negative affect and facilitate their interpersonal goals.     

Knowing how they feel: Perceiving emotions felt by outgroups

Individuals can often accurately perceive others’ emotions in a purely interpersonal context. However, when people identify with an important ingroup, they experience distinctive patterns of emotion [Smith, E. R., Seger, C. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2007). Can emotions be truly group-level? Evidence regarding four conceptual criteria. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 431-446]. Thus, in three studies using a variety of meaningful groups, we examine how a salient distinction between groups might influence people’s ability to estimate the emotions of outgroup members. Participants demonstrated substantial though imperfect accuracy in estimating the emotions reported by outgroups. Specific biases affected their estimates, especially the overlap of perceived emotions of the outgroup with the ingroup’s own emotions. Furthermore, there was a general overprediction of outgroups’ negative emotions and underprediction of their positive emotions. Because of the importance of an outgroup’s emotions as potential causes of their behavior, accuracy and biases in group emotion estimation may be consequential for intergroup relations.     

The association between self-concealment from one's partner and relationship well-being

In two studies the authors examined whether self-concealment from one's partner is associated with lower relationship well-being. In Study 1, participants who were in a romantic relationship (N = 165) completed an online survey. Self-concealment from one's partner was associated with lower relationship satisfaction and commitment. Furthermore, results were consistent with this relationship being mediated by autonomy and relatedness needs. In Study 2, couples (N = 50) completed daily records for 14 consecutive days. Multilevel analyses indicated that daily self-concealment from one's partner was associated with daily relationship satisfaction, commitment, and conflict. Lagged analyses also showed that self-concealment from one's partner predicted lower relationship well-being on the following day. Moreover, results supported that thwarted basic needs mediated the association between daily self-concealment and relationship well-being. Finally, actor-partner interdependence model over time analyses indicated that, apart from one's own self-concealment, one's partner's self-concealment was associated negatively with one's own relationship well-being.     

Prior Divergence: Do Researchers and Participants Share the Same Prior Probability Distributions?

Do participants bring their own priors to an experiment? If so, do they share the same priors as the researchers who design the experiment? In this article, we examine the extent to which self‐generated priors conform to experimenters’ expectations by explicitly asking participants to indicate their own priors in estimating the probability of a variety of events. We find in Study 1 that despite being instructed to follow a uniform distribution, participants appear to have used their own priors, which deviated from the given instructions. Using subjects’ own priors allows us to account better for their responses rather than merely to test the accuracy of their estimates. Implications for the study of judgment and decision making are discussed.     

When guessing what another person would say is better than giving your own opinion: Using perspective-taking to improve advice-taking

We investigated how perspective-taking might be used to overcome bias and improve advice-based judgments. Decision makers often tend to underweight the opinions of others relative to their own, and thus fail to exploit the wisdom of others. We tested the idea that decision makers taking the perspective of another person engage a less egocentric mode of processing of advisory opinions and thereby improve their accuracy. In Studies 1–2, participants gave their initial opinions and then considered a sample of advisory opinions in two conditions. In one condition (self-perspective), they were asked to give their best advice-based estimates. In the second (other-perspective), they were asked to give advice-based estimates from the perspective of another judge. The dependent variables were the participants' accuracy and indices that traced their judgment policy. In the self-perspective condition participants adhered to their initial opinions, whereas in the other-perspective condition they were far less egocentric, weighted the available opinions more equally and produced more accurate estimates. In Study 3, initial estimates were not elicited, yet the data patterns were consistent with these conclusions. All the studies suggest that switching perspectives allows decision makers to generate advice-based judgments that are superior to those they would otherwise have produced. We discuss the merits of perspective-taking as a procedure for correcting bias, suggesting that it is theoretically justifiable, practicable, and effective.     

How the head liberates the heart: projection of communal responsiveness guides relationship promotion

In 5 studies, the authors tested predictions that (a) people project their own felt communal responsiveness onto partners, perceiving partners to be just as caring and supportive as they are, and (b) projected perceptions guide perceivers' orientation toward further promotion of communal relationships. In Study 1, a manipulation of felt communal responsiveness toward a partner affected perceptions of the partner's responsiveness to the self, which in turn predicted evaluation of the partner. In Study 2, a manipulation of responsiveness toward a new acquaintance biased perceptions of the acquaintance's responsiveness to the self, which in turn predicted attraction and warmth toward the new acquaintance. In Studies 3 and 5, participants' own felt communal responsiveness toward a friend appeared to bias their perceptions of the friend's communal responsiveness, which in turn predicted self-disclosure, evaluation of the friend (Studies 3 and 5), and support provision (Study 5). Initial projected perceptions of a friend's (Study 3) and of a spouse's (Study 4) communal responsiveness also predicted longitudinal changes in perceivers' communal responsiveness. Results suggest that those who care for partners often project that care and that this projection guides their relationship promotion.     

Estimating one's own and one's relatives' multiple intelligence: a study from Argentina

Participants from Argentina (N = 217) estimated their own, their partner's, their parents' and their grandparents' overall and multiple intelligences. The Argentinean data showed that men gave higher overall estimates than women (M = 110.4 vs. 105.1) as well as higher estimates on mathematical and spatial intelligence. Participants thought themselves slightly less bright than their fathers (2 IQ points) but brighter than their mothers (6 points), their grandfathers (8 points), but especially their grandmothers (11 points). Regressions showed that participants thought verbal and mathematical IQ to be the best predictors of overall IQ. Results were broadly in agreement with other studies in the area. A comparison was also made with British data using the same questionnaire. British participants tended to give significantly higher self-estimates than for relatives, though the pattern was generally similar. Results are discussed in terms of the studies in the field.