James Baldwin,Christian Ethics,and the Recovery of Tradition

This essay uses James Baldwin’s thought about racism and homophobia as a critical lens for thinking about some influential strands of Christian ethics. The first part shows how Baldwin understood racism and homophobia and related them to one another by framing them as instances of spirit/flesh dualism and as effects of Christian supremacy. The second part relies on Baldwin’s categories to analyze and juxtapose the thought of select neo-Anabaptist and neo-Augustinian social ethicists. Like Baldwin, the ethicists I engage respond to the distorting power of Christian supremacy and of spirit/flesh dualism. Unlike Baldwin, these ethicists frame their response to Christian supremacy and dualism as a recovery of a more authentic or faithful Christian tradition. Baldwin, who often relied rhetorically and morally on Christian claims and frequently called on Christians to reflect the example of Jesus and the precepts of love, related to the tradition from the perspective of someone who had become an outsider to the church. He tended to focus instead on what the problems he described reflected about Christianity. The contrast with Baldwin helps identify two distinct retrieval strategies, which characterize the neo-Anabaptist and neo-Augustinian ethicists I discuss. One strategy seeks to preserve the integrity of Christian faith, and the other seeks to protect its essential decency. In what follows, I highlight some of the weaknesses of these approaches to tradition retrieval.     

Is the faith of faith development Christian faith?

The major research with a theological and developmental psychological perspective on the meaning and development of faith has been produced by James Fowler of Emory University and the Candler School of Theology. In this paper, I will present challenges by important critics who pose a significant question. Is this faith of the faith development research Christian faith? To provide an initial answer to the question, I will offer brief summaries of some of Fowler's writings that he has listed as most important for responding to the question. I will also present evidence from his writings and from the writings of other authors that he is indeed interpreting Christian faith.     

The Heritage of Ralph Wendell Burhoe for the Dialogue between Science and Theology: A German Perspective

This paper begins with some reflections on my personal experiences with Ralph Wendell Burhoe during visits to the Chicago Center for Religion and Science. I learned to know Burhoe as an interested and kind person with enormous intellectual power. In this paper I argue that integration of different concepts was the chief focus of his thinking, expressing both an ethical and a dogmatic concern. If his theory of altruism contributes to the scientific investigations into the problem of trans-kin altruism, then his vision of a scientific theology gains credibility. Such an integration is made plausible through the interpretation of altruism in light of Christian love. In fact, Burhoe's neonaturalistic approach may be a fertile resource for the dialogue between science and theology in Germany, and serve as an exemplar of Burhoe's important impact on this dialogue in general.     

James Fodor's Christian Theory of Truth: Is it Christian?

The 'task confronting contemporary theology', says James Fodor, 'is that of the rehabilitation or recovery of a distinctively Christian vision of truth' ( Christian Hermeneutics [Oxford, 1995] p. 72). In this paper I examine Fodor's attempt to construct a Christian or transformational theory of truth. I argue that his analysis of truth in terms of transformation leads to a concept of truth which is both subjective and relative. I argue further that Fodor's truth theory is either committed to a version of creative anti-realism, according to which the existence of basic structure of the world is determined by our linguistic activities, or it implies that although our language doesn't correspond to the world, we should go on making our theological truth claims anyway. I conclude that Fodor's Christian theory of truth is in most crucial respects not Christian at all.     

Transformations of the Concept of Reason

This outline of the transformations of the concept of reason is based on the idea that this can be presented/illustrated by means of a historical sketch of the criticism of reason, because all essential differentiations in that concept can be understood as consequences of critical arguments. In Kant's work, the Critique of Speculative Reason reaches its first conclusion; it was followed by a Critique of Critical Reason by Hegel and his followers, and Schopenhauer established a new type of critical argument: the Critique of Functional Reason which dominates the radical criticism of reason in our time. This radical criticism is the great challenge for the philosophy of reason today.     

History as a Literary Weapon: The Gospel of Barnabas in Muslim-Christian Polemics

Even if religion is not in itself a concept intrinsic to Christian doctrine, dogmatics need to develop its understanding of religion. Interpretating both early and late writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-45), the article takes us to the different understandings of religion to be found in Bonhoeffer. It focuses on the relation between religion and (the dogmatic notion of) sin in Bonhoeffer's thinking. In this very relation one finds the motives behind Bonhoeffer's wellknown criticism of religion. But surprisingly Bonhoeffer's hamartiological approach to religion also leads him to a positive understanding of religion which has escaped the attention of most Bonhoeffer scholarship. This positive understanding of religion is finally developed further by the article which shows how Bonhoeffer also connects religion and (the dogmatic notion of) man's God-likeness.     

Desacralizing Political Theology: Dionysius the Areopagite and Giorgio Agamben

Giorgio Agamben argues that Christian thought provides the paradigm of modern governmental power, which reinforces mundane government by investing it with glory. Agamben claims that Dionysius the Areopagite exemplifies this structure; in his view, Dionysian negative theology serves to sacralize ecclesiastical power. In response, I argue that Dionysius desacralizes every authority, affirming that some things are sacred even as he subjects that affirmation to thoroughgoing critique. Against both dogmatic adherence and pure profanation, Dionysius models a politics that draws on the power of the sacred while holding it open to unpredictable development.     

Meeting Scotus: On Scholasticism and Its Ghosts

Recalling the story of the ghost of Duns Scotus that haunts Merton Library, we investigate in this article whether Christian theology contains room for belief in ghosts. We conclude that there is no good reason why ghosts should not exist within a proper dogmatic account of death and resurrection, but that there is no theological need to affirm that ghosts do exist either. Thus we suggest that this matter is dogmatically indifferent. That same dogmatic account, however, demands that we take seriously the continuing lively voices of those, like Scotus, who have gone before as we pursue our own theological vocations.     

The theatre as an instrument of the criticism of ideologies

It is the thesis of the paper that the arts of the twentieth century have gone much further in the criticism of customary modes of thought than have both the sciences and the various critical philosophies which exist today. Moreover, they have not only developed an abstract principle of criticism, they have also studied the psychological conditions under which criticism can be expected to become effective. Some plays and the theoretical essays of Ionesco are analysed as an example. It is pointed out that Ionesco resembles Bacon in that he believes in an unchangeable basis of humanity from which all ideologies proceed. An attempt is made to free Ionesco from these dogmatic elements, theoretically, as well as practically (i.e. as regards the performance of his plays) and to utilize to the full his contributions to a theatre that is free of prejudice, and fully critical.     

Paradox and Mystery in Theology

The question of paradox in Christian theology continues to attract attention in contemporary philosophical theology. Much of this attention understandably centers on the epistemological problems paradoxical claims pose for Christian faith. But even among those who conclude that certain points of Christian theology are paradoxical and that belief in paradoxical points of doctrine is epistemically supportable, concepts of the nature and function of paradox in Christian theology differ significantly. In this essay, after briefly noting the diversity of phenomena that count as paradoxes in contemporary discourse, I critique two of the most helpful accounts of paradox in Christian theology available – James Anderson's and C. Stephen Evans's – on the way to proposing an alternative definition. That definition combines the most helpful features of those two accounts while correcting certain weaknesses in each. The result is a definition of paradox as a particular kind of mystery that fits the Reformed strand of Christian theology particularly well and involves a compelling analysis of the spirituality of the phenomenon of paradox in theology.     

On positive mysterianism

Religious believers react in one of four ways to apparent contradictions among their beliefs: Redirection, Resistance, Restraint, or Resolution. This paper evaluates positive mysterian Resistance, the view that believers may rationally believe and know apparently contradictory religious doctrines. After locating this theory by comparing and contrasting it with others, I explore the best developed version of it, that of James Anderson’s Paradox in Christian Theology. I argue that it faces steep epistemic problems, and is at best a temporarily reasonable but ultimately unsustainable stance.     

Medicine and Spiritual Healing Within a Region of Canada: Preliminary Findings Concerning Christian Scientists’ Healthcare Practices

Christian Science is the largest and most recognized of various spiritual healing groups that encourage members to forgo or overcome the need for medicine. Even so, it appears that some Scientists occasionally use medicine. In this study, I argue that Scientists in one region of Canada respond to influences on their healthcare practices differently and follow a variety of healthcare practices. These practices range from refusing medically necessary treatment (which could potentially harm individuals’ health) to making full use of the medical system. I base my findings primarily on interviews with eleven current members and one former Christian Scientist.     

Christian ethics and empirical research

What significance might empirical research have for a constructive theory of Christian ethics? This article discusses this question by bringing results from a concrete empirical study of aspects of Christian ethics into conversation with two theories of the same phenomenon: those of William Schweiker and Stanley Hauerwas/Samuel Wells. After mapping the results of the empirical study to the views offered by the two constructive accounts, I discuss more generally whether empirical studies of this kind can have significance for constructive ethical theory. I discuss three possible objections against such a position: that introducing empirical research to constructive theory of Christian ethics undermines normativity, that it blocks criticism, and that its contributions are likely to be divergent, incoherent and unsystematic, thus adding little of significance to constructive theory. I argue that none of these objections can definitively exclude empirical research from constructive theory. But they certainly have implications concerning not only how empirical research might have significance, but also regarding criteria it must meet in order to legitimately claim constructive relevance. Some concrete suggestions to this effect are launched in a final argumentative move.     

Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Dogmatism

Abstract

Transcendental arguments have been described as undogmatic or non‐dogmatic arguments. This paper examines this contention critically and addresses the question of what is required from an argument for which the characterization is valid. I shall argue that although transcendental arguments do in certain respects meet what one should require from non‐dogmatic arguments, they – or more specifically, what I shall call ‘general transcendental arguments’ – involve an assumption about conceptual unity that constitutes a reason for not attributing to them the status of non‐dogmatic arguments. As a solution to this problem I distinguish general transcendental arguments from what I shall call ‘specific transcendental arguments’ and seek to explain how by limiting the use of transcendental arguments to the latter type it would be possible to avoid dogmatism. This methodological adjustment also opens up a possibility of re‐interpreting transcendental arguments from the past in a novel non‐dogmatic fashion.     

Hope as Grounds for Forgiveness

It is widely assumed that Christianity enjoins its followers to practice universal, unconditional forgiveness. But universal, unconditional forgiveness is regarded by many as morally problematic. Some Christian scholars have denied that Christianity in fact requires universal, unconditional forgiveness, but I believe they are mistaken. In this essay, I show two things: (1) that Christianity does enjoin universal, unconditional forgiveness of a certain sort, and (2) that Christians, and perhaps other theists, are always justified in exercising unconditional forgiveness. Though most philosophers treat forgiveness as grounded in our beliefs about the offender's current state, I argue that we might more fruitfully ground forgiveness in hope for the wrongdoer. Christianity's commitment to the existence of an omnipotent God who is concerned about the moral status of His creatures always justifies such hope and thus always justifies forgiveness.     

The Innocuous Legacy of Christian Ethics in Comparative Religious Ethics

I argue that even if the influence of Christian ethics on comparative religious ethics (CRE) is inevitable, it need not be problematic. The legacy would only be worrisome if it stacked the deck in favor of Christian ethics or predisposed comparative ethicists to conform to the methods or thematic concerns of Christian ethics. Following Gadamer, I suggest that the ideal of presuppositionless objectivity is an illusion that applies to not only those who emerge from a Christian cultural context but in every global context. Given the specific historical and cultural contexts of the emergence of CRE, the residue of Christian ethics in CRE is understandable and expected. Thus, the legacy of Christian ethics in CRE will only be problematic to the extent that the potential dangers of Christian hegemony remain hidden, which does not seem to be the case in the contemporary academic context.     

Last of the mohicans? James McCosh and psychology "old" and "new"

This paper addresses the history of a rhetorical tradition in psychology that made a distinct division between old and new psychology and denigrated the old. The views of James McCosh, a transitional old psychologist and Princeton's president from 1868 to 1888, are analyzed to evaluate the stereotypical view of old psychology as antiscience and dogmatic. The evidence of James McCosh's writings and his actions while president of Princeton suggest the need for a more nuanced interpretation of the relationship between the old and the new. While McCosh did not share the new psychologists' valuation of experimental psychology, this was because of a disagreement over the correct methods of science, not a rejection of science itself. Therefore, the negative view of old psychology is better understood as a rhetorical strategy on the part of new psychologists who had professional reasons to distance themselves from their old psychology heritage.     

Reviews

Books reviewed:
John Webster, Barth's Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth's Thought
William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist
W. D. Davies, Christian Engagements with Judaism
Paul M. van Buren, According to the Scriptures: The Origins of the Gospels and the Church's Old Testament
Scott Bader-Saye, Church and Israel after Christendom: The Politics of Election
J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science
John Brooke and Geoffrey Cantor, Reconstructing Nature: The Engagement of Science and Religion
Joel James Shuman, The Body of Compassion: Ethics, Medicine, and the Church
Frederick Christian, Julian of Norwich and the Mystical Body Politic of Christ
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Women and Redemption: A Theological History     

Creating charisma online: the role of digital presence in the formation of religious identity

This article investigates the construction and transmission of charisma through online channels and its role in the formation of religious identities. Mindful of Max Weber’s observation that charisma inhabits the relationship between a leader and his/her followers, I argue for a critical reappraisal of the theoretical model in the light of the ubiquity in the twenty-first century of new, virtual forms of social encounter. I focus my analysis on the Christian creationist movement in the United States and particularly on an influential leader called Ken Ham. Using digital ethnographic methods, I show how Ham constructs charisma online and how a virtual community forms itself around his charismatic claims. I illustrate how this virtual community intersects with offline worlds and suggest that the theme park attractions that Ham’s organisation runs (Creation Museum, Ark Encounter) are imbued with deflected charisma by virtue of their association with his online avatar.