Replies to Timmerman and Gorman

In my reply to the thoughtful comments of Timmerman and Gorman, I take up, and further explore, some main questions, including: Can a horribly immoral person (a moral monster) lead a meaningful life? Similarly, can a significantly deluded person lead a meaningful life? What role do judgments of meaningfulness play in our normative framework? How can we understand the debate between those who would embrace the possibility of immortality and those who would reject it? What is the role of narrativity in evaluating meaning in human lives, and how would this concept apply to immortal lives? If death can be a bad thing for the deceased, should we fear death (the status of being dead)?

     

The real and the unreal: A reply to Jensen and Vernon

Jensen and Vernon (1986) have written a detailed reply to my critique of Jensen's reaction-time research (Longstreth, 1984). Their reply seems little short of a complete annihilation of my article. My critique is said to be full of inaccuracies, half-truths, false reasoning, wrong conclusions, and statistical naivete. But it just isn't so. I now explicate my concerns, and show that, particularly with respect to the major theoretical questions, there is little reason for accepting Jensen's claims.     

The sin of subjectivism: A reply to Shapiro

Shapiro criticises our book on two grounds. He first outlines a series of mistakes. None of them we believe, in fact, have been made and this is usually quite clear from our book. His second criticism rejects our ‘subjectivist’ approach to measurement. We argue that he misrepresents our methods and fails to grasp their ability both to collect accurate data and deal adequately with possible sources of bias. Indeed in these, in its attention to the dating of both independent and dependent variables, and in the flexibility of its approach to the respondent, we feel our approach is better equipped than other existing instruments to tackle the problem of the aetiological role of psycho-social factors in illness.     

The case of the disappearing disagreements: A reply to Yussen

S. R. Yussen (1984, Developmental Review, 4, 139–144) and I have few disagreements. The major one seems to be in what the purpose of my article (R. J. Sternberg, 1984, Developmental Review, 4, 113–138) should have been. I believe the article fulfills my own purpose, if not Yussen's.     

The contract ground: A reply to Jesse Kalin

Philosophical Studies -     

The missing link: A reply to Joseph Rychlak

We oppose Rychlak's (1991a, 1991b) claim that the view of mind entailed in artificial intelligence (AD and cognitive psychology is fundamentally at odds with Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory. Kelly's model and Al have much in common: They both are centrally concerned with representation, cognitive processes and their structure, and are ultimately empirical in their methodology. Many Al researchers have usefully embraced personal construct theory as a working conceptual framework, in this article, we examine Rychlak's assertions and identify several mistakes.     

The adjusted rand statistic: A SAS macro

A macro for calculating the Hubert and Arabie (1985) adjusted Rand statistic is presented. The adjusted Rand statistic gives a measure of classification agreement between two partitions of the same set of objects. The macro is written in the SAS macro language and makes extensive use of SAS/IML software (SAS Institute, 1985a, 1985b). The macro uses two different methods of handling missing values. The default method assumes that each object that has a missing value for the classification category is in its own separate category or cluster for that classification. The optional method places all objects with a missing value for the classification category into the same category for that classification.This study was supported in part by Individual National Research Service Award F32 DA 05283 from the National Institute on Drug Abuse.Requests for the Macro code can be sent via BITNET: CUSGPXH @ UCLAMVS. A copy of the macrocode can also be obtained by sending a stamped self-addressed mailer and a PC-DOS formatted floppy diskette to Paul Hoffman, 5628 MSA, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1557.     

The General Factor of Personality: A reply to Muncer

In previous studies we have shown that a General Factor of Personality (GFP) occupies the apex of the hierarchy of personality as well as the apex of the personality disorders in the same way that g, the general factor of mental ability, occupies the apex in the organization of cognitive abilities (Rushton & Irwing, 2011). In a critique, Muncer (2011) re-analyzed one of our data sets and concluded there was no evidence for a GFP. He also argued against the evolutionary theory we had proposed for the origin of the GFP. In this rejoinder I rebut Muncer’s conclusion and describe how directional selection can explain the GFP.