Synergistic man: outcome model for counselors

In this article the author revisits human nature in order to present it as a basis for guiding the quest for a working model of “optimal man.” The author postulates that our primordial human nature encompasses the possibilities for both good behavior and evil behavior. Accordingly, the perennial challenge facing guidance workers is helping to establish conditions that will actualize positive potentials while defusing the less beneficent ones. Drawing on the insights of Ruth Benedict and Abraham Maslow in their search for an ethical gauge by which to rate personal-social health, the author proposes “synergistic man” as the desired outcome model for counselors and educators.     

A Humean objection to Plantinga’s Quantitative Free Will Defense

Plantinga’s The Nature of Necessity (1974) contains a largely neglected argument for the claim that the proposition “God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good” is logically consistent with “the vast amount and variety of evil the universe actually contains” (not to be confused with Plantinga’s famous “Free Will Defense,” which seeks to show that this same proposition is logically consistent with “some evil”). In this paper I explicate this argument, and argue that it assumes that there is more moral good than evil in the cosmos. I consider two arguments in favour of this assumption, proposed by William King and Plantinga respectively, and argue that they are flawed. I then consider a sceptical objection to the assumption due to David Hume, and argue that this objection is at least prima facie plausible.     

The problem of religious evil: Does belief in god cause evil?

Daniel Kodaj has recently developed a pro-atheistic argument that he calls “the problem of religious evil.” This first premise of this argument is “belief in God causes evil.” Although this idea that belief in God causes evil is widely accepted, certainly in the secular West, it is sufficiently problematic as to be unsuitable as a basis for an argument for atheism, as Kodaj seeks to use it. In this paper I shall highlight the problems inherent in it in three ways: by considering whether it is reasonable to say that “belief in God” causes evil; whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God “causes” evil; and whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God causes “evil.” In each case I will argue that it is problematic to make such claims, and accordingly I will conclude that the premise “belief in God causes evil” is unacceptable as it stands, and consequently is unable to ground Kodaj’s pro-atheistic argument.     

Conceptions of the Opposite-Sex Ideal by International Students in the Netherlands

Abstract

An exploratory cross-cultural survey was used to investigate similarities and differences in stereotypes of good and evil. Students from the United States, West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany), Singapore, Nigeria, and Argentina responded projectively to a 62-item questionnaire, completing it as they imagined an extremely “good and virtuous,” an extremely “wicked and evil,” or an extremely “weak and helpless” person would. Two factors consistently emerged: control (the impulse to influence or dominate others) and power (the impulse to accomplish objectives). Stereotypes of good, bad, and helpless were related to extreme positions on these factors, suggesting that the concepts of good and evil are richer than simply opposite poles of a single, evaluative dimension. Strong similarities in factor structures were found across the five samples, but inconsistencies also emerged. In general, control and power appear to have been common across cultures; however, the five samples operationalized them, as well as good and evil, somewhat differently.     

The Role of Evil in Kant's Liberalism

Carl Schmitt distinguishes between political theories in terms of whether they rest on the anthropological assumption that man is evil by nature or on the anthropological assumption that man is good by nature, and he claims that liberal political theory is based on the latter assumption. Contrary to this claim, I show how Kant's liberalism is shaped by his theory of the radical evil in human nature, and that his liberalism corresponds to the characterization of liberalism that Schmitt himself offers. My discussion of this issue will be shown to have certain implications with respect to the view that for Kant evil is the product of society. I show that this view is mistaken insofar as it fails to recognize that Kant's political philosophy implies that human beings require the type of society that best suits their radically evil natures, namely, a commercial one in which the “vices of culture” largely have free play, while the state's role is limited to that of preventing the antagonisms found in society leading to the mutual destruction of its members.     

Indeterminacy and Moral Action in Laozi

There is an apparent tension in Laozi 老子 between his denial of the adequacy of positive theoretical formulations and his concomitant endorsement of certain kinds of practical action over others. Laozi writes, for example, “Where they all know the good as good, there is evil, Therefore Being and non-being produce each other” (Laozi 2.3–5), which suggests that good and evil produce each other the way being and non-being produce each other; in which case to do good will lead to evil and to do evil will lead to good. The result threatens to become moral paralysis. I argue that this destabilization of moral concepts does not amount to a moral relativism, but leaves us with a consistent moral point of view in its own way.     

The local problem of God’s hiddenness: a critique of van Inwagen’s criterion of philosophical success

In regards to the problem of evil, van Inwagen thinks there are two arguments from evil which require different defenses. These are the global argument from evil—that there exists evil in general, and the local argument from evil—that there exists some particular atrocious evil X. However, van Inwagen fails to consider whether the problem of God’s hiddenness also has a “local” version: whether there is in fact a “local” argument from God’s hiddenness which would be undefeated by his general defense of God’s hiddenness. This paper will argue that van Inwagen’s present account contains no implicit response to the “local” argument from God’s hiddenness, and, worse, the “local” argument brings to the fore crucial inconsistencies in van Inwagen’s account. These inconsistencies concern van Inwagen’s criterion for philosophical success—his methodological use of an “ideal audience” in an ideal debate—and a crucial premise in his argument: namely, that people who do not believe in God are culpably deceiving themselves regarding the manifest presence of God. These considerations will be a platform for my arguing that the failures of van Inwagen’s account amount to his ignoring the extra-rational, concrete aspect of grasping “spiritual propositions”—propositions which, in order to be affirmed, require the full self-understanding which precipitates out of the mind, body, and will of a particular existing individual.     

WHAT IS “SECULAR”? TECHNO‐SECULARISM AND SPIRITUALITY

Abstract. I argue that there is no “roaring reality of rampant secularism” with “technological application as its chief agent,” as claimed by John Caiazza (2005). Two phenomena, techno‐religion and a spirituality of technology, suggest a different picture of reality: Technology may be an alternative spirituality rather than an ally of a secularism that makes “nutcrackers of the soul” out of people who should be “dancers” (Nietzsche). An analysis of secularism and its manifold causes indicates that secularism is a fruit of both science and religion. The secular is a companion of religion rather than its enemy. Hence, I recommend a heuristic instead of an ontological use of the concept of secularism. In a technological age, religion is changing rather than being displaced. These changes are illustrated by the increase of private religiosity, megachurches, and cyber‐spirituality. Energized by the tension between finitude and creativity, technology shares in the marks of spirituality (Philip Hefner) and in the potential for good and evil. In this situation, fundamentalism and dogmatism in religion, science, and technology are a greater threat than secularism.     

Arthur Peacocke

Drawing on animal ethological studies, this article considers the possibility of a form of morality existing in animals and its relationship with human morality. Given this capacity, I argue that first we need to reflect more carefully on human sin and evil in evolutionary terms. Second, I question the adequacy of the traditional divide between “moral” and “natural” evil as well as consider the possibility of anthropogenic evil. Third, I suggest that a theological response to nonhuman morality should include discussion of the atonement, but traditional categories prove inadequate. Fourth, drawing on Sergii Bulgakov, I explore the idea of shadow sophia as representing a multivocal theodicy that is capable of holding together a tapestry of different theological responses to evil. Finally, I discuss the redemption of nature in the light of the foregoing discussion.     

EVOLUTION,CULTURE, AND SIN: RESPONDING TO PHILIP HEFNER'S PROPOSAL

Abstract. In his recent book, The Human Factor, Philip Hefner proposes to deepen theological understanding of the natural world and the place of humans within it. He describes humans as products of converging streams of genes and culture, and as possessors of freedom that requires them to be “created cocreators.” In accordance with the requirements of “the way things really are” (God), humans are to become divine agents in enlarging the realm of freedom in the world through self-sacrificing altruism. While Hefner's insights are admirable, his work could be viewed, in part, as a covert expression of nineteenth century liberal beliefs in progress. In fact, human culture and freedom are more ambiguous products of both good and evil, and hence we must take more cognizance of the pervasiveness of what theology has termed sin.     

Introduction to Margalit's Paper and Aron's Discussion: Contextualizing Memory and Nostalgia

The paper “Nostalgia” by Avishai Margalit and Lew Aron's discussion of it, which were the opening papers for the IARPP 2009 conference in Tel-Aviv, explicate the complex nature of memory and its ethical and relational components. Margalit explores the evaluative and ethical dimensions of memory in the private and collective spheres, describing “good” and “bad” nostalgia, and Aron brings Margalit's arguments to a meeting with psychoanalytic ideas of the transformative as well as defensive functions of memory and of “lived memory.”     

EBION AT THE BARRICADES: MORAL NARRATIVE AND POST‐CHRISTIAN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

My task in this article is to explore the question of the “place” of moral questions—questions of good and evil—in Christian faith, “faith” here being considered particularly as the content or narrative of belief. The thesis I will argue is that Christianity offers no substantial account or explanation of the origin(s) and nature of evil, that in a fundamental way Christianity is not concerned with offering such accounts, and that when the task of supplying accounts of the origin(s) and nature of evil is made central to the content or narrative of Christian faith that faith is made false: it is misunderstood.     

Through Thick and Thin: Validity and Reflective Judgment

The application of “thick” ethical concepts is best understood as a process of reflective rather than deductive judgment. Taking the form “B is as X as A,” where X is a thick ethical concept and A and B are narrative wholes unified through X (for example, “Those who hid Jews from the Nazis were as brave as Achilles”), reflective judgment opens thick ethical concepts to transformation. Though interpretive, such reflective judgment may still be able to provide validity without recourse to “thin,” purportedly context‐neutral terms.     

Orientation of attention to nonconsciously recognised famous faces

The nonconscious orientation of attention to famous faces was investigated using masked 17 ms stimulus exposure. Each trial presented a simultaneous pair of one famous and one unfamiliar face, matched on physical characteristics, one each in left visual field (LVF) and right visual field (RVF). These were followed by a dot probe in either LVF or RVF to which participants made a speeded two-alternative forced-choice discrimination response. Participants subsequently evaluated the affective valence (good/evil) of the famous persons on a 7-point scale. Higher accuracy of dot probe discrimination in the same visual field (VF) as the famous face suggested that attention was oriented towards faces of persons evaluated “good”, but a reverse orientation effect was observed for those evaluated “evil”. The awareness check presented the same face pairs under the same conditions, and participants were at chance in a task of selecting the famous face in each pair. The results suggest that famous faces can be identified without awareness, and that attention is attracted by the faces of famous persons not regarded as “evil”.     

高校心理咨询师多重关系情境与决策类型的研究

为探索高校咨询师面临的多重关系伦理情境、决策过程,对访谈17名高校心理咨询师的资料进行分析。结果：常见情境主要包括接送礼物承载的新关系、来访者和咨询师除咨询关系外的师生关系、咨询师与和来访者有关的第三人有关系、咨询师在咨询室之外的场所偶遇来访者、来访者有咨询师的联系方式、来访者和咨询师有身体接触等。决策表现为两种：经验主导型,决策时未意识到处于伦理情境只凭经验决策;伦理主导型,决策时意识到处在伦理情境。结论：高校心理咨询存在一些特殊多重关系,心理咨询师需增加具有伦理意识的决策。     

Is Evil Good for Religion? The Link between Supernatural Evil and Religious Commitment

“The devil made me do it” is a familiar cliché often used to justify a bad decision. However, are beliefs in a devil or other evil supernatural beings actually beneficial for religion? Building upon Stark and Bainbridge (1987) and elements of the supernatural punishment hypothesis, this study proposes and tests the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between the belief in supernatural evil and religious commitment. Data from 2007 Baylor Religion Survey reveal a strong positive correlation between the belief in supernatural evil and four measures of religious commitment: church attendance, religious perception, tithing, and faith sharing. This study not only contributes to a long discussion of religious commitment, but it also has implications for the growing literature on god images and the supernatural punishment hypothesis.     

Simone de Beauvoir's Ethics,the Master/Slave Dialectic,and Eichmann as a Sub‐Man

Simone de Beauvoir incorporates a significantly altered form of the Hegelian master/slave dialectic into The Ethics of Ambiguity. Her ethical theory explains and denounces extreme wrongdoing, such as the mass murder of millions of Jews at the hands of the Nazis. This essay demonstrates that, in the Beauvoirean dialectic, the Nazi value system (and Hitler) was the master, Adolf Eichmann was a slave, and Jews were denied human status. The analysis counters Robin May Schott's claims that “Beauvoir portrays the attitudes of the oppressor as defined fundamentally in relation to the oppressed” and that her use of the dialectic is “inadequate to account for how human beings create extreme situations of evil, such as that of genocide.”     

Consciousness and content‐formation

General opposition to ‘progress’ is often seen as involving a personification of technology as an evil spirit. One version of ‘luddism’ is defended here as worthy of serious debate. ('Luddism’ is an attempt to justify a general presumption that technical progress is bad for us, so technical innovations should not count as true achievement.) Our luddite says, ‘If technical powers, misused, will cause more harm than good, these powers should count as bad. And such harmful misuse is likely, since the dramatic, half‐blind changes resulting from technology will shortly damage world systems, swamping their adjustment‐mechanisms. “Superhuman”; powers go sour with merely human wisdom. “Know‐how”; tends inherently to pull ahead of “know‐whether”; ‘. This version of luddism is contrasted with various caricatures; luddite research priorities are outlined. Serious discussion is invited of the dangers inherent in further empowering fallible humanity.     

Person and Community in the Culture of Entertainment

Entertainment is so pervasive and influential in contemporary society that it is fair to say we live in an entertainment culture. What are the political, ethical, and spiritual implications of such a cultural environment? Building on the analysis offered in the author’s recent book Caught in Play: How Entertainment Works on You (Stromberg, 2009), this essay argues that entertainment is not susceptible to global moral evaluation, it is not “good” or “bad.” Rather, entertainment is a cultural system through which commitment to certain values is generated. This process, and these values, need to be brought into the light of day and assessed in open and critical discussion.