Kant's Pragmatism

This article offers a definition of the term ‘pragmatic’, as it is used in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The definition offered does not make any reference to the affinities between Kant's pragmatism and the philosophies of the American or other pragmatists but draws its definiens entirely from the Kantian conceptual framework. It states that the term ‘pragmatic’ denotes imperatives, laws and beliefs of a specific type: an imperative is pragmatic if and only if it is concerned with the choice of means to individual or universal happiness; a law is pragmatic if and only if our willingness to presuppose it results from our obedience to a pragmatic imperative; and a belief is pragmatic if and only if it relates to the objective validity of pragmatic laws. This article also discusses two rival definitions of the term ‘pragmatic’ (as used by Kant) that have been brought forward by Sidney Axinn and Nicholas Rescher.     

Kant's Musical Antiformalism

According to the orthodox view of Kant's philosophy of music, Kant is the founder of musical formalism, the view that music is pure, contentless form, and appreciated as such. On this orthodox view, Kant is an innovator in philosophy of music, though his views are confused and sometimes contradictory. Sometimes, we are told, Kant indicates that music is a fine art and sometimes that it is merely an agreeable art. None of the orthodox position is correct. Kant's views on music are familiar, even a little old fashioned for their time. His views are consistent. He believes that some music is fine art and that the fine arts are imitative arts. Imitative arts have content, and Kant believes that at least some music has content. Our views on Kant's philosophy of music ought to be thoroughly revised.     

康德的德性理论

康德的德性论聚焦于人的道德而非一般的理性存在的道德,在理性与经验情感、规范与性情、神性与人性等方面有着系统的论述,对于理解康德伦理学的完整面貌、澄清多年来的一些误解,有着重要的意义.     

The Mind of the Scenario Thinker

In the face of increasing uncertainty and changes, corporations must dynamically examine their business environment and activate the knowledge creation process in a future-oriented manner without getting hung up on analyzing their past (much like driving a car using only the rear-view mirror). In the previous article, we discussed the basics of scenario planning. We should not use this tool as a mere technique. Our knowledge of the world and the environment around us is important because it underlies our scenarios. When we look toward the future in an uncertain environment, we necessarily create knowledge proactively. Scenario planning and knowledge creation are commonplace when working on knowledge of innovations that shape the future. In this article we focus on the importance of having “scenario mind,” the philosophy underlying scenario planning. With any managerial tool, you cannot create real knowledge if you use only superficial know-how, like procedures described in manuals, to seek quick results. In the following sections, we discuss how scenario planning must be recognized as a “discipline of knowledge” to be embedded as a way of thinking and behavioral pattern of each individual or organization, not as a mere tool.     

试析康德伦理思想的起点及其现代价值

自由、主体、实践理性、善良意志、意志自律以至"绝对命令",在康德那里是相通的概念.正是独立于客体的主体概念奠定了道德的基础.在康德纯粹理性所划分的学科体系中,道德形而上学是作为伦理学的纯粹部分而存在的,它关注的是人的终极目的,涉及的是人的全部使命,体现的是人的高贵和尊严.所以它是优越于人类理性的任何其他追求的,而其他学科都是要为这个最高目的服务的.这是整个康德伦理思想的起点.康德伦理思想注意到了人生、人的理性的双层追求,力图将它们统一于整个先验哲学之中.     

Kant's Theory of Value: On Allen Wood's Kant's Ethical Thought

Karl Ameriks has recently devoted an entire volume to defending what he calls "orthodox" Kantianism against what he judges to be the "errors" of such post-Kantian idealists as K. L. Reinhold and J. G. Fichte and to exposing what he claims is the frequently unnoticed but always deleterious influence of post-Kantianism upon certain prominent strands of contemporary philosophy. In response, this paper challenges Ameriks' interpretation of Kantianism itself and of the "post-Kantian project", as well as his construal of transcendental idealism. This is followed by some remarks concerning Reinhold's and Fichte's actual "arguments" for transcendental idealism and a rejection of Ameriks' characterizations of the same. Ameriks' interpretation of "the primacy of the practical" within Fichte's philosophy is also analyzed and criticized, as are his unsubstantiated claims concerning the powerful "indirect" influence of the writings of Reinhold and Fichte upon contemporary philosophy.