Was Schopenhauer a Kantian Ethicist?

ABSTRACT

Commentators have generally seen the compassionate person as a second-rate character vis-à-vis the ascetic ‘saint’ who denies the will-to-life and resigns from willing altogether in Schopenhauer's ethical thought. In this paper I offer another way to interpret Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, which is textually grounded and genuinely Schopenhauerian, but which draws out similarities to Kant’s ethics that, I shall argue, have not been hitherto appreciated. Once these Kantian similarities are appreciated one sees that the compassionate person is no longer a runner up ethically and epistemically to the saint, rather, the compassionate person and the saint are at odds with each other, and really represent – unbeknownst to Schopenhauer himself–two distinct and incompatible ethical ideals.

To motivate this interpretation, I will first delineate the traditional interpretation of what Schopenhauer means by the compassionate person’s intuitive insight into the way the world really is. Second, I will offer a novel, and to my mind, textually preferable reading of what this intuitive insight consists in. Finally, I’ll suggest in light of recent work in metaethics by Colin Marshall – notably in his 2018 book titled Compassionate Moral Realism–that my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s ethics offers a creditable moral realist option for the contemporary landscape.     

A little help from my friends: Lack of social interaction predicts greater boredom during the COVID-19 pandemic

Were people bored during the pandemic, and if so why? One possibility is lack of social interaction due to restrictions on social activity intended to slow the spread of communicable disease. In a 3-week daily diary study (n = 438; international community sample) social interaction predicted boredom and its consequences. People felt more bored on days when they engaged in less social interaction than usual (in-person or virtually), largely driven by a lack of meaning. In turn, boredom predicted lower well-being concurrently, and more virtual interaction the next day; people dispositionally higher in trait boredom also reported more solitary (but not partnered) sexual activity. In conclusion, this study suggests that maintaining social connections, even during a pandemic, may be important to mitigate boredom and improve overall well-being.     

Schopenhauer on Christ,Suffering and the Negation of the Will

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to illuminate Schopenhauer’s notion of the negation or denial of the will by investigating the figure of the saint within his philosophy. We argue that various discussions in Schopenhauer’s works of the possible role of Christ as exemplar reveals an underlying Christological understanding of self-denial as a model for the saint. The connection between Schopenhauer’s approach to Christ and Kant’s Christology in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason is also explored. We note how Schopenhauer builds on the Kantian demythologization of the Incarnated Christ in order to uncover the moral and existential spirit that underlies Christianity. In addition, we outline how a recognition of the symbolic importance of Christ for Schopenhauer suggests features of the denial of the will that have been overlooked in the literature, involving the intellectual transcendence of suffering through the cultivation of a state of emotional unresponsiveness. It is argued that this reflects a deeper connection between Schopenhauer’s philosophy and Christian thought than is often recognised.     

Against the Tedium of Immortality

Abstract

In a well-known paper, Bernard Williams argues that an immortal life would not be worth living, for it would necessarily become boring. I examine the implications for the boredom thesis of three human traits that have received insufficient attention in the literature on Williams’ paper. First, human memory decays, so humans would be entertained and driven by things that they experienced long before but had forgotten. Second, even if memory does not decay to the extent necessary to ward off boredom, once-satisfied desires often return after a sufficient period of time. Eternity would always contain sufficient time for our desires to rejuvenate. Third, even if too many of our desires were satisfied but not yet rejuvenated, we can expect that human ingenuity would continue to invent new pursuits, pastimes, careers, and ways of life that would prevent us from becoming bored as we moved from one to another. Finally, I consider and respond to several objections, including the claims that as much variety as I propose to be put into an eternal life is inconsistent with having one character throughout one’s life and that the sort of character change and memory decay I postulate is inconsistent with personal identity.     

A self-regulatory approach to understanding boredom proneness

We investigated the relationship between self-regulation and two types of boredom proneness (perceived lack of internal stimulation, perceived lack of external stimulation) using a variety of measures of self-regulation. These included a general measure of self-control, measures of both regulatory focus (i.e., promotion or a sensitivity to gains/non-gains vs. prevention or a sensitivity to losses/non-losses) and regulatory mode (i.e., assessment or the tendency to compare means and goals vs. locomotion or the tendency to initiate and maintain commitment to action), and measures of cognitive flexibility (i.e., a perceived sense of control and the tendency to seek alternative solutions). Results identified a unique set of factors related to each boredom proneness component. Trait self-control and prevention focus were associated with lower boredom propensity due to a lack of external stimulation. Locomotion and the tendency to seek alternatives were associated with lower boredom propensity due to a lack of internal stimulation. These findings suggest that effective goal pursuit is associated with reduced likelihood of experiencing boredom.     

How to Think About Virtue and Right

Abstract

Robert Johnson argues that virtue ethical accounts of right action fail because they cannot take account of the fact that there are things we ought to do precisely because we do not possess virtuous character traits. Self-improving actions are his paradigm case and it would indeed be a problem if virtue ethics could not make sense of the propriety of self-improvement. To solve this serious problem, I propose that virtue ethics ought to define right action in terms of the virtuous agent's reasons for action instead of defining right action in terms of the actions that the virtuous agent performs. I argue that this revised definition of right action makes sense of the Tightness of self-improving actions and that it can be given a genuinely virtue ethical interpretation.     

There are Intentionalia of Which it is True that Such Objects Do Not Exist

Abstract

According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a kind such that its members figure (for independent reasons) in such an inventory. Negatively put, if there are no things of a certain metaphysical kind, thoughts about things of that kind are not really committed to such things. Pace Crane, however, this does not mean that the intentionalia that are really there are only those that exist. For existence, qua first-order property, is no metaphysical kind. Thus, there may really be intentionalia that do not exist, provided that they belong to good metaphysical kinds.     

Against Supermax

abstract Supermax prisons subject inmates to extreme isolation and sensory deprivation for extended periods of time. Crime reduction and retributive arguments in favour of supermax confinement are elaborated. Both types of arguments are shown to falter once the logic of the two approaches to the justification of legal punishment is made clear and evidence about the effects of supermax confinement on inmates is considered. It is also argued that many criminal offenders suffer from defects in their capacities for morally responsible action, lack sufficient opportunities to remain law‐abiding, or are understandably alienated from society and the prison regime. The implications of this more realistic picture of offenders for supermax confinement are then explored briefly.     

Transformative Choice,Practical Reasons and Trust

Abstract

In this article I reflect on the question of whether we can have reason to make transformative choices. In attempting to answer it, I do three things. First, I bring forward an internalist account of practical reasons which entails the idea that agents should deliberate to the best of their ability. Second, I discuss L.A. Paul’s views on transformative choice, arguing that, although they present a real problem, the problem is not as profound as she believes it is. Third, I argue that, given the situation in which we face transformative choices (a situation of principled uncertainty though not cluelessness), trust is an appropriate response to transformative choices, and that when one’s trust that one’s current desires will be fulfilled in making a transformative choice is reasonable, one has a reason to make it. Thus, trust turns out to be a crucial response to a profound problem each of us will face during our lives.     

How Morality Becomes Demanding Cost vs. Difficulty and Restriction

ABSTRACT

The standard view of demandingness understands demandingness exclusively as a matter of costs to the agent. The paper discusses whether the standard view must be given up because we should think of demandingness as a matter of difficulty or restriction of options. I will argue that difficulty can indeed increase demandingness, but only insofar as it leads to further costs. As to restrictions of options, I will show that confinement can become costly and thus increase demandingness in three ways, by prohibiting actions that the agent wants to perform in order to promote his well-being, by limiting the development of future preferences and projects and also by making the society less open. The paper thus defends a new variant of the standard view by arguing that difficulty and restrictions of options can increase the demandingness of morality on grounds of being costly.     

Predicting changes in student engagement in university physical education: Application of control-value theory of achievement emotions

ObjectivesBased on Pekrun’s (2006) control value theory of achievement emotions, this study examined both distal and proximal predictors of change in students' behavioral and emotional engagement during one semester of university physical education classes.DesignShort-term longitudinal design.MethodStudents (N = 202) completed questionnaires on three separate occasions during one semester. At the beginning of the semester, demographic information and behavioral and emotional engagement were reported. At the mid-point in the semester, control beliefs, extrinsic value beliefs, and discrete activity emotions toward the physical education context (i.e., enjoyment; anger; boredom) were completed. At the end of the semester, behavioral and emotional engagement were measured once again.ResultsA series of confirmatory factor analyses provided evidence for factor validity and reliability in the measured constructs and longitudinal measurement invariance tests established that any detected change in student engagement was associated with true change. Findings from a path analysis revealed that initial emotional engagement was a predictor of control and extrinsic value appraisals as well as enjoyment and boredom, but not anger. Extrinsic value positively predicted enjoyment while control negatively predicted anger. Finally, a distinct pattern of relations was established between enjoyment, boredom, and changes in engagement.ConclusionsDifferences in the predictive relations of boredom and anger on changes in student engagement highlights the unique contributions of measuring discrete emotions. Overall, findings partially support the applicability of using Pekrun's control value framework in physical activity settings.     

Nietzsche on Kant and teleology in 1868: ‘“life” is something entirely dark … ’

ABSTRACT

We know from Nietzsche’s posthumously published notebooks and correspondence of his plan in 1868 to compose a doctoral dissertation in philosophy on the subject of teleology in nature and the concept of the organic, with reference to Kant. The bulk of my discussion represents an attempt to extrapolate from Nietzsche’s letters and preparatory notes the view he arrived at. Since the notes do not defend explicitly any single definitive thesis, their interpretation is unavoidably conjectural. I argue that, if Nietzsche’s remarks are considered with close reference to the philosophers who at that point dominated his horizons, namely Kant, Schopenhauer, and Lange, with Goethe also playing a key role, a plausible account can be given of the broad conclusions Nietzsche reached as a result of his early engagement with the problem of teleology. This outlook maintains the necessity and distinctiveness of philosophical reflection, but takes a skeptical view of its basis. In 1868 Nietzsche had no clear idea of how to proceed from this point, but in the end I propose, as others have done, that Nietzsche’s reflections on Kant and teleology helped to lay the ground for The Birth of Tragedy. In conclusion, I hypothesize that Nietzsche’s later philosophy involves no change of metaphilosophical standpoint.     

Zur Psychodynamik der Langeweile

Zusammenfassung. Das Ph?nomen Langeweile wird als Ich-Zustand und als Beziehungsgeschehen in der analytischen Situation untersucht. Das in der psychoanalytischen Literatur vorherrschende Verst?ndnis der Langeweile als Abwehr libidin?ser und aggressiver Triebwünsche und als charakterologische Abwehr schwerer maligner Depression und psychosenaher Zust?nde wird um die Frage erweitert, unter welchen seelischen Bedingungen Langeweile toleriert werden kann und als übergangszustand kreative und regenerative M?glichkeiten in sich birgt. Diese Dialektik von Abwehr und kreativer Ich-Leistung bildet den Rahmen für das klinische Material. Drei exemplarische Fallsequenzen dienen der Darstellung sehr unterschiedlicher Qualit?ten und Schweregrade der Langeweile in der analytischen Beziehung. Die in der Langeweile abgewehrten Affekte und Beziehungsqualit?ten – Langeweile als übertragungswiderstand – werden untersucht: Langeweile als „geheimer Zuchtmeister der Triebe” dient der Abwehr inzestu?s-?dipaler Triebwünsche; sie schützt vor nicht tolerierbaren Leerzust?nden und depressiven Affekten, die mit traumatischen Erinnerungen verbunden sind; sie fungiert schlie?lich in Form von l?hmender, „t?dlicher” Langeweile als ein übertragungswiderstand, in dem der Patient die Beziehung zur Analytikerin vor destruktiver Bem?chtigung und sadistischen Triebwünschen zu schützen versucht. Die Arbeit wird durch einige philosophische und literarische Passagen (Oblomow) erg?nzt, die auf die Langeweile als kulturhistorisch interessantes Sujet verweisen.

---

Psychodynamics of boredom

Summary. The phenomenon of boredom is examined as ego state and as reflection of the relationship within the analytic situation. In psychoanalytical literature boredom is predominantly viewed as defence against libidinal and aggressive wishes and as characterological defence against serious malignant depression and states close to psychosis; here the question is extended to the consideration under what psychological conditions boredom may be tolerated and may even constitute a transitional phase towards the development of creative and regenerative potential. The dialectics of repression and creative ego-achievement form the framework for the discussion of the clinical material. Three casework sequences illustrate vastly differing aspects of boredom both in its intrinsic qualities and its degree in the analytic relationship. The affects and relationship qualities which are repressed in boredom – i.e. boredom as transference resistance – are considered: boredom as ”secred tamer of the drives” serves the repression of incestuous/oedipal drives; it serves as a protection against intolerable emptiness and the depressive affects relating to posttraumatic memories; and, finally, as crippling ”deadly” boredom it may function as transference resistance whereby the patient attempts to protect the analytic relationship from destructive usurpation and sadistic wishes. The paper concludes with some philosophical and literary passages (Oblomov) which illustrate interesting cultural and historical facets of the subject.

     

Miracles and the spiritual un‐consciousness of technological culture

Abstract

The unconscious can be understood in terms of a constriction of possibilities of relatedness which occurs within a specific historical construction of the human context. Van den Berg argues that our technological world, in its having become secularized, has constellated a spiritual unconscious. In a similar vein, Havel suggests that respect for the miracle of being moves beyond technological rationality making possible the “self‐transcendence” sorely needed in the postmodern era. Van den Berg's and Havel's theses are amplified in terms of an analysis of two popular films. These films present belief as a non‐technological, non‐functional disclosure of things. When we believe, we let things be miracles by respecting the obligations they place upon us.     

The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry by Frederick C. Redlich and Daniel X. Freedman

Abstract

The noted humorist Dave Barry, in looking back over his life and thinking of things he had learned, said one of the things he learned was that “There is a very fine line between ‘hobby’ and ‘mental illness’” (1998, p. 182).

Following in Dave Barry’s path, I would like to look back over the 45+ years I’ve been practicing group therapy and see if there is anything to be learned by what I have learned over those years.     

The pessimistic origin of Nietzsche’s thought of eternal recurrence

ABSTRACT

In this article I argue that we should understand Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence as the ideal of life affirmation opposed to philosophical pessimism, the view that life is not worth living. I first articulate Nietzsche’s psychological account of pessimism as a vengeful focus on the past and an aversion to time understood as transience. I then consider the question of why a person with the opposite psychological orientation – a creative relation to the future and an endorsement of time – would will the eternal recurrence of all things. My answer appeals to Nietzsche’s notions of will to power and the redemption of the past from its senselessness. The interpretation of eternal recurrence that emerges from this approach takes Nietzsche’s vision of a great, world-redeeming individual to be integral to his doctrine of eternal recurrence. This is just one way in which it differs from common interpretations of eternal recurrence as a cosmological theory or thought experiment.     

Reticence

There is an obvious role for self‐assertion within discourse. It is much less obvious what role self‐withdrawal might play. Indeed, it is far from obvious what role it could play. For how can we enter into discourse at all if we pull ourselves from the fray? Heidegger, however, claims not only that self‐withdrawal has a role to play but that reticence is the authentic mode of discourse. In this paper, I develop an account of reticence that explains its importance to Being and Time. I argue that Heidegger's conception of reticence is central to his explanation of how the understanding can be developed in terms of the things themselves, rather than in terms of what one says about things.