J. S. Mill’s hedonism: activism,experientialism and eudaimonism

Many contemporary scholars defend the position that J. S. Mill was a ‘eudaimonist’, in a sense implying that he was not an ‘experiential’ hedonist. One ‘activist’ argument for this interpretation rests on the claim that Mill’s core axiological uses of ‘pleasure’ in Utilitarianism should be understood to refer to worthy or pleasurable activities rather than mental states. This paper offers a three-stage rebuttal of the activist interpretation. Firstly, in the Analysis, the Examination and the Logic, Mill explicitly identifies pleasures and pains as mental states. Secondly, if we read Mill’s core axiological uses of ‘pleasure’ in Utilitarianism along activist lines, the text’s overall coherence and intelligibility becomes even more questionable than on the traditional experientialist reading. Finally, in his discussions of Plato, Mill seems to distance himself from the axiological view that non-hedonic features of mind or character have intrinsic value in their own right. In consequence, in the small number of cases in Utilitarianism in which Mill clearly speaks of ‘pleasures’ as activities, this is best construed as a derivative usage.     

The absolutism problem in On Liberty

Mill argues that, apart from the principle of utility, his utilitarianism is incompatible with absolutes. Yet in On Liberty he introduces an exceptionless anti-paternalism principle—his liberty principle. In this paper I address ‘the absolutism problem,’ that is, whether Mill's utilitarianism can accommodate an exceptionless principle. Mill's absolute claim is not a mere bit of rhetoric. But the four main solutions to the absolutism problem are also not supported by the relevant texts. I defend a fifth solution—the competence view—that turns on his attention to decision-making structures and, in particular, on the role of expertise considerations in his account.     

Conflict,consensus, and liberty in J. S. Mill’s representative democracy

The relationship between representative democracy and conflict in John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy has been interpreted in very different ways. While some scholars claim that Millian democracy is incompatible with political conflict, others identify in Mill a radical political agonism that would offer a non-consensual model of deliberative democracy. This paper argues that neither of these views is exactly accurate: although he highlights the centrality of conflict in political life, Mill believes that democratic deliberation presupposes a minimal level of consensus regarding the formal value of democracy’s basic principles, viz. the principles of individual freedom and equality. Initially, I shall reconstruct the relationship between conflict and consensus in Mill’s conception of representative democracy. I shall then investigate his association of representation and advocacy and show that Mill’s encomium on political conflict was influenced by Guizot’s work. Finally, I shall explain how a democratic debate riven with conflict is conducive to individual freedom.     

Quality of life - three competing views

The aim of the present paper is to describe three different attempts, which have been made by philosophers, to define what quality of life is; and to spell out some of the difficulties that faces each definition. One, Perfectionism, focuses on the capacities that human beings possess: capacities for friendship, knowledge and creative activity, for instance. It says that the good life consists in the development and use of these capacities. Another account, the Preference Theory, urges that satisfying one's preferences, or desires, is what improves one's quality of life. And a third account, Hedonism, sees life-quality as consisting in the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The paper describes and evaluates objections to each of these views, thereby displaying their weaknesses and strengths. Since no view comes out as the right one there is a choice to be made. At the end of the paper it is being discussed how well each of the views cohere with different methodologies used in quality of life research. Also it is suggested that considerations about what the research is to be used for are relevant.     

Shame,Stigma, and Disgust in the Decent Society

Would a just society or government absolutely refrain from shaming or humiliating any of its members? “No,” says this essay. It describes morally acceptable uses of shame, stigma and disgust as tools of social control in a decent (just) society. These uses involve criminal law, tort law, and informal social norms. The standard of moral acceptability proposed for determining the line is a version of perfectionistic prioritarian consequenstialism. From this standpoint, criticism is developed against Martha Nussbaum’s view that to respect the dignity of each person, society absolutely must refrain from certain ways of shaming and humiliating its members and rendering them objects of communal disgust.     

Was John Stuart Mill a Pluralist?

In his Autobiography,John Stuart Mill,the 19th-century British political philosopher,portrayed his On Liberty as being "a kind of philosophic text-book" dedicated to a single truth,that is,"the importance,to man and society,of a large variety in types of character,and of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and conflicting directions." The Mill of On Liberty may seem to be a pluralist who tends to prefer difference per se to goodness of a uniform pattern,many-sidedness to conformity,and eccentricity to mediocrity.This paper seeks to challenge this argument by paying close attention to the text.It argues that the Mill of On Liberty was far from a single-minded pluralist.Two divergent positions are found throughout his reasoning:one is a pluralist idea that an individual's own plan of life is the best,no matter how base or licentious it might be;the other is the belief that there exist a limited number of ideal ways of life which define what the good life is.The two positions are,if not mutually exclusive,at least in important aspects indicative of some profound tension at the center of Mill's thought.     

Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism

The paradox of hedonism is the idea that making pleasure the only thing that we desire for its own sake can be self-defeating. Why would this be true? In this paper, I survey two prominent explanations, then develop a third possible explanation, inspired by Joseph Butler's classic discussion of the paradox. The existing accounts claim that the paradox arises because we are systematically incompetent at predicting what will make us happy, or because the greatest pleasures for human beings are found in certain special goods which hedonists cannot enjoy. On the account that I develop, the paradox is a consequence of a theory about the nature of pleasure, together with a view about the requirements of rational belief. Which of these explanations is correct, I argue, bears on central questions about how to understand the nature and extent of the paradox.     

The Contributions of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Reading Motivation to the Development of Reading Competence over Summer Vacation

This study addressed the role of reading motivation as a potential determinant of losses or gains in reading competence over six weeks of summer vacation (SV). Based on a sample of 223 third-grade elementary students, structural equation analyses showed that intrinsic reading motivation before SV contributed positively to both word and sentence comprehension after SV when controlling for comprehension performance before SV. These effects were mediated by reading amount. Extrinsic reading motivation did not show significant associations with end-of-summer comprehension scores. Taken together, the findings suggest that intrinsic reading motivation facilitates students’ development of reading comprehension over SV.     

Savoring time: desire, pleasure and wholehearted activity

There is considerable appeal to the Aristotelian idea that taking pleasure in an activity is sometimes simply a matter of attending to it in such a way as to render it wholehearted. However, the proponents of this idea have not made adequately clear what kind of attention it is that can perform the surprising feat of transforming otherwise indifferent activities into pleasurable ones. I build upon Gilbert Ryle's suggestion that taking pleasure in an activity is tantamount to engaging in the activity while fervently desiring to do it and it alone. More specifically, I draw upon insights into the sort of evaluative attention involved in having a desire to generate corollary insights into the sort of attention that makes activity pleasurable. My aim is to offer a compelling account of a certain class of pleasures, and to shed light on their relation to reasons. I argue that prospective pleasures in this class are not always reasons for action, and that even when they are reasons they have this status only derivatively, as vivid apprehensions of an independent realm of values. This does not mean that such pleasures are never good. They are good provided that they track real values, for then they constitute a proper savoring of one's activities and/or circumstances, and provide a valuable respite from the distractions and unwarranted doubts that so often leave us at odds with ourselves and alienated from our own doings.     

Response to Stuart Kauffman: The Cosmic Mind and NIODA

Non-locality, indeterminacy, the meaning of the Schrödinger equation, and quantum measurements are interpretation issues in quantum mechanics that go beyond our typical view of the world through the classical physics lenses of the mechanistic determinism. In “Cosmic Mind?,” Stuart Kauffman offers an interpretation of the Schrödinger equation and quantum measurements that might support a cosmic mind. Robert John Russell in NIODA uses the indeterminacy to offer a mechanism for God to interact with nature. This response reviews these two interpretations of quantum mechanics with respect to the two-slit and EPR experiments and how these two interpretations of quantum mechanics could solve issues of interpretations.     

Authority as paradox: The transformations of Don Quijote

The author's contention is that the analysand's temporary attribution of authority to the analyst is inherent in the analytic situation; this is seen as a transitional and paradoxical form of authority pertaining neither to internal nor external reality, but dwelling in the analytic third. The author proposes a conceptualization of psychoanalytic authority as a form of aesthetic authority according to Gadamer's defi nitions. While the scientifi c and hermeneutic codes for the understanding of authority in psychoanalysis assume that the main issue at stake is the delimitation of the objectivity or the subjectivity of the analyst's knowledge, this aesthetic perspective centres on the analysand's attribution of a claim of truth to analytic interpretations, and on the experience of recognition. The experience of recognition of a possible truth is particular and context-bound, as well as self-transformational. A reading of three episodes from Cervantes's The history of Don Quixote de la Mancha illuminates the transitional and paradoxical character of aesthetic authority within a transformational dialogue. These episodes are read as dramatizations of different positions vis-à-vis the paradoxical authority that characterizes transformational dialogues.     

Dislike and Envy as Antecedents of Pleasure at Another's Misfortune

Previous research related to pleasure at another's misfortune has focused on the role of envy and competition in inducing such feelings. Additionally, some views assume that this emotion is restricted to mild misfortunes. In this paper, we propose that other-directed negative emotions (e.g., dislike and anger), independent of envy, can give rise to pleasure at another's misfortune and the misfortune can be severe when these other emotions are causal. In addition to providing support for this view in three studies, pleasure at another's misfortune was also associated with different factors when other-directed negative emotions as opposed to envy served as its eliciting condition. For example, given that dislike caused pleasure at another's misfortune, the misfortune was more likely to be perceived as deserved, any misfortune was pleasing, and the observer was more reluctant to help than given envy as the cause.     

Neat,Swine, Sheep,and Deer: Mill and Peirce on Natural Kinds

In the earliest phase of his logical investigations (1865–1870), Peirce adopts Mill's doctrine of real Kinds as discussed in the System of Logic and adapts it to the logical conceptions he was then developing. In Peirce's definition of natural class, a crucial role is played by the notion of information: a natural class is a class of which some non-analytical proposition is true. In Peirce's hands, Mill's distinction between connotative and non-connotative terms becomes a distinction between symbolic and informative and pseudo-symbolic and non-informative forms of representation. A symbol is for Peirce a representation which has information. Just as for Mill all names of Kind connote their being such, so for Peirce all symbols profess to correspond to a natural class.     

Competence and Quality in the Performance of Forensic Psychologists

Mere possession of generic professional credentials cannot be used as justification of necessary and sufficient skill to perform in a forensic role. Case examples are used to illustrate problems of both competence and quality that sometimes accompany mental health clinicians to the witness stand.     

Perceived Collective Efficacy and Parenting Competence: The Roles of Quality of Life and Hope

Parents' perceptions of their parenting competence predict successful implementation of parenting tasks and contribute to their interest and involvement in parenting and to their children's development. Thus, identifying factors that contribute to parents' perceptions of parenting competence can help inform efforts to promote children's safety and well-being. The present study employs social disorganization theory to examine the relationship between collective efficacy and parents' sense of competence, measured along two dimensions: parental efficacy and parental satisfaction. It examines the direct association between the two constructs and whether the association is mediated by parent perceptions of their quality of life (QOL) and sense of hope. Data were collected from 198 parents residing in a neighborhood in southern Tel Aviv, Israel. The analyses indicated that high collective efficacy was directly associated with high parental efficacy, but not with high parental satisfaction. Using structural equation modeling, a mediation model was found whereby higher collective efficacy was associated with (a) higher QOL, which in turn was related to a greater sense of hope, which was linked with higher parental efficacy; and (b) higher QOL, which was directly associated with higher parental satisfaction. The findings provide further support to the idea that neighborhood characteristics play an important role in parents' ability to care for their children.     

The Consolations of Boethius

The paper considers the account of happiness given in Boethius＇s Consolations of Philosophy. This account claims that happiness requires security of possession, and argues from this requirement to the conclusion that worldly goods, which of their nature cannot be securely possessed, cannot provide happiness. This argument is shown to depend on assuming a life-driven account of human motivation, rather than a goods-driven account of human motivation. The life-driven account, according to which voluntary actions are ultimately motivated by the pursuit of a certain kind of life, is defended against the goods-driven account, according to which actions are motivated by the pursuit of goods the enjoyment of which can only be episodes in a human life. It is claimed that Boethius is right in holding a life-driven account, and that his account of happiness follows from it.     

医疗质量模糊性特征研究

探讨医疗质量的特性,通过系统经验分析法,认为医疗质量具有模糊性特征,难以辨别优劣,导致卫生行政部门、医疗机构忽视提高医疗质量。行政部门应加强医疗技术管理,推行医院法人治理结构制度,做好信息公示。医疗机构也应加强服务过程管理,培养医护人员人文精神,落实规章制度,推行临床路径管理,减少医疗差错,加强医院感染管理,医护人员也应加强责任心,多方努力才有可能提高医疗质量、保障患者安全。     

The Structure of Current Affect: Controversies and Emerging Consensus

For some years now, emotion researchers have debated a series of issues related to the structure of consciously experienced affective states. The present article reviews evidence that current affective experience can be summarized by a structure that is anchored by two bipolar but independent dimensions of experience, pleasure and activation. Four issues have presented themselves as central to the nature of this structure: the number of dimensions necessary to describe the space, the bipolarity of the dimensions, whether the structure displays a circumplex shape, and the definition of the activation dimension. Points of consensus and the remaining controversies regarding each issue are presented.     

Global basic structure and institutions: The WTO as a practical example

In this article, I discuss the location of the sources of global poverty and injustice. I take it as granted that the members of the globally lowest income group live in unacceptable conditions and suffer from injustice. Yet the source of this injustice is a debatable question. Often the existing global institutions are seen as major causes behind this injustice. By taking the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations as a practical example, I aim to show that blaming the institutions as such can lead to misguided conclusions. The WTO, in fact, is quite just if one merely analyses its institutional structure. I argue that the major source of injustice are rather the prevailing power structures and the conduct of individual governments within this institutional framework, in other words the metaprocedural unfairness in the trade negotiations. I further argue that applications of Rawlsian theory of justice tend to be misleading at the global institutional level, as they focus disproportionately on the institutional structure, and tend to underestimate the relevance of the conduct of governments and the existing power structures, which allow powerful countries to use the institutional framework unjustly in their favour.