Reliabilism,scepticism, and evidentia in Ockham

The aim of this paper is to challenge the reliabilist interpretation of William Ockham (ca. 1287–1347)'s epistemology. The discussion proceeds as follows. First, I analyse the reliabilist interpretation into two theses: (1) a negative thesis I call the Anti-Internalism Thesis, according to which, for Ockham, epistemic justification does not depend on any internal factors that are accessible by reflection; (2) a positive thesis I call the Reliability Thesis, according to which epistemic justification in Ockham depends on the reliability of a causal process through which a given judgment is produced. Secondly, I argue that the Anti-Internalism Thesis fails since Ockham's notion of evidentness (evidentia), which is at the heart of his theory of justification, strongly suggests that he posits an indispensable, internalist element of justification. Lastly, I argue that the Reliability Thesis also fails since not only can there be a reliable but inevident judgment in Ockham's framework, his emphasis on causality is best read not as talk of reliability, but as his emphasis on the relation between reason (or evidence) and what is based on reason.     

Spinoza's Concept of Substance and Attribute: A Reading of the Short Treatise

ABSTRACT

In the recent secondary literature on Ockham’s philosophy of mind, it has been debated whether Ockham proposed an externalist or an internalist view of the intentional contents of intuitive cognitions. It has also been debated whether Ockham only attributes intentional content to intuitive cognitions, or rather two different properties, i.e. a likeness and an intentional content. Intuitive cognitions can be roughly understood as perceptions. In this article I propose a different perspective for analysing both debates, that is, the perspective that concerns Ockham’s theory of reflexivity. Ockham defended the idea that one can reflexively cognize two different features of intuitive cognitions; namely, their similarity or likeness, and their intentional content. Ockham proposed different degrees and modes of reflexive cognition regarding these features.     

The Unity of Efficient and Final Causality: The Mind/Body Problem Reconsidered

In this paper, I argue that it is in the fourteenth century that the problem of the compatibility or unity of efficient and final causality emerges. William Ockham and John Buridan start to flirt with a mechanized view of nature solely explainable by efficient causality, and they hence push final causality into the human mind and use it to explain for example action, morality and the good. Their argumentation introduces the problem of how to give a unified account of the world, that is, how are nature and freedom compatible. In the paper, I set up the discussion by going through some of the problems associated with final causality in the seventeenth century and show that Ockham and Buridan's problems are similar. I then argue using a formulation from Leibniz's Monadology that the problems here traced should be seen as versions of the mind/body problem.     

William King’s Influence on Locke’s Second Edition Change of Mind about Human Action and Freedom

ABSTRACT

Locke’s influential discussion of agency in the chapter ‘Of Power’ in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding underwent important changes between the first and second edition. He reconsidered many of his central claims about the mind’s deliberation about actions. Locke’s position in the two editions is not only different but, as he himself points out, sometimes incompatible. This has suggested to some commentators that his change of mind was at least partly due to an external influence. Locke himself gestures towards this conclusion in the new ‘Epistle’ in the second edition Essay. One view is that William Molyneux was a notable influence, while another position is that Ralph Cudworth’s work on free will, either directly or indirectly through the influence of his daughter Damaris Masham, was an important influence. The position I develop in this paper is that the strongest candidate for an important external influence on Locke’s second edition revision is Molyneux’s close associate and friend, Irish philosopher and Archbishop of Dublin, William King. I argue that King’s criticism is a plausible influence on Locke’s reconceptualization of will and desire. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, King’s criticism appears to have been instrumental in Locke’s new emphasis on the agent’s capacity to determine what to value.     

‘Doctrina Deo vivendi’: William Ames,the Nature and Sources of His Voluntarism

ABSTRACT

To establish his vision of theology as the doctrine of ‘living to God,’ William Ames, the English puritan theologian exiled in The Netherlands, strongly emphasized the will as the seat of faith. This prominence has often been interpreted as an extreme version of voluntarism eliminating the intellective elements altogether and regarded as something outside mainstream, Reformed orthodoxy. However, when analysed through the distinction between habit and action, it will be clear that Ames’s emphatic statements on the will reflect his concern for the singularity of virtue, and that he did assign some roles to the intellect in terms of the action of faith. Therefore, the difference over the question of the seat of faith is highly technical in nature and should not be exaggerated. Ames argued for the priority of the will over the intellect by drawing from Scotist sources, which was compatible with the Thomistic idea of premotion.     

Natural Realism or Transactionalism: On the Relationships between Putnam and Two Pragmatists,James and Dewey

The relationships between Hilary Putnam and the pragmatists (especially William James and John Dewey) are obvious but subtle.To shed some light on this issue,the author will explore a key issue that not only stands as Putnam's main inheritance from the pragmatists,but that also illuminates the relationships between them more clearly than any other issues.This key issue is the understanding of perception and the philosophical position that arises from this understanding.The author argues that in adopting Dewey's transactionalism (or interactionalism),Putnam advances from James' insight to Dewey's,a shift that is particularly manifest in Putnam's attempt to add another layer of meaning to what he refers to as the second na(i)veté that he detects and appreciates in James' natural realism.     

Rethinking Sellars’ Myth of the Given: From the Epistemological to the Modal Relevance of Givenness in Kant and Hegel

ABSTRACT

Here, I pursue consequences, for the interpretation of Sellars’ critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’, of separating the modal significance that Kant attributed to empirical intuition from the epistemological role it also played for him. It is argued that Kant’s approach to modality in the Critique of Pure Reason can best be understood as a transcendental variation on Leibniz’s earlier ‘possibilist’ approach that treated the actual world as just one of a variety of possible alternative worlds. In this context, empirical intuitions seem to work like the mythical Givens subject to Sellars’ critique. This Kantian possibilism is then contrasted with an ‘actualist’ alternative approach to modality found in the contemporary work of Robert Stalnaker, but also recognizable in Hegel. In particular, the role of immediate perceptual judgments in Hegel is likened to that played by ‘witness statements’ in Robert Stalnaker’s attempt to distinguish the logic of judgments about the actual world from those about its alternate possibilities.     

论伦理命题的意义

元伦理学在有意无意之间坚持了伦理命题没有“描述性”意义的教条。从“意义单位”理论出发 ,一个语言单位 (语词、语句或话语 )的意义 ,内在于它与同类单位发生联系而构成更高层次语言单位的能力 ,因此 ,一个有意义的纯伦理命题应该是一个“实质蕴涵”的复合命题 ,即“‘应该A’蕴涵‘应该B’”。     

Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation

The pressure to individuate propositions more finely than intensionally—that is, hyper-intensionally—has two distinct sources. One source is the philosophy of mind: one can believe a proposition without believing an intensionally equivalent proposition. The second source is metaphysics: there are intensionally equivalent propositions, such that one proposition is true in virtue of the other but not vice versa. I focus on what our theory of propositions should look like when it's guided by metaphysical concerns about what is true in virtue of what. In this paper I articulate and defend a metaphysical theory of the individuation of propositions, according to which two propositions are identical just in case they occupy the same nodes in a network of invirtuation relations. Invirtuation is here taken to be a primitive relation of metaphysical explanation exemplified by propositions that, in conjunction with truth, defines the notion of true in virtue of. After formulating the theory, I compare it with a view that individuates propositions by cognitive equivalence, and then defend the theory from objections.     

HISTORICISM IN PRAGMATISM: LESSONS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND PHILOSOPHY

Abstract: Pragmatism involves simultaneous commitments to modes of inquiry that are philosophical and historical. This article begins by demonstrating this point as it is evidenced in the historicist pragmatisms of William James and John Dewey. Having shown that pragmatism focuses philosophical attention on concrete historical processes, the article turns to a discussion of the specific historiographical commitments consistent with this focus. This focus here is on a pragmatist version of historical inquiry in terms of the central historiographical categories of the object of historical inquiry and mode of historical periodization. After describing the basic historiographical consequences of pragmatism's historicism, the article moves to a discussion of the philosophical results of this historicism. The focus here is on the role that historical inquiry can play in the general philosophical perspective of pragmatism as well as on some recent texts that exemplify the dual pragmatist commitment to philosophy and history.     

Militant atheism,pragmatism, and the God-shaped hole

This paper addresses recent examples of militant atheism. It considers the theistic reply that describes atheism as deriving from a “God-shaped hole” in the human soul. The paper will argue that American pragmatism offers a middle path that avoids militant atheism without suffering from this problem. The paper describes this middle path and considers the problem that is seen in Rorty’s recent work: how the pragmatist can remain critical of religious fundamentalism without succumbing to a militant version of atheism. The solution proposed is tolerant acceptance of religion along with melioristic criticism developed within shared norms of inquiry.     

Empirical Propositions and the Change of Language-Games

People unavoidably provide reasons for their words and deeds when reasoning in a language-game.Wittgenstein thinks that when people in different language-games argue with one other,they insist on adopting a doubtful attitude toward the reasons provided by the other side.His use of the term "language-game" here is a metaphor,and implies that people in different cultures can scarcely reason with one another.Indeed,according to Wittgenstein's consideration of concepts of logic in On Certainty,language-games are incompatible with one another because their internal logic and reasons are different from each other.However,in his discussion of empirical propositions Wittgenstein has also shown us the possibility that the intemal reasons of one language-game can transmit beyond its own borders and be valid in another language-game.     

7～11岁儿童图形辨认的发展研究

本研究选取 7岁、9岁、1 1岁的 81名儿童作为被试 ,采用图形辨认任务 ,探查图形熟悉度、感觉道对小学儿童图形认知的影响 ,结果表明 :感觉通道主效应不显著。年龄主效应显著 ,1 1岁组得分显著高于 9岁组和 7岁组 ,9岁组成绩好于 7岁组 ,差异达到边沿显著。熟悉度主效应显著 ,熟悉材料的辨认成绩显著好于不熟悉成绩。年龄×图形熟悉度交互作用显著 ,年龄×感觉道交互作用不显著 ,感觉道×熟悉度主效应不显著 ,年龄×图形熟悉度×感觉道交互作用显著 ,在触觉辨认条件下 ,年龄×图形熟悉度交互作用显著 ,在视觉辨认条件下 ,年龄×图形熟悉度交互作用不显著     

关于IN结合论的十对命题

本文首先概述IN结合论的基本内涵,指出它是智力(I)与非智力因素(N)结合论的简称;然后从三个维度考察了IN结合论的十对命题。这三个维度是：(1)区别维度。即从智力与非智力因素二者的区别看,有3对命题;(2)影响学习维度。即从二者对学习的影响看,有4对命题;(3)联系维度。即从二者的联系看,有3对命题。     

WILLIAM WHEWELL,THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS,AND THE MODERN SOLAR SYSTEM

Astronomers of the first half of the nineteenth century viewed our solar system entirely differently from the way twentieth‐century astronomers viewed it. In the earlier period the dominant image was of a set of planets and moons, both of which kinds of bodies were inhabited by intelligent beings comparable to humans. By the early twentieth century, science had driven these beings from every planet in our system except the Earth, leaving our solar system (and perhaps others) as more or less desolate regions for the most part bereft of intelligent life. This essay traces this extinction and its relation to religious thought, noting the role played in it by Sir John Herschel and especially by William Whewell. The inverse square laws for gravitation, heat radiation, and light receive special attention, as does the question of the relevance of the Christian notions of a divine incarnation and redemption.     

爱因斯坦科技伦理思想的三个基本命题

爱因斯坦是科学道德权威的象征。他的科技伦理思想非常丰富,其中,道德是一切人类价值的基础、科技具有伦理二重性以及科学家和工程师担负着特别沉重的道义责任等三个命题构成了他的科技伦理思想的核心。这些思想对于人类在科技活动中正确把握真与善的关系具有重要启迪。