Paradigms in psychosomatic research: a dialectic perspective

By tradition, psychosomatic research has relied on a linear causality model where various psychological and social factors have been correlated to organic disorders. It has become increasingly evident, however, that etiological models based on single causal factors are inadequate. Recently, a reorientation has been noted towards system-oriented multicausality models, which assume that social, psychological, and physiological factors interact in the pathogenesis of a disease. In this review, the limitations and potentials of the linear and system-oriented paradigms are discussed. It is suggested that these perspectives are complementary, and may be applied simultaneously in an integrated, dialectic approach.     

Toward a dialectic theory of concepts

The article spells out some guidelines for a dialectic theory of concepts. Concept formation is treated in terms of polemic and polar reference. The main thesis is that opposite references structure concepts by way of advocacy. On polar dimensions of comparison, (e. g., light versus dark), people select and advocate objects of comparison in agreement with the context of comparison (i.e., what is light depends on what is dark, and vice versa). In principle, any concept is subject to polemics because polarity enables opposite comparisons, (e.g., an object as dark and light with reference to lighter and darker objects, respectively). When opposite comparisons apply to the same object, reference becomes anomalous which will motivate conceptual change, (e.g., twilight accounts for a reference in between). Consequently, meaning is not secured by general rules but concepts presuppose advocated references; concepts are intentional constructs. The dialectic theory is illustrated by a case study of the environmental discourse on forest management. Conflicting references fuelled by industrial and environmental values demonstrate how opposite comparisons motivate revisions.Dialectic is a convenient technical name for the kind of thinking which takes place when human beings enter into dispute, or when they carry on in reflection the polemical consideration of some theory or idea. Adler, 1927, p. V     

Problems with Dreyfus' dialectic

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences -     

The dialectic of life

In the dialectic of debates about the extension of life, one witnesses a predictably repeating pattern: one side appeals to a motley of variegated criteria for something’s qualifying as a living system, only to find an opposite side taking issue with the individual necessity or collective sufficiency of the proposed criteria. Some of these criteria tend to cluster with one another, while others do not: metabolism, growth and reproduction; self-organization and homeostasis; an ability to decrease internal entropy by the appropriation of free energy; stimulus response suited to self-preservation and propagation; and adaptation. In competing approaches to the extension of life, these sundry criteria thus jockey for authority, with one group of theorists promoting some subset of them as essential for life, where the appeal to essence is as likely as not to be a simple modal sine qua non, and another denying that the nominated criteria are really necessary at all. The debate then stalls, because there seems to be no shared methodology for adjudicating such disputes. We may address this unhappy situation successfully by coming to appreciate that life is what we may call a core-dependent homonym.     

Empathy as dialectic imagination

Abstract

The importance of relationship processes for humanistic and psychodynamic therapists makes empathy a critical concept in psychotherapy. Experimental work suggests that learning occurs only when the subject is actively and cooperatively engaged in the learning process. Similarly, psychotherapy is only effective when the client is willingly active in the therapeutic process. A crucial aspect of the therapist's activity is empathic imagination, defined here as the use of “dialectic” thinking capacities‐the recognition of conceptual alternatives in a given situation. These processes are at the heart of a humanistic view of agency. The therapist's use of this capacity allows imaginative projection into aspects of the client's experience, helping the client to feel understood in the relationship and emboldened to consider new possibilities in life.     

Karen Horney's biocultural dialectic

The function of these [neurotic] trends can be better understood if we take a look at their genesis. They develop early in life through the combined effect of given temperamental and environmental influences. Whether a child becomes submissive or rebellious under the pressure of parental coercion depends not only on the nature of the coercion but also on given qualities, such as the degree of his vitality, the relative softness or hardness of his nature.Since we we know less of the constitutional factors than of the environmental ones, and since the latter are the only ones susceptible of change, I shall comment only on these. (Karen Horney,Self-Analysis. New York: Norton, 1942. Emphasis added)     

Accountability: a boon to guidance

Accountability for guidance: How appropriate is it? Can it aid in educational reform? Is it a professional help or hindrance? The author examines these questions, placing emphasis on the PPBS model and showing samples of program structure and program analysis based on that model. He concludes that the accountability movement can be a positive force if implemented properly.     

Technology and guidance: a balance

The following symposium discusses the place of technology in guidance and some of the concerns involved. Tiedeman, a leading authority on technological applications in guidance, takes the position that guidance technology is an important new development. Schmidt, who has written widely in the areas of psychology and counseling, questions the place of technology in guidance and society and underlines some of the concerns related to the adoption of technology. The authors' discussions of “one-way” versus “two-way” thinking and the problem of control over the technology should be of interest to readers concerned with applying technology in guidance.     

The danger of words: a Wittgensteinian lesson for developmentalists

Borrowing from Wittgenstein's and Drury's ideas, this article shows that, by overlooking Wittgenstein's message about the danger of words and the importance of the grammar and clarification of concepts, some developmentalists sometimes fall prey to the fallacy of the alchemists, the fallacy of Molière's doctor, the fallacy of the “missing hippopotamus”, the fallacy of Van Helmont, and the fallacy of “Pickwickian senses”. As a result of these fallacies, the field of development (and psychology) is paved with ungrounded concepts, circular explanations, untenable reifications, misleading and nonsensical conclusions, and a mix-up of language-games. We suggest that to remedy such state of affairs psychologists should not ignore or overlook Wittgenstein's message about the danger of words to bewitch our thought, and should take his conceptual or grammatical investigations, not suspiciously, but as a preliminary and indispensable step to set the stage for appropriate factual and functional investigations, and for intelligible, coherent, and meaningful theoretical presumptions.     

Laws and constrained kinds: a lesson from motor neuroscience

In this paper, I want to explore the question of whether or not there are laws in psychology. Jaegwon Kim has argued (Supervenience and mind. MIT press, Cambridge; 1993; Mind in a physical world. MIT press, Cambridge 1998) that there are no laws in psychology that contain reference to multiply realized kinds, because statements about such kinds fail to be projectible. After reviewing Kim??s argument for this claim, I show how his conclusion hinges on a hidden assumption: that a kind can only feature in a projectible statement if it is defined by an internal physical property. This assumption, however, is false: constrained kinds can feature in projectible statements, and yet they are not defined by any set of internal physical properties. I suggest that many mental terms actually refer to constrained kinds, and give an example from motor neuroscience of a constrained kind that is multiply realizable and ??projectible??: the intention to move voluntarily in a specific direction.