Is Mere True Belief Knowledge?

Crispin Sartwell ingeniously defends the provocative thesis that mere true belief suffices for knowledge. In doing so, he challenges one of the most deeply entrenched epistemological tenets, namely that knowledge must be more than mere true belief. Particularly interesting is the way he defends his thesis by appealing to considerations adduced by such prominent epistemologists as William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Alvin Goldman and Paul Moser, each of whom denies that knowledge is merely true belief. In this paper, I argue that the case Sartwell presents for his thesis fails. However, by examining why it fails, we may derive at least four important epistemological lessons: (1) being justified does not entail being able to give a justification; (2) we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as intrinsically conducive to truth and conceived of as extrinsically conducive to truth; (3) we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as an essential criterion of knowledge and conceived of as an accidental criterion of knowledge; and (4) epistemologists need to specify how the telos of inquiry involves more than the acquisition of (merely) true beliefs.Socrates: Then tell me: what definition can we give with the least risk of contradicting ourselves?Theaetetus: The one we tried before, Socrates. I have nothing else to suggest.Socrates: What was that?Theaetetus: That true belief is knowledge. Surely there can at least be no mistake in believing what is true and the consequences are always satisfactory.Theaetetus 200d–e     

Knowledge as ‘True Belief Plus Individuation’ in Plato

In Republic V, Plato distinguishes two different cognitive powers, knowledge and belief, which operate differently on different types of object. I argue that in Republic VI Plato modifies this account, and claims that there is a single cognitive power, which under different circumstances behaves either as knowledge or as belief. I show that the circumstances which turn true belief into knowledge are the provision of an individuation account of the object of belief, which reveals the ontological status and the nature of the object. Plato explores many alternative candidates of individuation accounts of objects of true belief, which he discards. I conclude with a Platonic sketch of a teleological account of individuation which would satisfy his requirements of turning true belief into knowledge.     

Protagoras Refuted: How Clever is Socrates' "Most Clever" Argument at Theaetetus 171a–c?'

This article aims at reconstructing the logic and assessing the force of Socrates' argument against Protagoras' 'Measure Doctrine' (MD) at Theaetetus 171a–c. I examine and criticise some influential interpretations of the passage, according to which, e.g., Socrates is guilty of ignoratio elenchi by dropping the essential Protagorean qualifiers or successfully proves that md is self-refuting provided the missing qualifiers are restored by the attentive reader. Having clarified the meaning of MD, I analyse in detail the broader section 170a–171d and argue, against an extensive scholarly consensus, (1) that it contains two slightly different formulations of the same argument, and not two (or three) distinct arguments, (2) that Socrates does not highlight his own strategy at 171a–c as especially clever, and (3) that his argument successfully shows that md turns out to be untenable for Protagoras himself when submitted to scrutiny in dialectical contexts, without aiming at proving its absolute falsehood. Finally, I clarify the philosophical import of the final image of Protagoras' momentary return from the underworld.     

“Hooking Up” at College: Does Religion Make a Difference?

Recent attention from media, scholars, and religious leadership has focused on the dating activities of college students, particularly in relation to casual physical encounters or what some have termed "hooking up." In this article, we examine the impact of both individual and institutional religious involvement on "hooking up" in a national sample of college women ( N = 1,000). The results of our analysis reveal several important patterns. First, Catholic college women are more likely to have "hooked up" while at school than college women with no religious affiliation. Second, conservative Protestant college women are less likely to have "hooked up" while at school than college women with no religious affiliation; however, this difference is mediated or explained by church attendance, which is protective against "hooking up." Finally, women who attend colleges and universities with a Catholic affiliation are more likely to have hooked up while at school than women who attend academic institutions with no religious affiliation, net of individual-level religious involvement.     

On Imagination: Reconciling Knowledge and Life,or What Does “Gregory Bateson” Stand for?

This article presents a reading of Gregory Bateson's oeuvre, focusing on his interest in the representational gap between map and territory, and its importance in the development of his redefinition of the concept of "mind," his new discipline called "ecology of ideas," and a methodology congruent to it based on the logics of metaphor. Inquiries on three initial stories from different domains allow the use of homologies between form and content in the article. This reading of Bateson's oeuvre stresses his questioning (like Derrida's) of the metaphysics of presence on which Western philosophy has been mostly based, and of the central role of imagination as a balancing factor for a family therapy that he both contributed to and saw with reservations.     

Is love a “basic” emotion?

This article documents the neglect of love in many contemporary emotion theories, despite its prominence in the lay psychology of emotion. We argue that love should be considered a basic emotion, like anger, sadness, happiness, and fear. We discuss the criteria that various theorists use to distinguish basic from nonbasic emotions, and we marshal arguments and evidence from a variety of sources suggesting that love fits the criteria for basicness. We conclude that a number of controversies over the status of love can be resolved by distinguishing between the momentary surge form of love, a basic emotion having properties similar to joy, sadness, fear, etc., and relational love, a bond that develops between people, associated with states that include not only surge love, but many other emotions such as distress and anxiety. Finally, we suggest that “love” is the broad, everyday name for emotions related to three interrelated behavioral systems discussed by Bowlby (1979): attachment, caregiving, and sex.     

Is a sigh “just a sigh”? Sighs as emotional signals and responses to a difficult task

Sighing and the interpretation of sighs in everyday life seem never to have been the subject of psychological research. A questionnaire study of sighing showed that people associate sighing mainly with negative, low-intensity and deactivated emotional states. A second study investigated self/other differences in the interpretation of sighs in four hypothetical situations, revealing that sighs in other people are primarily perceived as signs of sadness, whereas own sighs are more often believed to express a state of "giving up" something or somebody. In a third experimental study participants worked on difficult (insoluble) puzzles, which generated many futile solution attempts, often accompanied by sighs. It is concluded that sighs are often unintentional expressions of an activity, plan or desire that has to be discarded, creating a pause before it can be replaced by a novel initiative.     

Is “space” a concept? Kant,Durkheim, and French Neo-Kantianism

According to Kant, all humans share a basic form of spatial representation—space is an “a priori intuition.” Durkheim felt that Kant's a priori stance blocked the kind of empirical inquiry that would show human spatial representation to be, on the contrary, quite diverse. Durkheim's claim raises the issues in intellectual history and philosophy addressed in this paper. First, the paper traces Durkheim's reading of Kant through the nineteenth-century French neo-Kantians Renouvier and Hamelin. Second, it argues that Kant's and Durkheim's projects are not, after all, genuine competitors. The result is to reassert the sharp distinction between epistemological and sociological approaches to spatial representation that Durkheim and others tried to collapse. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

“Secularization of Consciousness” or Alternative Opportunities? The Impact of Economic Growth on Religious Belief and Practice in 13 European Countries

This research note contributes to an evaluation of the validity of secularization theory by studying the relationship between economic modernization and patterns of religious change. Both the disenchantment narrative of Berger and Weber and the existential security perspective of Inglehart hypothesize that economic development should be accompanied by a weakening of religious values. Using macro‐level panel regressions, my analysis reveals that while economic growth is directly associated with diminishing church attendance rates, it is not directly associated with a decline in belief. The relation between economic growth and religious decline is therefore not primarily mediated by a “secularization of consciousness.” Findings instead indicate that economic prosperity leads to a change in consumption patterns on the part of individuals due to increased income and availability of alternative, secular opportunities to meet needs previously fulfilled by traditional religion. A decline in religious belief may occur as a secondary consequence of this behavioral change, since diminishing worship attendance rates reduce the influence of religion on value socialization.     

How Do “Religion” and “Spirituality” Differ? Lay Definitions Among Older Adults

Research and public interest in religion and spirituality is on the rise. Consequently, there is an increasing need for rigorously obtained information on what individuals mean when they use these terms. This study examined how 64 older adults living in three retirement communities (including one Christian‐based community), a relatively understudied population, conceptualize religion and spirituality. Participants defined “religion” and “spirituality,” and their narrative definitions were coded and compared using a framework derived from Hill et al.'s (2000) conceptualization of religion and spirituality. Despite considerable overlap, participants' definitions differed on several dimensions. Participants were more likely to associate religion than spirituality with personal beliefs, community affiliation, and organized practices. Moreover, spirituality appeared to be a more abstract concept than religion, and included nontheistic notions of a higher power.     

“Prematurity stereotype” in a sample of Dutch mothers: Do researchers suffer from a “prejudiced parent stereotype”?

This paper reports a Dutch replication of North American research on the “prematurity stereotype” among mothers. In a rating task, infants labeled as “premature” were given less favorable scores on a number of dimensions. A questionnaire study also showed negative expectations concerning premature infants. Associations with the mothers' number of children and level of education were found. Methodological problems of this type of research are discussed. To a large extent, the effects found can be ascribed to the “demand characteristics” of the experiment and the normal effects of expectations on perception. It is argued that researchers should not automatically label such behavior as “stereotyping”: There must also be evidence of a failure to adapt expectations in the face of conflicting evidence. Recommendations are made concerning future research in this area, and the importance of providing clear and complete information for the public on the effects of prematurity is stressed.     

Religious Belief and Practice in Urban China 1995–2005

Drawing on relevant data from surveys conducted in 1995 and 2005, this article explores the perceptible changes in religious beliefs and practices among the Han Chinese in urban areas during this ten-year period. Through analysing the survey data, the article attempts to examine these changes—the increasing awareness of religious others and the more revealing interaction between change and continuity—in the context of greater changes of society, economy, and politics. It concludes that, while commercialism and rationalism continue to dominate the ideological sky of urban China, spiritual beliefs and practices in various forms have also gained a strong footing in contemporary society and demonstrate a complex religiosity.     

Who Knows? Knowledge Activation,Belief in Certainty of Knowledge,Maximization Tendencies and Need for Cognition in Answerability Judgments

In this study, investigating answerability judgments, 123 participants judged whether each of 46 general knowledge questions could currently be answered by themselves, by someone else, or by no one. There were 26 consensus questions (high expected consensus about their answerability) and 20 non-consensus questions. Before each question, half of the participants rated the extent of their knowledge related to the question. Results showed that answering consensus questions compared with non-consensus led to a lower proportion of “No one knows” answers. Moreover, in the knowledge rating condition compared with the control condition, participants choose “No one knows” proportionally less. Participants’ ratings of belief in certainty of knowledge were associated with more “Someone else knows” for the non-consensus questions. Moreover, tendency to maximization led to a higher proportion of “Someone else knows” options for the non-consensus questions. Finally, high need for cognition was associated with fewer choices of “Someone else knows.”     

“Statistical,” “Practical,” and “Clinical”: How Many Kinds of Significance Do Counselors Need to Consider?

The present article reviews and distinguishes 3 related but different types of significance: “statistical,” “practical,” and “clinical.” A framework for conceptualizing the many “practical” effect size indices is described. Several effect size indices that counseling researchers can use, or that counselors reading the literature may encounter, are summarized. A way of estimating “corrected” intervention effects is proposed. It is suggested that readers should expect authors to report indices of “practical” or “clinical” significance, or both, within their research reports; and it is noted that indeed some journals now require such reports.     

Are Nativists a Different Kind of Democrat? Democratic Values and “Outsiders” in Japan

This paper combines three elements: a discussion of democratic values and the status of outsiders in Japanese political culture, the development of new measures to examine sensitive issues of nativism and foreigner perception in Japan, and an empirical exploration of the relationship between democratic values and antipathy toward outsiders. Two forms of democratic orientation were investigated in a sample of about 1,000 university students in Japan: a defensive version, which adheres to the formalistic requirements of democracy but is exclusionary and illiberal, and a universalist version that is liberal and tolerant. A defensive orientation is associated with greater chauvinism, a greater sense of threat emanating from foreigners, and a heightened anxiety about economic competition. A universalist orientation is associated with low perceived threat and low chauvinism, a lack of fear of economic competition, and a positive view of the cultural contributions of outsiders. Nativism may indeed be compatible with democratic values, but only with the defensive, exclusionary form. In short, the defensive form is democracy for xenophobes. Such an orientation is not unique to Japan, but is likely to be found in developing democracies as well as in advanced democracies that feel threatened.     

Where should the balance be between “scientist” and “practitioner” in Australian undergraduate psychology?

The scientist—practitioner model of training in psychology has been widely influential in the development of undergraduate curricula in Australia. The model had its origins in post‐war America and has formed the basis for accreditation of psychology courses in Australia since the late 1970s. Recently a reconsideration of the model in Australian undergraduate psychology was argued for, suggesting that the absence of significant practical skills development in most curricula is detrimental to the discipline's graduates and their employers. The authors agree that the need for some practical skills development in undergraduate curricula is becoming increasingly important for psychology. Many of the exemplars of curriculum revision provided, however, are impractical and are unlikely to make significant contributions to Australian programs. There is an urgent need to consider the graduate attributes desired for 3‐year and 4‐year trained psychology graduates who will go on to employment without completing postgraduate study. Curriculum innovation to enhance graduates' employability will flow from this development, and will be likely to incorporate information technology solutions, rather than placement experience. This process is entirely compatible with the scientist—practitioner model of training and education in psychology.