Aristotle on the perception of universals

Aristotle claims that ‘although we perceive particulars, perception is of universals; for instance of human being, not of Callias-the-human-being’ (APo II.19 100a16–b1). I offer an interpretation of this claim and examine its significance in Aristotle's epistemology.     

Causal Necessity in Aristotle

Like many realists about causation and causal powers, Aristotle uses the language of necessity when discussing causation, and he appears to think that by invoking necessity, he is clarifying the manner in which causes bring about or determine their effects. In so doing, he would appear to run afoul of Humean criticisms of the notion of a necessary connection between cause and effect. The claim that causes necessitate their effects may be understood— or attacked— in several ways, however, and so whether the view or its criticism is tenable depends on how we understand the necessitation claim. In fact, Aristotelian efficient causation may be said to involve two distinct necessary connections: one is a relation between causes considered as potential, while the other relates them considered as active. That is, the claims that (1) what has the power to heat necessarily heats what has the power to be heated, and that (2) a particular flame which is actually under a pot necessarily heats it, both of which appear to be true for Aristotle, involve distinct notions of necessity. The latter kind of necessity is based on the facts, as Aristotle sees them, about change, whereas the former is based in the nature of properties. Though different, both kinds of necessity are instances of what contemporary philosophers would call metaphysical necessity, and together they also amount to a theory of causal determination.     

Foot and Aristotle on Virtues and Flourishing

This article compares the views of Foot and Aristotle on virtues and flourishing. It is argued that the view put forward in Philippa Foot’s recent book, Natural Goodness, suffers from a certain sort of vagueness and it is open to other criticisms which the Aristotelian view can avoid. Foot’s views have been subjected to criticism in the recent literature by David Copp and David Sobel. These criticisms are given consideration in the article and it is argued that the more traditional Aristotelian view advocated by the author will have the means to answer some of these criticisms whereas Foot’s view will not.

Aristotle and Headless Clones

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - Cloned organisms can be genetically altered so that they do not exhibit higher brain functioning. This form of therapeutic cloning allows for genetically...     

Signs and demonstration in Aristotle

In this paper, I explore the contrast drawn by Aristotle in two parallel passages of the Posterior Analytics (I.6, 75a28–37 and II.17, 99a1–4) between ‘signs’ and ‘demonstration’. I argue that while at APo. I.6 Aristotle contrasts demonstration proper with a deductively valid sign-syllogism (the tekmērion of APr. II.27), at APo. II.17 the contrast is rather between a demonstration proper and a deductively invalid sign-syllogism (the sēmeion in the strict sense of APr. II.27).     

Aristotle on God as Principle of Genesis

Aristotle holds that there must be multiple forms of human being and those forms constitute a genos, this paper argues. Aristotle advances his claim by arguing that the strength of a polis rests on the existence of a spectrum of useful essential differences among its citizens. The paper rejects the notion that eîdos is a homonym, and argues that it signifies `form,' not `species.' Its theses are based on analysis of passages in the Ethics, Metaphysics, Politics and other works. The argument of the paper is compatible with `individual' or `particular' forms. The paper also proposes a solution to the issue of `natural slavery.'     

Transference and katharsis,Freud to Aristotle

Aristotle's theory of tragic katharsis is the most ancient and debated theory of the effect of the theatrical experience on the audience. It affirms that tragedy effects the katharsis of fear and pity, engaging readers with the controversy whether by katharsis Aristotle meant purification of the emotions (i.e. their perfection within the mind) or purification of the mind from the emotions (i.e. their abreaction from the mind). In this paper I will explore how Freud's theory of transference can suggest a new interpretation of Aristotle's tragic katharsis. Transference allows for the representation and expression of repressed emotions through the re‐enactment of past relational dynamics. Although this process is essential to the psychoanalytic method, it is the subsequent analytic endeavour which allows for the “working through” of repressed emotions, bringing into effect the transference cure. I argue that the dynamic between emotional arousal in re‐enactment and emotional distancing in analysis offers an effective parallel of the dynamic between katharsis of fear and katharsis of pity in Aristotle's theory. Such interpretation of tragic katharsis suggests that the theatrical effect in audiences may be an opportunity for self‐analysis and the ‘working through’ of unconscious psychic dynamics.     

What Truth Depends on

What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of Φ in/from the extension of the truth predicate. Both φ and the members of Φ are allowed to contain the truth predicate. On that basis we are able define notions such as ungroundedness or self-referentiality within a classical semantics, and we can show that there is an adequate definition of truth for the class of sentences which depend on non-semantic states of affairs.     

Ethos and Habituation in Aristotle

This paper is concerned with Aristotle’s theory of habituation, focusing on the following three issues: (1) the relation between habit and reason, (2) human nature and habituation, and (3) the roles of family and politics in habituation. Aristotle’s theory of habituation has been a topic of interest recently. Yet so far, most debates about this topic are about the first issue. This paper will bring in the second and the third issues, in order to provide a complete picture of the theory. To be more specific, the paper seeks to better understand the following three claims of Aristotle, corresponding to the three issues mentioned above: (1) “We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts” (NE 1103a34–b1) . (2) “We are adapted by nature to receive virtues, and are made perfect by habit” (teleuioumenois de dia tou ethous) (1103a25–26). (3) “One’s own good cannot exist without household management, nor without a form of government” (1142a9–11).     

The Spirit of Truth

This article reflects on the theme of the “spirit of truth” in a post-truth era – a time in which objective truth seems to no longer exist, any given claim can be substantiated, and it is no longer possible to tell falsehood and truth apart. Focusing on the objectivity of science, the humanity of truth, and the spirit of truth revealed by divinity, the article argues for the adoption of a humane and ecological wisdom, seeing it as a way to deal with humanity’s immense knowledge in a way that is conducive to life, to avoid optimizing humans in a “trans-human” way and making the earth uninhabitable.     

Weak and Strong Theories of Truth

A subtheory of the theory of self-referential truth known as FS is shown to be weak as a theory of truth but equivalent to full FS in its proof-theoretic strength.     

真实性及其伦理边界——对新闻真实性原则的伦理反思

真实是新闻的生命 ,追求并维护新闻的真实性是新闻工作者的伦理准则。然而和任何准则都不可能是绝对的一样 ,真实性同样不是一条绝对性原则。在具体的新闻传播活动中 ,由真实性引发的伦理冲突是经常存在的。新闻从业人员的职责之一 ,就是如何运用自己的道德智慧来解决这些伦理冲突。     

想象的真理--论想象与真理的关系

无论再现论还是表现论的文艺观念,都肯定文艺活动的想象性质,并试图在此基础上理解文艺活动的区别特征。而这也同时产生了论证想象活动的真理性的要求,只不过在西方形而上学思想传统和符合论真理观念的限制下,对想象理解还包含着许多内在的困难。本文试图说明这些困难,并指出由西方现当代人文主义哲学所提供的解决问题的可能方向。     

Truth and Assertability

Deflationists say that the equivalence between ‘p is true’ and p is all there is to the meaning of ‘true’. “Use” theories generally construe meaning as acceptance conditions. I argue: (i) there are certain obvious objections to a deflationary theory of truth so formulated; but (ii) they can be overcome if we employ a graded notion of use, i.e. a notion of assertability; but (iii) there appear to be certain further difficulties which cannot be overcome in this way.     

Complete Virtue and the Definition of Happiness in Aristotle

In this paper, I challenge the standard reading of complete virtue (ἀρετή τελεία) in those disputed passages of Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. I argue that, for Aristotle, complete virtue is neither (i) wisdom nor (ii) a whole set of all virtues. Rather, it is a term used by Aristotle to denote any virtue that is in its complete or perfect form. In light of this reading, I offer a pluralist interpretation of Aristotelian happiness. I argue that for Aristotle, the life-long exercise of a predominant virtue—as long as it is exercised in its complete or perfect form—will suffice for human happiness. The so-called inclusivist and intellectualist notions of Aristotelian happiness, thus understood, are merely two forms (viz. the composite and the non-composite form) of the pluralist notion of Aristotelian happiness. And if I am right, my pluralist interpretation provides an alternative, if not better, solution to the long-standing problem of “dual happiness” in Aristotle.     

Relationality and Commitment: Ethics and Ontology in Heidegger's Aristotle

This article discusses the tension between social relationality and self-relationality central to Heidegger's ontology of Dasein and the possible ways of reconciling this tension. Arguing that this is a tension between communicability and existential commitments, the article poses the question: How are existential commitments responsive to communication? After problematizing the quasi-Kantian and communitarian ways of settling the tension, the article uses Heidegger's early reading of Aristotle to develop a third hermeneutic model of ethical relationality according to which existential commitments are shareable in communication, since ethos – the existential posture towards the good – arises out of pathos that exposes Dasein to coexistence. The account of ethical relationality found in Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle thus takes the world to be a shared and dynamic ontological condition and emphasize that the world constitutes selfhood in a way that is constantly at stake in ethical communication.     

When Fluency Signals Truth: Prior Successful Reliance on Fluency Moderates the Impact of Fluency on Truth Judgments

Repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true. One position relates this so‐called “truth effect” to metacognitive experiences of fluency, suggesting that repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true because they are processed more fluently. Although most prior research focused on why repetition influences truth judgments, considerably less is known about when fluency is used as information. The present research addresses this question and investigates whether reliance on fluency is moderated by learning experiences. Specifically, we focus on changes in the reliance on fluency over the course of time. A series of experiments reveals that fluency is more likely to be used in truth judgments when previous reliance on fluency has resulted in valid judgments, compared with when previous reliance on fluency was misleading. These findings suggest that reliance on fluency in judgments is a finely tuned process that takes prior experiences with fluency‐based judgments into account. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conservative Theories of Classical Truth

Some axiomatic theories of truth and related subsystems of second-order arithmetic are surveyed and shown to be conservative over their respective base theory. In particular, it is shown by purely finitistically means that the theory PA ÷ "there is a satisfaction class" and the theory FS of [2] are conservative over PA.     

Hylomorphic virtue: cosmology,embryology, and moral development in Aristotle

Aristotle is traditionally read as dividing animal souls into three parts (nutritive, perceptive, and thinking), while dividing human souls into four parts (a rational part, with theoretical and practical subparts, and non-rational part, with nutritive and desiderative subparts). But careful reading of Nicomachean Ethics 1.13 suggests that he divides the human soul into three parts – the nutritive, the theoretical, and the “practical” – but allows that the “practical” part is sometimes divided, as in akratic and other non-virtuous agents. In a fully virtuous agent, practical reason is the proper form of – and so in the hylomorphic sense one with – the desiring part of soul. It is thus contingent how many parts a given soul has, three being the norm, but four being common. Reading Aristotle this way is supported by appeal to his cosmology, where the superlunary world provides the unitary norm, and his embryology, where male offspring are the norm (in which menstrual fluid is fully mastered by the male principle) but female offspring commonly occur when the menstrual fluid (analogous to desire) is only partially mastered by the male principle (analogous to practical reason).