Habermas,Religion, and Public Life

Abstract

Although many scholars view Jürgen Habermas as the most important philosopher and social theorist since Weber, his account of religion has been relatively neglected. This may be a reflection of the fact that he appears to offer quite distinct views of religion, but it may also reflect the strong secularist assumptions of his early work. In this paper, Habermas’s early and later views of religion are outlined and the change in his understanding of religion is mapped—from being one of the sources of modernity’s inner problems to being a principal source of the passions and motivations underpinning cultural life today. I argue that the relative neglect of Habermas’s work on religion is unfortunate, as it offers a creative and important attempt to move beyond the secular assumptions that have characterised much modern study of religion, providing it with a central role in the mediation of the costs and benefits of modernity.     

BRIDGING SCIENCE AND RELIGION: "THE MORE" AND "THE LESS" IN WILLIAM JAMES AND OWEN FLANAGAN

There is a kinship between Owen Flanagan's The Really Hard Problem and William James's The Varieties of Religious Experience that not only can help us to understand Flanagan's book but also can help scholars, particularly scholars of religion, to be attentive to an important development in the realm of the "spiritual but not religious." Specifically, Flanagan's book continues a tradition in philosophy, exemplified by James, that addresses questions of religious or spiritual meaning in terms accessible to a broad audience outside the context of organized religions. Both James and Flanagan are concerned to refute the popular perception that the sciences of the mind pose a threat to meaning and particularly to meaningful processes of human growth and transformation. Where James used the subconscious to bridge between science and religion and persuade his readers of the reality of the More, Flanagan uses a scientifically grounded understanding of transcendence to enchant his readers into believing in Less. Although I think that Flanagan's attempt to link the psychological and sociocultural levels of analysis via the concept of transcendence is scientifically premature, his attempt at a naturalistic spirituality raises questions of definition that scholars of religion need to take seriously.     

The rise and fall of moral algebra: Francis Hutcheson and the mathematization of psychology

Until recently historians of psychology have typically argued that mathematical analysis in psychology originated with Herbart in nineteenth-century Germany. Among those who are now recognized to have pedated Herbart is Francis Hutcheson. In 1725, Hutcheson published a mathematical statement of his theory of the psychological basis of moral behavior and judgment. Hutcheson's attempt to present a theory of social behavior in mathematical terms is described and an analysis is presented of the background which led Hutcheson to adopt such a mathematical format. The work of several imitators of this aspect of Hutcheson's opus is considered and the role of his critic, Thomas Reid, in halting such mathematizing efforts for several decades in Britain is noted.     

Religion,Philosophy and Family Resemblances

Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances has been adopted by some writers either to explain the use of the word ‘religion’ or to advocate a use in the context of a definition. The purpose of this definition is supposedly to avoid an essentialist definition of religion such as ‘belief in God or gods’ which is seen as too parochially tied to Judaeo-Christian theistic origins of the word, while at the same time guaranteeing a distinctive role for religion as a universally applicable analytical concept. However, if an essentialist definition is not smuggled in for the purpose of maintaining a distinction between the ‘religion’ family and other neighbouring families such as ideologies, worldviews, values or symbolic systems, then the family becomes so indefinite that the word ceases to pick out any distinctive aspect of human culture. And this definitional dilemma in fact reflects the actual use of the word ‘religion’ by the scholarly community. Analysis of ‘religion’ texts shows that the word is used in such a large range of contexts that it is devoid of analytical value. Consequently, there is an obligation on the community of scholars to reconceptualize the wide and valuable range of work which is being carried out in ‘religion’ departments.     

Religious history as religious studies

What is the relationship between religious studies and religious history? Academic historical thinking emerged in part to repudiate ecclesiastical traditions of history, making the difference between religious history and histories of religion a question of denominational rivalry more than a difference in sect. Scholars working in the academic study of religion and the academic study of history have increased self-consciousness of this contingency but have not developed an account for the consequence of history as the primary mode for our thinking. As a result, scholars of religion frequently fall silent in the wake of postcolonial critiques of religious subjects, believing their work is adequately buttressed when this history (the history of the relationship between colonial oppression and religious classification) is acknowledged. Yet this is only the beginning of our work. Religious history cannot evade the methodological challenges of religious studies precisely because to identify an object as religious is to begin an inquiry into the subject of religion itself. Using the example of the year 1893, the author seeks to demonstrate how scholars of history might justify their subjects as religious, and how scholars of religion might consider their concept of history.     

Orientalism, representation and religion: the reality behind the myth

Said's Orientalism has been called an ‘epoch-making’ and ‘paradigm constitutive’ book. While it undoubtedly caused a stir on its appearance and proved an important influence upon post-colonial studies and other developments in literary and cultural theory, a careful re-reading of it reveals a deeply flawed work that offers a confused analysis of human representations and realities, a highly selective and partial engagement with Western and Middle Eastern history and scholarship, and a particularly unhelpful approach to religion. The argument offered here is that Said's claims about ‘Orientalism’ are actually incoherent, veering between Foucauldian social constructionism and references to trans-cultural human realities; that the theoretical approaches to religion are inconsistent and highly selective; that the account of human agency is entirely inadequate; and that, although Said condemns entire generations of Orientalist scholars as racist, imperialist and ethnocentric, he is insufficiently reflective about his own scholarly position and the implications of its inconsistencies. Although Orientalism has been hailed as a book that ‘breathed insurgency’, it actually offers a vision of human beings as remarkably powerless in the face of arbitrary and abstract discourses that define their lives as oppressors or oppressed. Said sought to demonstrate that the reality behind the myth of scholarly impartiality was a racist and ethnocentric exercise of control and authority over the Orient, but the reality behind the myth of Orientalism is a theoretically flawed work offering a reductive account of religion and an impoverished view of human beings.     

Militant Modern Atheism

Militant modern atheism, whose most eloquent champion is Richard Dawkins, provides an effective and necessary critique of fundamentalist forms of religion and their role in political life, both within states and across national boundaries. Because it is also presented as a more general attack on religion (tout court), it has provoked a severe reaction from scholars who regard its conception of religion as shallow and narrow. My aim is to examine this debate, identifying insights and oversights on both sides. Two distinct conceptions of religion are in play. For Dawkins and his allies (most notably Dan Dennett) religions are grounded in doctrines, propositions about supernatural entities, events and processes which the devout believe. Their beliefs prompt them to actions, which they support or rationalize by reference to the doctrines. Dawkins and Dennett view the acceptance of the doctrines as resting on cognitive misfiring — these are delusions to be outgrown or spells to be broken. By contrast, the religious scholars who criticize the militant atheists often view religion as centered in social practices that inform and enrich human lives. To the extent that there are doctrines that atheists might subject to epistemic evaluation, these are to be viewed as pieces of scaffolding, that are, in principle, dispensable. I argue that militant modern atheism is incomplete (and likely counter‐productive) so long as it fails to attend systematically to the roles religion fulfills in human lives. Yet it is important to achieve public clarity about the literal falsehood of the doctrines on which fundamentalists rely. The challenge is to develop a well‐articulated and convincing version of secular humanism. Meeting that challenge is, I claim, one of the central problems of philosophy today.     

ANDREW DICKSON WHITE AND THE HISTORY OF A RELIGIOUS FUTURE

Andrew Dickson White played a pivotal role in constructing the image of a necessary, and even violent, confrontation between religion and science that persists to this day. Though scholars have long acknowledged that his position is more complex, given that White claimed to be saving religion from theology, there has been no attempt to explore what this means in light of his overwhelming attack on existing religions. This essay draws attention to how White's role as a historian was decisive in allowing him to posit a future for religion purified of dogma by science. It argues, furthermore, that this effort is better understood as religious innovation, rather than a plea for strictly secular science. In so doing it hopes to lay the foundation for a more fruitful historical treatment of White, and a range of other figures whose devotion to science has otherwise been difficult to grasp.     

FROM DIVINE ORACLES TO THE HIGHER CRITICISM: ANDREW D. WHITE AND THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY IN CHRISTENDOM

Historians of science and religion have given little attention to how historical‐critical scholarship influenced perceptions of the relationship between science and religion in the nineteenth century. However, the so‐called “cofounders” of the “conflict thesis,” the idea that science and religion are fundamentally and irrevocable at odds, were greatly affected by this literature. Indeed, in his two‐volume magnum opus, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896), Andrew D. White, in his longest and final chapter of his masterpiece, traced the development of the “scientific interpretation” of the Bible. In this article, I argue that developments in biblical criticism had a direct impact on how White constructed his historical understanding of the relationship between science and religion. By examining more carefully how biblical criticism played a significant role in the thought of White and other alleged cofounders of the conflict thesis, this article hopes to relocate the origins, development, and meaning of the science–religion debate at the end of the nineteenth century.     

Walter Burkert and a Natural Theory of Religion

In his studies of ancient cultures, Walter Burkert has usually focused on materials derived from Greece and the ancient Near East. In Creation of the Sacred, he examines religious universalia in order to account for the ubiquity and persistence of the phenomenon of religion and to produce a general theory of religion. The themes and problems he has examined in previous books have led him to the claim in Creation of the Sacred that religion can be traced to origins in biology, and that religion derives from biology and language as genes and culture co-evolve.     

CHANCE AND NECESSITY IN ARTHUR PEACOCKE'S SCIENTIFIC WORK

Arthur Peacocke was one of the most important scholars to contribute to the modern dialogue on science and religion, and for this he is remembered in the science‐religion community. Many people, however, are unaware of his exceptional career as a biochemist prior to his decision to pursue a life working as a clergyman in the Church of England. His contributions to studies of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) structure, effects of radiation damage on DNA, and on the interactions of DNA and proteins are among the most important in the field at the time and have had a lasting scientific impact that is still felt today. Peacocke's arguments with Jacques Monod over stochastic (chance) and deterministic (necessity) processes driving evolution became important independently for both the science and the religion communities and appear to have contributed significantly to his decision to become involved in science‐religion dialogue rather than continuing his work exclusively in the field of science. Nevertheless, although Peacocke took on an active church life and ceased his experimental work, he never left science but continued to read the scientific literature and published a scientific review on different approaches in defining DNA structure as recently as 2005.     

Materials on Christianity

Religion is a semiotic phenomenon par excellence. Without signs and signification processes there could not ever have been any religion, and so semiotics should play a prominent role in the investigation of religion(s). However, this has not been the case. Yelle deserves praise for reminding scholars of religion of the research potentials of semiotic theories and methods. This volume is not an introductory manual for beginners, but they will get an impression of the value of semiotic analysis through a number of case studies. Yelle treats his topics in their ostensible specificity so as to trace more general and significant issues concerning signification, communication, ideology, and agency in the construction of social worlds. Semiotics is especially important for theorizing about religion in terms of social constructionism and discourse theory. Finally, a few notes on the available literature are offered.     

The ‘three knowledges’ of Buddhism: Implications of Buddhadasa's interpretation of rebirth

Said's Orientalism has been called an ‘epoch-making’ and ‘paradigm constitutive’ book. While it undoubtedly caused a stir on its appearance and proved an important influence upon post-colonial studies and other developments in literary and cultural theory, a careful re-reading of it reveals a deeply flawed work that offers a confused analysis of human representations and realities, a highly selective and partial engagement with Western and Middle Eastern history and scholarship, and a particularly unhelpful approach to religion. The argument offered here is that Said's claims about ‘Orientalism’ are actually incoherent, veering between Foucauldian social constructionism and references to trans-cultural human realities; that the theoretical approaches to religion are inconsistent and highly selective; that the account of human agency is entirely inadequate; and that, although Said condemns entire generations of Orientalist scholars as racist, imperialist and ethnocentric, he is insufficiently reflective about his own scholarly position and the implications of its inconsistencies. Although Orientalism has been hailed as a book that ‘breathed insurgency’, it actually offers a vision of human beings as remarkably powerless in the face of arbitrary and abstract discourses that define their lives as oppressors or oppressed. Said sought to demonstrate that the reality behind the myth of scholarly impartiality was a racist and ethnocentric exercise of control and authority over the Orient, but the reality behind the myth of Orientalism is a theoretically flawed work offering a reductive account of religion and an impoverished view of human beings.     

INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM ON SCIENCE,RELIGION, AND THE RISE OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM

This is an introduction to the Symposium on “Science, Religion, and the Rise of Biblical Criticism,” which has been designed as a thematic section for Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science. The Symposium demonstrates the importance of and need for greater interdisciplinary collaboration between philosophers, theologians, scholars of religion, and historians in tracing the origins and development of the “conflict thesis” between science and religion. Often neglected is the role biblical criticism played in guiding and constructing narratives of conflict. This series of articles thus attempts to redress this gap in the scholarship by explicitly focusing on the advent of historical‐critical scholarship of the Bible and how it changed perceptions about “science” and “religion.”     

The Limits of Learning: Habermas' Social Theory and Religion

Habermas' view that contemporary philosophy and social theory can learn from religious traditions calls for closer consideration. He is correct to hold that religious traditions constitute a reservoir of potentially important meanings that can be critically appropriated without emptying them of their motivating and inspirational power. However, contrary to what he implies, his theory allows for learning from religion only to a very limited degree. This is due to two core elements of his conceptual framework, both of which are key features of his account of postmetaphysical thinking. The first is the requirement of ethical agnosticism; this requires philosophy and social theory to refrain from offering guidance on questions of the good life. The second is his language‐immanent conception of truth in the domain of practical reason; this follows from his rejection of any source of validity beyond human communication in this domain. I make the case for a more robust account of learning from religious traditions and metaphysical worldviews, arguing that for this purpose Habermas must modify his requirement of ethical agnosticism and relinquish his language‐immanent conception of truth.     

The existential dimension in psychiatry: an enactive framework

ABSTRACT

In his paper Psychiatry and religion: Consensus reached!, Verhagen advocates the relevance of spirituality and religion for the “origins, understanding, and treatment of psychiatric disorders”. In this comment, I argue for the broader claim that the existential dimension is important for understanding psychiatric disorders – of which religion can, but must not necessarily be, part. The existential dimension refers to our ability to relate to ourselves, our experiences, and our situation. This evaluative relation can play an important role in psychiatry: it can co-constitute the disorder, be affected by the disorder, and/or modulate the course of the disorder. Given this importance, it makes sense to explicitly recognize the existential dimension in our explanatory model of psychiatric disorders. The biopsychosocial model goes a long way in providing an integrative model, but there is room for improvement, especially when it comes to integration of its aspects, and acknowledging the existential aspect. I briefly introduce the research paradigm of enactivism, and suggest that an enactive framework is well-suited to incorporate this existential dimension – along with the traditional dimensions of the biopsychosocial model.     

Józef Bocheński and static religion

One of the most interesting aspects of Józef Bocheński’s philosophy was its relation to Henri Bergson’s thought, particularly to his philosophy of religion. Unlike the majority of the Catholic philosophers at that time, Bocheński did not stress the significance of dynamic religion, but rather focused on the role of static religion in human life. In his view, what was of particular interest within this religion was its fabulation function. This direction of the philosopher’s research stemmed from the realism and empiricism proper to the analytic philosophy developed by Bocheński and became increasingly visible as the years passed. In this text the author shows how Bocheński’s analyses of religion, referring to both daily human experiences and logic, moved towards Bergsonian static religion, while diverging from dynamic religion and its key notion of mysticism.     

The economics of spiritual luxury: The glittering lobby and the parliament of religions

Richard H. Roberts's article on the theoretical setting of the 1993 World's Parliament of Religions is an example of the contradictions that result when scholars of religion presume that religion is autonomous or sui generis. By conceiving of religious experiences as independent variables that have socio‐political and economic implications, but not causes, such scholarship romanticises and thereby depoliticises historical, human interactions and institutions. Despite his efforts to portray globalised religion as an active, oppositional force, contradictions in Roberts's essay suggest that global religion is itself a commodified construct dependent on the process of mythifxcation to gloss over concrete differences in class, race and gender.     

Theology is not Mere Sociology: A Theological Reflection on the Reception of the Christian Religion in Mainland China

Abstract :  Post‐Maoist China retains its loyalty to Marxist principles; yet voices are being heard that interpret religion much more positively. Both government spokespersons and Religious Studies scholars measure the value of religion according to its social function. Such a criterion of evaluation fails to take account of what is essential to Christian theology, namely, appeal to divine transcendence. Yet, Christian theology in the tradition of the Lutheran Reformation begins with transcendence and turns toward human responsibility for the world through loving the neighbor. This may mark a common cause between Chinese sociology of religion and Christian commitments to social well‐being.     

Off the stage,on the page: on the relationship between advocacy and scholarship

When and how should scholars of religion draw a line between advocacy and research activities? In what ways does advocacy contribute to or cut against scholarly credibility? Addressing these questions from the intersection of the academic study of religion and Indigenous Studies, this article opens by asserting that both fields are frequently hampered by deferential treatments of their subject matter, a problem that is potentially exacerbated when scholars in these fields engage in forms of political advocacy. Problematizing this narrative, the author turns to his ethnographic experiences in Hawai'i with regard to burial-protection struggles in order to describe ways his theoretical commitments and advocacy activities stand in tension and how he has attempted to navigate these competing but sometimes complementary elements of his scholarly life. In this context, a heuristic definition of advocacy is advanced in order to sketch a spectrum of forms, ranging from direct advocacy (e.g., physical action, legal testimony, or publication) to indirect advocacy (e.g., sharing documents, brainstorming about pending issues, or providing transportation to a meeting). The article concludes with reflections on advocacy and changing institutional demands upon scholars in the humanities and social sciences with reference to perceived public relevance.