Moral attentiveness: who pays attention to the moral aspects of life?

This research draws from social cognitive theory to develop a construct known as moral attentiveness, the extent to which an individual chronically perceives and considers morality and moral elements in his or her experiences, and proposes that moral attentiveness affects a variety of behaviors. A series of 5 studies with undergraduates, MBA students, and managers were conducted to create and validate a reliable multidimensional scale and to provide evidence that moral attentiveness is associated with (a) the recall and reporting of self- and others' morality-related behaviors, (b) moral awareness, and (c) moral behavior. Results of the studies suggest that moral attentiveness has a significant effect on how individuals understand and act in their moral worlds. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).     

Hegelians Axel Honneth and Robert Williams on the Development of Human Morality

An individual is in the lowest phase of moral development if he thinks only of his own personal interest and has only his own selfish agenda in his mind as he encounters other humans. This lowest phase corresponds well with sixteenth century British moral egoism which reflects the rise of the new economic order. Adam Smith (1723?C1790) wanted to defend this new economic order which is based on economic exchange between egoistic individuals. Nevertheless, he surely did not want to support the moral theory of British egoism. His book The Wealth of Nations suits well into the world view of British moral egoism, but in the book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he presents a moral theory which is the total opposite of moral egoism. Contemporary German intellectuals saw contradiction in Adam Smith??s moral (social) philosophy which they called as Das Adam-Smith-Problem. Smith himself didn??t think that there is any contradiction in a situation where in economic sphere (civil society) individual act egoistically and in ethical sphere (encounter with the imagined Other) he feels humanity and compassion toward his fellow men. Hegel was a passionate reader of Adam Smith and he acknowledged Das Adam-Smith-Problem. He set the task of his social philosophy to overcome this paradox. He wanted to create a theory of a social totality where economic egoism and feelings of humanity are not in contradiction. In the same time Hegel wanted to create a theory on Bildung process where human spirit develops from moral un-freedom (heteronomy) to moral freedom and maturity (autonomy) taking care both aspect of love and reason. In certain Hegel??s texts notion of recognition plays crucial role. That is why modern Hegelians Ludwig Siep, Axel Honneth and Robert Williams consider the notion of recognition to be elementary in Hegel??s threefold theory of developing human spirit from family via civil society to sittliche state. For Hegel family is a sphere where people love their ??concrete other?? and where feeling surpasses reason. Civil Society is a sphere of private contracts and economic exchanges where cold egoistic and calculative reason surpasses feelings. In the sphere of State the contradiction between family and Civil Society (Das Adam-Smith-Problem) is solved by ??rational feeling??. According to Hegel State should protect citizens from alienating effect of egoistic reason of Civil Society and cultivate ??family-feelings?? to rational feelings which integrate citizen into ??sittliche community?? through reciprocal process of recognition. In this article I want to consider Hegelians Honneth??s and Williams??s relevance to the theory of moral development.     

理性、中道与幸福——探讨亚里士多德的道德选择理论

道德选择理论是亚里士多德伦理思想中的重要内容。本文首先三个方面研究了亚里士多德的道德选择理论:一、亚里士多德论道德选择的理论前提;二、亚里士多德论道德选择的依据;三、亚里士多德论道德选择的目标。其次,从西方哲学史的宏观背景中就亚里士多德的道德选择理论的成败得失进行讨论。通过研究古希腊亚里士多德的道德选择理论,这将有助于我们了解道德选择在道德理论和道德实践中的重要作用。     

How not to be a metaethical naturalist –Jesse Prinz on the emotional construction of morals

This paper is an analysis of the performance of one reading of Charles Taylor's general criticisms of naturalist accounts of morality (excluding the issue of moral realism) when measured against a specific naturalist account, in this case J.L. Mackie's moral theory. It is argued that Taylor's criticisms, read in this way, fail to find purchase, despite his singling out of Mackie's theory as a prime example of a theory that exhibits the flaws Taylor believes are inherent in this kind of approach to moral theory. This points the supporter of Taylor's position towards an alternative reading of his challenge to naturalist accounts of morality.     

God,Mixed Modes,and Natural Law: An Intellectualist Interpretation of Locke's Moral Philosophy

The goal of this paper is to explicate the theological and epistemological elements of John Locke's moral philosophy as presented in the ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding’ and ‘The Reasonableness of Christianity’. Many detractors hold that Locke's moral philosophy is internally inconsistent due to his seeming commitment to both the intellectualist position that divinely instituted morality admits of pure rational demonstration and the competing voluntarist claim that we must rely for our moral knowledge upon divine revelation. In this paper I argue that Locke is guilty of no such contradiction. In doing so, I attempt to accommodate Locke's position in the ‘Essay’ that moral principles are demonstrable a priori with his views on the sanctity of Christian revelation. I then consider Locke's conception of moral ideas as a species of mixed modes, or arbitrarily constructed complex ideas, and attempt to navigate the mechanism whereby human understanding can recognize these ideas as conforming to, or straying from, divinely appointed natural law. I conclude that despite Locke's failure to actually provide a full-fledged moral theory, he lays a rationally coherent groundwork for the fulfilment of such a project that accommodates a-priori rational reflection and divine revelation as complementary paths to moral understanding.     

Kant's Commitment to Metaphysics of Morals

A definitive feature of Kant's moral philosophy is its rationalism. Kant insists that moral theory, at least at its foundation, cannot take account of empirical facts about human beings and their circumstances in the world. This is the core of Kant's commitment to ‘metaphysics of morals’, and it is what he sees as his greatest contribution to moral philosophy. The paper clarifies what it means to be committed to metaphysics of morals, why Kant is committed to it, and where he thinks empirical considerations may enter moral theory. The paper examines recent work of contemporary Kantians (Barbara Herman, Allen Wood, and Christine Korsgaard) who argue that there is a central role for empirical considerations in Kant's moral theory. Either these theorists interpret Kant himself as permitting empirical considerations to enter, or they propose to extend Kant's theory so as to allow them to enter. With some qualifications, I argue that these interpretive trends are not supported by the texts, and that the proposed extensions are not plausibly Kantian. Kant's insistence on the exclusion of empirical considerations from the foundations of moral theory is not an incidental feature of his thought which might be modified while the rest remains unchanged. Rather, it is the very centre of his endeavours in moral philosophy. If we disagree with it, I argue, we have grounds for moving to a distinctly different theoretical framework.     

Salience,Imagination, and Moral Luck

One key desideratum of a theory of blame is that it be able to explain why we typically have differing blaming responses in cases involving significant degrees of luck. T.M. Scanlon has proposed a relational account of blame, and he has argued that his account succeeds in this regard and that this success makes his view preferable to reactive attitude accounts of blame. In this paper, I aim to show that Scanlon's view is open to a different kind of luck-based objection. I then offer a way of understanding moral luck cases which allows for a plausible explanation of our differential blaming responses by appealing to the salience of certain relevant features of the action in question.     

On Sinnott-Armstrong’s Case Against Moral Intuitionism

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued against moral intuitionism, according to which some of our moral beliefs are justified without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferred moral beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of our moral beliefs are formed in circumstances where either (1) we are partial, (2) others disagree with us and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgement to theirs, (3) we are emotional in a way that clouds our judgement, (4) the circumstances are conducive to illusion, or (5) the source of our moral beliefs is unreliable or disreputable. I take issue with the elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument that centre on (1) to (3) and (5), concluding that his case against moral intuitionism is unpersuasive.     

‘The Zone of the Carcass and the Knacker'—On Adorno's Concern with the Suffering Body

Adorno's moral philosophy is famously problematic. One of the main reasons for this is that it revolves around the moral addendum: a physical impulse of solidarity with suffering beings that, he argues, cannot and should not be rationalized. I show that, since this moral addendum remains vague and since Adorno's radical negativity forces him to dismiss as uncritical all other approaches to morality, he deliberately places his thought in danger of relapsing into irrationality. Most commentators therefore disagree about the manner in which Adorno's references to the moral addendum can be translated into a moral theory. In this paper, I bring in some often overlooked material to form a more complete overview of the issues at hand and to adjudicate this contested area. I do this by briefly discussing Schopenhauer's moral observations on Mitleid and by focusing on Adorno's references to animal cruelty and corporeality. Although this interpretation stays close to Adorno's observations on the moral addendum, it forces us to accept that his moral philosophy is rather weak. I conclude, however, that this weakness reflects a disturbing aspect of reality and in that sense has critical value.     

Non-consequentialism, the person as an end-in-itself, and the significance of status

Recently, several outstanding discussions of the structure of non-consequentialism have appeared. Two of these are Shelly Kagan's The Limits of Morality and a pair of articles by Warren Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing" and "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect." I would like to examine several related issues discussed by these authors. Another outstanding work to which I will refer in this article, but not discuss at great length, is Judith Jarvis Thomson's The Realm of Rights. The general topic with which I shall be concerned is the structure of a non-consequentialist moral theory. Non-consequentialism has two important features. In a non-consequentialist moral theory, (1) there is a permission not to maximize overall best consequences (this is sometimes referred to as an option), and (2) there are constraints on promoting overall best consequences (for example, we must not kill one innocent, non-threatening person for his organs to save five others). I shall use the works by Kagan, Quinn, and Thomson to help characterize further the elements of the non-consequentialist structure and to justify them.     

同情在亚当·斯密伦理思想中的作用

亚当.斯密是18世纪的著名道德哲学家和西方古典经济学的奠基人。同情在亚当.斯密的伦理思想体系中具有多种意义。同情不仅是亚当.斯密建构和评价其道德情操的工具,而且成为其经济伦理的认识论基础。斯密的同情论为我们把握"亚当.斯密问题"提供了一个独特的视角。     

Some aspects of explanation in Boškovič

Bo?kovi?'s explanatory procedure and his concept of explanation represents a certain departure from Newton's causal theory and his theory of explanation. Apart from particular elements of causal explanation, Bo?kovi? developed an alternative, non‐causal explanatory strategy. In this paper two different elements of this strategy are discussed: (i) the micro‐reductive explanatory strategy based on Bo?kovi?'s idea of determination, and (ii) a type of explanation of a theory by means of a more general law, through a thought‐experiment. In addition, an outline of the proposed (iii) ‘argument theory’ of explanation in his mature period is made. These aspects are considered with respect to the realist and anti‐realist elements in Bo?kovi?'s epistemology.     

Kant on space,time, and respect for the moral law as analogous formal elements of sensibility

To advance a successful reading of Kant's theory of motivation, his interpreter must have a carefully developed position on the relation between our rational and sensible capacities of mind. Unfortunately, many of Kant's commentators hold an untenably dualistic conception, understanding reason and sensibility to be necessarily conflicting aspects of human nature that saddle Kant with a rigoristic and fundamentally divided moral psychology. Against these interpreters, I argue for a reading that maintains a unified conception, claiming that we must think of reason and sensibility as interdependent capacities, which stand to one another as form to matter. Our sensible nature thus does not stand opposed to reason; its fundamental character is determined by reason's activity. I take Kant's account of moral motivation and the feeling of respect to represent the lynchpin of this unified account. Against interpreters who would emphasize either the intellectual or affective nature of respect, I claim that it should be understood as the formal element of moral sensibility, the result of practical reason determining the capacity to feel and fundamentally transforming its character. To make this argument, I draw on Kant's account of sensibility in the Critique of Pure Reason, claiming that space, time, and respect for the moral law are analogous formal elements of sensibility.     

Bernard Williams on the Human Prejudice

In “The Human Prejudice”, Bernard Williams discusses our treating human beings differently in our moral thinking from the ways we treat other creatures. He criticises the idea that this expresses a prejudice, speciesism, analogous to racism and sexism. His essay has been misunderstood by some of its critics, including Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan. My essay sets out several questions one may have about Williams's essay, and explains how they can be answered. I make clear the connections between “The Human Prejudice” and some main elements in Williams's thinking about ethics, including his criticisms of moral theory.     

The scope of instrumental morality

In The Order of Public Reason (2011a), Gerald Gaus rejects the instrumental approach to morality as a viable account of social morality. Gaus’ rejection of the instrumental approach to morality, and his own moral theory, raise important foundational questions concerning the adequate scope of instrumental morality. In this article, I address some of these questions and I argue that Gaus’ rejection of the instrumental approach to morality stems primarily from a common but inadequate application of this approach. The scope of instrumental morality, and especially the scope of pure moral instrumentalism, is limited. The purely instrumental approach to morality can be applied fruitfully to moral philosophy only in situations of extreme pluralism in which moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning, because the members of a society do not share, as assumed by traditional moral theories, a consensus on moral ideals as a basis for the derivation of social moral rules, but only an end that they aim to reach. Based on this understanding, I develop a comprehensive two-level contractarian theory that integrates traditional morality with instrumental morality. I argue that this theory, if implemented, is most promising for securing mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in deeply pluralistic societies, as compared to cooperation in a non-moralized state of nature.     

The Utopianism of Hamilton's State of Needs: on rights,deliberation, and the nature of politics

Abstract

This article explores the role and conception of politics in Lawrence Hamilton's The Political Philosophy of Needs (Cambridge, 2003), including his critique of the 'rights-preference couple' and of rights in general; his critique of deliberation; and his view regarding the role of political philosophy. It argues that his theory rests on a remarkably high epistemic, moral and political confidence in the state, or rather in what states might be capable of becoming; equally, it rests on an underexplored understanding of the nature of politics itself. The article also criticizes Hamilton's approach to needs by comparing it to the needs approach of Wiggins and the capabilities approach of Alkire, arguing that the difference is not as great as Hamilton believes. Finally, it is suggested that Hamilton needs additional elements to his argument to show how a state of needs could be psychologically and politically self-sustaining.     

Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality

Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay “Playfulness,‘World’‐Travelling, and Loving Perception” reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy.     

俞琰易学的义理思想探微

俞琰是宋末元初著名的易学家和杰出的道教学者。其学以《易》为本,他"首读朱子《本义》,次读《程传》",后又获道教异人传授,于《参同契》多有发挥。其易学可分为义理易、象数易、道教易三个方面,本文着重探讨其义理易学思想。俞琰易学的义理之学源于其深厚的儒学修养,又以程、朱易学为本,多有发微,形成其富有特色的义理思想。其内容具体包括天道观、人性论、修养论三个不可割裂的部分,其天道观援"气"入"理",秉承儒家"至诚无息"、"天道好谦"、"天道好生"、"福善祸淫"的义理传统,是其人性论与修养论的前提和基础;其人性论则是法天道以立人道的表现;修养论则是其实现回复天道、止于至善的重要途径。     

Modernity and Morality in Habermas's Discourse Ethics

Discourse ethics is originally conceived as a programme of philosophicaljustification of morality. This depends on the formal derivation of the moral principle (U) from non-moral principles. The moral theory is supposed to fall out of a pragmatic theory of meaning. The original programme plays a central role in Habermas's social theory: the moral theory, if true, provides good evidence for the more general theory of modernization. But neither Habermas nor his followers have succeeded in providing a formal derivation. This essay shows how and why Habermas's proposed derivation is impossible. As if aware of the lacuna, Habermas has recently suggested that (U) can be derived by 'abduction' rather than deduction. The proposal draws heavily on modernization theory; hence the only justification for (U) now available to him rests on premises drawn from that theory. The original programme of the justificationof morality has thus given way to the weaker programme of the philosophical elucidationof morality. Further, since Habermas's moral theory is no longer justified independently of modernization theory, but at least partly by it, the moral theory cannot without circularity provide evidence for the modernization theory.     

The Cognitive-Developmental Approach and the Practicing Counselor: An Opportunity for Counselors to Rethink Their Roles

At the present time, psychologists who describe the stages of human growth concur on the importance of cognitive elements, although they also recognize the affective and social components of development. Kohlberg's thinking was influenced by the work of Dewey and Piaget, and has been confirmed by his longitudinal study of 50 Chicago boys and by numerous other researches throughout the world. In his conception, discussions of moral problems (dilemmas) are the basis for moral growth. Through them the less mature become aware of the perspectives of those who have reached a higher level of moral judgment. These ideas and practices have been applied with young people in The Cluster School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where the ideas of justice for all and fairness have become the real themes of the school. The authors' challenge to counselors as consultants and facilitators is one of becoming deliberately involved in the value and moral growth of students. Allen E. Ivey reacts to this article by urging a value-centered advocacy model for counselors.