Age-related similarities and differences in first impressions of trustworthiness

Trust is a particularly under-studied aspect of social relationships in older age. In the current study, young (n = 35) and older adults (n = 35) completed a series of one-shot social economic trust games in which they invested real money with trustees. There were potential gains with each investment and also a risk of losing everything if the trustee was untrustworthy. The reputation and facial appearance of each trustee were manipulated to make them appear more or less trustworthy. Results revealed that young and older adults invest more money with trustees whose facial appearance and reputation indicate that they are trustworthy rather than untrustworthy. However, older adults were more likely than young to invest with trustees who had a reputation for being untrustworthy. We discuss whether age-related differences in responding to negative information may account for an age-related increase in trust, particularly when trusting someone with a reputation for being uncooperative.     

不可信面孔在视知觉加工中的注意偏向：来自眼动的证据

使用眼动追踪技术探究个体对同时呈现的可信和不可信面孔的视知觉加工差异, 以及注意偏向与可信和不可信面孔的记忆关系。结果发现：(1)被试再认不可信面孔成绩要好于可信面孔; (2)首注视点更多地偏向于不可信面孔, 并且落在不可信面孔上的总注视时间/注视点个数更长/多; (3)回归分析表明首注视点偏向能预测不可信面孔的再认优势。结果表明人们对不可信面孔产生更多的注意警觉与维持, 并且对不可信面孔的警觉能预测不可信面孔的记忆优势。     

高确定性情绪（开心、愤怒）与低确定性情绪（悲伤）对信任的影响

本研究通过信任游戏的实验范式探讨了在与“受信任者”高/低可信赖性有关的信任线索时,具体情绪的确定性维度对信任行为的影响。实验一发现,当被试被告知“受信任者”在可信赖量表上的得分（高/低）时,个体在高确定性情绪（开心和愤怒）下的信任判断比低确定性情绪（悲伤）下的信任判断上更容易被受信任者的“可信赖性”水平的高低所影响;实验二发现,当告知被试“受信任者”的群体身份（内/外群）时,个体在高确定性情绪（开心和愤怒）下的信任判断比低确定性情绪（悲伤）下的信任判断更容易被受信任者的“内外群”身份所影响。上述结果表明,高确定性的情绪比低确定性的情绪更容易使被试的信任判断受到与“受信任者”是否值得信赖有关的线索所影响。     

Mood and multiple source characteristics: mood congruency of source consensus status and source trustworthiness as determinants of message scrutiny

This research deals with the interplay of mood and multiple source characteristics in regard to persuasion processes and attitudes. In a four-factorial experiment, mood (positive vs. negative), source consensus status (majority vs. minority), source trustworthiness (high vs. low), and message strength (strong vs. weak) were manipulated. Results were in line with predictions of a mood-congruent expectancies perspective rather than competing predictions of a mood-as-information perspective. Specifically, individuals in both moods evinced higher message scrutiny given mood-incongruent (vs. mood-congruent) source characteristics. That is, across source trustworthiness, positive (negative) mood led to higher message scrutiny given a minority (majority) versus a majority (minority) source. Furthermore, across source consensus, positive (negative) mood led to higher message scrutiny given an untrustworthy (trustworthy) versus a trustworthy (untrustworthy) source. Additional analyses revealed that processing effort increased from doubly mood-congruent source combinations (low effort) over mixed-source combinations (intermediate effort) to doubly mood-incongruent combinations (high effort). Implications are discussed.     

The Influence of Spokesperson Trustworthiness on Message Elaboration,Attitude Strength,and Advertising Effectiveness

Recent research has shown that information presented by untrustworthy endorsers is likely to be thoughtfully elaborated, whereas information presented by trustworthy endorsers is likely to be unthinkingly accepted (Priester & Petty, 1995). Study 1 manipulated argument quality and assessed cognitive responses to demonstrate that this influence of trustworthiness on persuasion holds for familiar endorsers likely to be used in actual advertisements. Study 2 demonstrated that trustworthiness can be influenced by individuals endorsing too many products, with similar persuasion consequences (i.e., untrustworthy endorsers prompt greater scrutiny of product‐related attributes than trustworthy endorsers). Study 2 also found that the attitudes that resulted from an untrustworthy endorser came to mind faster, even when those attitudes were equivalently positive—thus demonstrating that elaboration can influence attitude accessibility. This research provides evidence that attitude extremity may not be a sufficient indicator of advertising effectiveness, in that equally extreme attitudes can vary as to the bases by which they were formed, their underlying strength, and their effectiveness. Further, this research provides theoretical and strategic insight into the use of trustworthy and untrustworthy endorsers.     

L-eye to me: the combined role of Need for Cognition and facial trustworthiness in mimetic desires

Recent studies showed that stimuli are evaluated more favourably when they are perceived to capture others' attention, an effect coined "mimetic desire". The aim of the present research was to examine the combined role of Need for Cognition and target's facial trustworthiness in this effect. Participants saw movie excerpts of trustworthy and untrustworthy 3D faces (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008) turning their attention towards one art painting and away from another art painting. Results showed that looked-at paintings were preferred to looked-away paintings when associated with a trustworthy face. However, the reversed finding was observed for paintings associated with untrustworthy faces. The latter interaction was in turn moderated by participant's Need for Cognition, with a larger reversal effect for participants scoring lower on the NFC scale. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Cooperative,pure, and selfish trusting: Their distinctive effects on the reaction of trust recipients

Three types of trusting have been distinguished conceptually and empirically. In cooperative trusting the trust giver explicitly expects a reaction from the trust recipient that fits with the equality norm. In pure trusting, no explicit expectation is expressed by the giver. In selfish trusting the giver explicitly expects a reaction that benefits himself or herself at the expense of the recipient. We asked whether the three types of trust elicit distinctive reactions from trust recipients. Each participant was paired with a fictitious player who ostensibly enabled him or her to divide money between them. As hypothesized, both cooperative and pure trusting elicited more equal allocations than did selfish trusting. A second hypothesis, that cooperative trust would yield more equal allocations than pure trust, was not supported. Results are discussed in terms of equality norm, self‐interest norm, reciprocity norm, reactance theory, social sanctioning, and the need to comply with others' expectations. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An overcorrection framing effect

With the “typical” attribute framing manipulation, assimilation effects have often been obtained; people often judge the attributes of a judgmental target more positively when the attributes are framed positively (e.g., 99% pure) than negatively (e.g., 1% impure). Research has not, however, explored or demonstrated the effects of correcting or overcorrecting for the frame's influence. Overcorrection framing occurs when a more positive response is produced by the negative frame. Across three experiments, overcorrection as well as typical framing effects were obtained. In Experiments 1 and 2, overcorrection effects were obtained when participants were prompted to consider complementary information and, in Experiment 3, when the frame's source was described as untrustworthy. In contrast, typical framing effects were obtained when prompts were not supplied and when the frame's source was not described as being untrustworthy. These results supported the unification model that uses a priming analysis to account for assimilation (typical framing) and contrast (overcorrection framing) effects. We discussed how overcorrection is expected with other framing manipulations, such as risky-choice framing. We provided reasons for asymmetrical correction effects and discussed implications of our analysis for holistic/analytical as well as System 1/System 2 processing styles, the influence of different amounts of cognitive resource allocations, and the possibility of a correction process involving averaging.     

Abnormalities in early visual processes are linked to hypersociability and atypical evaluation of facial trustworthiness: An ERP study with Williams syndrome

Accurate assessment of trustworthiness is fundamental to successful and adaptive social behavior. Initially, people assess trustworthiness from facial appearance alone. These assessments then inform critical approach or avoid decisions. Individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) exhibit a heightened social drive, especially toward strangers. This study investigated the temporal dynamics of facial trustworthiness evaluation in neurotypic adults (TD) and individuals with WS. We examined whether differences in neural activity during trustworthiness evaluation may explain increased approach motivation in WS compared to TD individuals. Event-related potentials were recorded while participants appraised faces previously rated as trustworthy or untrustworthy. TD participants showed increased sensitivity to untrustworthy faces within the first 65–90 ms, indexed by the negative-going rise of the P1 onset (oP1). The amplitude of the oP1 difference to untrustworthy minus trustworthy faces was correlated with lower approachability scores. In contrast, participants with WS showed increased N170 amplitudes to trustworthy faces. The N170 difference to low–high-trust faces was correlated with low approachability in TD and high approachability in WS. The findings suggest that hypersociability associated with WS may arise from abnormalities in the timing and organization of early visual brain activity during trustworthiness evaluation. More generally, the study provides support for the hypothesis that impairments in low-level perceptual processes can have a cascading effect on social cognition.     

In Politics We Trust…or Not? Trusting and Distrusting Demonstrators Compared

This article sheds light on the debate regarding political trust and protest activity. The debate boils down to the question whether trust in politics is positively or negatively related to protest activity. We exploit a dataset encompassing data on about 9,000 demonstrators spread over seven European countries. These demonstrators' trust in their parliaments varies widely, ranging from trustworthy capable, to corrupt incapable. We examine the diverging sociodemographic profiles and motivational dynamics that turn distrusting and trusting citizens into demonstrators. We hypothesize and show that distrusting demonstrators turn their back to institutionalized politics; for them, demonstrating substitutes the party politics they distrust. For trusting demonstrators, demonstrating supplements party politics. Trusting and distrusting demonstrators also differ considerably in terms of motivation. Distrusting demonstrators are stronger motivated to demonstrate than trusting demonstrators. Moreover, while political cynicism amplifies the motivation of distrusting demonstrators, it suppresses the motivation of trusting demonstrators. We conclude that the question to be answered is not so much whether people who engage in protest activity trust or distrust their political elites, but rather who the trusting and distrusting protesters are and why they protest.     

Trust and trustworthiness in a sequential bargaining game

We use a two‐person extensive form bargaining game to explore individuals' trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the ‘self‐interested’ outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others' trust. But people with low‐trust scores often exhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These ‘inconsistent trusters’ seem to be interested in exploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mediating Role of Memory of Another Person's Choicein Social Influence on Preference

We often tend to fit our subjective preference with those of others after merely being faced with what other people prefer. This is known as social conformity. However, it is still unclear how the impact of such a social influence on subjective preference is modulated by the personal characteristics of the other person (e.g., whether the person is trustworthy) and the explicit memory of those personal characteristics (e.g., remembering who evaluated the objects). To clarify explicit memory's underlying role regarding social influence, we asked participants to evaluate their preference for abstract paintings both before and after observing binary choices made by others whose behaviors could be labeled as trustworthy, neutral, or untrustworthy. The results showed the following: (a) even without explicit memory of who made a choice and which painting was chosen, the participants preferred chosen over unchosen paintings; and (b) such preference changes were modulated by the subjective trustworthiness of others only when they explicitly remembered who made a choice.     

Belief in a just world and trust

Three studies examined the relationship between belief in a just world and level of trust. Results showed that subjects with a high level of belief in a just world were (a) less suspicious with regard to deception in a social-psychological experiment, (b) less suspicious with regard to the promise of a free gift, and (c) less suspicious with regard to the government's position on several public issues. The same studies also examined the relationships among belief in internal-external control, authoritarianism, and level of trust. In some but not all cases, belief in internal control and high level of authoritarianism were related to more trusting attitudes. It was suggested that the relationship between internality (as measured by the I-E Scale) and trust was mediated by the construct of belief in a just world.     

To trust or not to trust: social decision‐making in post‐institutionalized,internationally adopted youth

Chronic parental maltreatment has been associated with lower levels of interpersonal trust, and depriving environments have been shown to predict short‐sighted, risk‐averse decision‐making. The present study examined whether a circumscribed period of adverse care occurring only early in life was associated with biases in trust behavior. Fifty‐three post‐institutionalized (PI) youth, adopted internationally on average by 1 year of age, and 33 never‐institutionalized, non‐adopted youth (M_age = 12.9 years) played a trust game. Participants decided whether or not to share coins with a different anonymous peer in each trial with the potential to receive a larger number of coins in return. Trials were presented in blocks that varied in the degree to which the peers behaved in a trustworthy (reciprocal) or untrustworthy (non‐reciprocal) manner. A comparison condition consisted of a computerized lottery with the same choices and probabilistic risk as the peer trials. Non‐adopted comparison youth showed a tendency to share more with peers than to invest in the lottery and tended to maintain their level of sharing across trials despite experiencing trials in which peers failed to reciprocate. In contrast, PI children, particularly those who were adopted over 1 year of age, shared less with peers than they invested in the lottery and quickly adapted their sharing behavior to peers’ responses. These results suggest that PI youth were more mistrusting, more sensitive to both defection and reciprocation, and potentially more accurate in their trusting decisions than comparison youth. Results support the presence of a sensitive period for the development of trust in others, whereby conditions early in life may set long‐term biases in decision‐making.     

Trust matters: Seeing how an adult treats another person influences preschoolers' willingness to delay gratification

Holding out for a delayed reward in the face of temptation is notoriously difficult, and the ability to do so in childhood predicts diverse indices of life success. Prominent explanations focus on the importance of cognitive control. However, delaying gratification may also require trust in people delivering future rewards as promised. Only limited experimental work has tested this idea, and such studies with children were focused on general reward expectations, so evidence was ambiguous as to whether social trust played a role. The present study provides the first targeted test of a role for social trust in children's willingness to delay gratification. Children observed an adult behave in either a trustworthy or untrustworthy manner toward another adult, then were tested in the classic delay of gratification task by that adult. Children were less likely to wait the full delay period, and waited less time overall, for a reward promised by an untrustworthy adult, relative to children tested by a trustworthy adult. These findings demonstrate that manipulations of social trust influence delaying gratification, and highlight intriguing alternative reasons to test for individual differences in delaying gratification and associated life outcomes.     

Not afraid to trust you: Trustworthiness moderates gaze cueing but not in highly anxious participants

Gaze cueing (i.e., the shifting of person B's attention by following person A's gaze) is closely linked with human interaction and learning. To make the most of this connection, researchers need to investigate possible moderators enhancing or reducing the extent of this attentional shifting. In this study we used a gaze cueing paradigm to demonstrate that the perceived trustworthiness of a cueing person constitutes such a moderator for female participants. Our results show a significant interaction between perceived trustworthiness and the response time trade-off between valid and invalid gaze cues [gaze cueing effect (GCE)], as manifested in greater following of a person's gaze if this person was trustworthy as opposed to the following of an untrustworthy person's gaze. An additional exploratory analysis showed potentially moderating influences of trait-anxiety on this interaction (p = .057). The affective background of the experiment (i.e., using positive or negative target stimuli) had no influence.     

Hermeneutics and historical consciousness: An appraisal of the contribution of Hans-Georg Gadamer

Abstract

In this introductory article to the volume of the South African Journal of Philosophy in tribute of Hans-Georg Gadamer, the author, first, makes a few remarks about the nature of hermeneutics and Gadamer’s views on the universality of the hermeneutical experience. This universality is, in particular, explained from the perspective of the “linguistic turn” in Gadamer’s thought. Secondly, there is a brief discussion of certain particular aspects of Gadamer’s contribution. Aspects of that contribution that are emphasized are: Gadamer’s reevaluation of prejudice, authority and tradition, his idea of “Wirkungsgeschichte”, his idea of meaning as a process rather than a given entity, his analogy between game-playing and the interpretation of art, and his dialogical conception of interpretation. The author concludes by developing his own estimate of the main thrust of Gadamer’s contribution. This contribution consists of the way in which Gadamer’s thought, on the one hand, represents a demonstration and embodiment of the kind of historical consciousness so typical of our times, but, on the other hand, also accomplishes this exemplification of historical consciousness while imaginatively avoiding the kind of relativistic historicism so typical of many other manifestations of the same trend.     

Reactions to a Motor‐Vehicle Accident in Relation to Mitigating Circumstances and the Gender and Moral Worth of the Driver1

Male and female students (N= 153) at the Flinders University of South Australia read scenarios describing a motor‐vehicle accident that varied mitigating circumstances (driving on a slippery road vs. driving at high speed), gender of driver, and the moral worth of the driver (very dependable and trustworthy vs. not dependable and a bit untrustworthy). Results showed that mitigation affected judgments about the driver's responsibility, seriousness of the offense, driver's deservingness of penalty imposed, harshness of penalty, positive affect about the penalty, and sympathy for the driver, consistent with a social cognitive process model (Feather, 1996c, 1998). Moral worth affected judgments about the driver's moral character, harshness of penalty, and liking and sympathy for the driver. Participants attributed higher moral character to the female driver and also reported more liking for the female driver. There was some limited evidence for an in‐group gender bias.