The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control

The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (“noetic feeling”) occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintentionally. Once such heuristics give rise to a conscious feeling that feeling can then affect controlled action. Examination of the cues that affect noetic feelings suggest that not only do these feelings inform controlled action, but they are also informed by feedback from the outcome of that action.     

DOES DESCARTES DENY CONSCIOUSNESS TO ANIMALS?

Contrary to longstanding opinion, Descartes does not deny all feeling and awareness to non‐human animals. Though he undoubtedly denies that animals think, a case can be made that he nonetheless would allow them organism consciousness, perceptual consciousness, access consciousness and even phenomenal consciousness. Descartes does not employ or accept an ‘all‐or‐nothing’ view of consciousness. He merely denies (not that this is a small thing) that animals have the capacity for self‐conscious reflective reception or awareness of sensations and feelings.     

On being, knowing and having a self

This paper(1) takes the distinction between being conscious ('core consciousness') and knowing that one is conscious (self-reflexive consciousness) as a starting point for differentiating between three different aspects of the self: 1) the overall process of psychosomatic being which we share with all living creatures and which expresses itself through action (self as totality), 2) the conscious awareness of knowing the self that is a peculiarly human phenomenon consequent on the development of symbolic imagination (sense of self including numinous experiences of the self) and 3) having a self (or soul) as an essential attribute of being human that can only be achieved through being endowed with a self in the mind of others (self-identity leading to the self as the centre of the personality). Some clinical implications of these distinctions are considered including the role of interpretation as fostering integration through the provision of alternative self-images, the loss of self-reflexive consciousness in states of overwhelming affect and the attack on the spontaneous psychosomatic being of the self in states of self-hatred and self-division.     

Reach Out and Reduce Prejudice: The Impact of Interpersonal Touch on Intergroup Liking

A brief, casual interpersonal touch results in positive behavior toward the toucher, presumably because touch is a cue to friendship. Research on intergroup contact shows that feelings of friendship toward an individual outgroup member reduce prejudice toward that entire group. Integrating these areas, we examined whether interpersonal touch by an outgroup member could reduce prejudice. In three replications in two studies, interpersonal touch decreased implicit, though not explicit, prejudice toward the toucher's group. Effects of interpersonal touch can extend beyond the toucher to others sharing the toucher's ethnicity, and findings suggest that such effects are automatic and outside conscious awareness.     

重量对元认知监控的无意识影响

采用结构知识归因的方法,以学习判断和项目优先选择作为元认知监测和控制的指标,考察重量对元认知监控的影响是否是无意识的。被试学习粘贴在不同重量纸盒上的词对,进行学习判断(实验1)或项目选择(实验2),并报告其判断或选择的依据。结果:(1)重量影响学习判断和项目优先选择,相对于轻纸盒,被试给予重纸盒上的词对更高的JOL并优先选择重纸盒上的词对进行学习;(2)重量对学习判断的影响只发生在判断依据为猜测的情况下,重量对项目优先选择的影响只发生在判断依据为猜测和直觉的情况下。上述结果支持了元认知的具身性,并提示重量对元认知监控的影响可能是无意识的。     

From behaviour to consciousness: Translating what animals do to what animals think

Cognitive ethology, an interdisciplinary and comparative branch of zoology, is concerned with the influence of conscious awareness and intention on animal behaviour. It enquires into the evolutionary value of consciousness. However, consciousness is hard to define and any account of animal behaviour based on it will need to take into account both the physical mechanisms that allow for consciousness, and also consider whether we can have knowledge of the phenomenal experience of consciousness in other species. While the first consideration can be investigated scientifically, phenomenal experience needs to be inferred from behaviour, since most animals are not capable of communicating this experience directly. In fact, many accounts of animal behaviour, behavioural ecology in particular, argue that we cannot accurately explain animal behaviour with relation to thoughts or feelings and conscious awareness of them. Rather, we must concern ourselves with what can be objectively observed and measured. Cognitive ethology, however, argues that we cannot give accurate accounts of complex animal behaviour, for example social interactions or tool use, without taking consciousness into account. In this article I will argue that one can justifiably assign and study consciousness in animals through their behaviour, and that an account of certain animals’ behaviour is incomplete without reference to conscious awareness. In other words, behavioural ecology is essentially flawed as it gives, in certain cases, ultimately incorrect accounts of animal behaviour. Firstly it cannot distinguish between behaviour of more and less conscious animals, and secondly, by avoiding any mention of consciousness, it narrows its own scope, and finally cannot explain complex behaviours such as learning in any meaningful way.     

What Do We Do Unconsciously? And How?

In this reply, we endorse Chartrand's (2005) taxonomy of conscious awareness for different stages of consumer decisions affected by environmental cues. In addition, we attempt to broaden the scope of this taxonomy by discussing its usefulness for consumer decisions in general. We generally support Simonson's (2005) claim that research based on consumers as conscious decision makers is indeed predictive of a wide variety of behavior. However, we also argue that the importance of consciousness should not be overstated. Conscious processes observed in a research laboratory are not representative of conscious processes in real life. The alternative model to describe effects of the environment on behavior by Janiszewski and van Osselaer (2005) may be useful to explain automaticity in goal‐directed behavior, but it poorly describes other automatic behaviors.     

UNSELF‐CONSCIOUS CONTROL: BROADENING THE NOTION OF CONTROL THROUGH EXPERIENCES OF FLOW AND WU‐WEI

Abstract. This paper both clarifies and broadens the notion of control and its relation to the self. By discussing instances of skillful absorption from different cultural backgrounds, I argue that the notion of control is not as closely related to self‐consciousness as is often suggested. Experiences of flow and wu‐wei exemplify a nonself‐conscious though personal type of control. The intercultural occurrence of this type of behavioral control demonstrates its robustness, and questions two long‐held intuitions about the relation between self‐consciousness and the experience of control. The first intuition holds that the conscious self initiates and controls actions, thoughts, and feelings. The second is the view that losing this self‐conscious type of control is a negative and upsetting experience. By focusing on “the paradox of control” in these experiences of skillful absorption, I argue that a feeling of control can occur without a self that narratively claims control. Furthermore, this type of control can be a very positive and pleasurable experience. Therefore, the common views of the notion of control are in need of broader conceptualization and further refinement.     

Unconscious biases in task choices depend on conscious expectations

Recent studies highlight the influence of non-conscious information on task-set selection. However, it has not yet been tested whether this influence depends on conscious settings, as some theoretical models propose. In a series of three experiments, we explored whether non-conscious abstract cues could bias choices between a semantic and a perceptual task. In Experiment 1, we observed a non-conscious influence on task-set selection even when perceptual priming and cue-target compound confounds did not apply. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that, under restrictive conditions of visibility, cues only biased task selection when the conscious task-setting mindset led participants to search for information during the time period of the cue. However, this conscious strategy did not modulate the effect found when a subjective measure of consciousness was used. Altogether, our results show that the configuration of the conscious mindset determines the potential bias of non-conscious information on task-set selection.     

New evidence of animal consciousness

This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.Donald R. Griffin died on 7 November 2003     

Consciousness during dreams

Two aspects of consciousness are first considered: consciousness as awareness (phenomenological meaning) and consciousness as strategic control (functional meaning). As to awareness, three types can be distinguished: first, awareness as the phenomenal experiences of objects and events; second, awareness as meta-awareness, i.e., the awareness of mental life itself; third, awareness as self-awareness, i.e., the awareness of being oneself. While phenomenal experience and self-awareness are usually present during dreaming (even if many modifications are possible), meta-awareness is usually absent (apart from some particular experiences of self-reflectiveness) with the major exception of lucid dreaming. Consciousness as strategic control may also be present in dreams. The functioning of consciousness is then analyzed, following a cognitive model of dream production. In such a model, the dream is supposed to be the product of the interaction of three components: (a) the bottom-up activation of mnemonic elements coming from LTM systems, (b) interpretative and elaborative top-down processes, and (c) monitoring of phenomenal experience. A feedback circulation is activated among the components, where the top-down interpretative organization and the conscious monitoring of the oneiric scene elicitates other mnemonic contents, according to the requirements of the dream plot. This dream productive activity is submitted to unconscious and conscious processes.     

No-loss gambling shows the speed of the unconscious

This paper investigates the time it takes unconscious vs. conscious knowledge to form by using an improved "no-loss gambling" method to measure awareness of knowing. Subjects could either bet on a transparently random process or on their grammaticality judgment in an artificial grammar learning task. A conflict in the literature is resolved concerning whether unconscious rather than conscious knowledge is especially fast or slow to form. When guessing (betting on a random process), accuracy was above chance and RTs were longer than when feeling confident (betting on the grammaticality decision). In a second experiment, short response deadlines only interfered with the quality of confident decisions (betting on grammaticality). When people are unaware of their knowledge, externally enforced decisions can be made rapidly with little decline in quality; but if given ample time, they await a metacognitive process to complete. The dissociation validates no-loss gambling as a measure of conscious awareness.     

The child who cannot bear to feel

Some children have such traumatic experiences that they need to defend vigorously against any thoughts or feelings which threaten to bring the painful memories back into consciousness. Repeated hurtful and traumatic experiences can affect the deeper structures of the brain, causing behaviour and learning difficulties, which are difficult to reverse. These defensive behaviours can be very hard for teachers to appreciate and cope with. Sometimes, when the threatened and feared feelings are triggered, a child's reaction can be beyond conscious control and reason, until they have calmed down. Very damaged children need emotional 'holding', as well as a facilitating environment, to be able to learn and function acceptably in school. 'The child who cannot bear to feel' looks at underlying causes, symptoms and difficulties experienced by these children, and discusses ways of reflecting on their defensive behaviours and offering emotional holding in school.     

The intricate relationships between monitoring and control in metacognition: lessons for the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior

Do we run away because we are frightened, or are we frightened because we run away? The authors address this issue with respect to the relation between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control. When self-regulation is goal driven, monitoring effects control processes so that increased processing effort should enhance feelings of competence and feelings of knowing. In contrast, when self-regulation is data driven, such feelings may be based themselves on the feedback from control processes, in which case they should decrease with increasing effort. Evidence for both monitoring-based control and control-based monitoring occurring even in the same situation is presented. The results are discussed with regard to the issue of the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior.     

Fiction,Pleasurable Tragedy,and the HOT Theory of Consciousness

Abstract

The ‘feeling fiction problem’ asks: is it rational to be moved by what happens to fictional characters? The so-called ‘paradox of tragedy’ is embodied in the question: Why or how is it that we take pleasure in artworks which are clearly designed to cause in us such feelings as sadness and fear? My focus in this paper is to examine these problems from the point of view of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ (HOT theory) which says that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought that one is in that state. I examine the feeling fiction problem in light of the HOT theory and through a critique of Colin Radford's view. For example, I argue that Radford equivocates in his use of the term ‘aware’ in his response to some of the proposed solutions to the feeling fiction problem. Finally, I show how Susan Feagin's approach to the paradox of tragedy can be analysed and supported by the HOT theory.     

Can Studies of Autism Teach us About Consciousness of the Physical and the Mental?

Abstract

Most scientists and theorists concerned with the problem of consciousness focus on our consciousness of the physical world (our sensations, feelings, and awareness). In this paper I consider our consciousness of the mental world (our thoughts about thoughts, intentions, wishes, and emotions).The argument is made that these are two distinct forms of consciousness, the evidence for this deriving from studies of autism. Autism is a severe childhood psychiatric condition in which individuals may be conscious of the physical world but not of the mental world. Relevant experimental evidence is described, including some recent neuroimaging studies pointing towards the neural basis of our consciousness of the mental.     

Consciousness in Schizophrenia: A Metacognitive Approach to Semantic Memory

Recent studies have shown that schizophrenia may be a disease affecting the states of consciousness. The present study is aimed at investigating metamemory, i.e., the knowledge about one's own memory capabilities, in patients with schizophrenia. The accuracy of the Confidence level (CL) in the correctness of the answers provided during a recall phase, and the predictability of the Feeling of Knowing (FOK) when recall fails were measured using a task consisting of general information questions and assessing semantic memory. Nineteen outpatients were paired with 19 control subjects with respect to age, sex, and education. Results showed that patients with schizophrenia exhibited an impaired semantic memory. CL ratings as well as CL and FOK accuracy were not significantly different in the schizophrenic and the control groups. However, FOK ratings were significantly reduced for the patient group, and discordant FOK judgments were also observed more frequently. Such results suggest that FOK judgments are impaired in patients with schizophrenia, which confirms that schizophrenia is an illness characterized by an impaired conscious awareness of one's own knowledge.     

Unconscious reward cues increase invested effort,but do not change speed–accuracy tradeoffs

While both conscious and unconscious reward cues enhance effort to work on a task, previous research also suggests that conscious rewards may additionally affect speed–accuracy tradeoffs. Based on this idea, two experiments explored whether reward cues that are presented above (supraliminal) or below (subliminal) the threshold of conscious awareness affect such tradeoffs differently. In a speed–accuracy paradigm, participants had to solve an arithmetic problem to attain a supraliminally or subliminally presented high-value or low-value coin. Subliminal high (vs. low) rewards made participants more eager (i.e., faster, but equally accurate). In contrast, supraliminal high (vs. low) rewards caused participants to become more cautious (i.e., slower, but more accurate). However, the effects of supraliminal rewards mimicked those of subliminal rewards when the tendency to make speed–accuracy tradeoffs was reduced. These findings suggest that reward cues initially boost effort regardless of whether or not people are aware of them, but affect speed–accuracy tradeoffs only when the reward information is accessible to consciousness.     

Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution

In common sense experience based on introspection, consciousness is singular. There is only one ‘me’ and that is the one that is conscious. This means that ‘singularity’ is a defining aspect of ‘consciousness’. However, the three main theories of consciousness, Integrated Information, Global Workspace and Recurrent Processing theory, are generally not very clear on this issue. These theories have traditionally relied heavily on neuropsychological observations and have interpreted various disorders, such as anosognosia, neglect and split-brain as impairments in conscious awareness without any reference to ‘the singularity’. In this review, we will re-examine the theoretical implications of these impairments in conscious awareness and propose a new way how to conceptualize consciousness of singularity. We will argue that the subjective feeling of singularity can coexist with several disunified conscious experiences. Singularity awareness may only come into existence due to environmental response constraints. That is, perceptual, language, memory, attentional and motor processes may largely proceed unintegrated in parallel, whereas a sense of unity only arises when organisms need to respond coherently constrained by the affordances of the environment. Next, we examine from this perspective psychiatric disorders and psycho-active drugs. Finally, we present a first attempt to test this hypothesis with a resting state imaging experiment in a split-brain patient. The results suggest that there is substantial coherence of activation across the two hemispheres. These data show that a complete lesioning of the corpus callosum does not, in general, alter the resting state networks of the brain. Thus, we propose that we have separate systems in the brain that generate distributed conscious. The sense of singularity, the experience of a ‘Me-ness’, emerges in the interaction between the world and response-planning systems, and this leads to coherent activation in the different functional networks across the cortex.