The Unconscious Feeling of Knowing: A Commentary on Koriat's Paper

In Koriat's paper “The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control,” he asserts that the feeling of knowing straddles the implicit and explicit, and that these conscious feelings enter into a conscious control process that is necessary for controlled behavior. This assertion allows him to make many speculations on the nature of consciousness itself. We agree that feelings of knowing are produced through a monitoring of one's knowledge, and that this monitoring can affect the control of behavior such as whether or not to search memory for an answer. Further, we believe that monitoring of performance with a strategy can also affect cognition control and strategy selection; however, we also believe that frequently this monitoring and control occurs without conscious awareness. Feeling of knowing has received an inordinate amount of attention because it lies behind the highly recognizable tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon that represents one of the rare cases of conscious monitoring. There are other feelings of knowing which are much more common and are not accompanied by conscious awareness. These are evident in the early selection of a strategy for answering a problem. In our view, the research on feeling of knowing will not resolve the question of whether consciousness is merely epiphenomenal.     

The flow of anoetic to noetic and autonoetic consciousness: A vision of unknowing (anoetic) and knowing (noetic) consciousness in the remembrance of things past and imagined futures

In recent years there has been an expansion of scientific work on consciousness. However, there is an increasing necessity to integrate evolutionary and interdisciplinary perspectives and to bring affective feelings more centrally into the overall discussion. Pursuant especially to the theorizing of Endel Tulving (1985, 2004, 2005), Panksepp (1998a, 2003, 2005) and Vandekerckhove (2009) we will look at the phenomena starting with primary-process consciousness, namely the rudimentary state of autonomic awareness or unknowing (anoetic) consciousness, with a fundamental form of first-person ‘self-experience’ which relies on affective experiential states and raw sensory and perceptual mental existences, to higher forms of knowing (noetic and autonoetic) and self-aware consciousness. Since current scientific approaches are most concerned with the understanding of higher declarative states of consciousness, we will focus on these vastly underestimated primary forms of consciousness which may be foundational for all forms of higher ‘knowing consciousness’.     

Feelings of knowing in the Ranschburg effect

In two experiments, we assessed feelings of knowing (FOKs) for the Ranschburg effect to examine the types of retrieval ease that affect FOKs. In the Ranschburg effect, retrieval performance for repeated items differs from nonrepeated items in supramemory span tasks. We found that FOKs are affected by memory manipulations that affect recall processes, but not by manipulations that affect recognition. This suggests that processes that affect recognition, such as target familiarity, do not affect FOKs, whereas processes that affect recall, such as response suppression and guessing factors, affect FOKs. We propose that an integrated theory of FOKs must include mechanisms responsive to both encoding and retrieval factors (such as retrieval accessibility and cue familiarity), which are highly susceptible to output interference.     

Feelings and Judgments of Knowing: Is There a Special Noetic State?

A. Koriat distinguishes between feeling-based and inferentially based feeling-of-knowing judgments. The former are attributable to partial information that is activated in implicit memory but not fully articulated. They are not, however, attributable to direct access to the target—an hypothesis that Koriat specifically repudiates. While there is considerable merit in the distinction that Koriat draws, and his emphasis on the possibility that people base at least some of their metacognitive judgments on implicit information seems well founded, it is argued that his rejection of the direct access view is premature. There may be a state—a true noetic state—in which people actually know the answer before they are able to express it. A case is made for further consideration of the scientific merits of the direct-access view of the noetic feelings people experience in imminent tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states.     

Motivated remembering efforts during tip-of-the-tongue states

Hart (1965) argues that the feeling of knowing in tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states monitors memory content and motivates retreival efforts. Although a number of studies have examined the memory-monitoring accuracy of feelings of knowing and not-knowing, no studies have focused directly on the hypothesized motivational function of these feeling states. This second function of memory feeling states is investigated in this study by assessing the degree to which TOT and Don't Know (DK) states interfere with a subject's ability to perform well on a concurrent task. Subjects studied a list of arbitrary word pairs for 3, 5, or 7 seconds and then provided Recall, TOT, or DK reports in an immediate recall test. Performance on the simple number-probe task that followed each memory report was poorer on TOT trials than on DK trials. This effect did not vary as a function of encoding time. Since covert memory searches were possible on both TOT and DK trials, it is concluded that the performance decrement observed on TOT trials is due to the fact that covert TOT target searches command processing capacity that might otherwise go to the concurrent number-probe task. The absence of an encoding time effect suggests that TOT states do not monitor the associative strength of target traces as Hart (1967) has proposed. The findings in this study are interpreted as providing support for the proposition that the feeling of knowing in the TOT state influences the setting of capacity-allocation priorities in the memory system.     

The intricate relationships between monitoring and control in metacognition: lessons for the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior

Do we run away because we are frightened, or are we frightened because we run away? The authors address this issue with respect to the relation between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control. When self-regulation is goal driven, monitoring effects control processes so that increased processing effort should enhance feelings of competence and feelings of knowing. In contrast, when self-regulation is data driven, such feelings may be based themselves on the feedback from control processes, in which case they should decrease with increasing effort. Evidence for both monitoring-based control and control-based monitoring occurring even in the same situation is presented. The results are discussed with regard to the issue of the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior.     

Sources of information in metamemory: Judgments of learning and feelings of knowing

Metamnemonic judgments probe people’s awareness of their own memory processes. The research reviewed here is an examination of the sources of information that subjects use to make judgments of learning (e.g., paired-associate judgments, ease-of-recognition predictions, free-recall judgments), and feelings of knowing (e.g., speeded strategy decisions, tip-of-the-tongue states, feeling-of-knowing judgments). The general pattern in the data suggests that subjects use different sources of information to form these judgments. Target-based sources appear to be important in judgments made at the time of acquisition, whereas cue-based judgments appear to be important in judgments made at the time of retrieval. In general, these sources of information serve as useful heuristics, and metamnemonic judgments tend to be accurate.     

Affect, accessibility of material in memory, and behavior: a cognitive loop?

Two studies investigated the effect of good mood on cognitive processes. In the first study, conducted in a shopping mall, a positive feeling state was induced by giving subjects a free gift, and good mood, thus induced, was found to improve subjects' evaluations of the performance and service records of products they owned. In the second study, in which affect was induced by having subjects win or lose a computer game in a laboratory setting, subjects who had won the game were found to be better able to recall positive material in memory. The results of the two studies are discussed in terms of the effect that feelings have on accessibility of cognitions. In addition, the nature of affect and the relationship between good mood and behavior (such as helping) are discussed in terms of this proposed cognitive process.     

Utilization of base-rate information during feeling-of-knowing judgments.

We examined whether subjects use base-rate information about item difficulty when making feeling-of-knowing judgments for items they failed to recall. First, the subjects attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions. Then, for those items they recalled incorrectly, half of the subjects received information about the normative probability of recall of each item while judging their feeling of knowing. The other subjects made their feeling-of-knowing judgments without receiving any base-rate information. Finally, all subjects had a forced-choice recognition test on those items to validate the accuracy of their feeling-of-knowing judgments. Relative to the no-base-rate information group, the base-rate group had lower feelings of knowing for normatively difficult items and higher feelings of knowing for normatively easier items. Subjects who had received base-rate information during the judgment state had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than subjects who did not receive base-rate information. However, even the predictions from subjects who received base-rate information were not significantly more accurate for predicting subsequent recognition than were the predictions derived from normative information alone.     

大学生的时间管理倾向与主观幸福感

以499名在校大学生为对象,采用青少年时间管理倾向性量表、幸福感指数量表和情感平衡量表,探讨其时间价值感、时间监控感和时间效能感与主观幸福感的关系。结果表明:(1)大学生的时间价值感、时间监控感和时间效能感与其主观幸福感间存在显著的相关关系;时间管理倾向和主观幸福感得分不存在显著的性别和年级差异;(2)时间管理倾向不同因子对大学生主观幸福感的影响作用存在一定差异。时间监控观和时间效能感能显著正向预测大学生的主观幸福感指数,时间效能感能显著正向预测大学生的积极情感和情感平衡,同时也能显著地负向预测其消极情感。     

Shaping feelings in cyberspace: The case of Chinese seafarer-partners

Research has shown that expressing feelings online is subject to feeling rules much like those that govern offline environments. ‘Expressing feelings’, however, is different from ‘feeling feelings’. Does emotional interaction online change how individuals feel and, if so, in what ways? This paper addresses the question by examining a group of Chinese seafarer-partners' activities in an online group. Drawing upon emotion management theory, this paper shows that seafarer-partners in the group helped each other to reframe negative experiences in positive ways in order to suppress unpleasant feelings. It also reveals a corollary process of online emotion-shaping, namely, boosting positive feelings, by drawing upon the concept of collective effervescence. Both processes served to make seafarer-partners feel positive about their relationships. This paper thus extends previous research findings by demonstrating that online support also serves to shape how individuals feel and does so through two processes.     

Emotions,feelings and intentionality

Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences.     

Toward a phenomenology of feelings

Our understanding of emotion cannot be complete without an understanding of feelings, the experiential aspect of emotion. Despite their importance, little effort has been devoted to the careful apprehension of feelings. Based on our apprehension of many randomly selected moments of pristine inner experience, we present a preliminary phenomenology of feelings. We begin by observing that often feelings occur as directly experienced phenomena of awareness; however, often no feelings are present in experience, or if they are present, they are too faint to be observed by a process intended to observe them. Feelings range from vague to distinct and sometimes do, but other times do not, include bodily sensations. When bodily sensations are present, there is a wide range of clarity and location of these sensations. Sometimes people experience multiple distinct feelings and sometimes people experience one feeling that is a mix or blend of different feelings. We also discuss what feelings are not, including instances when feelings do not appear to be present, despite evidence suggesting the presence of underlying emotional processes (e.g., behavioral evidence of emotion). These instances of emotion but not feeling lead us to speculate that experiencing feelings is a skill developed over time through an interaction of interpersonal and intrapersonal events.     

Exert more and feel better,not worse?: Examining links among changes in exertion,feelings of accomplishment,and feeling states

Zenko, Ekkekakis, and Ariely (2016) showed that participants whose exercise session became progressively easier over time showed more positive affect than participants whose session became increasingly more difficult. The current study examined whether Zenko et al.’s decrease in exertion-increase in feeling state relationship held in a series of three, unmanipulated practices among a sample of collegiate athletes. In addition, change in feelings of accomplishment was included as a predictor of overall after-practice feeling state and as a potential mediator of the relationship between change in exertion and change in feeling state during practice in multilevel models. Results showed the relationship between change in exertion and change in feeling state was negative but did not consistently reach significance, and change in feeling state did not consistently predict overall feeling state after practice. However, increase in accomplishment was a significant predictor of overall feeling state after practice, and change in accomplishment was a significant mediator of the relationship between change in exertion and change in feeling state. Increase in exertion can lead to an increase in positive feeling states when trying harder leads to an increase in feelings of accomplishment during practice settings despite a direct effect sometimes showing increase in exertion leads to a decrease in feeling states. These results demonstrate an inconsistent mediator effect and provide insight into how athletes may be able to feel better while working harder, not worse.     

How Different Guilt Feelings Can Affect Social Competence Development in Childhood

The authors examined how the two different dimensions of guilt feelings, needed for reparation and fear of punishment, could influence social conduct, such as prosocial and aggressive behaviors, and how they are linked to popularity in childhood. The authors hypothesized a theoretical model that they tested, fitting it with empirical data obtained from a sample of 242 Italian children 9–11 years old. Both dimensions of guilt predict prosocial and aggressive behaviors. Specifically, the feeling of guilt linked to the need for reparation tends to negatively predict aggressive behaviors, and positively predict prosocial behaviors. The feeling of guilt linked to the fear of punishment, on the contrary, tends to positively affect aggressive and negatively affect prosocial conducts in children. These results highlight that the different feelings of guilt can represent a relevant risk or protective factor for the development of social competence in childhood. Limitations, strengths, and further development of the present study are discussed.     

Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving

People’s metacognitions, both before and during problem solving, may be of importance in motivating and guiding problem-solving behavior. These metacognitions could also be diagnostic for distinguishing among different classes of problems, each perhaps controlled by different cognitive processes. In the present experiments, intuitions on classic insight problems were compared with those on noninsight and algebra problems. The findings were as follows: (1) subjective feeling of knowing predicted performance on algebra problems but not on insight problems; (2) subjects’ expectations of performance greatly exceeded their actual performance, especially on insight problems; (3) normative predictions provided a better estimate of individual performance than did subjects’ own predictions, especially on the insight problems; and, most importantly, (4) the patterns-of-warmth ratings, which reflect subjects’ feelings of approaching solution, differed for insight and noninsight problems. Algebra problems and noninsight problems showed a more incremental pattern over the course of solving than did insight problems. In general, then, the data indicated that noninsight problems were open to accurate predictions of performance, whereas insight problems were opaque to such predictions. Also, the phenomenology of insight-problem solution was characterized by a sudden, unforeseen flash of illumination. We propose that the difference in phenomenology accompanying insight and noninsight problem solving, as empirically demonstrated here, be used to define insight.     

The ego and the id revisited Freud and Damasio on the body ego/self

Freud's statement in The Ego and the Id (1923) that the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego is well known. This paper tempts to clarify the premises underlying Freud's thesis. Particular attention is paid to Freud's investigation of internal perceptions. Freud argued that internal perceptions are more primordial than perceptions arising externally. In Freud's opinion the roots of the ego, the id, are to be found in body sensations and feelings, but he had to admit that very little was known about these sensations and feelings. Only much later was neuroscience in a position to offer evidence that feelings can be the direct perception of the internal state of the body. Damasio (2010) has recently suggested that the core of the self might be found in what he, like Freud, terms primordial feelings. Not only was Freud able to conceive of the ego as the perception and feeling of our own body but also to conceive of knowing the mental life of another by means of recreating the bodily state of another through imitation.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

The good and bad of relationships: how social hindrance and social support affect relationship feelings in daily life

The authors examined the effects of social hindrance and support on negative and positive relationship-specific feelings in three daily diary studies. Study 1 showed that hindrance and support independently predicted positive relationship feelings, but only hindrance predicted negative feelings. Study 2 used new measures of hindrance and support and showed that hindrance and support independently predicted same-day relationship feelings but that the effects of hindrance were stronger in magnitude. Study 3 yielded similar findings using the new measures of hindrance and support and controlling for morning feeling. These asymmetrical crossover effects suggest that bad is only stronger than good when it comes to bad outcomes; they also support the distinction between aversive and appetitive relational processes.     

Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings

Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch the plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group to intend (in the relevant sense) is for its members to be jointly committed to intend that such-and-such as a body. Individual group members need not be directly involved in the formation of the intention in order to participate in such a joint commitment. The core concept of joint commitment is in an important way holistic, not being reducible to a set of personal commitments over which each party holds sway. Parties to a group intention so understood can reasonably see the resulting action as "ours" as opposed to "theirs" and thus appropriately respond to the action's badness with a feeling of guilt, even when they themselves are morally innocent in the matter. I label the feeling in question a feeling of "membership guilt." A number of standard philosophical claims about the nature of guilt feelings are thrown into question by my argument.