Zur Natur des „Sechsten Sinnes“

Unconscious interactions have been conceptualized since Sigmund Freud, especially within the framework of transference and countertransference,. Nowadays, findings in the cognitive neurosciences (cognitive psychology, neurobiology) allow for a broader view of unconscious mental processes, e.g., in terms of subliminal perception or unconscious information processing. In this paper, a model is presented for understanding countertransference processes in the context of both psychoanalysis and the cognitive neurosciences. The basic concept of this model is that, within the framework of (unconscious) transference, the patient sends complex social information which the therapist perceives both consciously and unconsciously. Further unconscious information processing leads to the known countertransference phenomena, which consist of specific emotions, body feelings, fantasies, or impulses for action, and in some respects facilitate a “sixth sense” on the part of the therapist. The various processes of unconscious information processing lead to a situation in which countertransference includes parts of both the patient and therapist. At the conclusion of the paper, current neuroscientific concepts of unconscious processes are applied to countertransference, and the unconscious nature of countertransference is discussed from this perspective.     

Metacognitive model of mindfulness

Mindfulness training has proven to be an efficacious therapeutic tool for a variety of clinical and nonclinical health problems and a booster of well-being. In this paper we propose a multi-level metacognitive model of mindfulness. We postulate and discuss following hypothesis: (1) mindfulness is related to the highest level of metacognition; (2) mindfulness depends on dynamic cooperation of three main components of the metacognition (metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experiences and metacognitive skills); (3) a mindful meta-level is always conscious while the other meta-cognitive processes can occur implicitly; (4) intentionally practiced mindfulness decreases dissociations between awareness and meta-awareness; (5) components of mindful meta-level develop and change during continuous practice. The current model is discussed in the light of empirical data and other theoretical approaches to mindfulness concept. We believe that presented model provides some helpful avenues for future research and theoretical investigations into mindfulness and the mechanisms of its actions.     

Anxiety, signal anxiety, and unconscious anticipation: neuroscientific evidence for an unconscious signal function in humans

A central tenet of psychoanalysis, and arguably of any comprehensive theory of mind, is the existence of a psychological unconscious. Years of clinical investigation into the nature of unconscious processes have facilitated the development of psychoanalysis as a clinical method. Empirical investigations of unconscious mental processes, however, have lagged behind clinical inquiry. With few exceptions, attempts to understand unconscious processes using rigorous experimental controls have remained sequestered in scientific domains other than psychoanalysis, where they have proliferated recently. In view of this recent upsurge of research on unconscious processes outside of psychoanalysis, efforts to integrate such knowledge into general theories of psychopathology and clinical investigation are critical. In this paper, an interdisciplinary approach is taken to the study of one aspect of unconscious mental functioning--what Freud originally termed signal anxiety. Signal anxiety is examined using information from cognitive psychology and learning theory, psychophysiology, behavioral neuroscience, and psychoanalytic theory. Though the original concept of signal anxiety is supported by recent research, it is concluded that signal anxiety is probably best thought of not as the affect of anxiety but as a subset of unconscious mental processes that have a signal function of anticipating danger. Such unconscious anticipatory processes are a general feature of the mind that includes responses to both real and imagined (neurotic) appraisals of a situation. The neurophysiological structures and processes associated with unconscious anticipation in humans are just beginning to be understood.     

无意识元认知调控下的策略转换

通过两位数乘法算式答案判别任务研究无意识元认知调控下策略转换的的认知加工特征。整个算式答案判别任务分为两种策略使用情境：一种为只可以使用尾数策略的任务情境;另一种为既可以使用尾数策略,又可以使用奇偶策略的任务情境。实验结果表明：1）无意识元认知具有高选择性、高效性和高潜力,能在策略使用情境转变之后,快速察觉并选择使用更为简单、高效的奇偶策略;2）尾数策略使用的强大思维定势阻止奇偶策略的意识化,致使绝大多数被试未能发现任务情境的变化而在内隐状态下使用了奇偶策略;3）策略在内隐或外显状态下使用具有同等效力,策略内隐使用具有高效性和高潜力。     

Further developments of the concept of fantasy

After the Isaacs' seminal work on the nature and function of unconscious phantasy (1948), several authors (mostly in the British Society) have reflected on the topic and tried to extend the concept of fantasy. In this paper I shall examine the contributions of Winnicott, Gaddini, Joseph and Anne Marie Sandler that aim at broadening this psychoanalytic concept. The authors that I have considered share a focus mostly on the early stages of child development. Both Winnicott and Gaddini belong to a line of thinking that explores the vicissitudes of the primary emotional development of the infantile self (in the mother‐infant relationship) involving the earliest processes of holding and bodily and kinaesthetic fantasy that form the bodily integrity of the person. The Sandlers focused mostly on the concept of the past unconscious understood as a place of primitive vicissitudes with a deficit in figuration where the process of repression is missing. The present unconscious phantasy (that is located in the here and now) has the function of rendering the past unconscious phantasy partly accessible; otherwise it would remain unknowable.     

重量对元认知监控的无意识影响

采用结构知识归因的方法,以学习判断和项目优先选择作为元认知监测和控制的指标,考察重量对元认知监控的影响是否是无意识的。被试学习粘贴在不同重量纸盒上的词对,进行学习判断(实验1)或项目选择(实验2),并报告其判断或选择的依据。结果:(1)重量影响学习判断和项目优先选择,相对于轻纸盒,被试给予重纸盒上的词对更高的JOL并优先选择重纸盒上的词对进行学习;(2)重量对学习判断的影响只发生在判断依据为猜测的情况下,重量对项目优先选择的影响只发生在判断依据为猜测和直觉的情况下。上述结果支持了元认知的具身性,并提示重量对元认知监控的影响可能是无意识的。     

On the status of nonconscious processes in human cognition: comment on Reber

Two issues are discussed. The first one pertains to the generality of the nonconscious learning processes and their somewhat paradoxical status in cognitive psychology. We argue that the ability of the human cognitive system to nonconsciously acquire complex knowledge structures is one of its elementary and indispensable properties. Moreover, the existence of this ability constitutes one of the necessary metatheoretical assumptions of contemporary cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, the contemporary cognitive psychology literature often implies that it is only one of many controversial and unusual phenomena. The second issue pertains to the distinction between the so-called primitive unconscious and the sophisticated unconscious as proposed by Reber (1989).     

Attentional sensitization of unconscious visual processing: Top-down influences on masked priming

Classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast to these classical conceptions, we argue that automatic processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways and propose an attentional sensitization model of unconscious visual processing: According to this model, unconscious visual processing is automatic in the sense that it is initiated without deliberate intention. However, unconscious visual processing is susceptible to attentional top-down control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. In this article, we describe our attentional sensitization model and review recent evidence demonstrating attentional influences on subliminal priming, a prototypical example of an automatic process. We show that subliminal priming (a) depends on attentional resources, (b) is susceptible to stimulus expectations, (c) is influenced by action intentions, and (d) is modulated by task sets. These data suggest that attention enhances or attenuates unconscious visual processes in congruency with attentional task representations similar to conscious perception. We argue that seemingly paradoxical, hitherto unexplained findings regarding the automaticity of the underlying processes in many cognitive domains can be easily accommodated by our attentional sensitization model. We conclude this review with a discussion of future research questions regar-ding the nature of attentional control of unconscious visual processing.     

'Projective transidentifi cation': An extension of the concept of projective identifi cation

Questions about the concept of projective identifi cation still persist. The author presents the following hypotheses: Klein's traditional view and Bion's extension and revision of it can be thought of as occupying a continuum in reverse. He postulates that Bion's concept of communicative intersubjective projective identifi cation (which the author renames 'projective transidentifi cation') is primary and inclusive of Klein's earlier unconscious, omnipotent, intrapsychic mode but includes Bion's 'realistic' communicative mode as well. The author hypothesizes, consequently, that intersubjective projective identifi cation constitutes both the operation of an unconscious phantasy of omnipotent intrapsychic projective identifi cation solely within the internal world of the projecting subject-in addition to two other processes: conscious and/or preconscious modes of sensorimotor induction, which would include signaling and/or evocation or prompting gestures or techniques (mental, physical, verbal, posturing or priming) on the part of the projecting subject; followed by spontaneous empathic simulation in the receptive object of the subject's experience in which the receptive object is already inherently 'hard-wired' to be empathic with the prompting subject.     

国内元认知的相关研究及其展望

元认知这一概念是由美国发展心理学家弗莱维尔(Flavell)在1976年正式提出来的。至今,学者们对其进行了广泛深入的研究,无论是在理论还是实证方面都取得了丰硕的成果。文章首先对元认知(metacognition)的概念作了阐述,接着陈述了当前关于元认知的结构比较认可的两分法以及三分法,并提出了关于元认知结构的看法。然后对目前国内元认知的相关研究做一综述,最后文章在分析过去研究所存在问题的基础上提出了对元认知研究的展望。     

Wishing to Be White: Begging to Be Black

With race in mind, in this response the author draws on her own experiences of exilic consciousness, racial melancholia, whiteness, dissociation, and self-censorship to dialogue with Yvette Esprey. The author explores the issue of voice and how this is affected by context. The notions of the normative unconscious, K (nots), and the anti-analytic third are differentiated from one another. The relative weight given in the literature to unconscious processes such dissociation as opposed to more conscious self-censorship is explored in theory and with reference to Esprey’s case studies.     

The relational unconscious: a core element of intersubjectivity, thirdness, and clinical process

The relational unconscious is the fundamental structuring property of each interpersonal relation; it permits, as well as constrains, modes of engagement specific to that dyad and influences individual subjective experience within the dyad. Three usages of the concept of thirdness are delineated and contrasted with the concept of the relational unconscious, which, it is suggested, has the advantage of being both consistent with existing views of unconscious processes and more directly applicable to therapeutic concerns. Enactments and intersubjective resistances are viewed as clinical manifestations of the relational unconscious, and the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis results, in part, from altering the structure of the relational unconscious that binds analysand and analyst.     

使用加工分离程序对低地位群体内\外群体偏爱的研究

使用加工分离程序（PDP）,以50名农村籍大学生为被试, 采用2（群体：外群体、内群体）×2（特质词效价：积极、消极）×2（加工：意识加工、无意识加工）混合设计,研究了低地位群体对内群体以及高地位外群体偏爱的内隐特征。在本研究情境中发现：农村大学生在提取城市群体积极特质词比消极特质词时的无意识加工更显著;而提取农村群体的积极和消极特质词时,无意识加工的贡献没有显著差异。说明低地位群体成员对外群体有内隐偏爱,对内群体却不存在内隐偏爱。     

The goal as process: music and the search for the Self

This paper explores and compares the processes of music and analysis from the author's experience as a musician, piano teacher and analyst. It explains how the use of music improvisation in analysis (with simple percussion instruments) can powerfully enhance the dialogue between the unconscious and conscious psyche, as well as deepen the relationship between analyst and analysand. This is connected theoretically to Jung's active imagination and Winnicott's concept of play within the analytic encounter. Finally, the question is raised whether analytic trainings could do more to expose trainees to the possibility of using music within the analytic encounter. This touches on the more basic and controversial issue (which often separates analytical psychology and psychoanalysis) of whether expressive therapy should be used in analysis at all.     

The speed of metacognition: Taking time to get to know one’s structural knowledge

The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments (conscious structural knowledge) decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure (unconscious structural knowledge), and guess responses (unconscious judgment knowledge) were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. Conversely, the deadline decreased the proportion of conscious structural knowledge in favour of guessing. Unconscious structural knowledge can be applied rapidly but becomes more reliable with additional metacognitive processing time whereas conscious structural knowledge is an all-or-nothing response that cannot always be applied rapidly. These dissociations corroborate quite separate theories of recognition (dual-process) and metacognition (higher order thought and cross-order integration).     

A process-dissociation examination of the cognitive processes underlying unconscious thought

Conscious and unconscious thought have been previously found to differentially impact decision-making quality. However, little research has directly measured the processes underlying these modes of thinking. We propose that both thinking modes are characterized by rule-based and intuitive processing. In two experiments, we used the Process Dissociation Procedure to independently measure these cognitive processes. We tested three competing hypotheses: (a) conscious thinking evokes both increased rule-based and decreased intuitive processing compared to unconscious thinking; (b) conscious and unconscious thinking evoke similar levels of intuitive processing but conscious thinking enhances rule-based processing; and (c) conscious and unconscious thinking evoke similar levels of rule-based processing but unconscious thinking enhances intuitive processing. Experiment 1 used base-rate and law-of-large-numbers decision-making problems, whereas Experiment 2 used decision-making problems similar to the “apartment” problem that is often used in unconscious thought studies. In both experiments we found support for hypothesis (b).     

When can we introspect accurately about mental processes?

Some theorists have suggested that the cognitive processes determining a person’s perforance in a given task are unconscious, making introspection a poor research tool for studying these processes. Others have argued that the relevant processes usually are consciously conrolled and can be detailed by asking the person to introspect. Here, a synthesis of these two positions, a dual-factor approach, is proposed. Some of the processes involved in achieving a cognitive goal, such as learning a new concept, are viewed as unconscious and automatic; howver, other processes are intentionally allocated conscious attention, in certain tasks, to accomlish othe goal. To illustrate this dual-factor position, evidence is presented in support of the view that when concept learning occurs solely by automatic frequency processing, introspective reports are inaccurate, but when the nature of the task prompts intentional hypothesis testing, introspective reports are accurate, revealing clues that subjects engage in a conscious hypothesisesting strategy.     

Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition

The relationship between metacognition and executive control is explored. According to an analysis by Fernandez-Duque, Baird, and Posner (this issue), metacognitive regulation involves attention, conflict resolution, error correction, inhibitory control, and emotional regulation. These aspects of metacognition are presumed to be mediated by a neural circuit involving midfrontal brain regions. An evaluation of the proposal by Fernandez-Duque et al. is made, and it is suggested that there is considerable convergence of issues associated with metacognition, executive control, working memory, and frontal lobe function. By integrating these domains and issues, significant progress could be made toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition.     

Emotion as a boost to metacognition: How worry enhances the quality of confidence

Emotion and cognition are known to interact during human decision processes. In this study we focus on a specific kind of cognition, namely metacognition. Our experiment induces a negative emotion, worry, during a perceptual task. In a numerosity task subjects have to make a two alternative forced choice and then reveal their confidence in this decision. We measure metacognition in terms of discrimination and calibration abilities. Our results show that metacognition, but not choice, is affected by the level of worry anticipated before the decision. Under worry individuals tend to have better metacognition in terms of the two measures. Furthermore understanding the formation of confidence is better explained with taking into account the level of worry in the model. This study shows the importance of an emotional component in the formation and the quality of the subjective probabilities.     

Priming in the attentional blink: Perception without awareness?

The attentional blink refers to a reduction in accuracy that occurs when observers are required to identify the second of two rapidly sequential targets. Even when the second target cannot be reported, however, it is still capable of priming the response to a subsequent related item. At issue in the present work was whether this priming is attributable mainly to conscious or unconscious processes. To answer this question, we used an exclusion procedure that permitted an assessment of the relative dominance of conscious and unconscious processes. The results showed that second targets that are identified incorrectly are nonetheless processed extensively outside of awareness. Moreover, this processing is sufficient to prime a subsequent response for at least 1 s after the onset of the prime.