On the Importance of Family,Morality, Masculine,and Feminine Honor for Theory and Research

This paper presents an approach to honor as multifaceted. In this approach, honor is defined as having four different facets, or honor codes: morality‐based honor, family honor, masculine honor, and feminine honor. The honor‐as‐multifaceted approach has generated much psychological research examining the importance of each honor code across different cultural and social groups. An overview of this research shows that that the different honor codes exert a powerful influence on a variety of group processes, including collective action, in‐group identification, the definition of gendered roles within the family, in‐group responses to threats to collective honor, intergroup attitudes, and value change within groups. The paper discusses how defining and measuring honor as multifaceted ‐rather than as an unitary construct‐ provides a fuller understanding of honor's role in group life.     

Honor in Everyday Life in Turkish Society: A Barrier Against Deviance?

It seems that honor in Turkish society has always been brought to light through its connection with violence and homicides committed in its name: the existence of this kind of honor, considered as “barbarous,” seems to have subverted any representations of civic honor. Through interviews made with Turkish young adults, this article will attempt to show that a “civic” honor exists in Turkish society aiming to organize public space to maintain social order. Honor can thus be seen as a principle that can regulate social interactions in everyday life and even curb deviance instead of provoking it.     

Honor and Moral Revolution

Western philosophers have generally neglected honor as a moral phenomenon worthy of serious study. Appiah’s recent work on honor in moral revolutions is an important exception, but even he is careful to separate honor from morality, regarding it as only “an ally” of morality. In this paper we take Appiah to be right about the psychological, social, and historical role honor has played in three notable moral revolutions, but wrong about the moral nature of honor. We defend two new theses: First, honor is an emotional and moral form of recognition respect that can hinder or aid moral progress. Second, honor, so conceived, can play a rational role in progressive moral change, as it did among the working class in the British abolition of slave trade, when the pressure of moral consistency moved them to protest American slavery as an affront to their honor without change in their moral belief that slavery is wrong.     

Fine-Tuning, Multiple Universes, and the "This Universe" Objection

Abstract: When it is suggested that the fine-tuning of the universe for life provides evidence for a cosmic designer, the multiple-universe hypothesis is often presented as an alternative. Some philosophers object that the multiple-universe hypothesis fails to explain why this universe is fine-tuned for life. We suggest the "This Universe" objection is no better than the "This Planet" objection. We also fault proponents of the "This Universe" objection for presupposing that we could not have existed in any other universe and that the values of the free parameters of the Universe could have been different. Lastly, we reflect on why fine-tuning for life needs explaining     

What Should Realists Say About Honor Cultures?

Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s (1996) influential account of “cultures of honor” speculates that honor norms are a socially-adaptive deterrence strategy. This theory has been appealed to by multiple empirically-minded philosophers, and plays an important role in John Doris and Alexandra Plakias’ (2008) antirealist argument from disagreement. In this essay, I raise four objections to the Nisbett-Cohen deterrence thesis, and offer another theory of honor in its place that sees honor as an agonistic normative system regulating prestige competitions. Since my account portrays honor norms as radically different from liberal ones, it actually strengthens Doris and Plakias’ case in some respects: cultures of honor are not merely superficially different from Western liberal ones. Nonetheless, the persistent appeal of honor’s principles, and their moral plausibility in certain contexts, suggests not antirealism, but pluralism—a reply on behalf of realism that itself has considerable empirical support.     

BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: JOHN LOCKE AND MALCOLM X ON THE RIGHT TO REVOLUTION*

Many will ask what Harlem finds to honor in the stormy, controversial and bold young captain. And we will smile. And we will answer and say unto them: Did you ever talk to Brother Malcolm? Did he ever touch you? Did you have him smile at you? Did he ever do a mean thing? Was he ever himself associated with violence or any public disturbance? For if you did, you would know him and if you knew him you would know why we must honor him.     

Men of Honor Don't Talk: The Relationship Between Masculine Honor and Social Activism Against Criminal Organizations in Italy

Criminal organizations have a strong influence on social, political, and economic life in Italy and other parts of the world. Nonetheless, local populations display collective passivity against organized crime, a phenomenon known as omertà. Omertà is linked to the concepts of honor and masculinity. That is, in order to fit ideological constructions of manliness, individuals should display indifference toward illegal activities and should not collaborate with legal institutions. In two studies, we investigated the link between endorsement of a masculine honor ideology and collective action intentions against criminal organizations (antimafia). Study 1 (N = 121) involved a Northern Italian sample, and Study 2 (N = 301) involved a Southern Italian sample. Across studies, results showed that endorsement of masculine honor ideology was associated with lower willingness to engage in social activism against criminal organizations. This relationship was mediated by attitudes toward criminal organizations (Study 1 and 2) and, in line with the notion of omertà, by lower levels of collective motive and more anxiety about interacting with police (Study 2). Directions for future research are discussed.     

Don't tread on me: masculine honor ideology in the U.S. and militant responses to terrorism

Using both college students and a national sample of adults, the authors report evidence linking the ideology of masculine honor in the U.S. with militant responses to terrorism. In Study 1, individuals' honor ideology endorsement predicted, among other outcomes, open-ended hostile responses to a fictitious attack on the Statue of Liberty and support for the use of extreme counterterrorism measures (e.g., severe interrogations), controlling for right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and other covariates. In Study 2, the authors used a regional classification to distinguish honor state respondents from nonhonor state respondents, as has traditionally been done in the literature, and showed that students attending a southwestern university desired the death of the terrorists responsible for 9/11 more than did their northern counterparts. These studies are the first to show that masculine honor ideology in the U.S. has implications for the intergroup phenomenon of people's responses to terrorism.     

Faith and the developmental cycle

According to Paul Tillich, faith as a human response is an act of the total personality in which all the elements of man's personal life participate. This paper explores one aspect of this assertion that has been neglected by both psychologists and theologians-the heuristic idea that faith is a developmental phenomenon. Specifically, the paper contends that the dominant form of an individual's faith at any one time is determined in part by the particular developmental stage in which that individual is immersed. This contention is developed using the epigenetic approach of Erik Erikson. Eight developmental forms of faith are explored: among them, faith as trust, faith as obedience, and faith as self-surrender.     

Memory for the Events of Early Childhood

There has been much recent interest in the phenomenon of childhood amnesia, the difficulty most adults have in recalling at least the first 3 years of life. In contrast, it has been shown that infants 18 months of age or less can retain information over long periods. Although there is no agreed-upon explanation of this paradoxical phenomenon, there are proposed biological, cognitive, and social-cognitive explanations. Distinguishing among these accounts involves investigating both adults' memories for childhood events and the mnemonicabilities of young children. These studies may not only reveal the reason why our earliest years are shrouded from us as adults, but also shed light on the memory processes that allow us a rich representation of the remainder of our personal past.     

Blond, tall, with honey-colored eyes: Jewish ownership of slaves in the Ottoman Empire

Hundreds of Hebrew written sources, dozens of official decrees, judicial records (sijillat), and reports of European travelers indicate that slaveholding – particularly of females of slavic origin – in Jewish households in the urban centers of the Ottoman Empire was widespread from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. This halachically and legally problematic habit was an unparalleled phenomenon in any other Jewish community in the early modern period. The presence of slaves in Jewish households effected family life in many ways. I dealt with two of them: The first is cohabitation of Jewish men with female slaves, usually non-Jewish, who in effect served as their concubines and bore them legitimate children; the second is marriage with manumitted slaves who converted to Judaism and became an integral part of the community. These phenomena attest once again to the great extent to which Jewish society and its norms and codes were influenced by Muslim urban society, and the gap between rabbinic rhetoric ideals and the dynamic daily existence of Jews from all social strata. Research for this article was carried out during my postdoctoral fellowship as a Mandel Scholar at the Scholion Interdisciplinary Research Center, the Mandel Institute of Jewish Studies, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The article is based on a lecture delivered at a conference in honor of Prof. Amnon Cohen in June 2005 at the Ben-Zvi Institute, Jerusalem; and in Ankara, Turkey, in October 2005. I thank Prof. Kenneth Stow for his kind and friendly guidance.     

'Deny Yourself and Take up Your Cross': John Calvin on the Christian Life

John Calvin's vision of the Christian life is guided by the fundamental insight that what distorts our lives more than anything else is our blind self-love. This self-love is the reason why we love to hear things that flatter us, and hate to hear things that truly reveal who we are. Our self-love also provides the driving engine behind our pride, ambition and arrogance, whereby we seek the meaning of our lives in power, wealth and honor, so that we may despise those we consider to be inferior to us. If we are to be transformed more and more into the image and likeness of God, so that we may at the end be united with God in eternal life, we must eradicate this blind self-love from our hearts. Although there is much in Calvin's vision of the Christian life that may strike us as odd or even as alien, it is hard to disagree with his insight that blind self-love is the primary reason our lives do not express the image and likeness of God.     

Fear and its vicissitudes

Abstract

The USA has been a changed society since 9/11: the Zeitgeist either has a background of low-level angst, or when an attack occurs or a threat is sounded, the fear peaks and comes to the foreground for a time. Perhaps nothing demonstrates the degree to which fear permeates contemporary culture more than the continual presence of the measures the USA takes to be safe: airport security, the Patriot Act, the mining of formerly private information by the government, to name but a few. Can we account for the pervasive nature of fear solely by the devastating and deadly attacks 15 years ago, unspeakably horrifying though they were? This paper will explore this omnipresent fear in contemporary American culture from a psychoanalytic perspective, and in so doing hopes to shed light on the nature of that fear, why it is so persistent despite 15 years without any sequels, and what the consequences of that fear are for the American way of life. The discussion will be rounded out by linking this pervasive fear to the violence that is endemic to our age.     

The Ferenczi cult: its historical and political roots

I examine how Sándor Ferenczi has survived in the cultural memory of psychoanalysis, and why myths and legends have been created around his life and work. It seems that he could not escape the fate of the founding fathers of psychoanalysis, most notably, that of Freud and Jung: their life and work have become an object of cultic respect for the followers, diabolic figures for the enemies. Quasi-religious cultivation of the “great man” is an often observable phenomenon in literature, politics, history and in science, and it has several political and ideological functions. These functions may help to increase the inner cohesion and the group identity of the cultic community, to defend the group against external threats. Psychoanalysis has always been vulnerable to myth formation; first, for obvious sociological reasons, and, secondly, for reasons originating in the nature of therapy. The cultic functions can be realized in several ways, such as, for example, the ritualization of the transmission of knowledge, and the “biography as passion” that is, attempts to create a biographical narrative in which all life history moments crystallize around the great man's central theme. Most of the biographies on the life of great psychoanalysts are of this kind – and Ferenczi is no exception. A historiography of psychoanalysis must follow the path of modern historiography in general, which attempts at deconstructing both myths and counter-myths about persons, events and processes, in political, as well as in cultural and intellectual history. By examining the structure of myth formation about psychoanalysts we can learn a lot about how ideas are operating in changing social contexts.     

Honor and I: Differential relationships between honor and self-esteem in three cultural groups

Honor is often defined as one's self-esteem through one's own eyes as through the eyes of others. This definition assumes that endorsing honor values is universally related to one's self-esteem. Yet, prior work shows that the salience of honor in individuals' lives differs across cultures, which implies that honor would be differentially related to self-esteem across cultural groups. In the present study, we examined the contribution of three honor components (integrity, reputation, family honor) to the prediction of self-esteem in three cultural groups (Dutch, European American, Turkish). Consistent with prior work that describes the Dutch and (Northern) European Americans as low-honor groups, we found that none of the honor components were associated with self-esteem in these groups. In the Turkish group, which has been described as a high-honor group, honor integrity was associated with higher levels of self-esteem and family honor was associated with lower levels of self-esteem. Taken together, the findings indicate that honor cannot be universally defined as one's self-esteem, since the salience of honor endorsement for one's self-esteem differs across cultural groups.     

The fragmentation of the religious tradition of the creation,after‐life and morality: Modernity not post‐modernity

Religion asks three central questions: ‘What becomes of us after death?’, ‘How should we lead a moral life?’, and ‘How and why were the universe, life and human beings created?’ In the past, these questions were answered together as part of a single unified narrative. From the mid‐nineteenth century onwards, the growth of modern science and of spiritualism led to a fragmentation of this religious tradition so that the questions are now often asked separately and the answers combined in unexpected ways. This phenomenon is an outgrowth of modernity, not post‐modernity. Post‐modernists have suggested that there has been a recent, new and definitive ending of modernity with a collapse of all dominant grand narratives. Religion is one of the grand narratives supposed to have suddenly unravelled and fragmented in this recent sea‐change, although post‐modernists in general have not bothered to provide the empirical evidence to demonstrate this. The detailed account of the long, slow process of religious fragmentation and the particular role of nineteenth‐century spiritualism given here shows that the post‐modernist thesis does not work for Europe's most important grand narrative—the Christian religion. We can see rather a process of slow unravelling of the origins which go back at the very least to the latter half of the nineteenth century, a time of classic modernity and confidence in progress. This tendency towards fragmentation has continued at least in Europe, but religion persists; it has not experienced the mushroom rise and sudden implosion that has characterised the (until recently) fashionable, grand narratives of the secular intellectuals. We are living in modern, not post‐modern, times.     

Case Study on Together towards Life and Ministerial Formation

When asked over the years why I believe the World Council of Churches is so important to the life of the church, my response has been not so much because of what its programmes do but because of its work in building a common ecumenical vision and bringing the diversity of the world church around that vision. This has been so valuable in shaping the life and ministry of the church ecumenical at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries. Together towards Life gives us a fresh opportunity to do this again in the area of mission and evangelism.     

The Politics of Masochism

This essay explores why people sometimes act against their economic interests, and, more particularly, why people sometimes knowingly and intentionally support economic inequality even though they are disadvantaged by it, a phenomenon I call masochistic inegalitarianism. The essay argues that such behavior is an inherent and widespread feature of human nature, and that this has important though previously overlooked practical and theoretical implications for any conception of distributive justice. On the practical side, masochistic inegalitarianism suggests that any theory of distributive justice with more than the most modest egalitarian aspirations is inherently self-defeating (or at least self-limiting) because it will naturally produce the background conditions necessary to trigger masochistic behavior among the very people it is designed to assist. On the theoretical side, masochistic inegalitarianism suggests that there are serious problems with any theory of distributive justice based on the idea of hypothetical consent. This is because people with masochistic tendencies would be unlikely to consent to the distributive arrangements these theories have presumed, and the arrangements to which they would be likely to consent would allow a far greater degree of economic inequality than we are prepared to acknowledge as intuitively just. Either we must rethink our intuitions, or, as I contend, there is something about masochistic inegalitarianism that robs hypothetical consent of its moral force.