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1.
Benjamin S. Cordry 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(1):61-83
While Hume has often been held to have been an agnostic or atheist, several contemporary scholars have argued that Hume was
a theist. These interpretations depend chiefly on several passages in which Hume allegedly confesses to theism. In this paper,
I argue against this position by giving a threshold characterization of theism and using it to show that Hume does not confess.
His most important “confession” does not cross this threshold and the ones that do are often expressive rather than assertive.
I then argue that Hume is best interpreted as an atheist. Instead of interpreting Hume as a proto-logical positivist and arguing
on the basis of Hume’s theories of meaning and method, I show that textually he appears to align himself with atheism, that
his arguments in the Dialogues on Natural Religion support atheism, and that this position is most consistent with Hume’s naturalism. But, I hold that his atheism is “soft”
and therefore distinct from that of his peers like Baron d’Holbach—while Hume really does reject theism, he neither embraces
a dogmatically materialist position nor takes up a purely polemical stance towards theism. I conclude by suggesting several
ways in which Hume’s atheistic philosophy of religion is relevant to contemporary discussions. 相似文献
2.
Paul Dicken 《Sophia》2011,50(3):345-355
As part of his wider critique of the credibility of miraculous testimony, Hume also offers a rather curious argument as to
the mutual detriment of conflicting testimony for the miracles of contrary religious worldviews. Scholarship on this aspect
of Hume’s reasoning has debated whether or not the considerations are to be understood as essentially probabilistic, and as
to whether or not a probabilistic interpretation of the argument is logically valid. The consensus would appear to offer a
positive answer to the first question and a negative answer to the second. In this paper I expose a deeper fallacy in Hume’s
reasoning that undermines both probabilistic and non-probabilistic readings. My critique is closely based upon analogous considerations
in the philosophy of science, and the equally intriguing issue as to the epistemological relevance of conflicting scientific
theories throughout the history of science. 相似文献
3.
Jane L. Mcintyre 《Synthese》2006,152(3):393-401
References to strength of mind, a character trait implying “the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent”, occur in a number of important discussions of motivation in the Treatise and the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Nevertheless, Hume says surprisingly little about what strength of mind is, or how it is achieved. This paper argues that Hume’s theory of the passions can provide an interesting and defensible account of strength of mind. The paper concludes with a brief comparison of Humean strength of mind with autonomy. 相似文献
4.
William Edward Morris 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):441-454
Although Hume has no developed semantic theory, in the heyday of analytic philosophy he was criticized for his “meaning empiricism,”
which supposedly committed him to a private world of ideas, led him to champion a genetic account of meaning instead of an
analytic one, and confused “impressions” with “perceptions of an objective realm.” But another look at Hume’s “meaning empiricism”
reveals that his criterion for cognitive content, the cornerstone both of his resolutely anti-metaphysical stance and his
naturalistic “science of human nature,” provides the basis for a successful response to his critics. Central to his program
for reforming philosophy, Hume’s use of the criterion has two distinct aspects: a critical or negative aspect, which assesses
the content of the central notions of metaphysical theories to demonstrate their unintelligibility; and a constructive or
positive aspect, which accurately determines the cognitive content of terms and ideas. 相似文献
5.
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe 《Synthese》2006,152(3):353-370
Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that the details of Hume’s naturalistic philosophy of mind actually allow for a conjunction of these allegedly incompatible views. This thesis is significant, since readers typically have thought that Hume’s view that motivation is not produced by representations, coupled with his view that moral judgments motivate on their own, imply that moral judgments could never take the form of beliefs about, or representations of, the moral (virtue and vice). 相似文献
6.
Covenants and reputations 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Peter Vanderschraaf 《Synthese》2007,157(2):167-195
In their classic analyses, Hobbes and Hume argue that offensively violating a covenant is irrational because the offense ruins
one’s reputation. This paper explores conditions under which reputation alone can enforce covenants. The members of a community
are modeled as interacting in a Covenant Game repeated over time. Folk theorems are presented that give conditions under which
the Humean strategy of performing in covenants only with those who have never offensively violated or performed with an offensive
violator characterizes an equilibrium of the repeated Covenant Game. These folk theorems establish that for certain ideal
settings Hobbes’ and Hume’s arguments against offensively violating covenants are compelling. However, these ideal settings
presuppose that the community has certain mechanisms that generate common knowledge of the identities of those with whom one
should perform. I analyze the results of computer simulations of the interactions in a community whose members must rely upon
private communication alone. The computer simulation data show that in this community, reputation effects cannot effectively
deter members from offensively violating covenants. I conclude that Hobbes’ and Hume’s warnings against offensive violation
are compelling only on condition that the community is sufficiently structured to generate common knowledge among its members.
I also conclude that even in such structured communities, the Humean strategy is not the uniquely “correct” policy. 相似文献
7.
8.
Nathan Stemmer 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(2):137-159
Many solutions of the Goodman paradox have been proposed but so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct
solution. However, I will not contribute here to the discussion with a new solution. Rather, I will argue that a solution
has been in front of us for more than two hundred years because a careful reading of Hume’s account of inductive inferences
shows that, contrary to Goodman’s opinion, it embodies a correct solution of the paradox. Moreover, the account even includes
a correct answer to Mill’s question of why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for a complete induction, since Hume
gives a well-supported explanation of this reliability phenomenon. The discussion also suggests that Bayesian theory by itself
cannot explain this phenomenon. Finally, we will see that Hume’s explanation of the reliability phenomenon is surprisingly
similar to the explanation given lately by a number of naturalistic philosophers in their discussion of the Goodman paradox. 相似文献
9.
Brian Ellis 《Sophia》2011,50(1):135-139
A theory of morality acceptable to humanists must be one that can be accepted independently of religion. In this paper, I
argue that while there is such a theory, it is a non-standard one, and its acceptance would have some far-reaching consequences.
As one might expect, the theory is similar to others in various ways. But it is not the same as any of them. Indeed, it is
a radically new theory. Like Hume’s ethics, it is founded on our natural sociability, and feelings of empathy for others.
Like Aristotle’s theory, it incorporates an ethics of virtue. Like Kant’s theory, it regards the set of moral principles as
those appropriate for a socially ideal society. But unlike Kant’s theory, it is essentially utilitarian. I call it ‘social
contractual utilitarianism’. 相似文献
10.
Roy T. Cook 《Synthese》2009,170(3):349-369
A number of formal constraints on acceptable abstraction principles have been proposed, including conservativeness and irenicity.
Hume’s Principle, of course, satisfies these constraints. Here, variants of Hume’s Principle that allow us to count concepts
instead of objects are examined. It is argued that, prima facie, these principles ought to be no more problematic than HP
itself. But, as is shown here, these principles only enjoy the formal properties that have been suggested as indicative of
acceptability if certain constraints on the size of the continuum hold. As a result, whether or not these higher-order versions
of Hume’s Principle are acceptable seems to be independent of standard (ZFC) set theory. This places the abstractionist in
an uncomfortable dilemma: Either there is some inherent difference between counting objects and counting concepts, or new
criteria for acceptability will need to be found. It is argued that neither horn looks promising. 相似文献
11.
Tom Froese 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):95-133
An important part of David Hume’s work is his attempt to put the natural sciences on a firmer foundation by introducing the
scientific method into the study of human nature. This investigation resulted in a novel understanding of the mind, which
in turn informed Hume’s critical evaluation of the scope and limits of the scientific method as such. However, while these
latter reflections continue to influence today’s philosophy of science, his theory of mind is nowadays mainly of interest
in terms of philosophical scholarship. This paper aims to show that, even though Hume’s recognition in the cognitive sciences
has so far been limited, there is an opportunity to reevaluate his work in the context of more recent scientific developments.
In particular, it is argued that we can gain a better understanding of his overall philosophy by tracing the ongoing establishment
of the enactive approach. In return, this novel interpretation of Hume’s ‘science of man’ is used as the basis for a consideration
of the current and future status of the cognitive sciences.
相似文献
Tom FroeseEmail: |
12.
Manuel Pérez Otero 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):357-376
Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion
is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist
reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know
that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the
subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly
accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts:
possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project
them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns.
相似文献
Manuel Pérez OteroEmail: |
13.
Michael E. Levin 《Synthese》2007,155(1):35-64
It is argued that the intuition driving Kripke’s famous version of Wittgenstein’s meaning skepticism is precisely the one
that prompted Hume to despair of his bundle theory of the self: there are no necessary connections between distinct mental
states. This interpretation is shown to throw light on Wittgenstein’s notorious idea that all proofs “create concepts.”
Wittgenstein has invented a new form of skepticism. Personally I am inclined to regard it as the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date[.] – Saul Kripke相似文献
14.
Bell DR 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2003,24(5):381-393
In his paper, “The Relevance of Rawls’ Principle of Justice for Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients” (Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2002):45–53), Giovanni Maio has developed athought-provoking argument for the permissibility of non-therapeutic research
on cognitively impaired patients. Maio argues that his conclusion follows from the acceptance of John Rawls’s principles of
justice, specifically, Rawls’s “liberty principle” Maio has misinterpreted Rawls’s “libertyprinciple” – correctly interpreted
it does notsupport non-therapeutic research on cognitivelyimpaired patients. Three other ‘Rawlsian’ arguments are suggested
by Maio’s discussion –two “self-respect” arguments and a “presumed consent” argument – but none of them are convincing. However,
an alternative argument developed from Rawls’s discussion of “justice in health care” in his most recent book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, may justify certain kinds of non-therapeutic research on some cognitively impaired patients in special circumstances. We
should not expect anything more permissive from a liberal theory of justice.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
15.
Nikolaj Jang Pedersen 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(2):141-155
The neo-Fregean account of arithmetical knowledge is centered around the abstraction principle known as Hume’s Principle: for any concepts X and Y, the number of X’s is the same as the number of Y’s just in case there is a 1–1 correspondence between X and Y. The Caesar Problem, originally raised by Frege in §56 of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, emerges in the context of the neo-Fregean programme, because, though Hume’s Principle provides a criterion of identity for
objects falling under the concept of Number–namely, 1–1 correspondence—the principle fails to deliver a criterion of application.
That is, it fails to deliver a criterion that will tell us which objects fall under the concept Number, and so, leaves unanswered
the question whether Caesar could be a number. Hale and Wright have recently offered a neo-Fregean solution to this problem.
The solution appeals to the notion of a categorical sortal. This paper offers a reconstruction of their solution, which has
the advantage over Hale and Wright’s original proposal of making clear what the structure of the background ontology is. In
addition, it is shown that the Caesar Problem can be solved in a framework more minimal than that of Hale and Wright, viz. one that dispenses with categorical sortals. The paper ends by discussing an objection to the proposed neo-Fregean solutions,
based on the idea that Leibniz’s Law gives a universal criterion of identity. This is an idea that Hale and Wright reject.
However, it is shown that a solution very much in keeping with their own proposal is available, even if it is granted that
Leibniz’s Law provides a universal criterion of identity.
相似文献
Nikolaj Jang PedersenEmail: |
16.
Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of
a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that
people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition,
and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model
has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. One important implication of Haidt’s model is that in giving reasons for their
moral judgments people tend to confabulate – the reasons they give in attempting to explain their moral judgments are not
really operative in producing those judgments. Moral reason-giving on Haidt’s view is generally a matter of post hoc confabulation.
Against Haidt, we argue for a version of rationalism that we call ‘morphological rationalism.’ We label our version ‘morphological’
because according to it, the information contained in moral principles is embodied in the standing structure of a typical
individual’s cognitive system, and this morphologically embodied information plays a causal role in the generation of particular
moral judgments. The manner in which the principles play this role is via ‘proceduralization’ – such principles operate automatically.
In contrast to Haidt’s intuitionism, then, our view does not imply that people’s moral reason-giving practices are matters
of confabulation. In defense of our view, we appeal to what we call the ‘nonjarring’ character of the phenomenology of making
moral judgments and of giving reasons for those judgments.
相似文献
Mark TimmonsEmail: |
17.
Christopher Cowley 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2006,9(5):495-504
Richard Brandt, following Hume, famously argued that suicide could be rational. In this he was going against a common ‘absolutist’ view that suicide is irrational almost by definition. Arguments to the effect that suicide is morally permissible or prohibited tend to follow from one’s position on this first issue of rationality. I want to argue that the concept of rationality is not appropriately ascribed – or withheld – to the victim or the act or the desire to commit the act. To support this, I explore how the concept is ascribed and withheld in ordinary situations, and show that it is essentially future-oriented. Since the suicide victim has no future, it makes no sense to call his act rational or irrational. The more appropriate reaction to a declared desire for suicide, or to the news of a successful suicide, is horror and pity, and these are absent from Brandt’s account, as is a humble acknowledgement of the profound mystery at the heart of any suicide.
相似文献
Christopher CowleyEmail: |
18.
The design argument was rebutted by David Hume. He argued that the world and its contents (such as organisms) were not analogous
to human artifacts. Hume further suggested that there were equally plausible alternatives to design to explain the organized
complexity of the cosmos, such as random processes in multiple universes, or that matter could have inherent properties to
self-organize, absent any external crafting. William Paley, writing after Hume, argued that the functional complexity of living
beings, however, defied naturalistic explanations. In effect he dared anyone to come up with an alternative to his inference
to design, and hence a designer, outside of nature. Charles Darwin explained the apparent design of functional complexity
by his theory of natural selection. Asa Gray, however, in essays as well as in correspondence with Darwin argued that natural
selection allowed for a type of ‘evolutionary teleology’ in which design at most could be considered the result of universal
principles. F.E. Hicks updated Hume by specifically objecting to the use of design arguments by Paley. Hicks argued that the
apparent design seen in nature reflected order at a deep level in nature. The design argument was briefly revived by Lawrence
Henderson early in the twentieth century but he ultimately concluded that design and teleology were not necessarily mutually
entailing and he retracted his design argument in favor of one that he termed ‘natural teleology’. The current claims of ‘intelligent
design’ have the same logical problems that have beset previous design arguments. If design is divorced from teleology and
its discontents put behind us, then there is a possibility that the latter can have a place in the development of theories
to explain the phenomena of emergent complexity. 相似文献
19.
Martha Nussbaum proposes a universal list of human capabilities as the basis for fundamental political principles. She claims
that the list, in an Aristotelian spirit, might be justified by an ongoing inquiry into valuable human functionings for the
good life. Here I argue that the attractiveness of Nussbaum’s theory crucially depends on the philosophical possibility of
a non-reductionist understanding of naturalism and on resolving the tensions between ethical and political aspects of the
role of capabilities. Through a comparison of Nussbaum’s approach with those of Aristotle and (less familiarly) Hume, I try
to show that in these alternative versions we find valuable resources for the kind of non-reductionist model which might,
in line with Nussbaum’s own objectives, provide the basis for a capabilities-based critique of dominant modes of normative
theorizing and their influence in public discourse.
This article was presented at the UK Association for Legal and Social Philosophy Conference on Equality, 5–7 July 2004, University of Wales, Newport. I am grateful to Gideon Calder, Herman De Dijn, Carlos
Steel, Jochim Lourduswamy, Toon Vandevelde and two anonymous referees for this journal for their comments and suggestions. 相似文献
20.
Damon A. Young 《Sexuality & culture》2005,9(4):58-79
Karl Marx once compared philosophy to masturbation, essentially seeing both as privative, idealistic, and impractical activities.
Indeed, many lay folk see philosophers as “wankers.” While the present state of universities does throw doubt on the liberatory
character of contemporary philosophy, Marx’s jibe nonetheless mischaracterizes masturbation. This paper is a brief attempt
to correct Marx’s characterization of masturbation by drawing on the work of a thinker ofter associated with “intellectual
onanism”: Martin Heidegger. Speaking ontologically, Heidergger’s theories can be developed to show that masturbation it is
not privative, but “stretched” in time and place. Moreover, masturbation plays a practical role in the creative development
of the self, including the self’s essential bodiliness. While not necessarily defending philosophy against Marx’s charges,
this paper does show how even so-called “onanistic” philosophy might be redeemed.
“Only a being which, like man, ‘had’ the word... can and must ‘have’ ‘the hand’” —Martin Heidegger
“I have a dangerously supple wrist.” —Friedrich Nietzsche 相似文献