Rights: Foundations, Contents, Hierarchy

It would seem that we in the West are suffering from an increasing glut of rights. To the sixty-odd human rights that the Universal Declaration and its Covenants have long given us, must now be added the particular rights claims of an increasing number of ‘oppressed’ minorities, claims to compensation rights for just about every conceivable harm done and claims to ever more trivial things. This tendency is harmful insofar as it trivialises rights and devalues the coverage of rights. Human rights are fundamental and ought to be protected from these tendencies. Using an analysis of the foundations of human rights, and their function in maintaining autonomy in particular, this article analyses the content of rights – what must be fulfilled in order for a right to be protected – as a means of demonstrating the possibility of reducing the volume of rights without reducing rights coverage and of creating a defensible hierarchy.     

International relations and the universality of human rights as a background for Islam's predicament with the western concept of human rights

The author argues that individual human rights are an originally Western concept which has become universal. The concept of human dignity which exists in Islam must not be confused with that of human rights, as secular entitlements, which are lacking in Islam. Human rights are a common concern for all humanity. In admitting that the origin of the concept of human rights is Western, this author — who is a Muslim — emphasizes the universality of human rights and questions cultural relativism. However, he does not argue for an imposition of these rights on non‐Western cultures. There is a basic need for establishing cross‐cultural foundations of human rights. Without these, human rights cannot thrive in cultures in which they did not grow.     

ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR TOWARD HUMAN RIGHTS ACROSS DIFFERENT CONTEXTS: THE ROLE OF RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM,POLITICAL IDEOLOGY,AND RELIGIOSITY*

Three studies were carried out to examine attitudes and behavior toward human rights. ‘Universal’ human rights implies that there should be cross-situational consistency in attitudes and behavior toward human rights. An alternative interpretation is that attitudes and behavior toward human rights may shift across contexts, as a function of ideology. We reasoned that Canadian subjects would be more critical of the human rights records of Soviet and the Third World societies, and thus show stronger support for human rights in these than in Canadian society. Hypothesis two predicted that right-wing political ideology and support for human rights would be negatively correlated in contexts Canada and Third World, but not in the Soviet context; hypothesis three predicted the same pattern of associations between religiosity and support for human rights. Hypothesis four predicted that authoritarians, because of their fundamental opposition to individual liberties, would oppose human rights in all contexts. Study 1 involved 155 students expressing attitudes toward a range of human rights issues. Study 2 involved 74 Pro-Life supporters expressing attitudes on human rights, as well as on abortion. Study 3 involved a behavioral measure of support for human rights among 450 students. The findings generally supported hypotheses one and four, and provided some support for hypotheses two and three. The results seem to provide further evidence of an association between ideology and moral reasoning.     

Natural Rights to Welfare

Abstract: Many people have lamented the proliferation of human rights claims. The cure for this problem, it may be thought, would be to develop a theory that can distinguish ‘real’ from ‘supposed’ human rights. I argue, however, that the proliferation of human rights mirrors a deep problem in human rights theory itself. Contemporary theories of natural rights to welfare are historical descendants from a theory of rights to subsistence which was developed in twelfth‐century Europe. According to this theory, each human being has a special role to fulfil in God's plan and therefore has inalienable rights to subsist. Later theories have secularized this idea by claiming that human beings are purposive agents. Secularization, however, comes at a price. In the case of these theories, the price is a failure to provide satisfactory answers to the most basic questions we would expect of a theory of natural rights to answer. They have failed to provide a basis for ascribing these rights to all and only to human beings. They have not been able to generate a clear and viable criterion for ascribing duties correlative to these rights. And they cannot limit rights‐claims in a non‐arbitrary way. Hence we should abandon these theories.     

Toward the 'Rights of the Poor' Human Rights in Liberation Theology

In this article, the author traces the response of liberation theologians to human rights initiatives through three distinct stages over the past thirty years: from an initial avoidance of the concept, to an early critique, and then to a nuanced theological appropriation. He contends that liberation theology brings a thoroughgoing concern for the poor and an innovative methodology of historicization to the discussion of human rights. In clarifying the treatment of human rights within a specific religious movement, the author also addresses larger questions about the specific role of human rights language. To this end, the article shows how liberation theologians have grappled concretely with the divisions among different 'generations' of rights, various rights discourses, and diverse options for rights advocacy.     

Needs and Rights not needs versus rights: expanding Hamilton's conception of politics to include negative rights

Abstract

Hamilton's argument for a political philosophy of needs moves from a critique of rights, more specifically the 'rights-preferences couple', as inappropriate foundation for liberal political theory and practice. While acknowledging some role for rights in a needs-based polity, Hamilton says nothing about what this role might be, and follows Geuss in criticising rights as neither philosophically special nor politically useful. This conclusion would be problematic, for certain rights, Marshall's 'rights from the state' or negative rights, are consistent with the 'state of needs' that Hamilton identifies. Moreover, rights from the s'tate' are better suited than needs to address the problem of oppressive state authority precisely because of their deontological character and legal institutionalisation. Today most politics in liberal democracies is less about conflict and more about co-operation between state and citizen, and so perhaps Hamilton is right to emphasise needs over rights, but there is still a role for a negative rights when conflict emerges. Indeed, negative rights together with needs could constitute a conceptual couple well suited to realising freedom and equality under liberal-democratic conditions.     

The Discontent of Social and Economic Rights

One major objection to social rights is a failure of determining which precise social and economic claims should be granted rights status. The social rights debate has grappled with this ‘indeterminacy problem’ for quite some time, and a number of proposals have emerged aimed at fixing the content of these rights. In what follows I examine three distinct approaches to fleshing out the idea of a minimum threshold: social rights as the fulfilment of basic needs, social rights as the securing of a minimally decent life and social rights as a requirement of citizenship (a civic minimum). Each of these proposals progressively expands on what the minimum threshold of social rights requires and, conversely, what obligations they generate on part of the state. I will show that none of these approaches is entirely satisfactory and suggest that the social rights debate look elsewhere to determine its content.     

Are future generations that belong to language minorities entitled to group rights?

In this article, I investigate to what extent future generations that belong to language minorities are entitled to group rights that protect their linguistic identity. In particular, I assess whether these future generations are entitled to assistance rights, symbolic claims, self-government rights and exemptions from the law. To address this I outline three arguments supporting group rights for current generations and raise the question of whether these arguments, which are true for current generations, will also be true for future generations. The answer defends the entitlement of future generations to group rights against two counterarguments. The first is that future generations have no interest in preserving their language and therefore there is no normative justification for group rights. The second is that there is a duty to eliminate group rights in order to avoid malign consequences of these rights for future generations.     

The Human Right to Subsistence

Is there a human right to subsistence? A satisfactory answer to this question will explain what makes human rights distinctive, what is meant by subsistence, and why subsistence is an appropriate content of a human right. This article situates the human right to subsistence within the context of recent philosophical discussions of human rights. The argument for human subsistence rights provides an instructive example of how to understand what human rights are, why we must affirm them, and how they fit together as a coherent group. I begin the article by outlining the meaning, content, and justification of human rights in general. I then identify the strongest arguments for affirming a human right to subsistence and the most powerful objections to such a right. Finally, I address the worry about human rights inflation and question any minimalist understanding of human rights that would either exclude subsistence rights altogether or limit their scope in certain ways.     

The five connections: A human rights framework for psychologists

This article provides a brief introduction to human rights, describes why human rights are intrinsic to psychology, and introduces the “Five Connections Framework,” which was adopted by the American Psychological Association in 2021. This framework articulates five distinct relationships between human rights and psychology: (a) Psychologists possess rights by virtue of being human, as well as specific rights essential to their profession and discipline; (b) Psychologists apply their knowledge and methods to the greater realisation of human rights; (c) Psychologists respect human rights and oppose the misuse of psychological science; (d) Psychologists ensure access to the benefits of psychological science and practice; and, (e) Psychologists advocate for human rights. Each of the five connections is described, highlighting implications for psychological research, practice, training and advocacy, with suggestions for how these connections can guide and inspire individual psychologists and psychological associations worldwide.     

Determinants of Human Rights Attitudes and Behavior: A Comparison and Integration of Psychological Perspectives

Following several political-psychological approaches, the present research analyzed whether orientations toward human rights are a function of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), basic human values in the sense of Schwartz (1992 ), and political ideology. Three dimensions of human rights attitudes (endorsement, restriction, and enforcement) were differentiated from human rights knowledge and behavior. In a time-lagged Internet survey ( N   =  479), using structural equation modeling, RWA, universalism and power values, and political ideology (measured at Time 1) differentially predicted dimensions of human rights attitudes (measured at Time 2 five months later). RWA and universalism values also predicted self-reported human rights behavior, with the effects mediated through human rights endorsement. Human rights knowledge also predicted behavior. The psychological roots of positive and negative orientations toward human rights, consequences for human rights education, and the particular role of military enforcement of human rights are discussed.     

Islam and Human Rights: A Case of Deceptive First Appearances

It is a common belief that Islamic-based government, when serving as an ideological foundation for government, facilitates the poor protection of human rights. However, most studies of the relationship between Islam and individual rights have been at the theoretical and anecdotal levels. In this article, I test the relationship between Islam and human rights across a sample of 23 predominately Muslim countries and a control group of non-Muslim developing nations, while controlling for other factors that have been shown to affect human rights practices. I found that the influence of Islamic political culture on government has a statistically insignificant relationship with the protection of human rights.     

User rights and the frail aged

ABSTRACT There is a growing acceptance of user rights models with regard to dependent populations such as nursing home residents, but classic theories of rights presuppose levels of human rationality and human agency often lacking in the case of highly dependent populations. While user rights models have strong advantages at a rhetorical level, the reduced capacity for dependent groups to assert their rights constitutes a significant structural limitation. Policies, practices and regulatory strategies developed on the assumption that very dependent groups can indeed assert such rights thus proceed on a premise which is fatally flawed.     

‘IP’ Moral Rights Breaches are Deception Offences,Not Property Offences: Correcting a Category Error

In March of 2014 Nature Publishing Group, responsible for the publication of journals such as Nature and Scientific American, was subject to criticism for its requirement that contributing authors waive their moral rights (a component of their copyright) in relation to their published articles. Some of the rights included under the umbrella term ‘moral rights’ are the right to have any copies of one’s work reproduced accurately and without alteration; the right to the accurate attribution of one’s work under one’s own name; and the right not to have the work of others falsely attributed to oneself. The Nature Publishing case, from the criticism it sparked to the group’s own response, highlights a category error that occurs when moral rights are conceived of as property rights. Rather, moral rights are natural, non-proprietary rights. In correcting this category error it becomes evident that moral rights offences are not property offences, such as theft, but fraud offences—like plagiarism and forgery. Subsequently, whereas property rights, by definition, are able to be transferred or waived, it can be shown that no justification can be made for treating moral rights as transferrable or able to be waived.     

Rights, Responsibilities, and Respect: A Balanced Citizenship Model for Schools of Business

In a world increasingly described as turbulent and chaotic, management scholars have acknowledged the importance of a virtue-based set of criteria to serve as a moral rubric for the stakeholders that an organization serves. Business schools play a unique role in helping their students to understand the ethical issues facing business. Business schools can also model the way for creating a clear statement of values and principles, by creating a bill of rights for business schools that recognizes the importance of rights and responsibilities and articulates the important ethical issues that apply not only to business but to the business school context. Four models for creating a bill of rights in schools of business are presented and a framework of a bill of rights is provided. The advantages of a virtue ethics model for a bill of rights are explained as the most practical approach for business faculty to consider.     

Human rights and correctional clinical practice

The formulation of human rights theory and policies represents an ethical advance and promises to supply a framework for resolving ethnic, social, and individual conflicts. Ethics is essentially a means for coordinating the conflicting interests of peoples and nations and human rights provide a strong foundation to do this in multiple domains. Our aim in this paper is to apply a human rights perspective, in association with a justifying theory and set of goods, to the correctional arena. First, we discuss the definition of human rights, their proper analysis and justification. We then apply the results of our discussion to the assessment, treatment, and monitoring of offenders. Finally, we consider the policy, research, and intervention implications of a human rights perspective for correctional practitioners.     

Religion,Human Rights,and Neo‐liberalism in a Post‐Humanist Era

In a modern and secularized world, churches and religious groups that fight in the public sphere for social justice justify these actions in the name of defending human rights. This has been the path taken to express in non‐religious language what they understand to be a God‐given mission. Based on the distinction between civil rights, political rights, and social rights, which make up the set of human rights, this article analyzes the relationship between the notion of religious mission and the struggle for human rights; how neoliberal ideology, in an anti‐humanist perspective, criticizes the notion of social rights and social justice with the denial of any human right above the laws of the market; and the challenges that this neoliberal ideology poses for the justification of the social and political action of religious groups and institutions in the contemporary globalized world with a growing post/anti‐humanist culture.     

Gender, relational role orientation, and affinity for animal rights

Research based mainly on non-national samples reports a greater affinity for animal rights among women than men, and proposes a greater relational role orientation among women that emphasizes caring for others to explain this difference. Using a recent national sample comprised of 11% African American and 89% white American respondents, we find that a relational role orientation fails to account for women’s greater support of animal rights. It does provide minor help in distinguishing animal rights advocates from nonadvocates, but only among women and only on one of two measures of animal rights support. We conclude by proposing women’s structural locations as well as the interplay between these locations and women’s role socialization as alternate explanations for gender differences in affinity for animal rights.     

Rethinking Accountability in the Context of Human Rights

Within liberal democratic theory, ‘democratic accountability’ denotes an aggregative method for linking political decisions to citizens’ preferences through representative institutions. Could such a notion be transferred to the global context of human rights? Various obstacles seem to block such a transfer: there are no ‘world citizens’ as such; many people in need of human rights are not citizens of constitutional democratic states; and the aggregative methods that are supposed to sustain the link are often used in favour of nation-state strategic action rather than human rights. So what could accountability mean in relation to human rights? This article argues that discourse theory offers resources for approaching these problems and for rethinking a normative notion of accountability in relation to human rights. It is suggested that accountability should link political decisions to universal agreements through global rights institutions and that the link should be sustained by deliberative rather than aggregative procedures.     

Dignity,Torture, and Human Rights

This paper focuses on a distinct puzzle for understanding the relationship between dignity and human rights. The puzzle is that dignity appears to enter human rights theory in two distinct roles: on the one hand, dignity is commonly pointed to as the foundation of human rights, i.e. that in virtue of which we have human rights. On the other hand, dignity is commonly pointed to as that which is at risk in a subset of human rights, paradigmatically torture. But how can dignity underpin all human rights, and yet only be at stake in very specific human rights violations? And if dignity is lost in torture, how can the tortured retain their human rights? In this paper I offer a solution to these puzzles, in the form of a new theory of dignity. On this new theory, an individual’s dignity can be constituted via either of two pathways: the agent’s own normative competencies, or the authority of her community. The former is what’s typically at stake in practices such as torture; it in virtue of the latter that we have human rights.