On what god would do

Many debates in the philosophy of religion, particularly arguments for and against the existence of God, depend on a claim or set of claims about what God—qua sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being—would do, either directly or indirectly, in particular cases or in general. Accordingly, before these debates can be resolved we must first settle the more fundamental issue of whether we can know, or at least have justified belief about, what God would do. In this paper, I lay out the possible positions on the issue of whether we can know what God would do, positions I refer to as Broad Skeptical Theism, Broad Epistemic Theism, and Narrow Skeptical Theism. I then examine the implications of each of these views and argue that each presents serious problems for theism.     

What I do and what I think they would do: Social axioms and behaviour

The social axioms system uniquely predicted a large variety of behaviours and preferences. It is suggested that (a) the assistance social axioms provide in predicting the behaviour of others, and (b) the self‐characteristics embedded in the axioms account for this unique prediction ability. Three studies, each pertaining to a different axiom, tested the prediction power of the social axiom regarding two types of behaviours: One that is directly impacted by how others are expected to behave, and another that is more self‐directed. Results consistently revealed a unique contribution of the social axioms over personal characteristics in prediction of behaviours directed by how others are expected to behave, whereas behaviours that are more self‐directed were largely explained by relevant personal characteristics. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

I am what I do, not what I have: the differential centrality of experiential and material purchases to the self

What kinds of purchases do the most to make us happy? Previous research (Carter & Gilovich, 2010; Van Boven & Gilovich, 2003) indicates that experiences, such as vacations and concerts, are more likely to do so than material possessions, such as clothes and electronic gadgets. The present research was designed to explore 1 potential explanation for this result, namely, that experiences tend to be more closely associated with the self than possessions. The authors first show that people tend to think of their experiential purchases as more connected to the self than their possessions. Compared with their material purchases, participants drew their experiential purchases physically closer to the self (Study 1), were more likely to mention them when telling their life story (Study 2), and felt that a purchase described in terms of its experiential, rather than its material, qualities would overlap more with their sense of who they are (Study 4). Participants also felt that knowing a person's experiential purchases, compared with their material purchases, would yield greater insight into that person's true self (Studies 3A-3C). The authors then show that the tendency to cling more closely to cherished experiential memories is connected to the greater satisfaction people derive from experiences than possessions (Study 5).     

What you want (and do not want) affects what you see (and do not see): avoidance social goals and social events

Two studies examined the influence of approach and avoidance social goals on memory for and evaluation of ambiguous social information. Study 1 found that individual differences in avoidance social goals were associated with greater memory of negative information, negatively biased interpretation of ambiguous social cues, and a more pessimistic evaluation of social actors. Study 2 experimentally manipulated social goals and found that individuals high in avoidance social motivation remembered more negative information and expressed more dislike for a stranger in the avoidance condition than in the approach condition. Results suggest that avoidance social goals are associated with emphasizing potential threats when making sense of the social environment.     

They do what they are told to do: the influence of instruction on (chess) expert perception-commentary on linhares and brum (2007)

Linhares and Brum (2007) argue that they provide evidence for analogy as the main principle behind experts' acquisition of perceptual knowledge. However, the methodology they used—asking players to pair positions using abstract similarity—raises the possibility that the task reflects more the effect of directional instructions than the principles underlying the acquisition of knowledge. Here we replicate and extend Linhares and Brum's experiment and show that the matching task they used is inadequate for drawing any conclusions about the nature of experts' perception. When expert chess players were instructed to match problems based on similarities at the abstract level (analogy), they produced more abstract pairs than pairs based on concrete similarity. However, the same experts produced more concrete pairs than abstract ones when instructed to match the problems based on concrete similarity. Asking experts to match problems using explicit instructions is not an appropriate way to show the importance of either analogy or similarity in the acquisition of expert knowledge. Experts simply do what they are told to do.     

A paradigm for exploring what the mind does while deciding what it should do.

One widespread belief about automatic mental processes is that, among other characteristics, they are involuntary. No initial conscious intent is necessary because such processing is stimulus initiated. This claim was studied in the context of a novel task-choice procedure in which subjects were informed as to which of two tasks they should perform on a letter string either well in advance of a target, or when the target appeared. The hypothesis that initial processing of the target occurs without intent predicts that the effect of contrast reduction will be absent when the task cue appears synchronously with the target. This is because initial processing of the target should be completed during the time taken to decode the task cue. The results are inconsistent with this account. Instead, they support an account in which functional target processing is delayed until the subject knows what the task is. Some directions for future investigations are noted.     

It hurts when I do this (or you do that): Posture and pain tolerance

Recent research (Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010) has shown that adopting a powerful pose changes people's hormonal levels and increases their propensity to take risks in the same ways that possessing actual power does. In the current research, we explore whether adopting physical postures associated with power, or simply interacting with others who adopt these postures, can similarly influence sensitivity to pain. We conducted two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants who adopted dominant poses displayed higher pain thresholds than those who adopted submissive or neutral poses. These findings were not explained by semantic priming. In Experiment 2, we manipulated power poses via an interpersonal interaction and found that power posing engendered a complementary (Tiedens & Fragale, 2003) embodied power experience in interaction partners. Participants who interacted with a submissive confederate displayed higher pain thresholds and greater handgrip strength than participants who interacted with a dominant confederate.     

'I say what I like': Frank talk(ing) in counselling and psychotherapy

The black consciousness psychology or philosophy of Steve Biko, the political activist who died in police detention in the 1970s in South Africa, is considered. Those aspects of the philosophy relating to empowerment, self-concept development, the internalisation of racism and the racial identity theory of black people are discussed. It is suggested that the 'frank talk' method is a particularly useful tool in counselling and psychotherapy with culturally diverse clients. These ideas and the issue of empowerment of black clients are explored through the examination of a case vignette. In reflecting on the narrative of Jo-Anne, the need for counselling and psychotherapy to accommodate ethnic-minority cultural traditions of healing is affirmed.     

Why individuals want money is what matters: Using self-determination theory to explain the differential relationship between motives for making money and employee psychological health

Researchers have debated for years whether money can lead to happiness. Indeed, the findings to date are contradictory in regard to the impact of individuals’ motives for making money on their psychological well-being. This study aimed to reconcile these findings and show that certain motives for making money can be beneficial to individuals’ psychological health, while others can be detrimental, not only by reducing well-being, but also by increasing ill-being. Based on self-determination theory, basic psychological needs (autonomy, competence, and relatedness) were hypothesized to be the psychological mechanism explaining these differential effects. More precisely, need satisfaction and need frustration were hypothesized to mediate the relationship between employees’ money motives and psychological health (well-being and ill-being). Our findings suggest that self-integrated motives for making money lead to greater well-being and lesser ill-being by positively predicting need satisfaction and negatively predicting need frustration. On the other hand, non-integrated motives for making money appear to result in lesser well-being and greater ill-being by being negatively associated with need satisfaction and positively associated with need frustration. Together, these findings suggest that money motives can have differential effects on employees’ psychological health depending on whether these underlying reasons are need-satisfying or need-frustrating life goals.     

"I won't do what you tell me!": elevated mood and the assessment of advice-taking in euthymic bipolar I disorder

We hypothesized that when individuals with bipolar disorder are engaged in goal-directed behaviour and experience elevated mood, their decision-making becomes less constrained by advice from other people. This process may allow their goal-directed behaviour to persist, contributing to manic symptoms. Three groups of 32 participants: euthymic-bipolar-I, remitted-unipolar and never-depressed healthy controls were allocated to either a high or low mood induction. Advice-taking was assessed before and after the induction by a computerized task incorporating facial images. The bipolar group significantly opposed the advice given in the task after the high mood induction. The effect was specific to bipolar disorder and remained when controlling for possible confounds. Future work could investigate the effects of this process on manic symptoms, its origins, and the wider theoretical and clinical implications.     

Putting off tomorrow to do what you want today: planning for retirement

In this article we note that in the coming years, a larger number of people will be experiencing retirement for a longer period of time than ever before and that despite this fact, many will find themselves unprepared for this stage of their lives. We review the literature on retirement preparation, structuring our review around the key questions that need to be addressed when planning for retirement: (a) What will I do? (b) How will I afford it? (c) Where will I live? and (d) Who will I share it with? We make a number of suggestions for research and practice. We conclude that although psychology has begun to play a role in understanding and addressing retirement preparation, there are considerable opportunities for psychologists to engage with this issue in their research and applied work.     

On Pretabular Logics in NExtK4 (Part I)

This paper partly answers the question “what a frame may be exactly like when it characterizes a pretabular logic in NExtK4”. We prove the pretabularity crieria for the logics of finite depth in NExtK4. In order to find out the criteria, we create two useful concepts—“pointwise reduction” and “invariance under pointwise reductions”, which will remain important in dealing with the case of infinite depth.     

What infants know and what they do: Perceiving possibilities for walking through openings

What infants decide to do does not necessarily reflect the extent of what they know. In the current study, 17-month-olds were encouraged to walk through openings of varying width under risk of entrapment. Infants erred by squeezing into openings that were too small and became stuck, suggesting that they did not accurately perceive whether they could fit. However, a second penalty condition revealed accurate action selection when errors resulted in falling, indicating that infants are indeed perceptually sensitive to fitting through openings. Furthermore, independent measures of perception were equivalent between the two penalty conditions, suggesting that differences in action selection resulted from different penalties, not lack of perceptual sensitivity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Jung, the trickster writer, or what literary research can do for the clinician

This paper aims to show how literary scholarship can contribute to clinical debates by offering different methods of reading and interpreting works by Jung. Firstly, as texts form much of the means by which Jungian ideas are transmitted and worked upon, literary research offers methods of examining the way we read for authority and orthodoxy. Secondly, it is invaluable to look at the way in which Jung actually wrote. Jung portrays a dynamic psyche in action in his writings. His works are not only about a creative archetypal psyche, they enact and perform this creativity in the way in which he uses words. The rich playfulness demonstrated in The Collected Works is an example of a writer as a mythmaker of the psyche, one who absorbs unconscious creative energies into his writing in ways that dissolve modernity's cultural boundaries of science and art. In addition, the aesthetic component in Jung's writing is not a decoration of his ideas. Rather, his 'literary' qualities are themselves forms of argument about the fragile state of modern subjectivity. Using his essays on 'Synchronicity', and the 'Trickster', the paper will show these works to be responses to three related crises that still face clinicians and scholars today: the problematic role of the hero myth as an individuation narrative, the nature of 'science', and the crisis of western modernity itself in desperate need of psychic healing. The paper will show that where writing on synchronicity aims to individuate science by adding a 'feminine' Eros to its Logos biases, the Trickster essay is designed to ameliorate modernity by providing frameworks to make visible marginal or excluded material. In these works Jung tries to rejuvenate the modern world by re-connecting traditional symbolic systems with the psyche through myth as a language of psychic relating.     

“What I did” versus “what I might have done”: Effect of factual versus counterfactual thinking on blame, guilt, and shame in prisoners

The present study tested the prediction that counterfactual thinking would have a stronger amplificatory effect on guilt than on shame and that the effect would be mediated by self-blame. Ninety sentenced prisoners were instructed to think either counterfactually or factually about the role they played in the events leading to their capture, conviction, and sentencing prior to reporting on their level of self-blame, guilt, and shame. Compared to factual-focused prisoners, counterfactual-focused prisoners reported feeling more blameworthy and guiltier but not more shameful. The effect of thought focus on guilt was fully mediated by blame. The findings support an emotion-specific account of the emotional consequences of counterfactual thinking that implicate attributional judgment as an important mediating process.     

What mediation analysis can (not) do

The present article is concerned with a common misunderstanding in the interpretation of statistical mediation analyses. These procedures can be sensibly used to examine the degree to which a third variable (Z) accounts for the influence of an independent (X) on a dependent variable (Y) conditional on the assumption that Z actually is a mediator. However, conversely, a significant mediation analysis result does not prove that Z is a mediator. This obvious but often neglected insight is substantiated in a simulation study. Using different causal models for generating Z (genuine mediator, spurious mediator, correlate of the dependent measure, manipulation check) it is shown that significant mediation tests do not allow researchers to identify unique mediators, or to distinguish between alternative causal models. This basic insight, although well understood by experts in statistics, is persistently ignored in the empirical literature and in the reviewing process of even the most selective journals.