Before and after Ritual: Two Accounts of Li as Virtue in Early Confucianism

In this article, I probe the nature of Confucian virtue with special focus on ritual propriety (li). I examine two classic, mutually competing accounts of li??as moral virtue and as civic virtue??in early Confucianism by investigating the thoughts of Mencius and Xunzi. My primary aim in this article is to demonstrate how their different accounts of human nature and equally different understandings of the natural state (that is, the pre-li state) led them to the development of two distinctive political theories of virtue in the Confucian tradition. More specifically, they justified the nature of the li on different terms??human/moral on the one hand and civic/political on the other. I conclude by revisiting the contemporary debate on the nature of Confucian ethics from the perspective of early Confucianism represented by Mencius and Xunzi.     

Self-Transformation and Civil Society: Lockean vs. Confucian

Although contemporary Confucianists tend to view Western liberalism as pitting the individual against society, recent liberal scholarship has vigorously claimed that liberal polity is indeed grounded in the self-transformation that produces “liberal virtues.” To meet this challenge, this essay presents a sophisticated Confucian critique of liberalism by arguing that there is an appreciable contrast between liberal and Confucian self-transformation and between liberal and Confucian virtues. By contrasting Locke and Confucius, key representatives of each tradition, this essay shows that both liberalism and Confucianism aim to reconstruct a society freed from antisocial passions entailing a vicious politics of resentment, and yet come to differing ethical and political resolutions. My key claim is that what makes Confucian self-cultivation so distinctive is the incorporation of ritual propriety (li) within it, whereas liberal self-transformation that relies heavily on a method of self-control comes back to the problem that it originally set out to overcome.     

论易儒道交融的中国古代和谐美思想

中国古代美学属于古典主义美学,在美的形态上主张和谐美。这同儒道两家的哲学思想、伦理思想和美学思想的互相离异和互相吸收密切相关。从儒家早期的经典文本《周易》和先秦儒家各大流派的相关论述中可以看到,儒家偏重人的哲学,突出人的主动性,着眼于人对社会的认识,强调善与美的统一。而从老子到庄子的道家学派代表人物的相关言论中则可以看出,道家则偏重于自然哲学,突出自然的合规律性,着眼于人对自然的认识,强调真与美的统一。儒道两家各有偏重又相互补充,相反相成地融合为共同的和谐美的思想。     

Ritual in the Xunzi: A Change of the Heart/Mind

This article seeks to advance discussion of Xunzi??s view of ritual by examining the problem ritual treats and the way in which it targets the problem. I argue that the root of the problem is the natural inclination of the heart/mind to be concerned only with self-interest. The reason ritual works is that, on the one hand, it requires one to disregard concern for self-interest and observe ethical standards and, on the other, it allows one to express feelings in an ethically appropriate way. The ideal character shaped by ritual is one of respect in dealing with affairs and people; the ideal effect of ritual on the person is a sense of ease and security. Based on these conclusions, I will flesh out an implicit assumption Xunzi might have adopted about a pattern in human psychological constitution so as to further our understanding of Xunzi??s moral psychology.     

The Limitations of Ritual Propriety: Ritual and Language in Xúnzǐ and Zhuāngzǐ

This essay examines the theory of ritual propriety presented in the Xúnz?? and criticisms of Xunzi-like views found in the classical Daoist anthology Zhu??ngz??. To highlight the respects in which the Zhu??ngz?? can be read as posing a critical response to a Xunzian view of ritual propriety, the essay juxtaposes the two texts' views of language, since Xunzi's theory of ritual propriety is intertwined with his theory of language. I argue that a Zhuangist critique of the presuppositions of Xunzi's stance on language also undermines his stance on ritual propriety. Xunzi contends that state promulgation of anelaborate code of ritual propriety is a key to good social order (zhi) and that state regulation of language is a key to smooth communication and thus also good order. The Zhu??ngz?? provides grounds for doubting both contentions. Claiming that ritual propriety causally produces social order is analogous to claiming that grammar causally produces smooth linguistic communication, when in fact it is more likely our ability to communicate that allows us to develop shared rules of grammar. Humans have fundamental social and communicative capacities that undergird our abilities to speak a language or engage in shared ritual performances. It is these more fundamental capacities, not their manifestation in a particular system of grammar or ritual norms, that provide the root explanation of our ability to communicate or to live together harmoniously. The Xunzi-Zhuangzi dialectic suggests that ritual is indispensable, but normatively justified rituals will be less rigid, less comprehensive, less fastidious, and more spontaneous than a Xunzian theorist would allow.     

Chinese Religiosity and Chinese Science of Nature

Fung Yu-lan has suggested that Chinese philosophers have been unreceptive to modern science. This suggestion, however, has not been substantiated. This essay is an attempt to provide a justification of Fung＇s assertion through an existential analysis of the Chinese concepts of nature. The essay will examine Chinese existential concerns prevailing in Daoism and Confucianism, and these systems＇ distaste for the type of scientific study which has become prevalent in the modern world. I also intend to defend the claim that the ultimate concern of the Zhuangzi and the Zhongyong is completely contrary to the one that sustains modern science. A brief comparative discussion between Xu Guangqi and Galileo Galilei will be used to support this claim. My discussion will raise the contention that, to have a better understanding of the development of modern science in China, we have to understand the attitude toward religion that has underpinned modern science.     

礼道·礼教·礼治:荀子哲学建构新探

荀子以“礼”为中心,形成偏重于儒家“外王学”的哲学建构。他首先把“礼”提升到“道”的高度,作为人类社会乃至自然界的最高哲学范畴;一方面把“礼”作为道德教化的依据,建立起自己的道德学说;另一方面把“礼”作为社会治理的准则,形成自己的社会政治思想。“礼道—礼教—礼治”,构成了荀子哲学思想的主体。     

Respect and the Confucian concept of Li (ritual propriety)

ABSTRACT

This paper specifically deals with the relation between respect and li禮in the Confucian context. Li has both negative and positive sources. On the positive level, ritual propriety enables one to express internal moral and religious feelings, especially respect, reverence and humility. Furthermore, this work investigates into the relevant feelings and acts of respect and ritual propriety, as well as meaningful critiques of ritual, in an attempt to clarify the genuine expression of ritual propriety that helps to actualize human inner moral and religious approaches.     

Xunzi’s Theory of Ritual Revisited: Reading Ritual as Corporal Technology

This essay offers a new reading of Xunzi’s ritual theory against the backdrop of excavated technical manuals from the Mawangdui and Zhangjiashan collections. While most studies tend to focus on the sociopolitical and moral aspects of Xunzi’s thought, I attempt to demonstrate that in composing his theory of ritual, Xunzi was not only concerned with defending the Confucian tradition against the criticism of his fellow philosophical masters, but was also responding to the emergence of bio-spiritual practices such as meditation, sexual cultivation, and gymnastic exercises. Alarmed by the growing popularity of these individual corporal techniques among the Warring States elite, Xunzi opted to repackage and redefine ritual as a superior technology of the body that would enable humans to transform their bodies and minds and obtain physical and spiritual bounties while at the same time enhancing sociopolitical stability and harmony by creating an organic communal body.     

VIRTUE AS MASTERY IN EARLY CONFUCIANISM

This essay explores the interrelation of skills and virtues. I first trace one line of analysis from Aristotle to Alasdair MacIntyre, which argues that there is a categorical difference between skills and virtues, in their ends and intrinsic character. This familiar distinction is fine in certain respects but still importantly misleading. Virtue in general, and also some particular virtues such as ritual propriety and practical wisdom, are not just exercised in practical contexts, but are in fact partially constituted by the mastery of certain skills. This has implications for moral psychology, specifically how we might understand the acquisition of virtue, as well as its very nature. To try to make this claim plausible I analyze two case studies from early Confucianism: treatment of ritual propriety as a cardinal virtue, and Mencius's less carefully integrated treatment of excellence at moral discernment. I conclude by revisiting the question of the relations between skill and virtue, and exploring a few of the difficulties implied by my account of early Confucian ethics.     

CONCEPTIONS OF SELF/NO-SELF AND MODES OF CONNECTION Comparative Soteriological Structures in Classical Chinese Thought

This essay examines the ways that the terms “self” and “no‐self” can illuminate the views of classical Chinese thinkers, particularly Confucians such as Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, and the Daoist thinker Zhuangzi. In particular, the use of the term “no‐self ” to describe Zhuangzi's position is defended. The concepts of self and no‐self are analyzed in relation to other terms within the thinkers' “concept clusters”—specifically temporality, nature, and social roles—and suggestions are given for constructing typologies that sort out the range of meanings of self and no‐self based on the characteristics of the relations among terms within the concept clusters. The essay focuses on the way that the Confucians and Zhuangzi use concepts of self and no‐self, respectively, as soteriological strategies that aim at making connections with larger systems or wholes, and it concludes that different connections are emphasized by the Confucians and Zhuangzi precisely because the various connections are made possible and sustained by different conceptions of self, temporality, nature, and social roles.     

Sorrow and the Sage: Grief in the Zhuangzi

The Zhuangzi offers two apparently incompatible models of bereavement. Zhuangzi sometimes suggests that the sage will greet loss with unfractured equanimity and even aplomb. However, upon the death of his own wife, Zhuangzi evinces a sorrow that, albeit brief, fits ill with this suggestion. In this essay, I contend that the grief that Zhuangzi displays at his wife’s death better honors wider values averred elsewhere in the text and, more generally, that a sage who retains a capacity for sorrow will be better positioned for the robust joy so often identified as central to the Zhuangzi’s vision of flourishing. The sagely figures who entirely forego sorrow, I argue, achieve equanimity only through a sacrifice of the emotional range and responsiveness necessary not only for grief but also for the delight Zhuangzi recommends.     

《周易·复卦》初爻的诠释进路

儒道释对<周易·复卦>的特殊关注,集中在用复卦初爻"一阳来复"表征的"天地之心"上.复见天地之心即复人之本心的认知模式,鲜明体现了中国文化内在超越的特质,奠定了中国文化发展的基调.从对复卦不断翻新的诠解中,可以看出儒道释三教由差异到会通的过程.儒道释异中之同在都用复的方法论;但各自所推崇的本体内容却有层次上的差异:儒家是复性;道家是复命;佛家是复其真如本源心,此为同之异.     

Principlism,Pragmatism, or Reconstructionist Confucianism? —Some Comments on Ni Peimin’s English Translation of the Analects

This essay provides a few critical points of view on Ni Peimin’s recent English translation of the Analects. It shows that his translations of ren into “human-heartedness” and of li into “ritual propriety” may indicate a willingness to recast these Confucian concepts in the modern ideology of western subjectivism or individualism, whereas Confucianism is not in the direction of such ideologies. Moreover, while Ni seems to offer a “no-rule” view of Confucian virtue ethics, he cannot deny the existence of moral rules and principles in the Confucian system. It is insufficient for him to emphasize the importance of Confucian “instructions” or “methods” as he does without explicating their relations to Confucian rules. Additionally, Ni’s gongfu Confucianism provides a necessary and healthy step back from the contemporary principlism that has been dominant and popular in contemporary politics, ethics, and applied ethics, but Ni goes too far in denying the importance of the moral rules and principles that are implicit or explicit in the Confucian ritual practices and upheld in Confucius’s Analects.     

中国古代儒道思想中的具身认知观

身心合一论是中国古代思想的基本观念。身是以“气”为根基, 并通过“修身-修心”与“修心-修身”可至天人合一的身体。本文选取中国古代思想中最有代表性的儒道两家思想, 融合现象学视角来诠释中国古代儒道思想中的身体观对身体主体性的生动凸显, 以及从“身-心-世界”三者互为交涉的层次上所建构的特有的认知观。随着国内外学者对具身认知观的日益关注, 结合中国古代思想视角开展的具身认知研究可在促进中国心理学发展的同时促进具身认知研究范式的成熟。     

《周易正义》的注疏特色

从形式上来说,唐代的注疏之学,是在南北朝的义疏之学的基础上发展而来的。至唐初孔颖达注疏《周易正义》时,受了南北朝义疏的影响,即以一家之注为底本,兼采诸经、诸家之说。而从内容方面来说,《周易正义》则以儒为宗,兼采老庄之说,并掺杂佛风,同时,重义理而不废象数,是儒家思想主导下儒、释、道三家合流、象数与义理互融的结果,在学术上显示了兼容并包的盛唐气象。     

《周易》刚健美思想对中国书法艺术的影响

<周易>集先秦儒道哲学为一体,建立了以阴阳学说为核心的哲学思想,在中国美学思想史中占有重要地位.围绕着阴阳辩证法,<周易>建构了以刚健美为核心的阴阳审美形态观,刚健所具有的中正、大、神、变化等内涵确立了中国古典美学阳刚之美的主要审美特征,其对天、地、人呼应关系的认识也成为艺术与主体辩证关系的源头.其刚健美的内涵经过后人的阐发渗透到中国书法艺术审美意识中,形成书法艺术中的刚健美风尚、中正美追求、变化美法则.     

Reading Xunzi through Nāmā: Two Ancient Inquiries into the Nature of Names

This essay is a comparison between two ancient theories of language—the 5th century BCE Indian etymologist Yāska and the 4th century BCE Chinese philosopher Xunzi 荀子. Specifically, it is a reading of the theory of “the rectification of names” in Xunzi through the lens of Yāska. Xunzi is known for his view that humanity’s innate tendencies need to be shaped through education and ritual. Similarly, ancient Indian authors like Yāska understand that a person is created, or made, through the performance of Vedic sacrifice. Both thinkers’ constructivist theories of language and meaning proceed from these ritual assumptions. However, Yāska would query Xunzi’s inherent distrust of multiple meanings of words and their negative effects on a functional state. Guided instead by a theory of the transcendence of Vedic language, Yāska would argue that the more one can proliferate possible meanings the more powerful a word becomes.     

Between Good and Evil: Xunzi’s Reinterpretation of the Hegemonic Rule as Decent Governance

This essay investigates Xunzi’s political philosophy of ba dao (Hegemonic Rule). It argues that Xunzi’s practical philosophy of ba dao was developed in the course of resolving the tension between theory and practice latent in Mencius’s account of ba dao. Its central claim is that contra Mencius who remained torn between his ideal political theory of ba dao and the practical utility and moral value of ba dao, Xunzi creatively re-appropriated ba dao as a “morally decent” (if not morally ideal) statecraft, within the parameter of practical Confucian philosophy. After examining the moral and political value of ba dao in both domestic and international governance, the essay concludes by arguing that Xunzi’s defense of ba dao should be understood in the context of what I call “negative Confucianism,” without which the realization of the Confucian moral-political ideal (or positive Confucianism) is impossible.