Sensitivity to reward and risky driving,risky decision making,and risky health behaviour: A literature review

Young driver road safety has persisted as a global problem for decades, despite copious and diverse intervention. Recently the influence in reward sensitivity, which refers to the individual’s personal sensitivity to rewards, has received attention in health-related research, including more generally through decision making in risky circumstances, and in risky driving behaviour specifically. As such, a literature review and synthesis of the literature regarding reward sensitivity in relation to risky driving, risky decision making, and risky health behaviour, with a focus on literature in which adolescents and young adults feature, is timely. Thirty-one papers were identified, and the literature revealed that young drivers with greater reward sensitivity engage in more risky driving behaviours including speeding, crashes and traffic violations; and that individuals with greater reward sensitivity engage in more risky decision making and other risky health-related behaviours (such as drinking and drug use). Adolescents and young adults exhibit heightened sensitivity to rewards in the presence of peers, which has considerable implications for young driver road safety as research consistently demonstrates that carrying peer passengers places all vehicle occupants at greater risk of being involved in a road crash. Consideration of the influence of reward sensitivity in young driver road safety, and other adolescent/young adult health-related safety, appears to be a promising avenue of intervention, with gain-framed messages more likely to be accepted by young drivers with greater reward sensitivity. Future research in jurisdictions other than Australia and Europe will increase our understanding of the influence of reward sensitivity, and exploration of the differential impacts of reward-responsiveness and fun-seeking specifically are warranted.     

The origins and function of the reference point in risky group decision making the case of the Cuban missile crisis

This case study explores reference level effects on group decision making during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The group is composed of American President John F. Kennedy and his advisers. The results are consistent with much experimental evidence showing that reference levels play an important role in determining preferences. The results also extend the notion of reference-dependent risky choice to the group level, where the group consists of seasoned experts who each have a different role to play within the group and who are dealing with an issue of great importance.     

Individual differences in need for cognition and decision making in the Iowa Gambling Task

Differences in decision making between individuals differing in Need for Cognition (NFC) are examined using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Previous work using normative one time decisions suggests that individual low in NFC process gains and losses differently than those high in NFC and are more susceptible to decision biases. The IGT is a popular laboratory task that involves making risky decisions from experience involving both gains and losses. In the first experiment, low NFC participants performed significantly worse than the high NFC participants. A second experiment designed to examine the nature of these differences provides evidence that low NFC participants place more importance on gains as opposed to losses when performing the IGT. Results are discussed in light of previous work suggesting that low NFC participants place more importance on losses in mixed outcome decisions.     

Information distortion in self-other decision making

In both organizational and social arenas, individuals make decisions for themselves and for other individuals. But research in decision making has provided little input into whether or how these decisions are psychologically different. In this paper, I propose that decisions—depending on whom they are for—vary according to the extent of information distortion, such that, individuals who choose for themselves demonstrate more postdecisional distortion, yet less predecisional distortion than individuals who choose on behalf of others. To test this hypothesis, participants in an experiment made a decision between two restaurants. Attributes about each restaurant were presented sequentially, and preferences were measured following each attribute. As expected, participants who chose for themselves experienced more postdecisional distortion. However, among participants who chose on behalf of others, greater distortion of predecisional attribute information was observed. These findings shed light on the differences in self-other decision making, as well as on research concerning information distortion.     

Corporate foreign exchange risk management: A study in decision making under uncertainty

This paper examines the management of foreign exchange risk in multinational corporations in light of the conclusions of previous empirical and theoretical investigations into decision making under uncertainty. Cognitive perceptions of risk and uncertainty are shown to underlie the hedging decisions made by corporate treasury managers, which are often demonstrably sub-optimal in a Bayesian expected utility framework. The findings suggest that simple principal-agent approaches to explaining seemingly sub-optimal corporate risk management preferences are inadequate inasmuch as they fail to account for the markedly different perspectives on risk and uncertainty taken by financial economists (qua economists) and corporate financial risk managers.     

Gambling for Gatorade: risk-sensitive decision making for fluid rewards in humans

Determining how both humans and animals make decisions in risky situations is a central problem in economics, experimental psychology, behavioral economics, and neurobiology. Typically, humans are risk seeking for gains and risk averse for losses, while animals may display a variety of preferences under risk depending on, amongst other factors, internal state. Such differences in behavior may reflect major cognitive and cultural differences or they may reflect differences in the way risk sensitivity is probed in humans and animals. Notably, in most studies humans make one or a few choices amongst hypothetical or real monetary options, while animals make dozens of repeated choices amongst options offering primary rewards like food or drink. To address this issue, we probed risk-sensitive decision making in human participants using a paradigm modeled on animal studies, in which rewards were either small squirts of Gatorade or small amounts of real money. Possible outcomes and their probabilities were not made explicit in either case. We found that individual patterns of decision making were strikingly similar for both juice and for money, both in overall risk preferences and in trial-to-trial effects of reward outcome on choice. Comparison with decisions made by monkeys for juice in a similar task revealed highly similar gambling styles. These results unite known patterns of risk-sensitive decision making in human and nonhuman primates and suggest that factors such as the way a decision is framed or internal state may underlie observed variation in risk preferences between and within species.     

A dual-process approach to health risk decision making: The prototype willingness model

Although dual-process models in cognitive, personality, and social psychology have stimulated a large body of research about analytic and heuristic modes of decision making, these models have seldom been applied to the study of adolescent risk behaviors. In addition, the developmental course of these two kinds of information processing, and their relation to the development of self-regulation are not well understood at this time. The current paper reviews what leading dual-process models have to say about the development of analytic and heuristic decision making, and their implications for adolescent risk behavior. In addition, it reviews research on the prototype willingness model of adolescent decision making—a dual-process model designed specifically to address non-intentional, but volitional adolescent risk behavior. It also discusses the implications of dual-process models for intervention research.     

Focus induced tunnel vision in managerial judgment and decision making: The peril and the antidote

Managers often must assess singular strategic options. Four studies of such assessments demonstrate a tunnel vision effect: Focal managerial options often are favored in an evidentially unjustifiable manner. Study 1 concerns new product development, and demonstrates that a prototype that has become focal tends to be judged overly favorably, and is chosen for launch with unwarranted enthusiasm. Study 2 shows that this tunnel vision effect generalizes to judgments and decisions about general strategy. Study 3 focuses on the information search patterns underlying the effect, and Study 4 replicates the tunnel vision effect among experienced executives, and demonstrates the utility of a debiasing procedure. Data in all of the studies implicate selective processing as the driver of the tunnel vision effect, and further understanding of how selective processing affects choice. Several alternative operationalizations of the empirically tested debiasing procedure are discussed.     

Peer influence on risk taking, risk preference, and risky decision making in adolescence and adulthood: an experimental study

In this study, 306 individuals in 3 age groups--adolescents (13-16), youths (18-22), and adults (24 and older)--completed 2 questionnaire measures assessing risk preference and risky decision making, and 1 behavioral task measuring risk taking. Participants in each age group were randomly assigned to complete the measures either alone or with 2 same-aged peers. Analyses indicated that (a) risk taking and risky decision making decreased with age; (b) participants took more risks, focused more on the benefits than the costs of risky behavior, and made riskier decisions when in peer groups than alone; and (c) peer effects on risk taking and risky decision making were stronger among adolescents and youths than adults. These findings support the idea that adolescents are more inclined toward risky behavior and risky decision making than are adults and that peer influence plays an important role in explaining risky behavior during adolescence.     

Who’s bringing the donuts: The role of affective patterns in group decision making

Two studies examined how intragroup affective patterns influence groups’ pervasive tendency to ignore the unique expertise of their members. Using a hidden profile task, Study 1 provided evidence that groups with at least one member experiencing positive affect shared more unique information than groups composed entirely of members experiencing neutral affect. This occurred because group members experiencing positive affect were more likely to initiate unique information sharing, as well as information seeking. Study 2 built upon this base by showing that confidence mediates the relationship between positive affect and the initiation of unique information sharing. Additionally, Study 2 investigated the role of negative affect in group decision making and how negative and positive affect concurrently influence decision making when groups are composed of members experiencing each. The results are discussed in terms of the role affect plays in influencing group behavior and the resultant importance of investigating specific affective patterns.     

The roles of planning,learning, and mental models in repeated dynamic decision making

Repeated search and decision making is a common consumer activity that should benefit from advanced planning. In three simulated shopping experiments, we find that people often fail to plan spontaneously or, when they do plan, do not use an appropriate mental model of the search problem. We also manipulate the mental models used by subjects and find that while our manipulation successfully encourages the development of appropriate mental models and improves performance when search costs are low, it does not result in the type of sophisticated mental model required to change strategies based on increased search costs. Finally, we show that the benefits of planning generalize to real world shopping behavior in a field experiment.     

Productive conflict in group decision making: genuine and contrived dissent as strategies to counteract biased information seeking

Decision-making groups in organizations are often expected to function as a “think tank” and to perform “reality testing” to detect the best alternative. A biased search for information supporting the group's favored alternative impairs a group's ability to fulfill these requirements. In a two-factorial experiment with 201 employees and managers from various economic and public organizations, genuine and contrived dissent were investigated as counterstrategies to biased information seeking. Genuine dissent was manipulated by forming three-person groups whose members either all favored the same alternative individually (homogeneous groups) or consisted of a minority and a majority faction with regard to their favored alternative (heterogeneous groups). Contrived dissent was varied by the use or nonuse of the “devil's advocacy” technique. The results demonstrate that heterogeneity was more effective in preventing a confirmatory information-seeking bias than devil's advocacy was. Confidence was identified as an important mediator. Implications for the design of interventions aimed at facilitating reality testing in group decision making are discussed.     

Common and distinct factors in decision making under ambiguity and risk: A psychometric study of individual differences

The relation between decision making under ambiguity and risky decision making was examined. In Studies 1 and 2, choices under ambiguity were measured for a large sample receiving an Ellsberg-type Ambiguity-Probability Tradeoff Task. Participants with extreme scores were recruited for Part 2 of each study which consisted of a risky decision making task (Study 1) or a series of decisions under ambiguity in “real life” scenarios (Study 2). Despite a time gap of up to 2 months, individual differences in scores on Part 1 predicted scores on Part 2. In Study 3 participants received in a single session several risky decision making tasks, several measures of decision making under ambiguity, and several personality scales related to uncertainty and decision making style. Taken together, the findings support the existence of a stable dispositional trait to reduce uncertainty in decision making but also task-specific differences related to gains and losses.     

Utilizing probabilities as decision weights in closed and open information boards: A comparison of children and adults

Decisions in preschoolers (6 years), elementary schoolers (9.7 years), and adults (21 years) were studied with an information board crossing three probabilistic cues (validities: .83, .67, .50) with two options. Experiment 1 (n = 215) applied a standard version of the information board (closed presentation format), in which information must be searched sequentially and kept in mind for the decision. Experiment 2 (n = 217) applied an open format (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008), in which all information was visible during decision making. Elementary schoolers but not preschoolers benefited from an open format — indicated by an increase in using probabilities as decision weights. In the open but not closed format, choices were biased by normatively irrelevant information (the lure). Variations in the prediction patterns of the cues influenced decisions in all age groups. Effects for presentation format, pattern, and lure jointly indicate that even children are capable of considering multiple information in their decisions.     

Effectiveness of the GOFER course in decision making for high school students

The paper describes and evaluates the GOFER course in decision making for high school students (Mann, Harmoni and Power, 1988). The course was based on principles from the conflict theory of decision making (Janis and Mann, 1977) and was designed to provide adolescents with an understanding of factors that produce good and poor decision making as well as knowledge and practice of sound decision skills. Two evaluation studies were conducted to examine effectiveness of the course. Study 1 was conducted with young adolescents (12 year olds). It found a significant difference between students trained in the course and a control group on measures of self-esteem as a decision maker, self reported decision habits and knowledge of decision strategy. Study 2 was conducted with mid-adolescents (15 year olds). It, too, found a significant difference between students who took the course and a control group on measures of self esteem as a decision maker and self-reported decision habits. It is concluded that while the evaluation study fell short of an ideal test, the GOFER course met the criteria of improving student knowledge, raising confidence in decision making and changing self reported decision habits.     

行为决策中的描述–经验差距:信息加工角度的解释

选项信息获取过程会影响决策,描述–经验差距简称D-E差距,是指个体进行决策时根据概括性描述信息得到的结果与依据序列体验信息的经验得到的结果之间的差异。文章以认知因素在决策范式演进过程中的角色为线索,梳理了D-E差距的提出及最新的研究发现。参考决策认知过程框架从信息加工角度探讨D-E差距影响因素,从整体上解释D-E差距的原因。未来需要从全面对比两种决策范式,改进经验决策研究方法等角度进行深入探讨。     

Selective exposure and decision framing: The impact of gain and loss framing on confirmatory information search after decisions

When people make decisions, they often prefer to receive information that supports rather than conflicts with their decision. To date, this effect has mainly been investigated in the context of decisions about gains, whereas decisions about losses have received less attention. Based on Prospect Theory, we expected information search to be differently affected by whether people previously have decided about gains or losses. Three studies have revealed that selectivity of information search is stronger after gain-framed rather than after loss-framed decision problems. An investigation of the underlying psychological processes revealed that gain decisions are made with increased subjective decision certainty (i.e. they are easier and less effortful to make), which in turn systematically increases confirmatory information search.     

Decision by sampling: The role of the decision environment in risky choice

Decision by sampling (DbS) is a theory about how our environment shapes the decisions that we make. Here, I review the application of DbS to risky decision making. According to classical theories of risky decision making, people make stable transformations between outcomes and probabilities and their subjective counterparts using fixed psychoeconomic functions. DbS offers a quite different account. In DbS, the subjective value of an outcome or probability is derived from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons with a sample of other outcomes or probabilities from the decision environment. In this way, the distribution of attribute values in the environment determines the subjective valuations of outcomes and probabilities. I show how DbS interacts with the real-world distributions of gains, losses, and probabilities to produce the classical psychoeconomic functions. I extend DbS to account for preferences in benchmark data sets. Finally, in a challenge to the classical notion of stable subjective valuations, I review evidence that manipulating the distribution of attribute values in the environment changes our subjective valuations just as DbS predicts.     

Fishing for the right words: decision rules for human foraging behavior in internal search tasks

Animals depleting one patch of resources must decide when to leave and switch to a fresh patch. Foraging theory has predicted various decision mechanisms; which is best depends on environmental variation in patch quality. Previously we tested whether these mechanisms underlie human decision making when foraging for external resources; here we test whether humans behave similarly in a cognitive task seeking internally generated solutions. Subjects searched for meaningful words made from random letter sequences, and as their success rate declined, they could opt to switch to a fresh sequence. As in the external foraging context, time since the previous success and the interval preceding it had a major influence on when subjects switched. Subjects also used the commonness of sequence letters as a proximal cue to patch quality that influenced when to switch. Contrary to optimality predictions, switching decisions were independent of whether sequences differed little or widely in quality.