Syntactic class influences phonological priming of tip-of-the-tongue resolution

During tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) experiences, phonologically related words have both facilitated and impeded word retrieval. In the present experiment, we examined whether phonologically related words’ syntactic class (part of speech) is responsible for these differential effects. Sixty college students saw general knowledge questions whose answers were designated target words and responded “know,” “don’t know,” or “TOT.” Following “TOT” and “don’t know” responses, the participants saw five words, one of which was a prime. The primes contained the target’s first syllable and either shared or did not share the target’s part of speech. Following presentation of the primes, retrieval of the target was attempted again. Different-part-of-speech primes facilitated resolution of TOT states, whereas same-part-of-speech primes had no effect, relative to phonologically unrelated words. These results support node structure theory’s most-primed-wins principle and the transmission deficit model account of TOT states and detail the importance of syntactic class in the selection of words that are candidates for speech production.     

Assertion,Moore, and Bayes

It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside, it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.

Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations

Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as “S ought to believe that p”, or “S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p”. However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons that make it desirable to believe that p whether or not p is true. I argue however that there is a different problem, one that becomes clearer in light of this solution to the first problem. Someone’s approval of our beliefs is at least often a non-evidential reason to believe, and as such cannot change our beliefs. Ought judgments aim to change the world. But ‘ought to believe’ judgments can’t do that by changing the belief, if they don’t give evidence. So I argue that we should instead regard epistemic ought judgments as aimed mainly at influencing assertions that express the belief and other actions based on the belief, in accord with recent philosophical claims that we have epistemic norms for assertion and action.     

The Real-Time Processing of Sluiced Sentences

Ellipsis refers to an element that is absent from the input but whose meaning can nonetheless be recovered from context. In this cross-modal priming study, we examined the online processing of Sluicing, an ellipsis whose antecedent is an entire clause: The handyman threw a book to the programmer but I don’t know which book the handyman threw to the programmer_ellipsis. To understand such an elliptical construction, the listener arguably must ‘fill in’ the missing material (“the handyman threw___ to the programmer”) based on that which occurs in the antecedent clause. We aimed to determine the point in time in which reconstruction of the sluiced sentence is attempted and whether such a complex antecedent is re-accessed by the ellipsis. Out of the two antecedent constituents for which we probed, only the Object (programmer) was found active in the elliptical clause, confirming that an antecedent is attributed to the sluice in real time. Possible reasons for the non-observation of the Subject (handyman) are considered. We also suggest that ellipses are detected earlier in coordinated than subordinated sentences.     

Defending the piggyback principle against Shapiro and Sober’s empirical approach

Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that non-reductive physicalism is incompatible with mental causation. This influential argument can be seen as relying on the following principle, which I call “the piggyback principle”: If, with respect to an effect, E, an instance of a supervenient property, A, has no causal powers over and above, or in addition to, those had by its supervenience base, B, then the instance of A does not cause E (unless A is identical with B). In their “Epiphenomenalism: The Dos and the Don’ts,” Larry Shapiro and Elliott Sober employ a novel empirical approach to challenge the piggyback principle. Their empirical approach pulls from the experiments of August Weismann regarding the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Through an examination of Weismann’s experiments, Shapiro and Sober extract lessons in reasoning about the epiphenomenalism of a property. And according to these empirically drawn lessons, the piggyback principle is a don’t. My primary aim in this paper is to defend the piggyback principle against Shapiro and Sober’s empirical approach.     

A. F. Losevs personalistische ontologie

A. F. Losev, one of the most important Russian philosophers and historians of ancient aesthetics and culture in the 20th century, develops in his ‘Dialectics of the Myth’ (Dialektika mifa), 1930, a personalistic ontology by using elements of neoplatonic philosophy and Orthodox Christian belief. According to Losev reality in all its different expressions and ontological strata must be understood as “mythical”, i.e. as “living mutual exchange of subject and object”. The subjective and personal aspect of reality is not grounded in man’s epistemic relation to it alone; reality in itself has to be characterized as personal and subjective. The main philosophical opponent is Descartes, the founder of “modern rationalism and mechanism”.

     

Lexical competition and phonological encoding in young and older speakers

The influence of age on word retrieval was investigated with a speeded picture naming study. Five hundred forty-one pictures were presented to young and older adults, and the influence of name agreement and name frequency was analyzed by multiple regression. The results showed that both name agreement and name frequency are significant predictors of picture naming performance in young and older adults. The results also suggest that older adults are more strongly influenced by name agreement than are young adults. These results indicate that competition during lexical selection may be a particularly age-sensitive stage in language production.     

Why are names of people associated with so many phonological retrieval failures?

Two experiments are reported that revisit the issue of why people’s names are more difficult to recall than common names such as the names of objects. In Experiment 1, retrieval of the names of a set of object pictures was compared with recall of a set of names of famous faces. The object and face sets were matched for preexperimental familiarity. The results showed significantly more tip-of-the tongue (TOT) states and significantly poorer name recall for faces than for objects. Although the overall numbers of incorrect answers for the two sets of items did not differ, the incorrect answers in the face condition were mostly “don’t know” responses, whereas incorrect answers for objects were mostly alternative names. In Experiment 2, written definitions were used instead of pictures, and target items were selected so as to keep the number of alternatives to a minimum. Under these circumstances, there were no differences in either the number of items correctly named or the number of TOTs for common and people’s names. These findings are consistent with the views of Brédart (Memory, 1, 351–366, 1993), who argued that there are fewer documented TOTs for common names because a semantically related alternative often comes to mind when a participant is experiencing, or is about to experience, a retrieval failure.     

What Do Women Want? A New View of Women’s Sexual Problems

Recent attempts to medicalize women’s sexual “dysfunction” are critiqued and a “New View” of women’s sexual problems is introduced. The author argues for a female-centered perspective on women’s sexual desires and problems, based on a review of the literature on women’s sexuality and her observations of young women’s sexual experiences from 25 years of teaching Human Sexuality to undergraduate women. The review suggests that a pill or a patch cannot adequately address the sexual problems commonly experienced by US women.     

Differential incidence of procrastination between blue and white-collar workers

The present study compared chronic procrastination tendencies claimed by “whitecollar” working adults (n = 141) with rates reported by Harriott and Ferrari ( 1996) of “blue-collar” working adults (n - 211). Participants completed reliable and valid measures of everyday procrastination tendencies (decisional, arousal, and avoidant), and socio-demographic items at one of several public forums. Results showed no significant difference between classes of working adults on age, gender, marital status, or the number of children, although “white-collar” workers claimed higher levels of education than “blue-collar” workers. “White-collar” workers also reported significantly higher scores on all three forms of chronic procrastination than “blue-collar” workers. It seems that professional employees report procrastination more frequently than unskilled workers. Further research is needed to explore the causes and consequences associated with differences in chronic procrastination by occupational group.     

Differential incidence of procrastination between blue and white-collar workers

The present study compared chronic procrastination tendencies claimed by “whitecollar” working adults (n = 141) with rates reported by Harriott and Ferrari ( 1996) of “blue-collar” working adults (n - 211). Participants completed reliable and valid measures of everyday procrastination tendencies (decisional, arousal, and avoidant), and socio-demographic items at one of several public forums. Results showed no significant difference between classes of working adults on age, gender, marital status, or the number of children, although “white-collar” workers claimed higher levels of education than “blue-collar” workers. “White-collar” workers also reported significantly higher scores on all three forms of chronic procrastination than “blue-collar” workers. It seems that professional employees report procrastination more frequently than unskilled workers. Further research is needed to explore the causes and consequences associated with differences in chronic procrastination by occupational group.     

How is God-talk logically possible? A sketch for an argument on the logic of ‘God’

In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term ‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory. The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes.     

“Measuring up to Measure” Dysmorphophobia as a Language Game

We look into the transformation of meanings in psychotherapy and suggest a clinical application for Wittgenstein’s intuitions concerning the role of linguistic practices in generating significance. In post-modern theory, therapy does not necessarily change reality as much as it does our way of experiencing it by intervening in the linguistic-representational rules responsible for constructing the text which expresses the problem. Since “states of mind assume the truths and forms of the language devices that we use to represent them” (Foucault, 1963, p. 57), therapy may be intended as a narrative path toward a new naming of one’s reified experiences. The clinical problem we consider here, the pervasive feeling of inadequacy due to one’s excessive height (dysmorphophobia), is an excellent example of “language game” by which a “perspicuous representation” (the “therapy” proposed by Wittgenstein in the 1953) may bring out alternatives to linguistically-built “traps”, putting the blocked semiotic mechanism back into motion.     

Propositional Names

I propose that an adequate name for a proposition will be (1) rigid, in Kripke’s sense of referring to the same thing in every world in which it exists, and (2) transparent, which means that it would be possible, if one knows the name, to know which object the name refers. I then argue that the Standard Way of naming propositions—prefixing the word ‘that’ to a declarative sentence—does not allow for transparent names of every proposition, and that no alternative naming convention does better. I explore the implications of this failure for deflationism about truth, arguing that any theory that requires the T biconditional to be a priori cannot succeed.     

Psychophysiological components of imagery

McGuigan’s neuromuscular model of information processing (1978a, 1978b, and 1989) was investigated by electrically recording eye movements (electro-oculograms), covert lip and preferred arm responses (electromyograms), and electroencephalograms. This model predicts that codes are generated as the lips are uniquely activated when processing words beginning with bilabial sounds like “p” or “b,” as is the right arm to words like “pencil” that refer to its use. Twelve adult female participants selected for their high imagery ratings were asked to form images to three orally presented linguistic stimuli: the letter “p,” the words “pencil” and “pasture,” and to a control stimulus, the words “go blank.” The following findings were significant beyond the 0.05 level: an increased covert lip response only to the letter “p,” increased vertical eye activity to “p” and to the word “pencil,” right arm response only to the word “pencil,” and a decreased percentage of alpha waves from the right 02 lead only to the word “pasture.” Since these covert responses uniquely occurred during specific imagery processes, it is inferred that they are components of neuromuscular circuits that function in accord with the model of information processing tested.     

"浩然之气"的创生性与先天性——从冯友兰先生《孟子浩然之气章解》谈起

Feng Youlan emphasizes the concept of “creativity” in his article “Explanation of Mencius’ Chapter on Strong, Moving Vital Force”, in particular highlighting the problem whether the “strong, moving vital force” is “innate” or “acquired”. Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi believed the “strong, moving vital force” was endowed by Heaven, so was therefore innate; “nourishment” cleared fog and allowed one to “recover one’s original nature”. Mencius’ theory on “the good of human nature” is illustrated in the concept of integrated “original endowment”. So Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi’s theory of “recovering the original nature” proposed that the “strong, moving vital force” was innate, which is in complete agreement with Mencius and of which there is ample evidence in Mencius. However, “nature” is “created by the accumulation of righteousness”. Namely, it is the completion and presentation of the process of creation and transformation of human beings. Only when we consider both Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi’s theory and Feng Youlan’s theory can we fully understand Mencius’ theory of “the nourishment of the strong, moving vital force”, which is of great theoretical and academic value in accurately understanding Mencius and the Confucian theory of mind-nature. Translated by Lei Yongqiang from Shehui kexue zhanxian 社会科学战线 (Social Science Front), 2007, (5):12–16     

列维纳斯面对康德、黑格尔、海德格尔——当代哲学关于"存在论"的争论

Levinas subverts the traditional “ontology-epistemology,” and creates a “realm of difference,” the realm of “value,” “ethic,” and “religion,” maintaining that ethics is real metaphysics. According to him, it is not that “being” contains the “other” but the other way round. In this way, the issues of ethics are promoted greatly in the realm of philosophy. Nonetheless, he does not intend to deny “ontology” completely, but reversed the relationship between “ontology (theory of truth)” and “ethics (axiology),” placing the former under the “constraint” of the latter. Different from general empirical science, philosophy focuses more on issues irrelevant to ordinary empirical objects; it does have “objects,” though. More often than not, the issues of philosophy cannot be conceptualized into “propositions”; nevertheless, it absolutely has its “theme.” As a discipline, philosophy continuously takes “being” as its “theme” and “object” of thinking. The point is that this “being” should not be understood as an “object” completely. Rather, it is still a “theme-subject.” In addition to an “object,” “being” also manifests itself in an “attribute” and a kind of “meaning” as well. In a word, it is the temporal, historical, and free “being” rather than “various beings” that is the “theme-subject” of philosophy. Translated by Zhang Lin from Wen Shi Zhe 文史哲 (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), 2007, (1): 61–70     

Proper function and defeating experiences

Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that what he terms “doxastic” theories of epistemic justification fail to account for certain epistemic features having to do with evidence. I’m going to give an argument roughly along these lines, but I’m going to focus specifically on proper function theories of justification or warrant. In particular, I’ll focus on Michael Bergmann’s recent proper function account of justification, though the argument applies also to Alvin Plantinga’s proper function account of warrant. The epistemic features I’m concerned about are experiences that should generate a believed defeater but don’t. I’ll argue that proper functionalism as it stands cannot account for the epistemic effects of these defeating experiences—or, at least, that it can only do so by embracing a deeply implausible view of our cognitive faculties. I’ll conclude by arguing that the only plausible option Bergmann has for modifying his theory undercuts the consideration that motivates proper functionalism in the first place.     

Humility and constraints on <Emphasis Type="Italic">O</Emphasis>-language

In “Ramseyan Humility,” David Lewis argues that we cannot know what the fundamental properties in our world are. His arguments invoke the possibility of permutations and replacements of fundamental properties. Most responses focus on Lewis’s view on the relationship between properties and roles, and on the assumptions about knowledge that he makes. I argue that no matter how the debates about knowledge and about the metaphysics of properties turn out, Lewis’s arguments are unconvincing since they rely on a highly implausible assumption about the expressive power of our language.