Does the Argument from Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim

By quantifying over properties we cannot create new properties any more than by quantifying over individuals we can create new individuals. Someone murdered Jones, and the murderer is either Smith or Jones or Wang. That “someone,” who murdered Jones, is not a person in addition to Smith, Jones, and Wang, and it would be absurd to posit a disjunctive person, Smith‐or‐Jones‐or‐Wang, with whom to identify the murderer. The same goes for second‐order properties and their realizers. (Kim 1997a, 201)     

The logic of ability,freedom and responsibility

The aim of this paper is to offer a rigorous explication of statements ascribing ability to agents and to develop the logic of such statements. A world is said to be feasible iff it is compatible with the actual past-and-present. W is a P-world iff W is feasible and P is true in W (where P is a proposition). P is a sufficient condition for Q iff every P world is a Q world. P is a necessary condition for Q iff Q is a sufficient condition forP. Each individual property S is shown to generate a rule for an agent X. X heeds S iff X makes all his future choices in accordance with S. (Note that X may heed S and yet fail to have it). S is a P-strategy for X iff X's heeding S together with P is a necessary and sufficient condition for X to have S. (P-strategies are thus rules which X is able to implement on the proviso P).Provisional opportunity: X has the opportunity to A provided P iff there is an S such that S is a P-strategy for X and X's implementing S is a sufficient condition for X's doing A. P is etiologically complete iff for every event E which P reports P also reports an etiological ancestry of E, and P is true. Categorical opportunity: X has the opportunity to A iff there is a P such that P is etiologically complete and X has the opportunity to A provided P. For X to have the ability to A there must not only be an appropriate strategy, but X must have a command of that strategy. X steadfastly intends A iff X intends A at every future moment at which his doing A is not yet inevitable. X has a command of S w.r.t. A and P iff X's steadfastly intending A together with P is a sufficient condition for X to implement S. Provisional ability: X can A provided P iff there is an S such that S is a P-strategy for X, X's implementing S is a sufficient condition for X's doing A, and X has a command of S w.r.t. A and P. Categorical ability: X can A iff there is a P such that P is etiologically complete and X can A provided P. X is free w.r.t. to A iff X can A and X can non- A. X is free iff there is an A such that X is free w.r.t. A.     

Vodou and Haiti: A Conference on Haitian Vodou,Mission Statement of a New Association: The Congress of Santa Barbara

J oseph Smith, Jr claimed to have seen an angel in the autumn of 1823, and to have learned from that angel of the Book of Mormon. He further claimed that the da y after his vision he found the Book of Mormon plates. An analysis of Smith's vision narratives-the earliest of which dates to 1832-shows that such claims were anachronistic. Smith could not have found the plates that year. Possibly Smith invented the vision in order to gain status in his family; more probably, however, there was a vision (hallucination) which Smith interpreted differently as time passed and he saw its significance for his career as prophet and ' translator'.     

Hyperplane arrangements in preference modeling

A standard representation of a family B of partial orders on a given finite set X is as a set of vertices of a cube. The metric and order structures on B inherited from the cube are often used in applications. In this paper, following Stanley [(1996). Hyperplane arrangements, interval orders, and trees. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 93, 2620-2625], we represent relations in B by regions and cells of a hyperplane arrangement arising from numerical representations of the partial orders in B. To illustrate this approach, we establish wellgradedness of some families of generalized semiorders. Although the families of linear and weak orders are not well graded, our approach allows the recasting of such concepts as well graded families of sets.     

Signed Orders, Choice Probabilities, and Linear Polytopes

Self-reflecting signed orders were proposed as an aid in estimating preference between subsets of items on the basis of limited information. The data of a signed order are preference comparisons that consider the desirability of excluding items from a subset as well as including items in a subset. This paper investigates signed orders within the setting of probabilistic choice and random utility theory. It focuses on linear signed order polytopes and their relationship to binary choice probabilities. The theory applies both to individual choice behavior and to group decision making. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.     

Local measures of association: Estimating the derivative of the regression line

A local measure of association that allows both heteroscedasticity and a non‐linear association was developed during the 1990s. The basic goal is to measure the strength of the association between X and Y, given X, when Y=θ(X)+τ(X)ε for some unknown functions θ(X) and τ(X). Application of this method requires the estimation of the derivative of θ(X). The focus in this paper is on four alternatives to a very slight modification of the method used by Doksum et al. when estimating this derivative. The main result is that in simulations, a certain robust analogue of their method dominates in terms of mean squared error, even under normality. The bias of the method is found to be small but a little larger than the bias associated with the method used by Doksum et al. The method is based in part on bootstrap bagging followed by a lowess smooth.     

Autonomy,free speech and automatic behaviour

One of the strongest defences of free speech holds that autonomy requires the protection of speech. In this paper I examine five conditions that autonomy must satisfy. I survey recent research in social psychology regarding automatic behaviour, and a challenge to autonomy is articulated. I argue that a plausible strategy for neutralising some of the autonomy-threatening automatic responses consists in avoiding the exposure to the environmental features that trigger them. If this is so, we can good autonomy-based pro tanto reasons for controlling exposure to certain forms of speech. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented in the 2005 Warwick Graduate Conference in Political theory, the 2005 ALSP Conference at the University of Strathclyde, and the Discussion Group of Political Theory at Warwick University. I am grateful for the many comments received on those occasions, especially to Peter Jones, Graham Long, Glen Newey, Fabienne Peter, Jonathan Seglow and Will Smith. Two anonymous referees for Res Publica gave me helpful comments that benefited the argument defended here. Especial thanks are due to Matthew Clayton and Susan Hurley who provided me with detailed written comments and fruitful discussion.     

Kant,the Third Antinomy and Transcendental Arguments

In this paper, I consider whether a reading of Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy can offer material for devising a new model of transcendental argument. The problem that this form of argument is meant to address is an antinomy between two apparently contradictory claims, q and ¬q, where we seem equally justified in holding both. The model has the following form: p; q is a necessary condition of p; the only justification we have for q is that it is a necessary condition of p; p is justified only in domain X (where X is a domain of objects of cognition); therefore, q is justified only in domain X. Because the argument shows that our justification for q is valid only in X, it also establishes that there is conceptual space to hold ¬q outside of X.     

Self-reflecting in developmental context: variations in level and patterning during the first 2 university years

Self-reflection, typically operationalized in scales of egocentrism and introspectiveness, is portrayed as problematic in much of the literature on adolescents. Self-reflection has been linked to dysfunctional self-consciousness, symptomatology, and risk behaviors. Yet, self-reflection also is seen as essential for adolescent development, particularly with respect to individuation and identity. In this exploratory study, the authors focused on the process of self-reflecting. From interviews with 10 students conducted over the first 2 university years, the authors longitudinally assessed and then evaluated self-reflecting patterns in relationship to a narrative analysis of developmental change. Students who showed evidence of developmental change or sustained engagement in developmental work over the study period devoted a higher percentage of their interview conversation to self-reflecting content. Differences in self-reflecting patterning over time among the students who showed developmental change further suggest linkages between self-reflecting and development. The authors discuss implications for the conceptualization of self-reflecting in relationship to development and for the reinterpretation of previous studies.     

Correlations between rats' spatial location and intracranial stimulation administration affects rate of acquisition and asymptotic level of time allocation preference in the open field

The present experiment explores the effects of the response (1-sec occupancy of a target area in an open field)-reinforcer (intracranial stimulation) contingency on time allocation in the open field in rats. The probability of reinforcement given response (X) and the probability of reinforcement given nonresponse (Y) were varied randomly across sessions within a subject. The 21 contingency treatments explored included all possible combinations of values (0, .1, .2, .3, .4, .5) of X and Y such that X ≥ Y. The results indicate that rate of acquisition and asymptotic level of time allocation preference to the target area are negatively related to the value of Y (for any given value of X). Variations in X (for any given value of Y) were less effective. Evaluation of proposed contingency metrics revealed that the Weber fraction (X − Y)/X most closely approximates performance, and that the value of the difference detection threshold derived from the Weber fraction is a constant.     

The duplication of love's reasons

If X loves Y does it follow that X has reasons to love a physiologically exact replacement for Y? Can love's reasons be duplicated? One response to the problem is to suggest that X lacks reasons for loving such a duplicate because the reason-conferring properties of Y cannot be fully duplicated. But a concern, played upon by Derek Parfit, is that this response may result from a failure to take account of the psychological pressures of an actual duplication scenario. In the face of the actual loss of a loved one and the subsequent appearance of a duplicate, how could we resist the inclination to love? Drawing upon duplication scenarios from Parfit and from Stanislaw Lem's Solaris, this paper will argue that there could be reasons for X to come to love a duplicate of Y but that these would not be identical with the reasons that X had (and may still have) to love Y. Nor (in the case of an agent with a normal causal history) could they be reasons for a love that violates the requirement that love is a response to a relationship and therefore takes time to emerge.     

The psychological side of Hempel’s paradox of confirmation

People often test hypotheses about two variables (X andY), each with two levels (e.g.,X1 andX2). When testing “IfX1, thenY1,” observing the conjunction ofX1 andY1 is overwhelmingly perceived as more supportive than observing the conjunction ofX2 andY2, although both observations support the hypothesis. Normatively, theX2&Y2 observation provides stronger support than theX1&Y1 observation if the former is rarer. Because participants in laboratory settings typically test hypotheses they are unfamiliar with, previous research has not examined whether participants are sensitive to the rarity of observations. The experiment reported here showed that participants were sensitive to rarity, even judging a rareX2&Y2 observation more supportive than a commonX1&Y1 observation under certain conditions. Furthermore, participants’ default strategy of judgingX1&Y1 observations more informative might be generally adaptive because hypotheses usually regard rare events.     

Trichotomous preferences for gambles

Let G_X be the set of all gambles on a set X of decision outcomes. Trichotomous preferences divide G_X into three disjoint subsets, viz., the set P⁺ of preferable gambles, the set P⁰ of indifferent gambles, and the set P^- of unpreferable gambles. Those preference comparisons are made against the status quo, i.e., the do-nothing alternative. This paper presents and discusses dyadic representations of such trichotomous preferences and identifies necessary and sufficient axioms for the existence of those representations.     

On the asymptotic distribution of Pearson’s X 2 in cross-validation samples

In categorical data analysis, two-sample cross-validation is used not only for model selection but also to obtain a realistic impression of the overall predictive effectiveness of the model. The latter is of particular importance in the case of highly parametrized models capable of capturing every idiosyncracy of the calibrating sample. We show that for maximum likelihood estimators or other asymptotically efficient estimators Pearson's X ² is not asymptotically chi-square in the two-sample cross-validation framework due to extra variability induced by using different samples for estimation and goodness-of-fit testing. We propose an alternative test statistic, X _xval ², obtained as a modification of X ² which is asymptotically chi-square with C−1 degrees of freedom in cross-validation samples. Stochastically, X _xval ² ≤ X ². Furthermore, the use of X ² instead of X _xval ² with a χ _C −1² reference distribution may provide an unduly poor impression of fit of the model in the cross-validation sample. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Michael V. Levine. Requests for reprints should be sent to Albert Maydeu-Olivares, Faculty of Psychology, University of Barcelona, P. Valle de Hebrón, 171, 0835 Barcelona, Spain.     

Indeterminism, Explanation, and Luck

I first adumbrate pertinent aspectsof Robert Kane's libertarian theory of free choice oraction and an objection of luck that has been levelledagainst the theory. I then consider Kane's recentresponses to this objection. To meet these responses,I argue that the view that undetermined choices (ofthe sort implied by Kane's theory) are a matter ofluck is associated with a view about actionexplanation, to wit: when Jones does A and hisdoing of A is undetermined, and when hiscounterpart, Jones*, in the nearest possibleworld in which the past and the laws are held constantuntil the moment of choice does B instead, thereis no explanation (deterministic or indeterministic)of the difference in outcome – Jones's A-ing butJones*'s B-ing – in terms of prior reasonsor motives of either agent. Absence of such anexplanation is one crucial factor that underliesthe charge that Jones's A-ing and Jones*'sB-ing are matters of luck. I argue that thissort of luck is incompatible with responsibility.     

More than,less than,or minimum,maximum: how upper and lower bounds determine subjective interval estimates

Uncertain quantities can be described by single‐point estimates of lower interval bounds (X₁), upper interval bounds (X₂), two‐bound estimates (separate estimates of X₁ and X₂), and by ranges (X₁?X₂). A price estimation task showed that single‐bound estimates phrased as “T costs more than X₁” and “T costs less than X₂,” yielded much larger intervals than “minimum X₁” and “maximum X₂.” This difference can be attributed to exclusive interpretations of X₁ and X₂ in the first case (X₁ and X₂ are unlikely values), and inclusive interpretations in the second (X₁ and X₂ are likely values). This pattern of results was replicated in other domains where participants estimated single targets. When they estimated a distribution of targets, the pattern was reversed. “Minimum” and “maximum” values of variable quantities (e.g., flight prices) were found to delimit larger intervals than “more than” and “less than” estimates. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the correlation of a naturally and an artificially dichotomized variable

A method is suggested for estimating the correlation of a naturally (X) and an artificially (Y) dichotomized variable. It is assumed that a normal random variable (L) underlies the artificially dichotomized variable. The proposed correlation coefficient recovers the product moment correlation coefficient between X and L from a fourfold table of X and Y. The suggested correlation coefficient ν is contrasted with the phi correlation and the biserial η. The biserial η was proposed by Karl Pearson and is conceptually related to the new correlation coefficient. However, in addition, Pearson's biserial η invokes the assumption that the marginal distribution of L is normal, which contradicts its basic assumptions and thus does not recover the true correlation of L and X. Finally, an approximation is provided to simplify the calculation of ν and its standard error.     

Making sense of Smith on sympathy and approbation: other-oriented sympathy as a psychological and normative achievement

ABSTRACT

Two problems seem to plague Adam Smith’s account of sympathy and approbation in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). First, Smith’s account of sympathy at the beginning of TMS appears to be inconsistent with the account of sympathy at the end of TMS. In particular, it seems that Smith did not appreciate the distinction between ‘self-oriented sympathy’ and ‘other-oriented sympathy’, that is, between imagining being oneself in the actor’s situation and imagining being the actor in the actor’s situation. Second, Smith’s account of approbation, according to which a sentiment of approval arises when there is recognition of concordance between the spectator’s sympathetic passion and the actor’s original passion, seems to face the following problem: since the spectator attains both his own sympathetic passion and the actor’s original passion by sympathizing with the actor, the sympathetic passion of the spectator and the original passion of the actor will necessarily be identical. Therefore, Smith’s account of approbation requires that the spectator utilize both self-oriented and other-oriented sympathy (‘the double-sympathy model of approbation’). I offer a novel developmental account of sympathy in TMS that renders Smith’s account of sympathy consistent and allows for the utilization of the double-sympathy model of approbation.     

Beyond sympathy: Smith’s rejection of Hume’s moral theory

Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) has long been recognized as importantly influenced by, and in part responding to, David Hume’s earlier ethical theory. With regard to Smith’s account of the foundations of morals in particular, recent scholarly attention has focused on Smith’s differences with Hume over the question of sympathy. Whilst this is certainly important, disagreement over sympathy in fact represents only the starting point of Smith’s engagement with – and eventual attempted rejection of – Hume’s core moral theory. We can see this by recognizing the TMS’s account of moral foundations as predicated upon a rejection of Hume’s distinction between the natural and artificial virtues. Smith is in turn revealed as generating a major break with Hume – a break which, if based on a superior theory of moral foundations (as Smith thought it to be) has important consequences for how we treat Smith and Hume in both the history of philosophy and contemporary moral theory.     

Intuitive prediction: ecological validity versus representativeness

Insufficiently regressive intuitive predictions have been attributed to mistaken reliance on the representativeness heuristic. In contrast, we suggest that intuitive predictions stem from a conceptualization of ‘goodness of prediction’ that differs from the accepted statistical definition in terms of error minimization, namely, ecological validity—that is, representation of the substantive characteristics of the predicted variable Y and its distribution as well as of the relationship between Y and the predictor X—rather than minimization of prediction errors. Simultaneous satisfaction of the above representation requirements is achieved by multivalued prediction: The prediction of different Y′ values for the same X value, resulting in conditional distributions Y′|X for at least some X values. Empirical results supporting this hypothesis are presented and discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.