共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Tomasz Szkudlarek 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2007,26(3):237-252
The paper assumes that education is part of the process of discursive construction of society. The theoretical framework on
which this argument is based includes Ernesto Laclau’s theory of the “ontological impossibility and political necessity of
society”, and the role discourse and empty signifiers play in the establishment of political identities. Laclau’s theory is
supplemented here by ideas of Derrida, Lacan, Žižek and Marx, and by other traits in contemporary semiotics that relate to
the notion of “the void” in semantic systems. My claim is that empty signifiers, crucial to the production of the totality
of society, are discursively produced, among others, in pedagogical debates. This is illustrated by one historical example
(Rouuseau), which gives ground for more contemporary analyses, and on the basis of the present economic discourse of educating
and the idea of “knowledge society”. The main conclusion is that education, in contemporary discourse of learning, becomes
a neurotic symptom of the lack of overt domination in social relations.
相似文献
Tomasz SzkudlarekEmail: |
2.
Jürgen Oelkers 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2000,19(1-2):3-19
In 20th century’s European theory of education there was little interest in philosophy ofdemocracy. John Dewey’sDemocracy and Education was translated in nearly every European language but did not become the center of discussion. Even “radical education” was
much more childcentered than open to radical questions of political democracy. This article discusses the problem in two respects,
first the tension between neo-liberalism’s concept of individuality and public education, and second the future problems of
a theory of “democratic education”after Dewey. The aim is to overcome traditional European dualisms like that of “citizen”or “man” i.e. to pave the way for a post-Rousseauian theory of education.
Inaugural lecture upon taking office at the University of Zurich on 22nd November 1999. 相似文献
3.
Dan Mcarthur 《Synthese》2006,151(2):233-255
In this paper I argue against Nancy Cartwright’s claim that we ought to abandon what she calls “fundamentalism” about the
laws of nature and adopt instead her “dappled world” hypothesis. According to Cartwright we ought to abandon the notion that
fundamental laws (even potentially) apply universally, instead we should consider the law-like statements of science to apply
in highly qualified ways within narrow, non-overlapping and ontologically diverse domains, including the laws of fundamental
physics. For Cartwright, “laws” are just locally applicable refinements of a more open-ended concept of capacities. By providing
a critique of the dappled world approach’s central notion of open ended capacities and substituting this concept with an account
of properties drawn from recent writing on the subject of structural realism I show that a form of fundamentalism is viable.
I proceed from this conclusion to show that this form of fundamentalism provides a superior reading of case studies, such
as the effective field theory program (EFT) in quantum field theory, than the “dappled world” view. The case study of the
EFT program demonstrates that ontological variability between theoretical domains can be accounted for without altogether
abandoning fundamentalism or adopting Cartwright’s more implausible theses. 相似文献
4.
Giorgio Agamben and Alain Badiou have both recently made central use of set-theoretic results in their political and ontological
projects. As I argue in the paper, one of the most important of these to both thinkers is the paradox of set membership discovered
by Russell in 1901. Russell’s paradox demonstrates the fundamentally paradoxical status of the totality of language itself,
in its concrete occurrence or taking-place in the world. The paradoxical status of language is essential to Agamben’s discussions
of the “coming community,” “whatever being,” sovereignty, law and its force, and the possibility of a reconfiguration of political
life, as well as to Badiou’s notions of representation, political intervention, the nature of the subject, and the event.
I document these implications of Russell’s paradox in the texts of Agamben and Badiou and suggest that they point the way
toward a reconfigured political life, grounded in a radical reflective experience of language. 相似文献
5.
Daniel Kolak 《Synthese》2008,162(3):341-372
Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians”
such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that
abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake
on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity.
Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of personal identity, including Derek Parfit, have either
completely distorted or not understood Locke’s actual view. Shoemaker’s defense, which uses a “package deal” definition that
relies on internal relations of synchronic and diachronic unity and employs the Ramsey–Lewis account to define personal identity,
leaves far less room for psychological continuity views than for my own view, which, independently of its radical implications,
is that (a) consciousness makes personal identity, and (b) in consciousness alone personal identity consists—which happens to be also Locke’s actual view. Moreover, the ubiquitous Fregean conception of borders and the so-called “ambiguity
of is” collapse in the light of what Hintikka has called the “Frege trichotomy.” The Ramsey–Lewis account, due to the problematic
way Shoemaker tries to bind the variables, makes it impossible for the neo-Lockean ala Shoemaker to fulfill the uniqueness
clause required by all such Lewis style definitions; such attempts avoid circularity only at the expense of mistaking isomorphism
with identity. Contrary to what virtually all philosophers writing on the topic assume, fission does not destroy personal
identity. A proper analysis of public versus perspectival identification, derived using actual case studies from neuropsychiatry,
provides the scientific, mathematical and logical frameworks for a new theory of self-reference, wherein “consciousness,”
“self-consciousness,” and the “I,” can be precisely defined in terms of the subject and the subject-in-itself. 相似文献
6.
7.
Josh Corngold 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(1):67-84
This paper offers a critique of the “democratic state of education” proposed by Amy Gutmann in her influential book Democratic Education. In the democratic state of education, educational authority is shared among the state, parents and educational professionals;
and educational objectives are geared toward equipping future citizens to participate in what Gutmann calls “conscious social
reproduction”—the collective shaping of the future of society through democratic deliberation. Although I agree with some
of Gutmann’s broad recommendations for civic education, I have misgivings about the centrality that she gives to conscious
social reproduction in her theory of education. I argue that in focusing so intently on the facilitation of conscious social
reproduction, Gutmann’s theory makes insufficient room for the basic interests of individual children, and in particular,
their prospective interest in autonomy. Gutmann’s considered position on sex education policy—specifically, her willingness
to allow local communities to deny their children access to sex education—exemplifies the shortcomings of her theory. Ultimately,
her democratic state of education fails to acknowledge the fundamental moral importance of individual flourishing, and the
contribution that education can and should make to it. 相似文献
8.
In this paper I argue that there are in fact external relations in Russell’s sense. The level at which we are forced to acknowledge
them is, however, not the level of relations between concrete individual objects. All relations of this kind, which I will
call “inter-individual” relations, can be construed as supervenient on the monadic properties of their terms. But if we pursue
our ontological analysis a little bit deeper and consider the internal structure of a concrete individual, then we will inevitably
find irreducible external relations. I mean for example the relation of instantiation (in the frame of a realist’s theory)
or that of concurrence (in the frame of a trope theory). I will show that such “intra-individual” relations – the relations
that make up the internal structure of a concrete individual out of more primitive metaphysical “building blocks” like universals
or tropes – could not (even in principle) be construed as supervenient.
I should like to thank David Frost for brushing up my English and the Austrian Foundation for the Promotion of Scientific Research (FWF) for the financial support. 相似文献
9.
10.
In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a
good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”.
This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions
are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend upon a trivial fact. 相似文献
11.
Dun Zhang 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2010,5(4):631-651
The “end of history” by Fukuyama is mainly based on Hegel’s treatise of the end of history and Kojeve’s corresponding interpretation.
But Hegel’s “end of history” is a purely philosophical question, i.e., an ontological premise that must be fulfilled to complete
“absolute knowledge.” When Kojeve further demonstrates its “universal and homogeneous state,” Fukuyama extends it into a political
view: The victory of the Western system of freedom and democracy marks the end of the development of human history and Marxist
theory and practice. This is a misunderstanding of Hegel. Marx analyzes, scientifically, the historical limitation of Western
capitalism and maintains, by way of a kind of revolutionary teleology, the expectation of and belief in human liberation,
which is the highest historical goal. His philosophy of history is hence characterized by theoretical elements from both historical
scientificalness and historical teleology. 相似文献
12.
Claudia W. Ruitenberg 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(3):269-281
Many scholars in the area of citizenship education take deliberative approaches to democracy, especially as put forward by
John Rawls, as their point of departure. From there, they explore how students’ capacity for political and/or moral reasoning
can be fostered. Recent work by political theorist Chantal Mouffe, however, questions some of the central tenets of deliberative
conceptions of democracy. In the paper I first explain the central differences between Mouffe’s and Rawls’s conceptions of
democracy and politics. To this end I take Eamonn Callan’s Creating Citizens as an example of Rawlsian political education and focus on the role of conflict and disagreement in his account. I then address
three areas in which political education would need to change if it were to accept Mouffe’s critiques of deliberative approaches
to democracy and her proposal for an agonistic public sphere. The first area is the education of political emotions; the second
is fostering an understanding of the difference between the moral and the political; the third is developing an awareness
of the historical and contemporary political projects of the “left” and “right.” I propose that a radical democratic citizenship
education would be an education of political adversaries.
相似文献
Claudia W. RuitenbergEmail: |
13.
14.
Christian Lotz 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(2):171-185
In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture
consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis
that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology
avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such as Goodman’s, I submit that his overall theory is unacceptable, especially
when it is applied to works of art. Regarding art, the main problem of Husserl’s theory is the assumption that pictures are
constituted primarily as a conflict between perception/physical picture thing and imagination/picture object. Against this
mentalist claim, I maintain, from a hermeneutic point of view, that pictures are the result of perceptual formations [Bildungen]. I then claim that Husserl’s theory fails, since it does not take into account what I call “plastic perception” [Bildliches Sehen], which plays a prominent role not only within the German tradition of art education but also within German art itself. In
this connection, “plastic thinking” [Bildliches Denken] was prominent especially in Klee, in Kandinsky, and in Beuys, as well as in the overall doctrine of the Bauhaus. Ultimately,
I argue that Husserl’s notion of picture consciousness and general perceptive imaginary consciousness must be replaced with
a more dynamic model of the perception of pictures and art work that takes into account (a) the constructive and plastic moment,
(b) the social dimension and (c) the genetic dimension of what it means to see something in something (Wollheim).
相似文献
Christian LotzEmail: |
15.
Igor Primoratz 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(4):371-386
Any plausible position in the ethics of war and political violence in general will include the requirement of protection of
civilians (non-combatants, common citizens) against lethal violence. This requirement is particularly prominent, and particularly
strong, in just war theory. Some adherents of the theory see civilian immunity as absolute, not to be overridden in any circumstances
whatsoever. Others allow that it may be overridden, but only in extremis. The latter position has been advanced by Michael
Walzer under the heading of “supreme emergency.” In this paper, I look into some of the issues of interpretation and application
of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” view and some of the criticisms that have been levelled against it. I argue that Walzer’s
view is vague and unacceptable as it stands, but that the alternatives proposed by critics such as Brian Orend, C.A.J. Coady,
and Stephen Nathanson are also unattractive. I go on to construct a position that is structurally similar to Walzer’s, but
more specific and much less permissive, which I term the “moral disaster” view. According to this view, deliberate killing
of civilians is almost absolutely wrong. 相似文献
16.
Corey Anton 《Human Studies》2006,29(2):181-202
This paper explores the meaning of dreamless sleep. First, I consider four reasons why we commonly pass over sleep’s ontological significance. Second, I compare and contrast death and sleep to show how each is oriented to questions regarding the possibilities of “being-a-whole.” In the third and final part, I explore the meaning and implications of “being-toward-sleep,” arguing that human existence emerges atop naturally anonymous corporeality (i.e. living being). In sum, I try to show that we can recover an authentic – if somewhat ambiguous – sense of “being-a-whole” only by recognizing the ontological significance of dreamless sleep. 相似文献
17.
Robert Eamon Briscoe 《Synthese》2006,152(1):95-128
Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims
about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning
of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of it. I here show that a conception of idiolectical meaning is possible that accepts the “anti-internalism” of the first
claim while rejecting (what I shall refer to as) the “anti-individualism” of the second. According to this conception, externally
constituted idiolectical meaning supervenes on idiolectical understanding. I begin by trying to show that it is possible to
disentangle anti-internalist and anti-individualist strands of argument in Hilary Putnam’s well-known and widely influential
“The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Having once argued that the latter strand of argument is not cogent, I then try to show that individualism
(in the sense above) can be reconciled with perhaps the most plausible reconstruction of Putnam’s well-known and widely accepted
“indexical” theory of natural kind terms. Integral to my defense of the possibility of an individualist externalism about
idiolectical meaning are my efforts to demonstrate that, pace Putnam, there is no “division of linguistic labor” when it comes to the fixing the meanings of such terms in a speaker’s
idiolect. The fact that average speakers sometimes need defer to experts shows that not reference, but only reliable recognition of what belongs in the extension of a natural kind term is a “social phenomenon.”
相似文献Wittgenstein (1958, 14).
18.
How to Define a Number? A General Epistemological Account of Simon Stevin’s Art of Defining 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jurgen Naets 《Topoi》2010,29(1):77-86
This paper explores Simon Stevin’s l’Arithmétique of 1585, where we find a novel understanding of the concept of number. I will discuss the dynamics between his practice and
philosophy of mathematics, and put it in the context of his general epistemological attitude. Subsequently, I will take a
close look at his justificational concerns, and at how these are reflected in his inductive, a postiori and structuralist
approach to investigating the numerical field. I will argue that Stevin’s renewed conceptualisation of the notion of number
is a sort of “existential closure” of the numerical domain, founded upon the practice of his predecessors and contemporaries.
Accordingly, I want to make clear that l’Aritmetique have to be read not as an ontological analysis or exploration of the numerical field, but as an explication of a mathematical
ethos. In this sense, this article also intends to make a specific contribution to the broader issue of the “ethics of geometry.” 相似文献
19.
Pablo Gilabert 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(1):39-56
What should our theorizing about social justice aim at? Many political philosophers think that a crucial goal is to identify
a perfectly just society. Amartya Sen disagrees. In The Idea of Justice, he argues that the proper goal of an inquiry about justice is to undertake comparative assessments of feasible social scenarios
in order to identify reforms that involve justice-enhancement, or injustice-reduction, even if the results fall short of perfect
justice. Sen calls this the “comparative approach” to the theory of justice. He urges its adoption on the basis of a sustained
critique of the former approach, which he calls “transcendental.” In this paper I pursue two tasks, one critical and the other
constructive. First, I argue that Sen’s account of the contrast between the transcendental and the comparative approaches
is not convincing, and second, I suggest what I take to be a broader and more plausible account of comparative assessments
of justice. The core claim is that political philosophers should not shy away from the pursuit of ambitious theories of justice
(including, for example, ideal theories of perfect justice), although they should engage in careful consideration of issues
of political feasibility bearing on their practical implementation. 相似文献
20.
Heikki Kirjavainen 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,64(2):75-88
In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term
‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this
presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and
Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification
and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus
two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices
and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory.
The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes. 相似文献