The plausibility effect: Lexical priming or sentential processing?

Five experiments are reported that investigated whether the plausibility effect is caused by lexical priming resulting from the higher proportion of related words in plausible than in implausible sentences. In Experiment 1, a plausibility effect was demonstrated that was entirely attributable to the way in which lexical items were combined rather than to the properties of individual lexical items. In Experiment 2, the content words from the sentences used in Experiment 1 were shown to produce a similar reaction-time difference in a task in which syntactic processing was disrupted, supporting a lexical priming explanation of the plausibility effect. However, Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that, in another task less prone to task-specific strategies but sensitive to plausibility, the disruption of syntactic processing eliminated the effect. In Experiment 5, it was shown that when lexical priming was eliminated, a plausibility effect still occurred. Thus, two separate lines of evidence suggested that the plausibility effect cannot be fully explained in terms of lexical priming.     

Is coherence conducive to reliability?

A measure of coherence is said to be reliability conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (as measured) of a set of testimonies implies a higher probability that the witnesses are reliable. Recently, it has been proved that the Shogenji measure of coherence is reliability conducive in restricted scenarios (e.g., Olsson and Schubert, Synthese, 157:297?C308, 2007). In this article, I investigate whether the Shogenji measure, or any other coherence measure, is reliability conducive in general. An impossibility theorem is proved to the effect that this is not the case. I conclude that coherence is not reliability conducive.     

Why does coherence appear truth-conducive?

This paper aims to reconcile (i) the intuitively plausible view that a higher degree of coherence among independent pieces of evidence makes the hypothesis they support more probable, and (ii) the negative results in Bayesian epistemology to the effect that there is no probabilistic measure of coherence such that a higher degree of coherence among independent pieces of evidence makes the hypothesis they support more probable. I consider a simple model in which the negative result appears in a stark form: the prior probability of the hypothesis and the individual vertical relations between each piece of evidence and the hypothesis completely determine the conditional probability of the hypothesis given the total evidence, leaving no room for the lateral relation (such as coherence) among the pieces of evidence to play any role. Despite this negative result, the model also reveals that a higher degree of coherence is indirectly associated with a higher conditional probability of the hypothesis because a higher degree of coherence indicates stronger individual supports. This analysis explains why coherence appears truth-conducive but in such a way that it defeats the idea of coherentism since the lateral relation (such as coherence) plays no independent role in the confirmation of the hypothesis. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop Coherence: Interpreting the Impossibility Results held in Lund, Sweden. I would like to thank the participants of the workshop, especially Erik J. Olsson who subsequently sent me written comments. I would also like to thank Ken Akiba for comments on precursors of this paper     

Can readers ignore implausibility? Evidence for nonstrategic monitoring of event-based plausibility in language comprehension

We present evidence for a nonstrategic monitoring of event-based plausibility during language comprehension by showing that readers cannot ignore the implausibility of information even if it is detrimental to the task at hand. In two experiments using a Stroop-like paradigm, participants were required to provide positive and negative responses independent of plausibility in an orthographical task (Experiment 1) or a nonlinguistic color judgment task (Experiment 2) to target words that were either plausible or implausible in their context. We expected a nonstrategic assessment of plausibility to interfere with positive responses to implausible words. ANOVAs and linear mixed models analyses of the response latencies revealed a significant interaction of plausibility and required response that supported this prediction in both experiments, despite the use of two very different tasks. Moreover, it could be shown that the effect was not driven by the differential predictability of plausible and implausible words. These results suggest that plausibility monitoring is an inherent component of information processing.     

Judging the plausibility of arguments in scientific texts: a student–scientist comparison

The ability to evaluate scientific claims and evidence is an important aspect of scientific literacy and requires various epistemic competences. Readers spontaneously validate presented information against their knowledge and beliefs but differ in their ability to strategically evaluate the soundness of informal arguments. The present research investigated how students of psychology, compared to scientists working in psychology, evaluate informal arguments. Using a think-aloud procedure, we identified the specific strategies students and scientists apply when judging the plausibility of arguments and classifying common argumentation fallacies. Results indicate that students, compared to scientists, have difficulties forming these judgements and base them on intuition and opinion rather than the internal consistency of arguments. Our findings are discussed using the mental model theory framework. Although introductory students validate scientific information against their knowledge and beliefs, their judgements are often erroneous, in part because their use of strategy is immature. Implications for systematic trainings of epistemic competences are discussed.     

A test of central coherence theory: linguistic processing in high-functioning adults with autism or Asperger syndrome: is local coherence impaired?

Central coherence theory (Frith, U., 1989. Autism: Explaining the Enigma. Blackwell, Oxford.) is addressed by exploring linguistic processing in normally intelligent adults with either autism or Asperger syndrome, to test whether local coherence is impaired. Local coherence is the ability to make contextually meaningful connections between linguistic information in short-term or working memory. Experiment 1 demonstrated that individuals with an autism spectrum condition were less likely to use the sentence context spontaneously to provide the context-appropriate pronunciation of a homograph. Experiment 2 presented scenarios which had a situation and outcome which only cohered if a bridging inference was drawn. The clinical groups were less likely to select the most coherent (bridging) inference from competing alternatives. Experiment 3 demonstrated that individuals with an autism spectrum condition were less able to use context to interpret an auditorily presented ambiguous sentence. The findings from Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that individuals with autism or Asperger syndrome have a difficulty in achieving local coherence, while the evidence from Experiment 1 suggests a preference not to strive for coherence. Taken together, these results suggest that individuals with an autism spectrum condition are impaired in achieving local coherence, and they have a preference not to strive for coherence unless instructed to do so, or unless they make a conscious decision to do so. Moreover, the three experiments correlate with one another, which suggests that central coherence may be a unitary force in these different tasks. Of the two clinical groups, the autism group had the greater difficulty in achieving coherence. Possible explanations for the clinical groups' difficulty are explored.     

Why reread? Evidence from garden-path and local coherence structures

Two eye-tracking experiments were conducted to compare the online reading and offline comprehension of main verb/reduced relative garden-path sentences and local coherence sentences. Rereading of early material in garden-path reduced relatives should be revisionary, aimed at reanalysing an earlier misparse; however, rereading of early material in a local coherence reduced relative need only be confirmatory, as the original parse of the earlier portion of these sentences is ultimately correct. Results of online and offline measures showed that local coherence structures elicited signals of reading disruption that arose earlier and lasted longer, and local coherence comprehension was also better than garden path comprehension. Few rereading measures in either sentence type were predicted by structural features of these sentences, nor was rereading related to comprehension accuracy, which was extremely low overall. Results are discussed with respect to selective reanalysis and good-enough processing.     

A corrective to Bovens and Hartmann’s measure of coherence

Bovens and Hartmann (Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) propose to analyze coherence as a confidence-boosting property. On the basis of this idea, they construct a new probabilistic theory of coherence. In this paper, I will attempt to show that the resulting measure of coherence clashes with some of the intuitions that motivate it. Also, I will try to show that this clash is not due to the view on coherence as a confidence-boosting property or to the general features of the model that Bovens and Hartmann use to analyze coherence. It will turn out that there is at least one other measure that is similarly based on the concept of a confidence-boosting property, but does not have the same counterintuitive results.     

Is there coherence among the cognitive components of gender acquisition?

This study examined the relationships among five measures that assess various cognitive components of the child's acquisition of gender. At around 2 years of age, children were given a task assessing their ability to accurately label as a boy or a girl some head-and-shoulders pictures of boys and girls. At 4 years of age, these children were given tasks measuring (1) the degree to which they found gender a salient parameter of categorization, (2) the amount of gender-related knowledge they could display (SERLI-SRD), (3) the degree to which their preferences were gender-typed (SERLI-SRP) and (4) the accuracy of their memory for gender-typed information. There was no consistent pattern of relationship among the children's scores on these five tools for measuring gender acquisition. Our findings suggest that gender is a multidimensional construct in children's development, and thus these results challenge the undimensional manner in which gender is repeatedly addressed in developmental theory and research.This research was funded in part by a federal biomedical research grant (No. 2507RR07080) awarded to the first author from the Department of Psychology at the University of Oregon, and by Grant No. RO1HD175751 from the National Institute of Child Development awarded to the third author.We wish to thank Margo Lane, Rachel Robertson, Jacqui Oucalt, Laura Baker, Dale Roberts, and the teachers, parents, and assistants of the Child Research Laboratory at the University of Oregon in Eugene, Oregon, for their invaluable contribution to this research.     

Congruence or coherence? Emotional and physiological responses to colours in synaesthesia

Lexical–chromatic synaesthesia is a condition in which letters and/or words elicit percepts of synaesthetic colours, termed photisms. Anecdotal data suggest that synaesthetes are particularly sensitive to inconsistencies between their synaesthetic percepts and the real world, e.g., it can be annoying and unpleasant for them to see a letter printed in a colour different than the respective photism colour. For R, a synaesthete subject who participated in the present study, the photisms possess specific emotional values (a red photism is pleasing and attractive, green is repulsive and unpleasant, etc.). In contrast to the anecdotal data, R does not always find the colour–photism incongruence to be disturbing. More importantly, he states that it is the emotional coherence between the stimulus and the corresponding photism that matters. In a series of experiments, we studied this new concept of emotional coherence on three levels—subjective (self-report), behavioural, and physiological, corroborating R's introspective statements. Besides the implications of the concept of coherence itself, the results presented here suggest that even highly subjective cognitive constructs can be approached and measured experimentally, uncovering the workings of the underlying psychophysiological mechanisms.     

Did you witness demonic possession? A response time analysis of the relationship between event plausibility and autobiographical beliefs

This study tested the hypothesis that the search for information pertinent to answering the question “Did eventx happen to you?” is preceded by a preliminary plausibility assessment, the outcome of which affects the amount of effort invested in the search. Undergraduate students were asked to assess the plausibility of six events and subsequently to rate their belief that each event had happened to them before the age of 6. Unknown to them, response times (RTs) for answering the belief questions were also recorded. RTs for making belief judgments were more highly correlated with plausibility than with belief, and were significantly associated with plausibility even when belief ratings were controlled. As predicted, RTs were very short when the event was deemed highly implausible and increased sharply if the event was deemed at least somewhat plausible; significant but less pronounced increases in RTs followed as plausibility increased further.     

Why wasn't O.J. convicted? Emotional coherence in legal inference

This paper evaluates four competing psychological explanations for why the jury in the O.J. Simpson murder trial reached the verdict they did: explanatory coherence, Bayesian probability theory, wishful thinking, and emotional coherence. It describes computational models that provide detailed simulations of juror reasoning for explanatory coherence, Bayesian networks, and emotional coherence, and argues that the latter account provides the most plausible explanation of the jury's decision.     

Is knowing believing? The role of event plausibility and background knowledge in planting false beliefs about the personal past

False memories are more likely to be planted for plausible than for implausible events, but does just knowing about an implausible event make individuals more likely to think that the event happened to them? Two experiments assessed the independent contributions of plausibility and background knowledge to planting false beliefs. In Experiment 1, subjects rated 20 childhood events as to the likelihood of each event having happened to them. The list included the implausible target event “received an enema,” a critical target event of Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge (1997). Two weeks later, subjects were presented with (1) information regarding the high prevalence rate of enemas; (2) background information on how to administer an enema; (3) neither type of information; or (4) both. Immediately or 2 weeks later, they rated the 20 childhood events again. Only plausibility significantly increased occurrence ratings. In Experiment 2, the target event was changed from “barium enema administered in a hospital” to “home enema for constipation”; significant effects of both plausibility and background knowledge resulted. The results suggest that providing background knowledge can increase beliefs about personal events, but that its impact is limited by the extent of the individual’s familiarity with the context of the suggested target event.     

Encoding the target or the plausible preview word? The nature of the plausibility preview benefit in reading Chinese

Previous studies have shown that a plausible preview word can facilitate the processing of a target word as compared to an implausible preview word (a plausibility preview benefit effect) when reading Chinese (Yang, Wang, Tong, & Rayner, 2012; Yang, 2013). Regarding the nature of this effect, it is possible that readers processed the meaning of the plausible preview word and did not actually encode the target word (given that the parafoveal preview word lies close to the fovea). The current experiment examined this possibility with three conditions wherein readers received a preview of a target word that was either (1) identical to the target word (identical preview), (2) a plausible continuation of the pre-target text, but the post-target text in the sentence was incompatible with it (initially plausible preview), or (3) not a plausible continuation of the pre-target text, nor compatible with the post-target text (implausible preview). Gaze durations on target words were longer in the initially plausible condition than the identical condition. Overall, the results showed a typical preview benefit, but also implied that readers did not encode the initially plausible preview. Also, a plausibility preview benefit was replicated: gaze durations were longer with implausible previews than the initially plausible ones. Furthermore, late eye movement measures did not reveal differences between the initially plausible and the implausible preview conditions, which argues against the possibility of misreading the plausible preview word as the target word. In sum, these results suggest that a plausible preview word provides benefit in processing the target word as compared to an implausible preview word, and this benefit is only present in early but not late eye movement measures.     

How stable is sense of coherence? Changes following an intervention for unemployed individuals

The present investigation was concerned with the changeability of sense of coherence. We examined changes in sense of coherence (SOC) over a six-month period in a sample of Finnish unemployed individuals ( n = 74) participating in an intervention program designed to boost re-employment. Over the study period, participants' sense of coherence improved significantly and re-employed individuals reported the greatest changes. Different changes in the subcomponents of SOC, comprehensibility, manageability and meaningfulness, were found. Contrary to expectations, participants younger than 30 years of age did not show greater changes in their SOC. Initial personal resources were predictors of both positive and negative changes in SOC.     

Lexical coherence in short-term memory: Strategic reconstruction or “semantic glue”?

This study explores the foundation of lexical/semantic phoneme binding effects in verbal short-term memory (STM). The immediate serial recall of pure lists of words and nonwords was compared with the recall of mixed lists that had either a predictable, alternating structure (e.g., wnwnwn) or an unpredictable structure (i.e., the serial positions of the words/nonwords could not be known in advance). The study provides evidence for two separate mechanisms by which long-term linguistic knowledge contributes to STM. First, there was evidence for automatic lexical/semantic binding effects that were independent of knowledge of lexical status. The nonwords in both types of mixed list damaged word recall and encouraged the phonological elements of words to migrate. In both alternating and unpredictable mixed lists, the phonemes of words were more likely than the phonemes of nonwords to be recalled together as a coherent item, suggesting that lexical/semantic knowledge encourages the phonological elements of words to emerge together in immediate serial recall, even when lexical status is unknown. Secondly, there was evidence for “strategic redintegration”, which was dependent on prior knowledge of the lexical status of the items in mixed lists. When participants recalled items that they knew to be words in advance, they were able to use this knowledge to constrain their responses so that they were more likely to be lexically appropriate. These findings motivate modifications to current theories of the interaction between linguistic knowledge and verbal short-term memory.