I'm feeling lucky: the relationship between affect and risk-seeking in the framing effect

Engagement in risky behavior has traditionally been attributed to an underestimation of the associated risks, but recent perspectives suggest that affective reactions toward a risky option may better explain risk-seeking than risk perception. However, the precise relationship between emotion and risk-seeking remains unclear. The current set of studies elucidates the relationship between emotion and risk-seeking in risky choice framing, using a gambling task. In Study 1, reliance on emotion was related to risk-seeking, but goals to regulate emotion mitigated these effects. In Study 2, positive affect was associated with risk-seeking in loss frames, but unrelated to risk aversion in gain frames. Collectively, these findings indicate a general role for emotion reliance on risk-seeking and a specific role of positive affect on risk-seeking in the loss trials of the framing effect.     

不同乐观水平大学生的框架效应研究

采用乐观人格倾向问卷筛选乐观水平低组（96名）和高组（99名）大学生,探讨不同乐观水平大学生在生命救助、奖学金申请、娱乐金钱3种决策任务领域上的框架效应及其在性别、专业的特点。结果发现：（1）不同乐观水平大学生在不同决策任务领域上的框架效应特点不同,乐观水平低组和高组大学生在生命救助问题上表现为偏向于风险的单向框架效应,乐观水平高组大学生在娱乐金钱问题上倾向于风险寻求;（2）乐观水平高的男大学生在3种决策任务领域上均倾向于风险寻求,低乐观水平的女大学生在生命救助问题上表现为偏向于风险的单向框架效应;（3）     

Reacting to Perceived High- and Low-Risk Win–Lose Opportunities in a Risky Decision-Making Task: Is It Framing or Affect or Both?

Affect research has suggested that in high-risk situations, a positive mood often results in an enhanced sensitivity to losses, leading to strong risk-averse behavior relative to neutral or negative mood, but when a situation is seen as being low risk, a reversal occurs and positive affect will often result in more risk-seeking behavior. It was hypothesized that the simple framing of a gambling task to emphasize either potential gains or potential losses could act as an affect inducer and would produce similar results. In Experiment 1 the effects of an induced positive or negative affective state on risk-taking behavior in a gambling task were examined. Results replicated the risk-averse/risk-seeking reversal phenomenon described above. In Experiment 2 the affect conditions were replaced with a simple Winning vs. Losing framing manipulation where an instructional emphasis was placed either on accumulating points or avoiding the loss of points. Results demonstrated that a reversal pattern in risk taking like that found in Experiment 1 for affect could also be obtained via this simple framing manipulation. An affective-cognitive model of pre-choice framing and a theoretical link between the effects of framing and the effects of mood manipulation based on mood management theory are presented and discussed.     

Risk perception and risky choice: Situational, informational and dispositional effects

We investigated how situational (gain–loss), informational (opportunity–threat framing) and dispositional (achievement motive and avoidance motive) variables affected opportunity–threat perception and risky choice in managerial decision-making contexts. In Study 1, the risk preference of the participants showed a reflection effect due to situational differences (gain or loss) and a partial framing effect caused by presenting the same choice information in terms of either opportunities or threats. However, both effects were in the opposite direction of predictions from prospect theory. Gains and positive framing enhanced risk-seeking preference whereas losses and negative framing augmented risk-averse preference. Risk-seeking choices were mediated by opportunity perception whereas risk-averse choices were mediated by threat perception. In Study 2, the participants high in achievement motive perceived greater opportunities in a negative situation, and the participants high in avoidance motive perceived greater threats in a positive situation, suggesting that ambition (achievement motive) operates more significantly in the face of adversities whereas cautiousness (avoidance motive) functions more significantly in prosperity.     

Multiple Framing: Verbal,Facial, and Vocal Cues in Risky Choice

Verbal framing effects have been widely studied, but little is known about how people react to multiple framing cues in risk communication, where verbal messages are often accompanied by facial and vocal cues. We examined joint and differential effects of verbal, facial, and vocal framing on risk preference in hypothetical monetary and life–death situations. In the multiple framing condition with the factorial design (2 verbal frames × 2 vocal tones × 4 basic facial expressions × 2 task domains), each scenario was presented auditorily with a written message on a photo of the messenger's face. Compared with verbal framing effects resulting in preference reversal, multiple frames made risky choice more consistent and shifted risk preference without reversal. Moreover, a positive tone of voice increased risk‐seeking preference in women. When the valence of facial and vocal cues was incongruent with verbal frame, verbal framing effects were significant. In contrast, when the affect cues were congruent with verbal frame, framing effects disappeared. These results suggest that verbal framing is given higher priority when other affect cues are incongruent. Further analysis revealed that participants were more risk‐averse when positive affect cues (positive tone or facial expressions) were congruently paired with a positive verbal frame whereas participants were more risk‐seeking when positive affect cues were incongruent with the verbal frame. In contrast, for negative affect cues, congruency promoted risk‐seeking tendency whereas incongruency increased risk‐aversion. Overall, the results show that facial and vocal cues interact with verbal framing and significantly affect risk communication. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The evolution of decision-making under risk: Framing effects in monkey risk preferences

When making choices between risky options, human decision-makers exhibit a number of framing effects. One of the most prominent framing effects is the tendency for decision makers to evaluate gambles relative to a reference point, and to act risk-seeking when prospects are framed as losses but risk-averse when identical prospects are framed as gains. This tendency for risk-preferences to reverse between loss and gain frames has been termed the reflection effect, and is one of the primary predictions of Prospect Theory. Here, we explore whether non-human primates exhibit a similar reflection effect. Using a token-trading task, we show that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) exhibit an analogous reversal of risk preferences depending on whether outcomes are presented as gains or losses, suggesting that similar framing effects also influence choice in non-human primates. This finding suggests that the mechanisms that drive framing effects in humans may be evolutionarily ancient, extending broadly across the primate order.     

封面故事、选项框架和损益概率对风险偏好的影响

以股市投资为背景设计决策问题,考查了问题的封面故事类型、备择选项框架和风险项的概率水平对327名股民被试和465名大学生被试的风险偏好的影响。结果表明,股民被试的风险偏好不同于大学生被试,前者在所有实验处理上呈现出稳定的风险回避倾向。大学生被试在不同类型的封面故事下呈现出不同的风险偏好。在传统的坏封面故事下,风险偏好只受到备择选项框架的影响,不受损益概率的影响,即出现经典的框架效应现象。在好封面故事下,风险偏好受到备择选项框架、损益概率及两者交互作用的影响,即在高概率水平上出现框架效应现象,在低概率水平上出现框架效应反转现象     

Framing, intentions, and trust–choice incompatibility

The present paper examines how framing of messages and the intentions inferred from different—positive vs. negative—framings, interact with the development of trust. Empirical evidence is presented showing that different, logically equivalent, frames are supposedly interpreted as implying different intentions. Next, the relationship between different frames (and the corresponding intentions reflected from these frames) and trust are explored. Finally, and most important, the relationship between the assessment of trust, inferred from different frames, and the corresponding choice behavior resulting from these frames, are investigated. Specifically, consider agents A and B offering to sell exactly the same commodity, except that one agent formulates it in a positive and the other in a negative frame. The different frames may lead to different assessments of the trustworthiness of the two agents. Following common wisdom, if agent A is trusted more than B, then one should prefer to conduct transactions with the former rather than with the latter agent. Several experiments are presented that are incompatible with this conjecture. For example, when faced with a choice between two butchers, whose ground beef is advertised as containing 25% fat (negative frame) or 75% lean (positive frame), respectively, most people have more trust in the former yet most indicate they would buy their meat from the latter butcher. This phenomenon, in which negative framing weighs more in trust assessments, and positive framing weighs more in choice, is labeled trust–choice incompatibility. The robustness of the phenomenon is further demonstrated in several experiments, and possible explanations for its occurrence are discussed.     

Fines,Frames, and Images: Examining Formulation Effects on Punishment Decisions

Two laboratory experiments examine how punishment decisions are influenced by formulation effects. Results indicate the fines levied by disciplinary agents for deceptive advertising practices were significantly biased by objectively equivalent information framed in a positive or negative way. Specifically, negative framing produced fines that were 44 to 120% larger, depending on whether the offending party was listed as an individual or an organization. Results also indicate framing influenced perceptions of image compatibility, a measure derived from Beach and Mitchell's Image Theory (1990, 1996), and that differences in image compatibility correlated with differences in fines. The more incompatible a decision maker's image of the offending party, the higher the fine. Image theory is then discussed as a potential instrument for enhancing our understanding of framing and formulation effects.     

Self‐framing of risky choice

Previous research on framing effects has largely focused on how choice information framed by external sources influences the response of a decision maker. This research examined how decision makers framed choice options and how the hedonic tone of self‐framing influenced their risk preference. By using pie charts and a complementary sentence‐completion task in Experiment 1, participants were able to interpret and frame the expected choice outcomes themselves before making a choice between a sure option and a gamble in either a life–death or a monetary problem. Each of these self‐frames (phrases) was then rated by a group of independent judges in terms of its hedonic tone. The hedonic tone of self‐frames was mostly positive and was more positive in the life–death than the monetary context, suggesting a motivational function of self‐framing. However, positive outcomes were still more likely to be framed positively than negative outcomes. In Experiment 2, choice outcomes were depicted with a whole‐pie chart instead of a pie slice in order to emphasize positive and negative outcomes equally. The results showed that the hedonic tone of self‐framing was still largely positive and more positive in the life domain than the monetary domain. However, compared to Experiment 1, the risk preference in the life–death domain was reversed, showing an outcome salience effect: when the pie‐slice chart emphasized only survival outcomes, participants were more risk taking under positive hedonic frames whereas when the whole‐pie chart depicted both survival and mortality outcomes, they became risk averse under positive frames. In sum, self‐framing reflected a positive bias in encoding risk information and affected the risk preference of the decision maker. Like the tone of voice used in communication, the hedonic tone of self‐framing, either positive or negative, can affect risk perception of a choice problem. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

压力下一搏：压力如何影响个体风险寻求

压力促使个体风险寻求已得到许多研究的验证和支持, 但对于该现象背后的根本机制缺乏深入探讨和整合。模型指出, 压力诱发认知资源损耗和心理需要失衡, 导致个体执行控制功能减弱, 奖赏寻求增加, 这两者引起对风险选项价值的高估、风险感知的降低和启发式决策策略的使用, 最终导致风险寻求。期望效用论、预期理论、双系统理论和风险敏感理论的视角能各有侧重地解析模型中的路径。最后, 基于模型梳理了边界条件, 并提出未来可关注压力下执行功能、认知和情绪的交互以及慢性压力的影响和调控。     

Impact of mood,framing, and need for cognition on decision makers' recall and confidence

This study examined the impact of mood, information framing, and need for cognition on participants' amount of recall and level of confidence in a simulated business‐decision‐making setting. No main effect was obtained for either positive or negative mood. However, in support of the congruity–incongruity hypothesis, participants who received mood‐congruent framing information (positive mood/positive framing and negative mood/negative framing) showed significantly better recall and were significantly less overconfident than those who received mood‐incongruent framing information (positive mood/negative framing and negative mood/positive framing). Yet, congruity–incongruity effects were moderated by decision makers' need for cognition and were obtained only among participants' with a lower cognitive processing requirement. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of decision framing on choice of risky vs certain options

Tversky and Kahneman (1981, Science, 211, 453–458) reported that the choice between two decision alternatives of equal expected value, differing only in the degree of risk, was significantly influenced by the “framing” of the alternative decision outcomes. When alternative outcomes were phrased “positively” in terms of lives saved, subjects preferred the risk-averse alternative. When outcomes were phrased “negatively” in terms of lives lost, the risk-seeking option was preferred. Experiment 1 investigated the robustness of the framing effect and its remediation by formal training. Forty-five MBA students responded to a decision problem before and after training in decision theory. Results differed from those published by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in two respects. First, although results in the positive framing condition were similar to Tversky and Kahneman's results, no preference for the risky option in the negative framing condition was observed. Consequently, no framing effect was found even on the pretest. Second, many students reported being indifferent to the two options. No significant changes occurred after training. Experiment 2 replicated these results on a nonbusiness sample. These findings suggest that (a) unidentified factors affect whether a framing effect is observed, and (b) the bias known as the framing effect may not be as robust as has been believed.     

Looking Closer at the Effects of Framing on Risky Choice: An Item Response Theory Analysis

Item response theory (IRT) methodology allowed an in-depth examination of several issues that would be difficult to explore using traditional methodology. IRT models were estimated for 4 risky-choice items, answered by students under either a gain or loss frame. Results supported the typical framing finding of risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses but also suggested that a latent construct we label preference for risk was influential in predicting risky choice. Also, the Asian Disease item, most often used in framing research, was found to have anomalous statistical properties when compared to other framing items.     

The Impact of Positive and Negative Affect and Issue Framing on Issue Interpretation and Risk Taking

Two studies examined the influence of transient affective states and issue framing onissue interpretationandrisk takingwithin the context of strategic decision making. In Study 1, participants in whom transient positive or negative affective states were induced by reading a short story showed systematic differences in issue interpretation and risk taking in a strategic decision making context. Compared to negative mood participants, those in a positive mood were more likely to interpret the strategic issue as an opportunity and displayed lower levels of risk taking. Study 2 replicated and extended these results by crossing affective states with threat and opportunity frames. Results showed that framing an issue (as a threat or an opportunity) had a stronger impact on issue interpretation among negative affect participants than among positive affect participants. Affective states also moderated the impact of issue framing on risk taking: the effect of framing on risk-taking was stronger under negative rather than positive affect. These results are interpreted via information-processing and motivational effects of affect on a decision maker.     

眼睛注视线索对经济领域风险决策的影响：基于框架效应范式

采用基金投资框架任务,结合眼动技术考察眼睛注视线索与框架类型对风险决策的影响。结果发现：（1）消极眼睛注视线索促进了被试在损失框架下的风险寻求行为,控制组与积极、中性、消极眼睛组的行为结果无显著差异;（2）以均字注视次数为指标的眼动结果表明,积极眼睛组和中性眼睛组对确定损益的关注差异大于对风险损益的关注差异;消极眼睛组和控制组被试对损失的关注大于对收益的关注,对确定项的关注大于对风险项的关注,但两者不存在交互作用。消极眼睛注视线索可能改变了个体对风险性和确定性的感知,并因此影响了人们的风险决策行为,规避消极情绪线索可能有助于减少经济决策中的风险寻求行为。     

Attribute Framing and Goal Framing Effects in Health Decisions

Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (LSG, 1998) have distinguished among three types of framing—risky choice, attribute, and goal framing—to reconcile conflicting findings in the literature. In the research reported here, we focus on attribute and goal framing. LSG propose that positive frames should be more effective than negative frames in the context of attribute framing, and negative frames should be more effective than positive frames in the context of goal framing. We test this framework by manipulating frame valence (positive vs negative) and frame type (attribute vs goal) in a unified context with common procedures. We also argue that the nature of effects in a goal-framing context may depend on the extent to which the research topic has “intrinsic self-relevance” to the population. In the context of medical decision making, we operationalize low intrinsic self-relevance by using student subjects and high intrinsic self-relevance by using patients. As expected, we find complete support for the LSG framework under low intrinsic self-relevance and modified support for the LSG framework under high intrinsic self-relevance. Overall, our research appears to confirm and extend the LSG framework.     

自我框架、风险认知和风险选择

对行为决策中“框架效应”(Framing Effect)的研究进行了拓展：探讨了自我框架对风险决策的影响及其机制。面对运用图示方法表示的管理,健康,及投资方面的风险决策问题,参与者自主地选择对方案的描述（自我框架）。研究有四个主要发现：1）自我框架对风险选择的效应部分显著,而且对风险选择的影响方向因情境的不同而不同;2）机会威胁认知是自我框架效应的一个中介变量;3）自我框架在情绪语气上的差异对风险决策有显著影响：决策者对一个备选方案（确定性或风险性方案）相对于另一个备选方案的自我描述的情绪语气越积极正面,这个方案被选择的可能性越大;4）决策者的机会-威胁认知是这一自我框架效应的部分中介变量。也就是说,对备选方案的自我描述语气作为一种对决策信息的编码影响了风险（机会和威胁）认知,进而影响决策者的风险偏好和选择     

Socioeconomic Status and Psychopathic Traits in a Community Sample of Youth

The current study aims to address socioeconomic status (SES) as a moderating variable between psychopathic traits and conduct problems in a sample of 2432 Dutch adolescents (M_age?=?14.50 years, SD?=?1.67, 56% male). Both family and neighborhood SES were measured, with income as a proxy for the level of SES. There were small but significant positive correlations between the behavioral and interpersonal dimensions of psychopathy and family SES, a small but significant negative correlation between the affective dimension and neighborhood SES, and a small and significant positive correlation between neighborhood SES and the behavioral dimension of psychopathy. Results further showed that the relations between youth psychopathic traits were moderated by neither family SES nor neighborhood SES. The results suggest that the relations between psychopathic traits and conduct problems are equally strong for lower and higher SES youth. Taken together, these findings warrant the conclusions that SES does not play a role as a moderator in the relation between psychopathy and conduct problems.