The Scientometric Bubble Considered Harmful

This article deals with a modern disease of academic science that consists of an enormous increase in the number of scientific publications without a corresponding advance of knowledge. Findings are sliced as thin as salami and submitted to different journals to produce more papers. If we consider academic papers as a kind of scientific ‘currency’ that is backed by gold bullion in the central bank of ‘true’ science, then we are witnessing an article-inflation phenomenon, a scientometric bubble that is most harmful for science and promotes an unethical and antiscientific culture among researchers. The main problem behind the scenes is that the impact factor is used as a proxy for quality. Therefore, not only for convenience, but also based on ethical principles of scientific research, we adhere to the San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment when it emphasizes “the need to eliminate the use of journal-based metrics in funding, appointment and promotion considerations; and the need to assess research on its own merits rather on the journal in which the research is published”. Our message is mainly addressed to the funding agencies and universities that award tenures or grants and manage research programmes, especially in developing countries. The message is also addressed to well-established scientists who have the power to change things when they participate in committees for grants and jobs.     

Perception

Book Information Perception. Perception Barry Maund, Chesham : Acumen Publishing, 2003, 240, £12.95 (paper) By Barry Maund. Acumen Publishing. Chesham. Pp. 240. £12.95 (paper:),     

On Ignorance and Contradiction Considered as Truth-Values

A critical view of the alleged significance of Belnap four-valuedlogic for reasoning under inconsistent and incomplete informationis provided. The difficulty lies in the confusion between truth-valuesand information states, when reasoning about Boolean propositions.So our critique is along the lines of previous debates on therelevance of many-valued logics and especially of the extensionof the Boolean truth-tables to more than two values as a toolfor reasoning about uncertainty. The critique also questionsthe significance of partial logic. Received for publication 8 November 2007.     

The Senses Considered as One Perceptual System

ABSTRACT

J. J. Gibson (1966) rejected many classical assumptions about perception but retained 1 that dates back to classical antiquity: the assumption of separate senses. We suggest that Gibson's retention of this assumption compromised his novel concept of perceptual systems. We argue that lawful, 1:1 specification of the animal–environment interaction, which is necessary for perception to be direct, cannot exist in individual forms of ambient energy, such as light, or sound. We argue that specification exists exclusively in emergent, higher order patterns that extend across different forms of ambient energy. These emergent, higher order patterns constitute the global array. If specification exists exclusively in the global array, then direct perception cannot be based upon detection of patterns that are confined to individual forms of ambient energy and, therefore, Gibson's argument for the existence of several distinct perceptual systems cannot be correct. We argue that the senses function as a single, irreducible perceptual system that is sensitive exclusively to patterns in the global array. That is, rather than distinct perceptual systems there exists only 1 perceptual system.     

Medicine and Music: Three Relations Considered

Two well-recognised, but inherently reductionist, relations between medicine and music are the attempted neuro-scientific understanding of responses to music and interest in music's contributions to clinical therapy. This paper proposes a third relation whereby music is seen as an organising metaphor for clinical medicine as a practice. Both music and clinical medicine affirm human well-being, and both do this inter alia through varieties of skilful, crafted yet spontaneous mutual engagement between a 'performer' and an 'audience'. I argue that this organising metaphor offers a corrective to the reductionist influences of the first two relations, illuminates a number of medicine's important features, and reaffirms the existential as being at the core of medicine's telos.     

Perception2

The article is an overview of some central philosophical problems associated with perception. It discusses what distinguishes perception from other sensory capacities and from conception. It discusses anti‐individualism, a view according to which the nature of a perceptual state is dependent not just causally but for its identity or ‘essence’ on relations to a normal environment in which systems containing that state were formed. It discusses different views about epistemic warrant. By emphasising the deep ways in which human and animal perceptual systems, especially visual systems, are similar, it criticises a dominant view of the last century, in both philosophy and large parts of psychology, according to which a range of sophisticated supplementary abilities have to be learned before a child can perceive objective features of the physical world.     

Distance Perception

ABSTRACT— Distance perception seems to be an incredible achievement if it is construed as being based solely on static retinal images. Information provided by such images is sparse at best. On the other hand, when the perceptual context is taken to be one in which people are acting in natural environments, the informational bases for distance perception become abundant. There are, however, surprising consequences of studying people in action. Nonvisual factors, such as people's goals and physiological states, also influence their distance perceptions. Although the informational specification of distance becomes redundant when people are active, paradoxically, many distance-related actions sidestep the need to perceive distance at all.     

Moral Perception

Abstract: In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non‐moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties couldn't operate in much the same way that our perception of these complex non‐moral properties operates. I then defend the moral perception view from two challenging objections that have yet to be adequately addressed. The first objection is that the moral perception view has implausible commitments concerning the morally blind, people who would claim not to perceive wrongness. The second objection is that the moral perception view is not really compatible with a wide range of the main candidate moral theories. I argue that the moral empiricist has plausible responses to both of these objections. I then address three residual concerns that my defense raises.     

以人为本的价值观

从哲学上看,尽管我们的存在论和认识论在事实上是要以人为本的,但"以人为本"却并不是一个存在论和认识论的命题,而是一个纯粹的价值观命题.我们在理解贯彻"以人为本"原则时,需要牢牢把握它的价值观特征.