The impact of magnitude of harm and perceived difficulty of making reparations on group‐based guilt and reparation towards victims of historical harm

The present research investigates how reading stories about past mistreatment of children who had been in institutional care affects support for reparations, perceived difficulty of reparations and group‐based guilt were investigated in two experiments. In Study 1 we showed that, when the stories increased in perceived harm, so did the perceived difficulty of making reparations whereas group‐based guilt decreased. Furthermore, both perceived difficulty of making reparations and group‐based guilt predicted support for reparation. It was suggested that these findings were due to a natural confound between the severity of harm and the difficulty of reparations. Study 2 included a direct manipulation of perceived difficulty that was intended to weaken or strengthen the ability to make reparations. This study demonstrated stronger group‐based guilt when reparations were potentially possible and not when they are impossible. Moreover, support for reparations varied as a function of perceived difficulty of reparations and group‐based guilt mediated that relationship. The research has two key implications. First, advocates of reparations as a mechanism for reconciliation and community healing need to consider the degree to which reparations are perceived to be possible and consider ways of addressing those perceptions. Second, the research provides an experimental demonstration to the power of stories about experience to bolster support for social change. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings

Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch the plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group to intend (in the relevant sense) is for its members to be jointly committed to intend that such-and-such as a body. Individual group members need not be directly involved in the formation of the intention in order to participate in such a joint commitment. The core concept of joint commitment is in an important way holistic, not being reducible to a set of personal commitments over which each party holds sway. Parties to a group intention so understood can reasonably see the resulting action as "ours" as opposed to "theirs" and thus appropriately respond to the action's badness with a feeling of guilt, even when they themselves are morally innocent in the matter. I label the feeling in question a feeling of "membership guilt." A number of standard philosophical claims about the nature of guilt feelings are thrown into question by my argument.     

What do the TOSCA guilt and shame scales really measure: Affect or action?

Psychologists have long used the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA) as an instrument for empirically distinguishing between trait emotions of guilt and shame. Recent assessments of the internal structure of the TOSCA guilt scale suggest that it may not measure the experience of guilt, but rather motivation to make amends for personal wrongdoing. In contrast, TOSCA shame may better assess the tendency to experience negative self-conscious affect. Previous research did not take into account that TOSCA guilt theoretically should only predict emotions in a situation of wrongdoing; we put this idea to the test in two studies. Experimental, but not control, participants received believable feedback that they had shown involuntary prejudice towards a member of a minority group. In both studies TOSCA guilt predicted reparative action after feedback was given, including expressing non-prejudiced views and recommending financial compensation to the minority group. However, TOSCA guilt had no relationship with feelings of guilt or shame after expressing prejudice. In contrast, TOSCA shame was a better predictor of feelings of guilt, shame and other self-critical emotions, but did not predict compensatory action. These findings suggest motivation rather than emotion as a mechanism behind past findings involving TOSCA guilt.     

How a “Reasonable Doubt” Instruction Affects Decisions of Guilt

Jurors are instructed to render a guilty verdict if they feel the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury is often told that this does not mean an absolute certainty of guilt and that even if it were possible to imagine a scenario in which the defendant is innocent, a guilty verdict may still be appropriate. Here, participants read a case summary. They were either told to say that the defendant was guilty if they believed in guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or were given more detailed instruction stressing that they did not have to be absolutely certain of guilt to give a guilty verdict. In Experiment 1, participants provided “think-aloud” protocols. Content analysis revealed that those who were given this instruction often used the phrase reasonable doubt to justify their guilty verdicts by saying that although they were not certain of the defendant's guilt, their belief exceeded the reasonable doubt threshold. None of the participants in the control group did this. Experiment 2 was designed to test if the instruction affected belief in guilt and the reasonable doubt threshold quantitatively. The instruction affected both people's belief in guilt and the threshold that they used to define reasonable doubt. The implied values for reasonable doubt were 63% for those who received the instruction and 77% for the control group. Implications for jury decision making are discussed.     

Shame and Guilt—Do They Really Differ in Their Focus of Evaluation? Wanting to Change the Self and Behavior in Response to Ingroup Immorality

Shame and guilt are often theorized to differ on a self versus behavior focus. However, we propose that this is not true when taking a group perspective. In our field study, 196 communal participants were confronted with historical ingroup immorality. Results showed that participants who were old enough to have understood what happened in that time-period felt more guilt and shame than did those who were too young. Partly due to their ingroup anger, shame motivated an intention to change the ingroup self and behavior. In contrast, partly due to personal anger, guilt motivated an intention to change personal self and behavior. This suggests that the distinction between shame and guilt are not as clear-cut as previous research have assumed.     

The self‐regulatory role of anticipated group‐based shame and guilt in inhibiting in‐group favoritism

In three studies, we examined whether the anticipation of group‐based guilt and shame inhibits in‐group favoritism. In Studies 1 and 2, anticipated group‐based shame negatively predicted in‐group favoritism; in neither study did anticipated group‐based guilt uniquely predict in‐group favoritism. In Study 3, we orthogonally manipulated anticipated group‐based shame and guilt. Here, we found that the shame (but not the guilt) manipulation had a significant inhibitory effect on in‐group favoritism. Anticipated group‐based shame (but not guilt) promotes egalitarian intergroup behavior. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Sins of Their Fathers: When Current Generations Are Held to Account for the Transgressions of Previous Generations

When are current generations held accountable for transgressions committed by previous generations? In two studies, we test the prediction that current generations will only be assigned guilt for past atrocities when victim group members perceive high levels of cultural continuity between historical perpetrators and the current generation within the perpetrator group. Japanese participants were presented with information describing the current generation of Americans as either similar or dissimilar in personality to the Americans who were implicated in dropping the atomic bomb on Japan during World War II. The results of both studies revealed that victim group members assigned more guilt to current Americans when they perceived high (compared to low) outgroup continuity, and they did so relatively independently of the transgressor group's guilt expressions.     

On the relationship between responsibility and guilt: antecedent appraisal or elaborated appraisal?

Three studies are reported in which we examined the relation between responsibility and guilt. Results from Study 1 suggested that responsibility increased as a function of guilt, but that the reverse relation did not emerge. In the second and third studies we primed either responsibility or guilt and examined how these primes influenced subsequent appraisals for novel events. We also used different manipulations of responsibility and guilt. In Study 2 guilt was operationalized as negative interpersonal consequences as evidenced by the reactions of others. Responsibility was varied by manipulating the controllability of negative outcomes. In Study 3 responsibility was manipulated in terms of the severity of negative consequences for oneself. Results of both studies showed that guilt primes gave rise to perceptions of responsibility but that responsibility primes did not affect perceptions of guilt. We conclude that responsibility is best regarded as an elaborated appraisal generated by guilt, rather than an antecedent of guilt. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reduction of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity: the role of leader accountability and proneness to guilt

Two experiments contrasted interactions between group leaders with interactions between individuals in a mixed-motive setting. Consistent with the idea that being accountable to the in-group implies normative pressure to benefit the in-group, Experiment 1 found that accountable leaders were more competitive than individuals. Consistent with the idea that being unaccountable to the in-group implies normative pressure to be cooperative and that high guilt proneness provides motivation to be moral, Experiment 2 found that when guilt proneness was high, unaccountable leaders were less competitive than accountable leaders and did not differ significantly from individuals. In other words, the robust interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect was eliminated when groups had unaccountable leaders who were high in guilt proneness.     

Self-compassion Improves Parental Well-being in Response to Challenging Parenting Events

Shame and guilt are common during the course of parenting and can reflect feelings of “bad self “and “bad behaviour” in relation to parenting events. Self-compassion is known to be beneficial for well-being by reducing negative emotions, yet there is little research examining whether self-compassion might reduce parental guilt and shame. The current study examined the effects of dispositional and induced self-compassion on guilt and shame in a sample of 167 parents (Mage = 37.23, SD = 6.73, 83.1% female) of children ≤12?years recruited online. After completing baseline measures, parents were randomly assigned to recall a guilt versus shame provoking parenting event, and randomly allocated to either a self-compassion prompt versus a control condition. Analyses confirmed that those who received the self-compassion prompt reported higher levels of self-compassion, and reduced feelings of guilt and shame compared to the control group. Effects did not differ as a function of the guilt versus shame instructions. Multivariate analyses revealed that, when controlling for dispositional self-compassion, and baseline guilt and shame, differences between conditions were maintained for post-manipulation guilt and shame. Findings extend our understanding of the role of self-compassion for improving well-being when dealing with the challenges of parenting.     

Race,Rape, and Bias: Distortion of Prior Odds and Meaning Changes

Two experiments were conducted to investigate how racial bias affects juror decision making. Three sources of bias were studied: (1) prior probabilities of guilt, (2) distortion of the meaning of evidence, and (3) differential weighting of information. A paired comparison technique employed in the first study revealed that pretrial probabilities of guilt were greater when the victim was White than when she was Black. In the second experiment, a different group of subjects viewed one of four videotaped simulated rape trials in which seven segments of testimony had been previously rated as pro-prosecution, pro-defense, or neutral. During the trial, subjects rated each segment on three different scales: prosecution, defense, and degree of defendant guilt. Results indicated that neutral evidence was seen as more favorable to prosecution for a White victim compared to a Black victim. Evidence which favored either prosecution or defense was not distorted. Regression analyses revealed a positive relationship between estimates of guilt and distortion of evidence. The weight or importance of the evidence did not vary as a function of victim or defendant race. Years of recommended imprisonment indicated greater severity toward the Black assailant of a White woman. The results suggest that bias in favor of White victims occurs both in the assessment of pretrial probabilities and perception of evidence.     

An assessment of decision-making as a possible factor in the age-related loss of contrast sensitivity

The possibility that changes in decision-making may contribute to the age-related decline in contrast sensitivity has been investigated in nineteen young subjects (ages 21-38 years) and twenty-seven old subjects (ages 55-92 years). A signal detection paradigm was employed in which the detection of stationary sinusoidal grating patterns was measured at 3 and 15 cycles deg-1 for a range of contrasts which were psychophysically equivalent for each subject. A decline in contrast sensitivity with age at the spatial frequencies studied was confirmed for contrast thresholds obtained both by the ascending method and from the 50% hit rate for detection of the grating pattern. The criterion adopted for decision-making, expressed as both beta and percentage bias, did not change significantly between young and old subjects at 15 cycles deg-1. At 3 cycles deg-1, criterion beta did not change significantly at X0.8, X1.0, or X1.2 contrast threshold, but at contrast giving 50% hit rate there was a significant increase with age. The percentage bias increased significantly at contrast threshold but not at 50% hit rate. It is inferred from the results that the loss of contrast sensitivity was not accountable in terms of the adoption of a more conservative criterion by older subjects. Hence visual loss in ageing is attributed to changes within the visual pathway rather than within higher decision-making centres.     

A group approach to guilt in depressive and suicidal patients

Summary A psychiatrist and a pastoral psychologist considered the problem of guilt as a source of alienation in depressed and suicidal patients by using a four-dimensional approach in a group psychotherapy setting. This involved functioning as cotherapists representing theological and psychiatric orientations and utilizing both didactic and insight-oriented approaches to elicit and explore meaningful material related to guilt feelings. With a number of exceptions, the patients did not appear to make a sharp distinction between the cotherapists' roles. The didactic openings on guilt served to provoke ready discussion of personal conflicts involving guilt feelings, especially in the silent patients who were not easily drawn into spontaneous discussion.     

How jurors use and misuse character evidence

The Federal Rules of Evidence allow defendants to offer testimony about their good character, but that testimony can be impeached with cross-examination or a rebuttal witness. It is assumed that jurors use the defense's character evidence (CE) to form guilt and conviction judgments but use impeachment evidence only to assess the character witness's credibility. Two experiments tested these assumptions by presenting mock jurors with various forms of CE and impeachment. Participants made trait ratings for the character witness and defendant and guilt and conviction judgments. Positive CE did not affect guilt or conviction judgments, but cross-examination caused a backlash in which judgments were harsher than when no CE was given. Using path analysis, the authors tested a model of the process by which CE and impeachment affect defendant and witness impressions and guilt and conviction judgments. Implications for juror decision making are discussed.     

高中生选科的自我-他人决策差异：预期内疚的作用

本研究首次探讨高中生选科的自我-他人决策差异。结果发现：（1）当科目难度与兴趣存在冲突时,个体倾向于为自己选择低难度低兴趣科目,而为他人选择高难度高兴趣科目;（2）自我-他人决策差异存在程度效应：为近的社会距离他人（朋友）选科时自我-他人决策差异缩小;（3）预期内疚在高中生选科的自我-他人决策差异中起中介作用：相较于为自己选科,为陌生人选择低难度低兴趣科目诱发更高的预期内疚,从而降低其为陌生人选择低难度低兴趣科目的偏好。这些发现拓展了自我-他人决策差异的研究范畴,对家长、学校和教育咨询公司的选科指导具有一定的参考价值。     

初中生内疚情绪体验的发展及其对公平行为的影响

为探讨初中生内疚情绪体验的发展特点及其对公平行为的影响,研究1采用自编的初中生内疚情绪体验情境问卷,对335名七、八、九年级初中生的内疚情绪体验特点进行测查,研究2采用独裁者博弈游戏研究范式,考察了120名初中生的内疚情绪体验对不同情境中公平行为的影响,结果表明：初中生的内疚情绪体验随年级的增长而降低,且在性别、他人评价、情境类型以及情境类型与他人评价的交互作用上存在显著差异。在内疚情绪唤醒状态下,初中生在两人情境中分配给搭档的代币数显著高于分配给自己的代币数;初中生在三人情境中分配代币的数量依次从分配给搭档、自己和第三人而递减,但与控制组没有显著差异。研究说明初中生的内疚情绪体验对两人情境中的公平行为有积极影响,而对三人情境中的公平行为没有显著影响。     

Audiospatial integration

A method to examine audiospatial integration was developed through studies of normal and brain-injured patients. The method used a sound source sequentially outlining a spatial pattern within an array of 100 loudspeakers. For 48 subjects tested with this method, the presence or absence of visual cues had no effect in audiospatial processing. Eye movements also did not match the perceived sound patterns. Significantly higher hit rates were obtained by placing the panel of loudspeakers in front, behind or above the subject rather than on the left or right. These differences were observed with involuntary but not with voluntary head-fixation. Theoretical concepts of audiospatial processing are discussed.     

Impairment in judgement of the moral emotion guilt following orbitofrontal cortex damage

Although neuroimaging studies have provided evidence for an association between moral emotions and the orbitofrontal cortex, studies on patients with focal lesions using experimental probes of moral emotions are scarce. Here, we addressed this topic by presenting a moral emotion judgement task to patients with focal brain damage. Four judgement tasks in a simple pairwise choice paradigm were given to 72 patients with cerebrovascular disease. These tasks consisted of a perceptual line judgement task as a control task; the objects’ preference task as a basic preference judgement task; and two types of moral emotion judgement task, an anger task and a guilt task. A multiple linear regression analysis was performed on each set of task performance scores to take into account potential confounders. Performance on the guilt emotion judgement task negatively correlated with the orbitofrontal cortex damage, but not with the other variables. Results for the other judgement tasks did not reach statistical significance. The close association between orbitofrontal cortex damage and a decrease in guilt emotion judgement consistency might suggest that the orbitofrontal cortex plays a key role in the sense of guilt, a hallmark of morality.     

The effects of consensus requirements and multiple decisions on mock juror verdict preferences

After watching a simulated rape trial, prerecorded on videotape, mock jurors either did or did not expect to sentence a defendant following deliberation with or without a group verdict required. Both sentencing expectation and verdict requirement significantly elevated jurors' preference for conviction (and average ratings of guilt likelihood). Closer analyses of personal changes (before and after deliberation) in the distribution of opinions suggested that majorities favoring not guilty were more influential than guilty-favoring majorities; and, somewhat unexpectedly, minorities in juries which deliberated without a verdict required were more likely to change personal opinions than minorities in juries required to render a verdict. The overall social decision scheme confirmed earlier observations about the importance of the initial majority in determining the verdict; but the majority did not always prevail and there was a marked asymmetry (“defendant protection”) in its action.