Secondhand information and social judgment

This research investigates how secondhand impressions of other people differ from those based on firsthand information. It was hypothesized that secondhand impressions are often more extreme because secondhand accounts of another person's actions frequently fail to convey adequately the role of mitigating circumstances and situational constraints in producing that person's behavior. Experiments 1 and 2 tested this hypothesis by exposing “first generation” subjects to information about a target person, having them rate the target on several trait and attribution scales, and having them describe the target person's actions to a group of “second generation” subjects. As predicted, second generation subjects made more extreme ratings of the target than their first generation counterparts. Content analyses of the accounts transmitted by first generation subjects indicated that they did indeed underemphasize various situational qualifications of the target persons' behavior. Experiment 3 extended these findings by demonstrating that people's impressions of someone they have often heard about from a friend (but never met) are more extreme than their friends' more informed impressions.     

The linear perspective information in ground surface representation and distance judgment

Most ground surfaces contain various types of texture gradient information that serve as depth cues for space perception. We investigated how linear perspective, a type of texture gradient information on the ground, affects judged absolute distance and eye level. Phosphorescent elements were used to display linear perspective information on the floor in an otherwise dark room. We found that observers were remarkably receptive to such information. Changing the configuration of the linear perspective information from parallel to converging resulted in relatively larger judged distances and lower judged eye levels. These findings support the proposals that (1) the visual system has a bias for representing an image of converging lines as one of parallel lines on a downward-slanting surface and (2) the convergence point of a converging-lines image represents the eye level. Finally, we found that the visual system may be less sensitive to the manipulation of compression gradient information than of linear perspective information.     

Narrative unity and clinical judgment

Alasdair MacIntyre's recent thinking both about the concept of a practice and the existence of narrative unity in human life raises important questions about how we should view clinical medicine today. Is it possible for clinical medicine to pursue patient well-being in a society (allegedly) afflicted with what he calls ‘modernity’? Here it is argued that MacIntyre's pessimistic view of the individual in contemporary society makes his call for patient autonomy in the clinical setting pointless. Finally, recent work in gerontology is cited to make three points: first, MacIntyre's pessimism about us is too extreme; second, the concept of a ‘fictionalized’ personal history is closer to reality than either MacIntyre's notion of narrative unity or the ideas of his imagined opponent (Sartre); and finally, we should not expect clinical medicine to produce patient well-being, when this is understood narratively.     

Experience and validity of clinical judgment: The illusory correlation

Mental health experts often justify diagnostic and predictive judgments on the basis of “years of experience” with a particular type of person. Justification by experience is common in legal settings, and can have profound consequences for the person about whom such judgments are made. However, research shows that the validity of clinical judgment and amount of clinical experience are unrelated. The role of experience in learning varies as a function of what is to be learned. Experiments show that learning conceptual categories depends upon: (1) the learner's having clear hypotheses about the possible rule for category membership prior to receiving feedback about which instances belong to the category, and, (2) the systematic nature of such feedback, especially about erroneous categorizations. Since neither of these conditions is satisfied in clinical contexts in psychology, the subsequent failure of experience per se to enhance diagnostic or predictive validity is unsurprising. Claims that “I can tell on the basis of my experience with people of a particular type (e.g., child abusers) that this person is of that type (e.g., a child abuser)” are simply invalid.     

Causal judgment from contingency information: Relation between subjective reports and individual tendencies in judgment

In two experiments, participants made causal judgments from contingency information for problems with different objective contingencies. After the judgment task, the participants reported how their judgments had changed following each type of contingency information. Some reported idiosyncratic tendencies--in other words, tendencies contrary to those expected under associative-learning and normative rule induction models of contingency judgment. These idiosyncratic reports tended to be better predictors of the judgments of those who made them than did the models. The results are consistent with the view that causal judgment from contingency information is made, at least in part, by deliberative use of acquired and sometimes idiosyncratic notions of evidential value, the outcomes of which tend, in aggregate, to be highly correlated with the outcomes of normative procedures.     

Integration of information in a clinical judgment task, an empirical comparison of six models.

Six models were compared for their effectiveness in reproducing six clinical psychologists' judgments of 38 patients on intelligence, ability to establish contact, and control of affect and impulses. In two of the models, subjective weights were used in the prediction of a judge's ratings. The judges based their judgments solely on verbal protocols from the Rorschach, a sentence completion test, and the Thematic Apperception test. The stability of the linear aspect of the judgment process was very high but decreased as the depth of interpretation of the rating variable increased. The nonlinear aspect of the judgment process had considerably low stability. In general, a model based on subjective weights was most effective in reproducing the judges' ratings.     

Multimethod study of clinical judgment

Expert and novice clinicians judged the likelihood of disease alternatives and gave thinking-aloud protocols as they evaluated simulated cases of congenital heart disease. Specific combinations of cues in the patient data were manipulated to create alternate versions of a single case so that the use of critical cues could be identified. Analyses of variance of subjects' disease judgments revealed differences between expert and novice clinicians in their use of critical cues and cue combinations. Analyses of the thinking-aloud protocols revealed that clinicians with different degrees of expertise employed different interpretations of patient data cues as well as qualitatively distinct "lines of reasoning" in reaching clinical judgments.     

The impact of information from similar or different advisors on judgment

People rely on others’ advice to make judgments on a daily basis. In three studies, we examine the differential impacts of similarity between the source of that advice and the person making the judgment in two settings: judging others’ behavior and judging one’s own actions. We find that similarity interacts with the target of the judgment. In particular, information received from a different advisor is more heavily weighed than from a similar advisor in judging others’ actions, but information from a similar advisor is more heavily weighed than from a different advisor in judging one’s own. We provide two potential explanations for this interaction, difficulty of the judgment and informativeness of the advice. Our analyses show a moderated mediating role of informativeness and difficulty in the relationship between the advisor’s similarity by judgment type interaction and advice use.     

Motivated information processing in group judgment and decision making.

This article expands the view of groups as information processors into a motivated information processing in groups (MIP-G) model by emphasizing, first, the mixed-motive structure of many group tasks and, second, the idea that individuals engage in more or less deliberate information search and processing. The MIP-G model postulates that social motivation drives the kind of information group members attend to, encode, and retrieve and that epistemic motivation drives the degree to which new information is sought and attended to, encoded, and retrieved. Social motivation and epistemic motivation are expected to influence, alone and in combination, generating problem solutions, disseminating information, and negotiating joint decisions. The MIP-G model integrates the influence of many individual and situational differences and combines insight on human thinking with group-level interaction process and decision making.     

Effects of amount of information on judgment accuracy and confidence

When a person evaluates his or her confidence in a judgment, what is the effect of receiving more judgment-relevant information? We report three studies that show when judges receive more information, their confidence increases more than their accuracy, producing substantial confidence–accuracy discrepancies. Our results suggest that judges do not adjust for the cognitive limitations that reduce their ability to use additional information effectively. We place these findings in a more general framework of understanding the cues to confidence that judges use and how those cues relate to accuracy and calibration.     

The influence of improper sets of information on judgment: how irrelevant information can bias judged probability

This article introduces 2 new sources of bias in probability judgment, discrimination failure and inhibition failure, which are conceptualized as arising from an interaction between error prone memory processes and a support theory like comparison process. Both sources of bias stem from the influence of irrelevant information on participants' probability judgments, but they postulate different mechanisms for how irrelevant information affects judgment. The authors used an adaptation of the proactive interference (PI) and release from PI paradigm to test the effect of irrelevant information on judgment. The results of 2 experiments support the discrimination failure account of the effect of PI on probability judgment. In addition, the authors show that 2 commonly used measures of judgment accuracy, absolute and relative accuracy, can be dissociated. The results have broad implications for theories of judgment.     

Framing effects in judgment tasks with varying amounts of information

Subjects were asked to make evaluations in each of three tasks—a gambling task, a consumer judgment task, and a student evaluation task. Each task involved two important attributes, but information about one attribute was missing on some trials. Half of the subjects received a version of the task in which a key attribute was presented in positive terms (e.g., probability of winning a gamble) and half received a version in which that same attribute was presented in negative terms (e.g., probability of losing a gamble). Even though the information was objectively equivalent in the two versions of each task, there were two significant framing effects. (1) In all tasks, responses to two-attribute stimuli were more favorable in the positive condition than in the negative condition. (2) When the key attribute was missing, evaluations of one-attribute stimuli relative to evaluations of two-attribute stimuli were lower in the positive condition than in the negative condition. Results were discussed in terms of the constructs of prospect theory and information integration theory.