Mnemonic convergence in a social network: Collective memory and extended influence

Research on the social influences on remembering has focused on how people influence one another's memory through direct conversation. This project examined indirect influence, that is, the influence of those to whom one may be connected through a social network. We extend Christakis and Fowler's (2007. The spread of obesity in a large social network over 32 years. The New England Journal of Medicine, 357(4), 370–379) discovery that factors may propagate across several degrees of influence; influences of social remembering may also propagate. In a naturalistic study, we tracked weekly recollections of a narrative in a small social network. Two individuals’ mnemonic convergence could be predicted by their degree of separation. Directly and indirectly connected pairs show more convergent remembering than unconnected pairs, indicating that conversation is not the only route by which two individuals may come to hold a shared representation of the past. This propagation of memories across the links of a social network is an important means by which a group converges on a collective memory.     

Collaborative recall and collective memory: what happens when we remember together?

Studies of collective memory have traditionally been the domain of philosophers and sociologists, while cognitive psychologists have largely investigated memory at the level of the individual. However, within cognitive psychology there is a variety of psychological theories and experimental paradigms that have been used to study the process and outcomes of remembering in groups. In this paper we review the research on group remembering and draw together findings from different traditions. In doing so, we aim to answer a series of questions about the outcomes and consequences of recalling in groups, and the particular features of groups and of memories that may be conducive to the formation of a collective memory. In clarifying what we know and what is yet to be studied about group memory, we point the way forward for a cognitive psychological study of collective memory.     

From the individual to the collective: The emergence of a psychological approach to collective memory

Throughout much of the 20th century, psychologists have largely examined mnemonic processes through an individualistic lens at the expense of social influences. However, this perspective began to change toward the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century, when psychologists began to better appreciate the social nature of remembering. In the present paper, we focus on a relatively recent and important evolution of this line of research: the emergence of a psychological approach to collective memory. Using an epidemiological approach to collective memory, we attempt to distil the extant and relevant psychological research and focus on how (collective) memories transmit, converge, and remain stable over time while considering the bidirectional relationship between collective memory and a mnemonic community's identity. We conclude with a discussion of research areas that psychologists should examine moving forward, which will ultimately provide a more holistic understanding of how collective memories emerge, remain stable, and/or change over time.     

What we remember and what we tell: The effects of culture and self-priming on memory representations and narratives

Two experiments were conducted to explore culture and self-priming effects on memories of Caucasian and Asian American adults (N = 526). In the experimental conditions, either the collective or private self was primed prior to retrieval. Participants then described their earliest childhood memories (Study 1) or recalled a fictional story (Study 2). Systematic cultural differences in memory content were obtained across both memory tasks, independent of priming conditions. Caucasians tended to recall specific, one-moment-in-time events that focused on the individual as the central character. Asians tended to provide memories of general, routine events centring on collective activities and social interactions. Priming effects also emerged: memory content reflected the particular aspect of the self being primed. Findings are discussed in light of the interactive relation between memory representations and memory narratives and the role culture plays in remembering.     

What we remember and what we tell: the effects of culture and self-priming on memory representations and narratives

Two experiments were conducted to explore culture and self-priming effects on memories of Caucasian and Asian American adults (N=526). In the experimental conditions, either the collective or private self was primed prior to retrieval. Participants then described their earliest childhood memories (Study 1) or recalled a fictional story (Study 2). Systematic cultural differences in memory content were obtained across both memory tasks, independent of priming conditions. Caucasians tended to recall specific, one-moment-in-time events that focused on the individual as the central character. Asians tended to provide memories of general, routine events centering on collective activities and social interactions. Priming effects also emerged: memory content reflected the particular aspect of the self being primed. Findings are discussed in light of the interactive relation between memory representations and memory narratives and the role culture plays in remembering.     

You say tomato? Collaborative remembering leads to more false memories for intimate couples than for strangers

Research on memory conformity shows that collaborative remembering--typically in the form of discussion--can influence people's memories. One question that remains is whether it matters with whom we discuss our memories. To address this question we compared people's memories for an event after they discussed that event with either their romantic partner or a stranger. Pairs of subjects watched slightly different versions of a movie, and then discussed some details from the movie, but not others. Subjects were better at remembering non-discussed details than discussed details: when remembering discussed details they incorrectly reported information from their partner's version instead of their own. In addition, subjects who discussed the event with their romantic partner (rather than with a stranger) were even more likely to report false memories. We discuss our findings in relation to other research on memory conformity, social influences on false memories, and memory systems within romantic relationships.     

Why I remember that: The influence of contextual factors on beliefs about everyday memory

In the present study, we examined the role of contextual factors in beliefs about remembering personal experiences. Specifically, we examined why individuals think that they remember experiences in everyday life and whether the reasons for remembering varied as a function of recall context, memory theme, and culture. In Experiment 1, we examined young adults’ reported memories in two hypothetical contexts. In Experiment 2, memories were reported in response to cue words in European American and Chinese young adults. The results indicated that social sharing contexts appeared to favor social functions, whereas private reminiscence contexts tended to favor nonfunctional reasons for remembering and, to a lesser extent, directive functions. The European Americans reported more functional reasons for remembering, whereas the Chinese were more likely to report external cues as a reason for remembering. Finally, self functions were rarely reported. The results are interpreted in light of theories of memory functions and the role of contextual factors on remembering.     

Collaboration inflation: Egocentric source monitoring errors following collaborative remembering

Following collaborative remembering, people may adopt their partner's contributions as their own memory. In two studies, we asked people to study partially overlapping lists of words. During collaborative remembering, dyads either worked to include all words no matter who studied them or limited recall to only words studied by both dyad members. This differential focus on source information during collaborative recall impacted performance on a later source memory test. Nonetheless we found frequent source monitoring errors that displayed an egocentric bias. People were more likely to claim their partner's contributions as their own memories than attribute their memories to their partners. In collaborative remembering, people work to construct an agreed upon version of the past that quickly becomes each individual's memory.     

On the formation of collective memories: The role of a dominant narrator

To test our hypothesis that conversations can contribute to the formation of collective memory, we asked participants to study stories and to recall them individually (pregroup recollection), then as a group (group recounting), and then once again individually (postgroup recollection). One way that postgroup collective memories can be formed under these circumstances is if unshared pregroup recollections in the group recounting influences others' postgroup recollections. In the present research, we explored (using tests of recall and recognition) whether the presence of a dominant narrator can facilitate the emergence of unshared pregroup recollections in a group recounting and whether this emergence is associated with changes in postgroup recollections. We argue that the formation of a collective memory through conversation is not inevitable but is limited by cognitive factors, such as conditions for social contagion, and by situational factors, such as the presence of a narrator.     

On the persuadability of memory: Is changing people's memories no more than changing their minds?

The observation of parallels between the memory distortion and persuasion literatures leads, quite logically, to the appealing notion that people can be ‘persuaded’ to change their memories. Indeed, numerous studies show that memory can be influenced and distorted by a variety of persuasive tactics, and the theoretical accounts commonly used by researchers to explain episodic and autobiographical memory distortion phenomena can generally predict and explain these persuasion effects. Yet, despite these empirical and theoretical overlaps, explicit reference to persuasion and attitude‐change research in the memory distortion literature is surprisingly rare. In this paper, we argue that stronger theoretical foundations are needed to draw the memory distortion and persuasion literatures together in a productive direction. We reason that theoretical approaches to remembering that distinguish (false) beliefs in the occurrence of events from (false) memories of those events – compatible with a source monitoring approach – would be beneficial to this end. Such approaches, we argue, would provide a stronger platform to use persuasion findings to enhance the psychological understanding of memory distortion.     

On the cultural constitution of collective memory

The study of collective memory needs to take into consideration the cultural context in which the remembering takes place. In this article, I analyse how functional variations of collective memory across cultures may influence the processes, practices, and outcomes of collective remembering. I then discuss the transitory nature of culture in affecting collective memory across an individual's lifespan as well as across time and generations. I borrow recent findings from cross-cultural research on autobiographical memory to illustrate the cultural effects, and propose a new approach to studying collective memory in which the individual, the collective, and the culture are treated as a single unit of analysis.     

Epistemic Generation in Memory

Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For that reason, memory can produce justification for belief through the process of remembering. This is why a subject may be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of memory even if, in the past, she was not justified in believing it through any other source. The resulting picture of memory is a picture wherein the epistemically generative role of memory turns out to be grounded on its intentionally generative role.     

Retelling Is Not the Same as Recalling: Implications for Memory

ABSTRACT— In contrast to laboratory free recall (which emphasizes detailed and accurate remembering), conversational retellings depend upon the speaker's goals, the audience, and the social context more generally. Because memories are frequently retrieved in social contexts, retellings of events are often incomplete or distorted, with consequences for later memory. Selective rehearsal contributes to the memory effects, as does the schema activated during retelling. Retellings can be linked to memory errors observed in domains such as eyewitness testimony and flashbulb memories; in all of these situations, people retell events rather than engage in verbatim remembering.     

Cultural differences in levels of autonomous orientation in autobiographical remembering in posttraumatic stress disorder

This study investigated cultural differences in levels of autonomous orientation (the tendency to express autonomy and self‐determination) in autobiographical remembering in those with and without posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Trauma survivors with PTSD and without PTSD from individualistic and collectivistic cultures (N = 101) provided self‐defining, everyday and trauma autobiographical memories. Memories were coded for levels of autonomous orientation and interdependence. It was found trauma survivors from individualistic cultures with PTSD had lower levels of autonomous orientation in their autobiographical remembering than trauma survivors from individualistic cultures without PTSD. In contrast, trauma survivors from collectivistic cultures with PTSD had higher levels of autonomous orientation in their autobiographical remembering than trauma survivors from collectivistic cultures without PTSD. The results suggest the cultural distinction in self‐impacts on the relationship between the nature of autobiographical remembering and posttraumatic psychological adjustment. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Towards a psychology of collective memory

This article discusses the place of psychology within the now voluminous social scientific literature on collective memory. Many social scientists locate collective memories in the social resources that shape them. For scholars adopting this perspective, collective memories are viewed as transcending individuals; that is, as being "in the world". Others recognise that, in the final analysis, individuals must remember collective as well as individual memories. These scholars treat collective memories as shared individual memories. We attempt to bridge these two approaches by distinguishing between the design of social resources and memory practices, on one hand, and on the other, the effectiveness of each in forming and transforming the memories held by individuals and the psychological mechanisms that guide this effectiveness.     

Collective memory: conceptual foundations and theoretical approaches

In order to outline the conceptual landscape that frames discussions of collective memory, three oppositions are proposed: collective memory versus collective remembering; history versus collective memory; and individual memory versus collective remembering. From this perspective collective remembering is viewed as an active process that often involves contention and contestation among people rather than a static body of knowledge that they possess. Collective remembering is also viewed as privileging identity formation and contestation over the sort of objective representation of the past that is the aspiration of formal historical analysis. And finally, while collective remembering involves individual minds, it also suggests something more in the form of socially situated individuals, a claim that can usefully be formulated in terms of how members of a groups share a common set of cultural tools (e.g., narrative forms) and similar content.     

MEMORY ALTERING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE CAPACITY TO FORGIVE: WESTWORLD AND VOLF IN DIALOGUE

I explore the impact of memory altering technologies in the science fiction drama (2016–2020) in order to show that unreconciled altered traumatic memory may lead to a dystopian breakdown of society. I bring Miroslav Volf's theological perspectives on memory into conversation with the plot of Westworld in order to reveal connections between memory altering technologies and humanity's responsibility to remember rightly. Using Volf's theology of remembering as an interpretive lens, I analyze characters’ inability to remember rightly while recalling partial memories of their trauma. In virtue of this examination, I contend that memory altering technologies may inhibit individuals from relational processes of healing, such as forgiveness. Consequently, I argue that this study leads to a richer understanding of the potential that memory altering technologies have for undermining humanity's ability to interact in a relational capacity, specifically in terms of forgiveness.     

The development of collective remembering

This essay outlines a sociocultural, developmental approach to collective memory. This work is grounded in Halbwachs' (1950/1980) theory of collective memory and in recent prospective studies of collective remembering within families from early childhood through adolescence. The claim is that the basic process of collective remembering is present from the earliest conversations about the past between parents and children, but it is not until adolescence that collective memory is informed by family stories and by history. There are both positive and negative consequences of collective remembering as a function of the nature of the collective. In conclusion, researchers are urged to broaden their view of the collective in their studies of autobiographical and collective memory.     

Representing Rebellion: Memory and Social Conflict in Sixteenth-Century England

This paper takes key insights from social psychologists and interrogates them as methodological tools for historians, applying these theories to a large-scale uprising that occurred in southern England in 1549. In a social order based on notions of paternalism and deference, a diverse band of rebels were able to forge an alliance strong enough to pose a serious threat to local authorities in Norwich. Social psychological approaches to collective memory and evolving social representations are deployed to highlight contested memories of rebellion as central to Tudor state formation, and to understand how a rebel group with many competing interests was able to sustain their alliance. I argue that the imperative to understand individual behaviour in a collective context illuminates the way that this group could form a vision of the world which contradicted deferential social ideals without ranging themselves against central government. The article also suggests ways in which historical approaches can inform social psychological concepts.     

More than a feeling: Emotional cues impact the access and experience of autobiographical memories

Remembering is impacted by several factors of retrieval, including the emotional content of a memory cue. Here we tested how musical retrieval cues that differed on two dimensions of emotion—valence (positive and negative) and arousal (high and low)—impacted the following aspects of autobiographical memory recall: the response time to access a past personal event, the experience of remembering (ratings of memory vividness), the emotional content of a cued memory (ratings of event arousal and valence), and the type of event recalled (ratings of event energy, socialness, and uniqueness). We further explored how cue presentation affected autobiographical memory retrieval by administering cues of similar arousal and valence levels in a blocked fashion to one half of the tested participants, and randomly to the other half. We report three main findings. First, memories were accessed most quickly in response to musical cues that were highly arousing and positive in emotion. Second, we observed a relation between a cue and the elicited memory’s emotional valence but not arousal; however, both the cue valence and arousal related to the nature of the recalled event. Specifically, high cue arousal led to lower memory vividness and uniqueness ratings, but cues with both high arousal and positive valence were associated with memories rated as more social and energetic. Finally, cue presentation impacted both how quickly and specifically memories were accessed and how cue valence affected the memory vividness ratings. The implications of these findings for views of how emotion directs the access to memories and the experience of remembering are discussed.