Fairness,self-deception and political obligation

I offer a new account of fair-play obligations for non-excludable benefits received from the state. Firstly, I argue that non-acceptance of these benefits frees recipients of fairness obligations only when a counterfactual condition is met; i.e. when non-acceptance would hold up in the closest possible world in which recipients do not hold motivationally-biased beliefs triggered by a desire to free-ride. Secondly, I argue that because of common mechanisms of self-deception there will be recipients who reject these benefits without meeting the counterfactual condition. For this reason, I suggest that those who reject non-excludable benefits provided by the state have a duty to support their rejection with adequate reasons. Failing that, they can be permissibly treated as if they had fair-play obligations (although in fact they might not have them). Thus, I claim that there is a distinction, largely unappreciated, between the question of whether we have a duty of fairness to obey the law and the question of whether we can be permissibly treated as if we had one.     

Real self-deception

Self-deception is made unnecessarily puzzling by the assumption that it is an intrapersonal analog of ordinary interpersonal deception. In paradigmatic cases, interpersonal deception is intentional and involves some time at which the deceiver disbelieves what the deceived believes. The assumption that self-deception is intentional and that the self-deceiver believes that some proposition is true while also believing that it is false produces interesting conceptual puzzles, but it also produces a fundamentally mistaken view of the dynamics of self-deception. This target article challenges the assumption and presents an alternative view of the nature and etiology of self-deception. Drawing upon empirical studies of cognitive biases, it resolves familiar "paradoxes" about the dynamics of self-deception and the condition of being self-deceived. Conceptually sufficient conditions for self-deception are offered and putative empirical demonstrations of a kind of self-deception in which a subject believes that a proposition is true while also believing that it is false are criticized. Self-deception is neither irresolvably paradoxical nor mysterious, and it is explicable without the assistance of mental exotica. The key to understanding its dynamics is a proper appreciation of our capacity for acquiring and retaining motivationally biased beliefs.     

Robust,unconscious self-deception: Strategic and flexible

In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and psychological claims that the unconscious is rigid, ballistic, and of limited cognitive sophistication.     

Self awareness and the body image

What mental representations give us the sense of our body as a unique object in the world? We investigated this issue in the context of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), an illusion of body image in which a prosthetic hand brushed synchronously, but not asynchronously, with one’s own hand is perceived as actually being one’s hand. We conducted a large-scale study of the RHI, and used psychometric analysis to reveal the structure of the subjective experience of embodiment [Longo et al. (2008). What is embodiment? A psychometric approach. Cognition,107, 978-998]. Here, we use this dataset to investigate the relation between incorporation of a rubber hand into the body image and the perceived similarity between the participant’s hand and the rubber hand. Objective similarity (as measured by skin luminance, hand shape, and third-person similarity ratings) did not appear to influence participants’ experience of the RHI. Conversely, incorporation of the rubber hand into the body image did affect the similarity that participants perceived between their own hand and the rubber hand. Participants who had experienced the RHI perceived their hand and the rubber hand as significantly more similar than participants who had not experienced the illusion. That is, embodiment leads to perceived similarity, but perceived similarity does not lead to embodiment. Furthermore, similarity ratings following the illusion were selectively correlated with some components of embodiment, but not with others. These results suggest an important role of a mental body image in the perception of the relation between the self and others.     

Willful ignorance and self-deception

Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give no support to the idea that willful ignorance is a kind of self-deception. Afterwards an independent argument is adduced for excluding willful ignorance from this category. The crucial differences between the two phenomena are explored, as are the reasons why they are so easily conflated.     

Relationships between conscientiousness,self-efficacy,self-deception,and learning over time

The present study examined the dual mediating effects of self-efficacy and self-deception on the relationship between conscientiousness and learning over time. Data from 134 college students were used to investigate the relative impact of self-efficacy and self-deception. Consistent with the hypothesized model, conscientiousness was significantly and positively related to both early training self-efficacy and self-deception, and both self-efficacy and self-deception had significant effects on learning but in opposite directions. Furthermore, the relative impact of self-efficacy and self-deception on learning changed over time as expected. The negative effect of self-deception in early stages of training disappeared at later stages of training but the positive effects of self-efficacy remained. Support was not found for self-efficacy and self-deception as mediators of the conscientiousness-learning relationship.     

Social strategies in self-deception

How do people deceive themselves? I argue that although self-deception tends to be conceptualized as something that happens ‘within an individual’, it can also be a process that is distributed across the social context of a self-deceiver. In this paper I will, first, conceptually distinguish different strategies of such ‘social self-deception’. Second, I will incorporate these into the two main conceptualizations of self-deception: intentionalism and deflationism. Finally, I will show how the proposed re-conceptualization of self-deception can be beneficial to conceptual, moral and empirical research.     

Self and body esteem perception in multiple sclerosis

Self esteem and body esteem were examined in a group of 35 relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis (MS) patients using the Body Esteem Scale (BES) and the Eysenck Self Esteem Scale (ESES) and compared to age and sex matched normal controls. There were 23 females and 12 males in the MS patient's group; average age 38.9 years (range: 22-52). All participants completed the self-rated BES evaluating the following subscales: females - sexual attractiveness, physical condition and weight concern; males - physical attractiveness, physical condition and upper body strength. In addition all participants were scored, following a semi-structured interview, on the ESES. Psychiatric co-morbidity was excluded using a semi-structured interview by the consulting psychiatrist. All evaluations were carried out during the remitting phase. Statistical analysis, comparing patients to healthy controls, demonstrated lowered self-rating of the physical condition (males < 0.05, females < 0.001). On the other hand, no significant differences were found in the physical (male) or sexual (female)--attractiveness subscales. The mean ESES score in the patients group was 23.2 +/- 4.0, slightly above the reported average. The controls mean ESES was 28.4 +/- 3.6, (P < 0.05). No correlation was found between self and body esteem amongst M.S. patients. This study emphasizes impaired perception of body esteem in multiple sclerosis patients even in remission. The preservation of physical and sexual attractiveness may be related to the non-disfiguring nature of the disease. Preservation of self-esteem in MS patients suggests that body-esteem should be the focus of supportive treatment.     

Self and body esteem perception in multiple sclerosis

Self esteem and body esteem were examined in a group of 35 relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis (MS) patients using the Body Esteem Scale (BES) and the Eysenck Self Esteem Scale (ESES) and compared to age and sex matched normal controls. There were 23 females and 12 males in the MS patient's group; average age 38.9 years (range: 22-52). All participants completed the self-rated BES evaluating the following subscales: females - sexual attractiveness, physical condition and weight concern; males - physical attractiveness, physical condition and upper body strength. In addition all participants were scored, following a semi-structured interview, on the ESES. Psychiatric co-morbidity was excluded using a semi-structured interview by the consulting psychiatrist. All evaluations were carried out during the remitting phase. Statistical analysis, comparing patients to healthy controls, demonstrated lowered self-rating of the physical condition (males < 0.05, females < 0.001). On the other hand, no significant differences were found in the physical (male) or sexual (female)?attractiveness subscales. The mean ESES score in the patients group was 23.2 ± 4.0, slightly above the reported average. The controls mean ESES was 28.4 ± 3.6, (P < 0.05). No correlation was found between self and body esteem amongst M.S. patients. This study emphasizes impaired perception of body esteem in multiple sclerosis patients even in remission. The preservation of physical and sexual attractiveness may be related to the non-disfiguring nature of the disease. Preservation of self-esteem in MS patients suggests that body-esteem should be the focus of supportive treatment.     

Effort denial in self-deception

We propose a mixed belief model of self-deception. According to the theory, people distribute belief over two possible causal paths to an action, one where the action is freely chosen and one where it is due to factors outside of conscious control. Self-deceivers take advantage of uncertainty about the influence of each path on their behavior, and shift weight between them in a self-serving way. This allows them to change their behavior to provide positive evidence and deny doing so, enabling diagnostic inference to a desired trait. In Experiment 1, women changed their pain tolerance to provide positive evidence about the future quality of their skin, but judgments of effort claimed the opposite. This “effort denial” suggests that participants’ mental representation of their behavior was dissociated from their actual behavior, facilitating self-deception. Experiment 2 replicated the pattern in a hidden picture task where search performance was purportedly linked to self-control.     

A relational theory of self-deception

The authors argue that the fragmentary model of consciousness implied in the term ‘self-deception’ has provided the chief metaphor for explaining the apparent discrepancies that can arise between the evaluation of a motivated observer and the evaluation of a less interested external observer. Though self-deception models have explained these discrepancies in terms of both a dualistic opaque consciousness and in terms of cognitive and affective processes, all of these accounts seem to rest on the same essential fragmentation of the psyche. The authors argue that a relational model of consciousness, one that claims the indissolubility of cognition and affect, object and perception, and of past, present, and future can account for the apparent discrepancies involved in the paradigmatic cases of self-deception in a more parsimonious and phenomenologically faithful way than more objectivist and fragmented accounts of self-deception.     

The evolution and psychology of self-deception

In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception.     

The self-deception of the self-destructive

317 college students as respondents were measured for suicide proneness and self-destructive behaviors and were also asked questions about self-attitudes, value for life, beliefs about suicide and self-destruction, religiosity and dogmatism. Those who score high on suicide proneness and self-destructiveness do not tend to be the same people, and they differ from one another. Correlations and factor analyses suggest the Suicide Prone are aware of their tendencies and are influenced by their value for life and beliefs about suicide and self-destruction. The Self-destructive are tied to negative self-evaluations, are less aware of their self-destructive tendencies, and score significantly higher than the Suicide Prone on dogmatism. Belief structure of the highly dogmatic person may allow those who are self-destructive to deny negative self-attitudes and to be unaware of self-destructive behaviors which are inconsistent with their beliefs.     

Self-awareness and self-deception: a Sartrean perspective

In spite of the fact that many find Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of la mauvaise foi puzzling, unclear and troublesome, he remains a recurring figure in the debate about self-deception. Indeed, Sartre’s exposition of self-deception is as puzzling as it is original. The primary task of my paper will be to expose why this is the case and to thereby correct a recurrent misunderstanding of Sartre’s theory of consciousness. In the end, will we see that Sartre offers the following theory: self-deception is to be accounted for by assuming that there are intrinsically self-deceptive epistemic states. The latter are self-deceptive in so far as they claim certainty while nevertheless being accompanied by an inbuilt and incorruptible awareness of being unwarranted. For Sartre, developing this rather peculiar account of self-deception, is, as we will see, not primarily intended as an end in itself. Rather, Sartre thereby hopes to illuminate the nature of self-awareness as (i.) epistemically super-secure, (ii.) pre-reflexive, (iii.) non-positional and “embryonic” knowledge that (iv.) does not necessitate but can still ground epistemically super-secure reflexive knowledge, and (v.) that can replace Freud’s notion of unconscious knowledge. As an account of self-deception, Sartre’s suggestion, however, comes at a high price. Apart from the presuppositions Sartre makes in the theory of consciousness and intentionality, his account is deflationist with regard to local cases of self-deception.     

Inherent Self,Invented Self,Empty Self: Constructivism,Buddhism, and Psychotherapy

Constructivist and Buddhist approaches to counseling and psychotherapy share increasing popularity as well as similar epistemological assumptions and understanding of human dysfunction and its amelioration. These approaches can be seen as consistent with postmodern psychology, which is distinguished from a realist or foundationalist view. This article provides an overview of these 2 models and describes some of their implications for psychopathology and psychotherapy, including examples of specific therapeutic approaches drawn from each perspective that might mutually inform practitioners who wish to apply this perspective to a higher view of the human situation.