How do people know?

To fully understand processes of knowing and knowledge acquisition, it is necessary to examine people's understanding of their own knowing. Individual and developmental differences in what it means to know something, and hence in the criteria for justifying knowledge claims, have potentially wide-ranging implications. In providing support for a claim, young children have difficulty differentiating explanation of why a claim makes sense and evidence that the claim is true. Epistemic understanding progresses developmentally, but substantial variation remains among adults, with few adults achieving understanding of the complementary strengths and weaknesses of evidence and explanation in argument. Epistemic understanding shapes intellectual values and hence the disposition (as opposed to competence) to exercise intellectual skills. Only its most advanced levels support a disposition to engage in the intellectual effort that reasoned argument entails. The sample case of juror reasoning illustrates how epistemic understanding underlies and shapes intellectual performance.     

Evaluating evidence of psychological adaptation: how do we know one when we see one?

Evolutionary psychologists argue that human nature contains many discrete psychological adaptations. Each adaptation is theorized to have been functional in humans' ancestral past, and empirical evidence that an attribute is an adaptation can come from showing it possesses complexity, efficiency, universality, and other features of special design. In this article, we present a tutorial review of the evidentiary forms that evolutionary psychologists commonly use to document the existence of human adaptations. We also present a heuristic framework for integrating and evaluating cross-disciplinary evidence of adaptation. Pregnancy sickness, incest avoidance, men's desires for multiple sex partners, and an easily learned fear of snakes are evaluated as possible human adaptations using this framework. We conclude that future research and teaching in evolutionary psychology would benefit from more fully utilizing cross-disciplinary frameworks to evaluate evidence of human adaptation.     

What do we really know about witness preparation?

Witnesses often meet with an attorney or witness preparation specialist before trial to review, discuss, and sometimes modify the substance and delivery of their anticipated testimony. This process is commonly referred to as witness preparation. During witness preparation, witnesses are taught to use effective testimony delivery skills (e.g., verbal and nonverbal communication skills) so that they will be perceived as being credible and persuasive in the courtroom. Although social scientists know much about communication skills, credibility, and persuasion, few published studies have attempted to determine whether or not these factors can be modified through witness preparation training. The present article reviews the psychological literature pertaining to witness preparation and makes recommendations for needed witness preparation research.     

Procedures: do we really want to know them? An examination of the effects of procedural justice on self-esteem

This study examined the effects of procedural justice on state-dependent self-esteem using the group-value model and attribution theory to present competing theoretical perspectives. The group-value model predicts a positive relationship between self-esteem and fair procedures. In contrast, attribution theory suggests procedural fairness interacts with outcome favorability to influence self-esteem. Thus, fair procedures will result in higher self-esteem ratings than unfair procedures when the outcome is positive but will result in lower self-esteem ratings than unfair procedures when the outcome is negative. The results of a laboratory and field study provide converging evidence to support the attribution theory predictions. The results of a 2nd laboratory study suggest that self-esteem is influenced by outcome expectancies, not actual outcomes.     

Personal goals and well-being: how do young people navigate their lives?

This chapter examines development through different life transitions, such as educational transitions and transition to parenthood during adolescence to adulthood in the context of the life-span model of personal goals. According to the life-span model of motivation, four key mechanisms-channeling, choice, co-regulation, and compensation-play a key role in how young people navigate their life. The aim is to describe how the conceptualized key factors are helpful in understanding the changes from adolescence to emerging adulthood and later in the life course and related well-being.     

For love or money? What motivates people to know the minds of others?

Mood affects social cognition and "theory of mind", such that people in a persistent negative mood (i.e., dysphoria) have enhanced abilities at making subtle judgements about others' mental states. Theorists have argued that this hypersensitivity to subtle social cues may have adaptive significance in terms of solving interpersonal problems and/or minimising social risk. We tested whether increasing the social salience of a theory of mind task would preferentially increase dyspshoric individuals' performance on the task. Forty-four dysphoric and 51 non-dysphoric undergraduate women participated in a theory of mind decoding task following one of three motivational manipulations: (i) social motivation (ii) monetary motivation, or (iii) no motivation. Social motivation was associated with the greatest accuracy of mental state decoding for the dysphoric group, whereas the non-dysphoric group showed the highest accuracy in the monetary motivation condition. These results suggest that dysphoric individuals may be especially, and preferentially, motivated to understand the mental states of others.     

Cross-gender perceptions of facial attributes and their relation to attractiveness: do we see them differently than they see us?

Examination of perceptions of human facial attributes revealed that individual attributes are similarly perceived by males and females. However, patterns of attribute interrelationships differ as a function of gender of the face. Undergraduate students (N = 280) rated pictures of 40 male or female Caucasians on 12 physical attributes (e.g., nose size, face width) and overall attractiveness. The four sets of attribute ratings (defined by rater gender and picture gender) were submitted to principal components analyses, and five-factor solutions were found for each condition (accounting for about 76% of the variance). Comparisons of the four component solutions using confirmatory factor procedures revealed that male and female raters share one factor structure when rating photographs of female faces and another factor structure when rating photographs of male faces. Multiple regression analyses revealed that the patterns of attribute interrelationships were not "perceptual units" in the perception of attractiveness, and that different "rules" are used to assess the attractiveness of male and female stimuli faces. The importance of these results for models of facial attractiveness and interfacial similarity judgements are discussed.     

Examining the world of the depressed: do depressed people prefer others who are depressed?

Two studies were conducted to examine the interpersonal world of the depressed person. In Study 1, depression levels and perceptions of depressed and nondepressed people and their best friend were assessed to test the hypothesis that depressed Ss have best friends who are themselves more depressed than the best friends of nondepressed Ss. The hypothesis was confirmed, suggesting that depressed persons may prefer others who also tend toward depression. To examine this possibility, in Study 2 depressed and nondepressed college students spoke with one another in either depressed-depressed, nondepressed-depressed, or nondepressed-nondepressed pairs. It was found that depressed Ss felt worse than nondepressed Ss after speaking with nondepressed targets, but not after speaking with depressed targets. There were no differences in liking or in perceived similarity between the groups. Implications for the social world of the depressed person are discussed.     

Accuracy of person perception: do people know what kinds of impressions they convey?

Do people know what kinds of impressions they convey to other people during particular social interactions? In a study designed to answer this question, subjects interacted individually with three partners on each of four different tasks. After each interaction, participants reported their impressions of the other person's likability and competence. They also postdicted the impressions they believed they conveyed to the other person along the same dimensions. Accuracy was computed as recommended by Cronbach (1955) and by Kenny's (1981) Social Relations Model. Subjects could tell to a significant degree how the impressions they conveyed to their partners changed over time (time accuracy) and how they changed over time in different ways with different partners (differential accuracy). They could also tell how their competence was differentially perceived by different partners (dyadic accuracy). However, they were not very accurate at discerning which partners perceived them as most competent or most likable across all interactions (person accuracy). Subjects believed that they conveyed similar impressions of themselves to all of their partners, although actually partners evidenced little agreement with each other in their impressions of a given subject. The implications of these findings for symbolic-interactionist theories of the development of the self and impression-management perspectives on social behavior are described.     

Meta-perception for pathological personality traits: do we know when others think that we are difficult?

The self allows us to reflect on our own behavior and to imagine what others think of us. Clinical experience suggests that these abilities may be impaired in people with personality disorders. They do not recognize the impact that their behavior has on others, and they have difficulty understanding how they are seen by others. We collected information regarding pathological personality traits--using both self and peer report measures--from groups of people who knew each other well (at the end of basic military training). In previous papers, we have reported that agreement between self-report and peer-report is only modest. In this paper, we address the question: Do people know that others disagree with their own perceptions of themselves? We found that expected peer scores predicted variability in peer report over and above self-report for all 10 diagnostic traits. People do have some incremental knowledge of how they are viewed by others, but they do not tell you about it unless you ask them to do so; the knowledge is not reflected in ordinary self-report data. Among participants who expect their peers to describe them as narcissistic, those who agree with this assessment are viewed as being less narcissistic by their peers than those who deny being narcissistic. It therefore appears that insight into how one is viewed by others can moderate negative impressions fostered by PD traits.     

What do we know about how best to assess counsellor competence?

Issues of assessment of counsellor competence are becoming increasingly important as counselling becomes more professionalized and recognizable as a distinct profession. There is, however, a lack of systematic research into competence assessment in this field. The existing literature is discussed in terms of the issues involved in employing different sources of assessment, such as trainers, tutors, managers, supervisors, external assessors, clients, self and peers. Techniques of assessment are reviewed, including questionnaires, video and audiotapes, role play, examinations, learning diaries and computer simulations. Some suggestions are offered for increasing the validity of assessment judgements.     

Imitation by animals: how do they do it?

Imitation is of psychological interest in part because it has cognitive implications for how organisms view the behavior of others, relative to their own behavior. It implies the ability to take the perspective of another. For this reason, researchers have tried to distinguish imitation from other kinds of social learning and influence. In the two-action procedure, one of two response topographies is demonstrated, and the correlation between the topography demonstrated and the topography later used by the observer is a measure of imitation. Both pigeons and Japanese quail show response matching, despite the fact that from their perspective, their own behavior appears quite different from that demonstrated. Although imitation has been demonstrated in birds and several species of primates, researchers are still not certain what mechanisms underlie this ability.     

Preexisting knowledge versus on-line learning: what do young infants really know about spatial location?

Contemporary knowledge of infant cognition relies heavily on violation-of-expectation experiments. However, there are two ways to conceptualize what occurs in such studies. Babies may react to anomalous test events because of preexisting world knowledge. Alternatively, they may react because they have learned about events during the familiarization period. One way to distinguish these possibilities is to contrast familiarization with everyday versus anomalous events. In the studies we report here, we used this method to probe the nature of 5-month-olds' expectations about the locations of objects hidden in sand and later revealed. In Experiment 1, infants who initially saw everyday events did react to anomalous ones, as found previously, whereas infants who initially saw anomalous events did not react to everyday events. In Experiment 2, two alternative explanations of this pattern were ruled out. We conclude that by the age of 5 months, infants have expectations regarding the location of objects in continuous space.     

Why do people self-harm?

The accuracy of perceptions about self-harm that are presented in the psychological and psychiatric literature was assessed with a sample of self-harmers. A list of 20 statements containing ten myths and ten accurate statements about self-harm behaviour was incorporated into an internet-based questionnaire. Respondents (n?=?243) rated their extent of agreement with each statement. Factor analysis confirmed the a priori classification of statements as being accurate. Only one item, regarding the relationship of self-harm to previous sexual abuse, did not confirm a priori classification; this statement was considered by self-harmers to be an accurate perception of self-harm. It was concluded that this questionnaire could be a useful aid for group-work training with professionals who are involved in working with people who engage in self-harm.     

Do chimpanzees know what others can and cannot do? Reasoning about ‘capability’

Much recent comparative work has been devoted to exploring what nonhuman primates understand about physical causality. However, few laboratory experiments have attempted to test what nonhumans understand about what physical acts others are capable of performing. We tested seven chimpanzees’ ability to predict which of two human experimenters could deliver a tray containing a food reward. In the ‘floor’ condition, legs were required to push the tray toward the subject. In the ‘lap’ condition, arms were required to hand the tray to the subject. In Exp. 1, chimpanzees begged (by gesturing) to either an experimenter whose legs were not visible (LNV) or whose arms were not visible (ANV). Rather than flexibly altering their preferences between conditions, the chimpanzees preferred the ANV experimenter regardless of the task. In subsequent experiments, we manipulated various factors that might have controlled the chimpanzees’ preferences, such as (a) distance between experimenter and subject (Experiment 2), (b) amount of occlusion of experimenters’ body (Experiments 2 and 3), (c) contact with the food tray (Experiments 3 and 4) and (d) positioning of barriers that either impeded the movement of the limbs or not (Experiment 5). The chimpanzees’ performance was best explained by attention to cues such as perceived proximity, contact, and maximal occlusion of body that although highly predictive in certain tasks, were irrelevant in others. When the discriminative role of such cues was eliminated, performance fell to chance levels, indicating that chimpanzees do not spontaneously (or after considerable training) use limb visibility as a cue to predict the ability of a human to perform particular physical tasks. Thus, the current findings suggest a possible failure of causal reasoning in the context of reasoning about the use of the limbs to perform physical acts.