The Case for Pacifism

ABSTRACT I present the case for pacifism by formulating what I take to be the most plausible version of the idea of respect for human life. This generates a very strong, though not necessarily absolute, moral presumption against killing, in war or any other situation. I then show how difficult it is for this presumption to be overridden, either by the considerations invoked in 'just war'theory, or by consequentialist claims about what can be achieved through war.
Despite the strength of the moral case against war, people sometimes say that they have no choice but to fight. In the concluding section of the paper I attempt to identify the relevant sense in which this could be said, and I discuss briefly how this affects the case for pacifism.     

Cosmopolitan Pacifism

In this paper I argue that cosmopolitanism prohibits war and requires a global approach to criminal justice. My argument proceeds by drawing out some implications of the core cosmopolitan intuition that every human being has a moral status which constrains how they may be treated. In the first part of this paper, I describe cosmopolitanism. In the second part, Cosmopolitanism and War, I analyse violence, consider the standards cosmopolitanism sets for its justification, and argue that war fails to meet them. In the third part, Cosmopolitanism and Criminal Justice, I argue that cosmopolitanism implies a moral obligation to deal justly with human wrongdoing wherever it occurs. Cosmopolitan pacifism follows: war is prohibited, and a consistent global criminal justice system is required. In the fourth part, Why No Cosmopolitan Pacifists?, I consider why cosmopolitans tend not to identify as pacifists, and in the final part, Objections, I discuss some objections.     

Pacifism and Punishment

This article seeks to expose some of the implications of certain versions of pacifism for matters of criminal punishment, arguing that the plausibility of these versions of pacifism depend on the extent to which their implicit denials of certain central punishment-related concepts are themselves reasonable.     

Making Pacifism Plausible

The ethics of war is a minefield. It is a morass of conceptual unclarity, contentious assumptions, impassioned arguments, unexploded myths, and the injured defenders of indistinct positions. My aim is to help to make the minefield (conceptually) safe, and to assist that most vulnerable party to the dispute, the pacifist. In this paper I explore the possibility that, farfrom being naïve or outlandish, pacifism might follow from a widely-held and fundamental intuition about the moral status of persons [hereafter MSP]. In Section 1 I describe MSP, and suggest how we might draw implications from it about the ethics of war. In Section 2, I argue that a ‘presumption of war-ism’ has distorted debate in the ethics of war: to arrive at a balanced view, we need distinguish two sets of moral questions. First, can the development and maintenance of the means to make war be justified? Second, can the use of those means ever be justified? I sketch some strategies which might be developed in addressing the first question, concentrating on what MSP suggests might be wrong with setting up a war-machine, and with being or employing a soldier. In Section 3 I argue that even if considerations from Section 2 are insufficient to establish that we must dismantle our war-machines, facts about war which conflict with MSP do establish that we must never use them.     

Pacifism and Care

I argue there is no pacifist commitment implied by the practice of mothering, contrary to what Ruddick suggests. Using violence in certain situations is consistent with the goals of this practice. Furthermore, I use Ruddick's valuable analysis of the care for particular individuals involved in this practice to show why pacifism may be incompatible with caring passionately for individuals. If giving up passionate attach-ments to individuals is necessary for pacifist commitment as Ghandi claims, then the price is too hith.     

Seventeenth Century Quaker Pacifism

Book reviewed in this article:
Meredith Baldwin Weddle, Walking in the Way of Peace: Quaker Pacifism in the Seventeenth Century     

Pacifism and Moral Integrity

The paper has three parts. The first is a discussion of the values as goals and means. This is a known Moorean distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values, with one other Moorean item - the doctrine of value wholes. According to this doctrine the value wholes are not simply a summation of their parts, which implies a possibility that two evils might be better than one (e. g. crime + punishment, two evils, are better than either one of them taken separately). In this first part I will discuss peace as an end value, and war as a means value. The second part dicsusses briefly the issue of sincerity. The third, last and for me the most important part of the paper explores the issue of moral integrity in pacifism: could a pacifist preserve the integrity of the attacker, or, for that matter her own integrity, or must she destroy anyone’s integrity and dehumanize the attacker and also herself?     

Pacifism as a moral ideal

Conclusion In conclusion I would like to forestall one potential misunderstanding. As I have described it the pacifist ideal may seem so difficult to attain that it may seem closed off from the aspirations of ordinary human beings; and there is no doubt that few people are likely to attain this ideal to any great degree. This accords with our intuition that true, by which I think we mean paradigm pacifists, are rare indeed. But ideals can be sought, as well as attained, to greater or lesser degrees. So there are many ordinary people who regard themselves as pacifists because they avoid violence more scrupulously than most. On my analysis their claim might well be true.This paper was originally written for the Gandhi-King Society Meeting held in April of 1984 at the Western Division Meeting of the APA. I am greatful to Greg Rich, Albert Flores, and others who have helped me with their comments.     

On the Compatibility of Pacifism and Care

A mother's commitment to use violence if necessary to protect her children is not incompatible with pacifism, if pacifism is understood as the commitment to end war and war is understood as the use of violence as a political tool.     

Pacifism, Just War, and Self-Defense

This essay distinguishes two main forms of pacifism, personal pacifism and political pacifism. It then contrasts the views on self-defense of political pacifism and just war theory, paying special attention to notions of the state and sovereignty.     

Pacifism and Absolute Rights for Animals: a comparison of difficulties

ABSTRACT There are many points of similarity between the views of pacifists and those of people who argue that sentient non-human animals have absolute rights. Both positions ultimately rest on the assertion that the consequences of a violent action which is intended to preserve some lives by terminating others are more far-reaching than we generally suppose. When the total net consequences of such actions are considered, it can be seen that an ethic of complete non-violence might turn out to be optimific in the long run. Hence, absolutist moral positions of this sort should not be seen as irrational, or self-serving, and are worthy of respectful consideration even if we finally decide that we ourselves cannot accept them.
Until we have firm evidence as to whether non-violence has positive or negative net consequences, the choice between absolute and situationist ethical positions must remain one which depends very largely on personal character. Absolutist positions do serve a valuable 'conscience-pricking' function for the rest of us. They stand most chance of becoming more widely accepted if they are incorporated within a general ethic of positive helpfulness, rather than being presented as purely negative prohibitions.     

The Feminist Pacifism of William James and Mary Whiton Calkins

In this paper, I accompany William James (1842–1910) and Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930) in the steps each takes toward his or her respective proposal of a moral equivalent of war. I demonstrate the influence of James upon Calkins, suggesting that the two share overlapping formulations of the problem and offer closely related—but significantly different—solutions. I suggest that Calkins's pacifistic proposal is an extension of that of her teacher—a feminist interpretation of his psychological and moral thought as brought to bear on the problem of war. Calkins's brand of pacifism widens the scope of James's “moral equivalent of war” in a way that is consonant with feminist ideals of inclusiveness and social justice. I conclude by commenting on how James's and Calkins's pacifism can continue to be extended fruitfully in contemporary feminist pacifist theory and practice.