Barth's Criticisms of Kierkegaard – A Striking out at Phantoms?

Abstract:  Towards the end of his life, Karl Barth had occasion to review his and Christian theology's relation to the work of Søren Kierkegaard. Barth's 'settling of accounts' with Kierkegaard issued in three searching criticisms: first, that Kierkegaard's work succumbs to a dour legalism , second, that it promotes a pious individualism at the expense of the church as a community with social and political responsibility, and third, that it promotes a new fixation upon subjectivity , enthralled by the idea of the possibility of a self-founding and groundless gesture of faith. This article explores the extent to which these are in fact warranted criticisms of Kierkegaard's theology. After considering how and by whom Kierkegaard was mediated to Barth, each of the three criticisms is taken up in turn and tested against a reading of texts from Kierkegaard's 'second authorship'. While it appears that in significant respects Kierkegaard's theology is different to what Barth takes it to be, what does become plain is that Kierkegaard's account of the church is in fact almost as phantasmal as the image of the Danish thinker at which Barth himself tilts for the most part.     

Deliberative epistemology: Towards an ubuntu-based epistemology that accounts for a priori knowledge and objective truth

The field of epistemology is concerned with the nature, generation and justification of knowledge as well as the rationality of belief; addressing what makes beliefs justified, what it means to say that one knows something and how one knows it. It has been characterised by many debates such as those between rationalism and empiricism or those between absolute truth and relativism. In light of the often bipolar framing of such epistemic debates, the scholarship on ubuntu contains insights that help advance the idea of a “deliberative” epistemology, which is well positioned to resolve many such tensions. With this idea, which speaks to like-minded approaches that are couched within frameworks such as conversational philosophy and complementary reflection, I add the dimension of discourse (i.e. how we think, speak and therefore do) and show that by applying an alternative discursive lens, an ubuntu-inspired epistemology need not only account for experience and subjectivity, as typically presumed, but can also embrace a priori knowledge and objective truth.     

康德哲学与广松涉"交互主体的共同主观性"理论

广松涉认为,对近代认识论基础的问题式及其构成机制和局限进行反思,首先需要将着眼点放在康德哲学的问题式及其构成机制上。康德哲学的总的问题式就是在以先验逻辑学为基础的逻辑学、认识论和本体论“三位一体”的哲学构架中,探讨人的认识以及纯粹理性的先天综合判断及其能力何以可能。这一问题式潜含着一个意义非常重大的认识论问题——即“主体际共同主观性”问题．需要我们认真地加以研究。     

KIERKEGAARD, INDIRECT COMMUNICATION, AND AMBIGUITY

Notoriously, Kierkegaard claims his project to be one of indirect communication. This paper considers the idea that Kierkegaard's distinction between direct and indirect communication is to be accounted for in terms of ambiguity. I begin by outlining the different claims Kierkegaard makes about his method, before examining the textual evidence for attributing such a distinction to him. I then turn to the work of Edward Mooney, who claims that the distinction between direct and indirect communication is to be drawn in just this way. I argue that Mooney misinterprets the type of ambiguity Kierkegaard holds to be involved in indirect communication, and consequently ends up with an unsatisfactory account of Kierkegaard's method. Finally I seek to cast doubt on the very idea that ambiguity might do justice to the claims Kierkegaard makes about his project, and suggest that what is required to do so is a theological interpretation of his work.     

Epistemological Misgivings of Karen Barad’s ‘Posthumanism’

Karen Barad develops a view she calls ‘posthumanism,’ or ‘agential realism,’ where the human is reconfigured away from the central place of explanation, interpretation, intelligibility, and objectivity to make room for the epistemic importance of other material agents. Barad is not alone in this kind of endeavor, but her posthumanism offers a unique epistemological position. Her aim is to take a performative rather than a representationalist approach to analyzing ‘socialnatural’ practices and challenge methodological assumptions that may go unnoticed in some disciplinary fields. Yet for all the good of the challenge, Barad must support it with sound epistemological theorizing, theorizing that would apply to any methodology, whether that be sociological, historical, anthropological, or philosophical. Thus, where one might critique Barad on her assessments of sociological, historical, or anthropological incorporations of humans and the nonhuman, I critique Barad’s epistemology on its sense of objectivity and dismissal of the centrality of the human. I argue that Barad’s epistemology must retain a particular form of humanism, a humanism that stakes human subjectivity as the locus of rationality and objectivity, without which it creates intractable problems. To recuperate Barad’s challenge to contest assumptive distinctions while avoiding her epistemological problems, I offer some parting reflections.     

KIERKEGAARD'S "NEW ARGUMENT" FOR IMMORTALITY

This essay examines texts from Kierkegaard's signed and pseudonymous authorship on immortality and the resurrection, challenging the received opinion that Kierkegaard's account of eternal life merely connotes a temporal, existential modality of experience as a present eternity. Kierkegaard's thoughts on immortality are more complicated than this reading allows. I demonstrate that Kierkegaard's ideas on the afterlife emerge out of a context in which the topic had been vigorously debated in both Germany and Denmark for more than a decade. In responding to these debates, Kierkegaard establishes a "new argument" for immortality that stands as a robust account of the Christian resurrection and highlights the power of a personal God at the center of life, death, and post-mortem existence.     

弗洛姆的道德认识理论

弗洛姆的道德认识理论建立在对人的研究的基础上。认识善、恶以及道德规范,主要是对人性以及蕴含在人性中的可能性的认识。由于人是有生命的,处于不断的生成过程中,因此,对人的认识必须打破客观主义的认识模式,认识主体打破与对象之间的鸿沟,实现融合合一,以整个的内在体验对象,从而获得如对象本来所是的样子去认识对象。弗洛姆的体验性知识在强调人的主观情感投入到认识中的同时,认为认识对象是外在实在的,知识是普遍性有效的,因而是一种客观的认识。弗洛姆的道德认识理论与认识论的实践转向的暗相契合。     

Hans Loewald: A radical conservative

Hans Loewald's work was relatively marginalized in its day and it is little known outside the United States. It is, however, assuming increasing importance in American psychoanalysis. Loewald's attractiveness as a theoretician is due, in no small part, to his rigor and synthetic reach. He is able to accomplish the difficult feat of remaining non-sectarian and systematic at the same time. Indeed, Loewald's work contains an integrative vision that is unusual in today's fragmented psychoanalytic world. This author tries to show how Loewald attempts to reconcile many of the rigid oppositions that often become reified in analytic controversies: structural theory versus relational psychoanalysis, traditionalism versus revisionism, oedipal versus pre-oedipal, modernist versus postmodernist and hermeneutical versus scientific. The article examines how Eros, understood in terms of the psyche's synthetic strivings, plays a major role in Loewald's theory. The author also situates Loewald's position within contemporary psychoanalytic discussions of epistemology. These discussions tend to criticize the objectivism of modern science-and analysis in so far as it models itself on science-and stress countertransference and the subjectivity of the analyst. Loewald's argument, however, runs in the opposite direction. Because of his concern with the autonomy and individuality of the patient, he is concerned with the clinical dangers rising from an overemphasis on the subjectivity of the analyst.     

Analytic philosophy challenged. Scepticism and arguing transcendentally

Analytic philosophy has recently been challenged from a perspective advocated by Richard Rorty: this favours edifying philosophy against systematic philosophy comprising also analytic philosophy. In Rorty's presentation analytic philosophy is one more variant of the Cartesian—Kantian epistemology which, being committed to a permanent framework of inquiry rooted in our human subjectivity, implies the uniqueness of one conceptual scheme.Against this tenet I argue in two ways. First, I show that analytic philosophy of mind and language with the Fregean background and possible world semantics implies the pluralism of conceptual schemes on logical-conventionalist grounds. Secondly, I show that although analytic philosophy shares the claim for legitimation of a conceptual scheme with Kantian epistemology, it is critical of the latter in that the uniqueness-claim is refuted.In connection with legitimation the relation of analytic philosophy to scepticism is also discussed.     

Betrayal in teaching: Persuasion in Kierkegaard, theory and performance

This paper explores the relationship between Kierkegaard's theory of “indirect communication,” his employment of that method in the pseudonymous literature, and his explicit comments on the Teacher in Philosophical Fragments. My interest is principally in a pedagogical method able to serve as a solution to the problem of will formation, and so my assessment of Kierkegaard's theory and performance is essentially ethical in nature. I argue that there is at least an ambiguity, if not a contradiction, to be found in the above relationship and that as a result, in its current form, Kierkegaardean pedagogical devices do not appear to be able to offer an adequate solution.     

The Tacit–Explicit Connection: Polanyian Integrative Philosophy and a Neo-Polanyian Medical Epistemology

The purpose of this paper is to introduce an approach to clinical practice aiming to resolve the dilemma of choosing between a mechanistic and a phenomenological model. The approach is an extension of Polanyi's epistemology. Michael Polanyi (1891–1976), devised an epistemology of science which overcomes the problem of detachment, inherent in the mechanistic approach, and resolves the problem of subjectivity troubling phenomenologists. His epistemology is known as Personal Knowledge. An extension of this epistemology, a Neo-Polanyian proposal, is offered as a more successful model for clinical practice than previous suggestions addressing the dilemma.     

Genetic testing and human subjectivity

This article offers a brief overview of how methods of DNA testing are reframing what it means to be a living being in a living world. It is no longer the case that genetic technologies objectify life in such a way as to deny something essential to human subjectivity. The style of reasoning of the life sciences today is characterised by complexity, dynamism and emergence. This requires rethinking the relationship between technology, society and subjectivity. Genetic testing is a social and symbolic practice through which notions of identity and relatedness are reconfigured in terms of being genetically at risk. Far from reducing subjectivity to one's biological destiny, genetic technologies have consequences in terms of not only governing others to govern their risk wisely, but also aligning conduct with Western liberal values of autonomy, responsibility and choice. New pastors and gatekeepers of genetic information have assembled around these technologies where psychology plays a key role in facilitating autonomy and instilling a sense of genetic responsibility. Nevertheless, the increasing capitalization of genomics is moving genetic testing beyond these clinical enclosures of control into the domain of consumer choice, creating new forms of subjectification, citizenship and community.     

A Euthyphronic Problem for Kitcher's Epistemology of Science

Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science that purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief-regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing.     

Conceivability,Imagination and Modal Knowledge*

The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such criticism, an advocate of the modal insightfulness of the imagination must broaden the idea of what it is to be imaginable. I argue that this required broadening renders the imagination idle (in this context). Consequently, I distinguish two different accounts of the evidential basis of modal knowledge and present a more general argument that concludes that the very notion of conceivability should be eschewed in modal epistemology.     

Humanistic Constructionism in the Analysis of Subjectivity

A sociologist who has to confront him/herself with social change cannot avoid running into subjectivity, which is seen as a clear indicator of the most recent tendencies that are going through contemporary society. The demand for subjectivity, generically considered as self-consciousness and the need for self-fulfilment, is undoubtedly a distinguishing feature of our age. The central role this concept has gained within recent sociological literature, however, coincides with the rise of a postmodern sociology, which tends to put forward a precise image of subjectivity that I would call “minimalist.” Through its call for subjectivity, postmodern sociology intends to celebrate indeed a radical freeing from the ethical, social, and relational constraints that would have oppressed human beings during modernity, which was characterized by a high degree of sociocentrism. Although I share all the contentions that aim at underlining the positive achievements of subjectivity over the constrictions and the de-personalizing forces that distressed the so-called homo sociologicus, I think we need nonetheless to distance ourselves from this new reductionism, which levels out subjectivity to its postmodern conception, and to underline instead the existence of a dual aspect in contemporary subjectivity. As a matter of fact, along with its minimalist and disengaged aspect, conceptualized in the homo psychologicus, another possible expression, called “significant subjectivity” is emerging, which is a typical feature of the kind of human I propose to define civicus, a human who distinguishes him/herself because of the ability to become the bearer of an authentic form of responsible freedom. Consequently, we can identify two different aspects, at least, in contemporary subjectivity, notably a minimalist and a significant aspect.     

Knowledge,probability, and credibility

This paper concerns study of the credibility of human sources of evidence and its relation to the inferential value of testimony they provide. From a certain view of 'knowledge' in epistemology comes the suggestion that credibility assessment can be construed as a cascaded inference in which attributes of human source credibility are identified. Scholarship from evidence law in jurisprudence suggests an evidential basis for credibility assessment in terms of these attributes. Applying Bayes' rule to this cascaded inference offers a way of expressing and combining credibility-related beliefs in the process of assessing the inferential value of evidence.     

Psychology—Tensions between Objectivity and Subjectivity

The self is often defined in terms of its presentational appearances. This may easily end up in a denial of the internal aspects of the self, which is very often related to a tendency to avoid the tension between the internal and the external, but also between subjectivity and objectivity. In this paper this ambition is regarded in a historical perspective, in which Fichte and Hegel both represent attempts at abolishing the tension, whereas Kant and Kierkegaard represent the opposite. History shows that an eradication of the tension between subjectivity and objectivity implies a deterioration of psychology as well. Thus the conclusion is that psychology is primarily to be defined in terms of the tension between subjectivity and objectivity, which requires an accurate understanding and the inclusion of both of them.     

Kierkegaard on authority and leadership: Political logic in religious thought

This paper examines a political theory implict in Kierkegaard's critique of the novel Two Ages. To achieve that aim, it views Kierkegaard as a political radical relative to modern liberalism and aristocratic conservatism of the 1840's in Denmark, by juxtaposing him to Locke. Basic to the theory is a notion of individuality which relies on three interlocking concepts: will, equality, and autonomy. That notion in turn supports ideas of authority and leadership that throw further light on Kierkegaard's understanding of the relation between religion and politics and suggests what is central to the political logic operative in the critique in his publication Literary Review.     

Representation and cognitive science

‘Representation’ is a concept which occurs both in cognitive science and philosophy. It has common features in both settings in that it concerns the explanation of behaviour in terms of the way the subject categorizes and systematizes responses to its environment. The prevailing model sees representations as causally structured entities correlated on the one hand with elements in a natural language and on the other with clearly identifiable items in the world. This leads to an analysis of representation and cognition in terms of formal symbols and their relations. But human perception and cognition use multiple informational constraints and deal with unsystematic and messy input in a way best explained by Parallel Distributed Processing models. This undermines the claim that a formal representational theory of mind is ‘the only game in town’. In particular it suggests a radically different model of brain function and its relation to epistemology from that found in current representational theories.